Japan does not surrender after atomic bombs, how does the Soviet invasion of Manchuria go?

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Of note, the Southern route was covered by the Tunghua defensive redoubt.
No, it was not. That map only shows the area of responsibility of the various armies, not the region covered by the defensive redoubt. This map, on the other hand, does show that:

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The redoubt is the big circle in the Third Area Army's sector, well to the northwest of Sinjuin. There is a forward fall back position at Sinjuin (it's the little semi-circle you can see there), but the map indicates the defensive positions face due west and leaves the direct northern approach to the city uncovered.

Also, according to the JM-155 monograph:

"Nanam Divisional District Headquarters had lost contact with higher headquarters due to the severance of communications, and was unaware of the Imperial Rescript of 15 August. Its force continued to engage the enemy from the 16th to the 18th and by holding previously prepared defense positions, it checked the enemy's southward advance. On the morning of 18 August, General Nishiwaki decided to move his troops to the vicinity of Kilchu, about sixty miles south of Chongjin. At about 1800 hours, while en route, a staff officer of the Korea Administrative Defense Army joined the retreating columns, bringing word of the cease-fire order."​
Effectively, the Soviet advance into Korea was blocked on all routes.
Interesting, because the Soviet record of their advance shows they captured the region of Ranam-Guyok, which is to the southeast of Chongjin in that time period. Were the "previously prepared defense positions" to the south of this region? Because if so, then that would contradict the quotes statement they were still in engagement with the enemy. The fact that the quote states General Nishiwaki subsequently had to order a retreat another 55 miles to the southwest on the morning of the 18th, before he even heard about the surrender, likewise contradicts the claim Soviet forces were being held.

Or were perhaps these prepared defensive positions more to the north/northwest, due west of Chongjin? Because if so, then the various elements of the story can be reconciled and the retreat makes sense, because Nishiwaki needed to do it in order to avoid getting outflanked and cut off. But it still contradicts the claim that the Soviets were ultimately being held.
 
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No, it was not. That map only shows the area of responsibility of the various armies, no the layout of the defensive redoubt. This map, on the other hand, does show the redoubt:

View attachment 573498

The redoubt is the big circle in the Third Area Army's sector, well to the northwest of Sinjuin. There is a forward fall back position at Sinjuin (it's the little semi-circle you can see there), but the map indicates the defensive positions face due west and leaves the direct northern approach to the city uncovered.
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Interesting, because the Soviet record of their advance shows they captured the region of Ranam-Guyok, which is to the southeast of Chongjin. Were the "previously prepared defense positions" to the south of this region? Because if so, then that would contradict the claim they were still in engagement with the enemy. The fact that the quote states General Nishiwaki subsequently had to order a retreat another 55 miles to the southwest on the morning of the 18th, before he even heard about the surrender, likewise contradicts the claim Soviet forces were being held.
It's a pretty big assumption to take a withdrawal as a counter, given armies routinely did this to economize