King Theodore's Corsica
- Thread starter Carp
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If this plan succeeds, Genoa is likely to be a laughing stock internationally. A former great maritime power just folding to a colony which rebelled mere decades ago would reduce what little prestige Genoa still has from it's history to almost nothing.
The potential parallels might also lead to Britain taking a much more hardline stance towards potential US expansion.
The potential parallels might also lead to Britain taking a much more hardline stance towards potential US expansion.
On the one hand, the actual "Genoese Navy" is worthless - they have the same handful of galleys they've had since forever.
On the other hand, there's not that much difference between a merchant ship and a warship at this time - at least if you're talking about frigate/sloop sized vessels - and Genoa is a maritime state with a lot of ships and experienced sailors.
The question is really one of will. Given enough time and money, the Genoese could probably assemble a fleet of hired/requisitioned ships and win naval supremacy. But how much money is the Republic willing to spend for the sake of one town of 2,500 people, given that they've only just managed to pay off their war debt from the 1740s? How long are the merchants of Genoa willing to suffer privateering and skyrocketing naval insurance rates? Many Genoese merchants actively traded with the Corsicans during the Revolution because they valued profit more than patriotism, and after 1750 the merchants have even more influence in government than they did during the Revolution. How deep is their commitment to Bonifacio?
This could all go wrong pretty spectacularly, and the Corsicans are probably relying a little too hard on their stereotype of the Genoese as weak cowards who won't stand up to brave Corsicans. Yet if they can take Bonifacio - which is a big if, given that they've tried and failed twice so far - Genoa's willingness to continue dragging out the war is questionable. They can keep fighting, but will they?
The other factor to consider here is Sardinia-Piedmont getting frisky in Liguria. Especially given Corsica's potential willingness to make concessions and the ongoing big war, Sardinia might decide that a coup de main (or even just an attempt) against Genoa proper might be worth trying...
Before the siege, could you include a section on how Bonifacio has been doing under the Genoese these past few decades as the last outpost on Corsica? Has it benefitted from being the last colonial outpost and the only hub for Genoese ships outsode of Liguria? Have filogenovese from Calvi or the Fiumorbo moved over? Will it do better as a city under Corsica or Genoa? Under Corsica, its just another presidio albeit completely cut off from the mainland by mountains.
An actual attempt on Genoa itself would set off alarm bells all over Europe. Even if we assume that France and Spain are too busy to intervene - which is a big assumption - Austria definitely will. Just letting Genoa fall would be a huge insult to the emperor and would upset the balance of power in Italy. Any Austrian minister could tell you that if the Sardinian king is bold enough to take Genoa today, he'll be setting his sights on Milan tomorrow.
That said, the Sardinians launched a number of limited incursions into Genoese territory during the 17th and 18th centuries that resulted in some skirmishing and not much else. If Turin really wanted to they could apply pressure in this way, or at least give the Genoese some cause for concern. The benefits of such a provocation, however, might not be worth the potential diplomatic blowback.
We're not going strait into a war with the next update, but yes, I will consider this. Given that Bonifacio is effectively its own island anyway, I don't foresee that much of a change; its maritime economy was never particularly integrated with the rest of Corsica.
Under Corsican ownership it would probably just become a larger, more strategic Capraia - that is, an "island" fishing community - albeit filled with Ligurian-speaking citizens who consider themselves fully Genoese rather than Capraiesi who identify more with the Corsicans than anyone else. How well the city would do under Corsican rule depends a lot on what happens to those citizens. Do they leave? Are they forced out? After all, the constitution still says that no Genoese may reside in the kingdom...
Do you see any tangible benefit, besides a bit more fishing water? The state is already complete and functioning. Bonifacio doesnt pose an obstacle or a threat to the country, either. This could just be a costly adventure, after all Bonifacio's natural defenses and fortress are formidable, and Genoa has payed off its debt. If the Republic succeeds in sending over enough troops and supplies, it could be a stinging loss for the overconfident Corsicans.
The Sardinian factor may be key. If they join as a cobelligerent, Genoa is probably fucked. Even if Bonifacio is holding out against a Corsican siege, if Sardinia-Piedmont invades Liguria, they may be able to force Genoa to surrender Bonifacio in exchange for Corsica conceding the Isole delle Bocche.
Honestly I feel like Bonifacio is just plainly in trouble with a Corsican siege alone- remember during the revolutionary campaigns the commissioner/lieutenant of the fort was like utterly convinced that he would have to surrender to avoid starving to death in just a few weeks when the alliance with the British Navy fell apart and the Corsicans abandoned the siege. Now the Corsicans have their own navy, or at least something that would serve the same functional purpose in ferrying men and supplies around the sea instead of marching through the bare wastelands about Bonifacio, and in interdicting the privateers and supply convoys that are the most realistic response Genoa on the mainland can probably generate then and there.
True, the Republic has finally regained some of its footing by repairing its fiscal state and putting the public debt back in order- but there's no way that the more mercantile and professional classes of bourgeoise that have achieved this new project of Genoese government and pushed open the halls of power where the old sclerotic oligarchy had welded them shut did any of that by caring at all about military readiness and fighting trim, especially in Bonifacio of all places. It's likely that none of the defenses have been worked on at all since the Treaty of Monaco or at best that one war scare with the Genoese under King Theodore's later reign. Even with a completely uninspired and desultory campaign, I'm not sure Bonifacio has a way to last long enough to compel Genoa to just destroy all its financial recovery and actually try to build a real war effort. Their only real hope is diplomacy and Austrian intervention, I think.
True, the Republic has finally regained some of its footing by repairing its fiscal state and putting the public debt back in order- but there's no way that the more mercantile and professional classes of bourgeoise that have achieved this new project of Genoese government and pushed open the halls of power where the old sclerotic oligarchy had welded them shut did any of that by caring at all about military readiness and fighting trim, especially in Bonifacio of all places. It's likely that none of the defenses have been worked on at all since the Treaty of Monaco or at best that one war scare with the Genoese under King Theodore's later reign. Even with a completely uninspired and desultory campaign, I'm not sure Bonifacio has a way to last long enough to compel Genoa to just destroy all its financial recovery and actually try to build a real war effort. Their only real hope is diplomacy and Austrian intervention, I think.
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What I'm having trouble understanding is why Corsica is so incapable of supporting an army of 1,000 men. That is just over 0.5% of the population. It was emphasized how Frederico was a military man. Like comparing to France or Sardinia or Denmark adjusted for population, peacetime strength of ~2,000, nearly doubling in war seems reasonable.
And that is assuming Corsica doesn't go down the Prussia or Hesse paths, which seems a natural path to pursue for Prussian nobles given Corsica has a very militarized culture and at the start of the timeline already has an enormous number of people doing military service (admittedly in various foreign services, but better to have a rented out army than mere free-lancers). In which case those numbers easily can double. That of course would be ruinously expensive, but that is why you try to rent it out as much as possible. The disadvantage of course is that may get people annoyed at you. The advantage is you are a tough morsal and people will feel more interested in throwing you occasional bones. It may be a bit late for this model to fit nicely in this story, but something to think about when you rewrite.
Also, you might want to upscale the size of the French forces when you get to that in the rewrite. Like you talked about how you realized it was implausible for the Corsicans to repulse the French, but my impression was quite the opposite. Paoli's Republic had *24,000* French soldiers put it down. You did the job with 9,000. State capacity may not be Paoli-level, but it isn't OTL 1739 Corsica. Heck, even the Austrian intervention in 1732 was 12,000 men. I feel much more plausible would be for the 9,000 to fail, and then France decide it needs to save face, increase deployment well above the 10,000 men they promised and then utterly crush the Corsicans. I would go almost as far as to say the French deployment you have couldn't succeed. It would also increase your Corsica's diplomatic wiggle room. Like could the great powers invade if they wanted? Sure, but if the last intervention took nearly 20,000 men, they will be very reluctant to. And of course that is a bit much for Sardinia, who could make Corsica's life absolutely miserable, but would find it borderline impossible to do more than occupy the ports.
There is no doubt the Corsicans were very weak in the grand scheme of things, but I think you have a tendency to overstate how weak they were (a little ironic since you would tend to think an author would do the opposite for their pet country). This is not to say I don't love this timeline, I would go so far as to say it is one of the best timelines this site has produced. It seems like a good time though to make suggestions given you are currently rewriting it.
And that is assuming Corsica doesn't go down the Prussia or Hesse paths, which seems a natural path to pursue for Prussian nobles given Corsica has a very militarized culture and at the start of the timeline already has an enormous number of people doing military service (admittedly in various foreign services, but better to have a rented out army than mere free-lancers). In which case those numbers easily can double. That of course would be ruinously expensive, but that is why you try to rent it out as much as possible. The disadvantage of course is that may get people annoyed at you. The advantage is you are a tough morsal and people will feel more interested in throwing you occasional bones. It may be a bit late for this model to fit nicely in this story, but something to think about when you rewrite.
Also, you might want to upscale the size of the French forces when you get to that in the rewrite. Like you talked about how you realized it was implausible for the Corsicans to repulse the French, but my impression was quite the opposite. Paoli's Republic had *24,000* French soldiers put it down. You did the job with 9,000. State capacity may not be Paoli-level, but it isn't OTL 1739 Corsica. Heck, even the Austrian intervention in 1732 was 12,000 men. I feel much more plausible would be for the 9,000 to fail, and then France decide it needs to save face, increase deployment well above the 10,000 men they promised and then utterly crush the Corsicans. I would go almost as far as to say the French deployment you have couldn't succeed. It would also increase your Corsica's diplomatic wiggle room. Like could the great powers invade if they wanted? Sure, but if the last intervention took nearly 20,000 men, they will be very reluctant to. And of course that is a bit much for Sardinia, who could make Corsica's life absolutely miserable, but would find it borderline impossible to do more than occupy the ports.
There is no doubt the Corsicans were very weak in the grand scheme of things, but I think you have a tendency to overstate how weak they were (a little ironic since you would tend to think an author would do the opposite for their pet country). This is not to say I don't love this timeline, I would go so far as to say it is one of the best timelines this site has produced. It seems like a good time though to make suggestions given you are currently rewriting it.
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In terms of Bonifacio, I feel like it is equally possible for it to be a walk in the park or for a bloodbath. Given it is Genoa we are talking about and it is also a minor outpost, it could surrender as soon as you get an army. On the other hand a siege in a logistical dead zone when you don't necessarily have naval supremacy is also asking for a potentially very long siege, successful or not, with horrific casualties, many hundreds, even low thousands, mostly to disease if Genoa has a decent garrison with supplies. It will either be a glorious, clean operation or a pyrrhic victory at best, with not much middle ground.
Also it probably makes sense for one part of any peace agreement to remove the constitutional ban on Genoese. It was very understandable at the time, but that was decades ago, seems a bit tacky, and will interfere with any effort to normalize relations in the long run, which like Genoa won't have anything Corsica wants once it loses Bonifacio. Note that this doesn't necessarily mean the Genesee living in Bonifacio won't be less than gently nudged along.
Also it probably makes sense for one part of any peace agreement to remove the constitutional ban on Genoese. It was very understandable at the time, but that was decades ago, seems a bit tacky, and will interfere with any effort to normalize relations in the long run, which like Genoa won't have anything Corsica wants once it loses Bonifacio. Note that this doesn't necessarily mean the Genesee living in Bonifacio won't be less than gently nudged along.
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The 1767 Establishment provided for 1,110 regulars, plus an additional 480 auxiliaries (bombardieri and presidiali) who are part-timers paid significantly less. Federico added the provincial infantry, who in theory number 3,600 but only 300 are active at any one time, so we'll call that 300 "regulars" for cost purposes. By disbanding the Trabants, Theo only cut this by about 100 men, although these were the most expensive men in the army. So in 1780 the army has 1,310 "regulars" on paper, although regiments were pretty much never at paper strength in any 18th century army even during peacetime.
IOTL, the population of Corsica in 1787 was estimated by the Plan Terrier as being 150,000. The 1801 census claimed 163,896 people. ITTL, it seems reasonable to say the population has probably reached 160,000 by 1780 owing to a generally improved economic situation, immigration (Jewish and otherwise), and 20 fewer years of civil war. So that's about 0.8% soldiers (using paper strength), which does not include anyone in the navy (including, from 1781, a "marine company" which has not been mentioned yet), any of the part-time troops or off-duty provincials, or any local militia formations like the Capraia Company. By the standards of the time, that's a pretty robust military establishment for such a small population.
A comparable example might be the Duchy of Modena, which around 1760 at the time of the Seven Years' War had about 150,000 inhabitants. During the WAS the Duke of Modena authorized the raising of an army of "2,500 regular infantrymen and 3,100 militiamen," which is around 4% of the population; during the Seven Years' War the regular army was 3,700 strong, or nearly 2.5% of the population. But Modena was only able to do that because they were being subsidized, in the WAS by the Spanish and in the SYW by the Austrians (2,700 of those 3,700 men were garrisoning Austrian Lombardy during the SYW at Austria's expense). Once the war was over the army was cut to about 1,000 men.
Corsica has plenty of willing soldiers, but it's a poor country that has real difficulty collecting taxes. Modena was a richer state and still proved unable to raise a significant army without a subsidy from the great powers.
This was certainly what Federico wanted to do, but it hasn't worked out that well for a variety of reasons. Corsica's traditional military employers - France, Spain, Venice, Naples, Genoa - all preferred to recruit their foreign regiments directly from foreign populations rather than hiring pre-existing regiments from a foreign state like Hesse-Kassel. There were exceptions to this, like the French Deux-Ponts regiment furnished by Zweibrücken, but this was an expression of political dependency which isn't really feasible for a state attempting to be neutral. Britain made use of subsidy arrangements with neutrals, but generally only during war, and typically only with the Protestant German princes. Until now the only European war since the death of Theodore I (who had no interest in running a mercenary state) has been the Russo-Turkish war, which did involve a contracted Corsican regiment (although provided informally as to not upset the Danes).
It's worth noting that while Lautrec did succeed in defeating the Corsicans in battle, it would be inaccurate to say that he put down the rebellion with 9,000 men. The French were supported by the Genoese, who didn't do much fighting but did garrison territory; in 1768 the Genoese seem to have mostly withdrawn by summer, which required the French to garrison everything themselves. ITTL the southern part of the island was occupied by Austrian troops, and ultimately the rebellion was not completely defeated, as Rauschenburg held out until the French withdrawal. That said, it's certainly possible that the French could have sent more forces (even above what Genoa was willing to pay for), and that might make their ultimate victory at Ponte Leccia more plausible.
When writing this TL, I came very close to having Theodore "win" in 1740, at least to the extent that the French (and Austrians) were unable to dislodge him from the interior until the start of the WAS forced them to leave. In fact, that was the original plan I sketched out in the first post of the thread:
Carp said:
When I finally reached that point, however, I was concerned that an outright Corsican victory might seem to implausible, and it occurred to me that Theodore's travels in 1741-43, and particularly his ability to establish relationships and build support in Britain, might be advantageous for the ultimate victory of the rebels. It's not enough for them to merely "hold out" - they have to actually gain strong foreign (and ideally British) support during the WAS to pry the Genoese out of the remaining presidi. That didn't happen IOTL despite the fact that the rebellion was rekindled after the French departure; there were some fitful attempts to support the rebels, like Rivarola's expedition and the British bombardment of Bastia, but Ajaccio and Calvi remained untouched, and even Bastia didn't remain in Rivarola's hands for long.
I could very well be wrong about that. Perhaps Theodore succeeding in fighting off the French would have made him more credible in the eyes of the British even without his journeys in the early 1740s and his personal meetings with Carteret. I may, as you say, have underestimated the ability of the Corsicans to lead a successful defense of the interior. That would be a pretty substantial rewrite - if Theodore holds out in 1740, his travels abroad, the Colonna Mutiny, all the wrangling around the Regulation, the Battle of Morosaglia, and all the various Genoese interior campaigns between 1741 and 1744 never take place. Andergossen isn't murdered and Rauschenburg never makes his reputation as the one man who refused to surrender. Bastia and/or Ajaccio might fall more quickly. Provided that Theodore is still able to convince the British to help him, however, the ultimate course of the TL may not be greatly changed.
Edit: And just in case it wasn't clear, I absolutely do welcome suggestions, and you're quite right that it's a good time to make them. Thank you!
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I mean the final takedown of Paoli had ballooned to that size because Genoa had been officially voluntold that they were selling Corsica to His Christian Majesty and because this was now an affair of not just French honor fighting on behalf of an ally/dependent but the process of conquering Corsica for France, or at best Genoa actually being able to use that face-saving provision to redeem Corsica back to the Republic a couple decades later, after France did all the imperializing for them . That army was to end all rebellion for all time to build a new outpost of French civilization in the wilderness, while Boissieux and Lautrec had a relatively more limited more like Afghanistan-y mission to disperse the specific government and coalition of the rebels under the royalist camp and hold Genoa's hand as they themselves set to administering and extracting from her colony once again.
Plus I feel like Theodore would have to have a fundamentally different view of French invasion than Pasquale growing up as he did in the outer orbit of the French court and instilled with perhaps more appreciation for the might of a continental war machine and perhaps just a bit of cultural chauvinism. I think Theodore, whose fundamental source of power was as a gun-runner and comprador for the rebel notables and their middleman who can speak to the rest of Europe, would view being cut off as king of a hermit kingdom in the highlands much more of a failure than Paoli who had, more than charisma or patriotism or even word of honor, the bonds of blood in the clan networks as the seed for rebellion to germinate and sprout all over again across Corsica even through years of foreign occupation.
Plus I feel like Theodore would have to have a fundamentally different view of French invasion than Pasquale growing up as he did in the outer orbit of the French court and instilled with perhaps more appreciation for the might of a continental war machine and perhaps just a bit of cultural chauvinism. I think Theodore, whose fundamental source of power was as a gun-runner and comprador for the rebel notables and their middleman who can speak to the rest of Europe, would view being cut off as king of a hermit kingdom in the highlands much more of a failure than Paoli who had, more than charisma or patriotism or even word of honor, the bonds of blood in the clan networks as the seed for rebellion to germinate and sprout all over again across Corsica even through years of foreign occupation.
I think the 'winning' scenario is quite likely, and would work just fine for the British. I have a hard time seeing them as a practical matter refusing to work with someone successfully defeating the French. Especially since that makes them seem a lot more useful, especially if the Corsicans manage to keep regular forces. I totally understand why you don't want to do that though, both in terms of not 'wasting' your diplomatic fun and not adding more work in revising. Like the British failing to support Corsica in 1770 despite being at peace with France weakened the prime minister of the time. Supporting Corsica when they are a real force fighting the French during a war against France is not very challenging.
The simplest 'fix' might be to have the French increase their commitment a few thousand more men and increase the surviving resistance. Rauschenburg doesn't have to be literally the only one who stays fighting, just the one seen as the most successful and the 'leader' of the resistance. This is pretty plausible since as Herucalmo mentioned, Theodore is going to be much more reluctant than an actual Corsican to stay locked up in the interior especially if the ability to escape looks increasingly shaky.
Similar with the army size stuff, easy enough to slightly up. I think Prussia model is plausible and Fredrico would be tempted to align with someone if that would help pay for a large military, but that certainly can plausibly *not* happen. I do think Modena is not necessarily a perfect model though. Like military size involves cost per soldier and share of government spending on military in addition to revenue. Like Prussia spent roughly 1/3rd less per soldier and 85% instead of slightly over 50% of budget on military compared to France, which allowed it slightly over twice the army per capita. Compared to a small Italian state, Corsica will likely have lower revenue per capita, but it will spend a much larger share on the military (far lower court/noble/administrative spending) and have somewhat cheaper soldiers.
The simplest 'fix' might be to have the French increase their commitment a few thousand more men and increase the surviving resistance. Rauschenburg doesn't have to be literally the only one who stays fighting, just the one seen as the most successful and the 'leader' of the resistance. This is pretty plausible since as Herucalmo mentioned, Theodore is going to be much more reluctant than an actual Corsican to stay locked up in the interior especially if the ability to escape looks increasingly shaky.
Similar with the army size stuff, easy enough to slightly up. I think Prussia model is plausible and Fredrico would be tempted to align with someone if that would help pay for a large military, but that certainly can plausibly *not* happen. I do think Modena is not necessarily a perfect model though. Like military size involves cost per soldier and share of government spending on military in addition to revenue. Like Prussia spent roughly 1/3rd less per soldier and 85% instead of slightly over 50% of budget on military compared to France, which allowed it slightly over twice the army per capita. Compared to a small Italian state, Corsica will likely have lower revenue per capita, but it will spend a much larger share on the military (far lower court/noble/administrative spending) and have somewhat cheaper soldiers.
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It's certainly true that Theodore loses much of his attraction as king in that situation. His basic sales pitch to the rebels since the beginning was "I can get you arms and manage your diplomacy." At this point he has succeeded in getting them arms - and they probably keep a lot more of those arms if Corti and the interior never fall - but there aren't going to be any more supplies coming in with the French and Austrians holding the coast, and the joint invasion suggests that his diplomatic skills have been somewhat oversold. Theodore never really fought a guerrilla war (that was more Rauschenburg's thing) and it's not clear that he was really cut out for it or was willing to stick around and find out. Traveling through Europe and working his charms on statesmen and financiers seems much more suited to his personality than ruling as the "King of Corti" for the next four years.
Moreover, he had already done this once before (ITTL) in 1737, when his sojourn abroad resulted in the formation and arrival of the Syndicate Armada, a massive success for the rebel movement. Even if the interior held out, Theodore might still come to the conclusion that the best use of his time and energy would be to go on another "diplomatic tour" of Europe while leaving a regency at Corti.
In fact, that might be the best of all possible worlds - Lautrec fails to conquer the interior, meaning that the nucleus of the Kingdom is preserved, and at some point in 1741/42 Theodore goes abroad (presumably leaving his nephews and Gaffori in charge) to drum up more support and see if he can get on the radar of the Pragmatic Allies. If anything, he might be an even bigger celebrity in London after successfully "defeating" the French. That way I still get my "diplomatic fun," as @Hastings put it, but the Corsican state and army is preserved in some sense, and a lot less war materiel is lost.
A rewrite on that scale would be a considerable amount of work, but it's certainly something to think about.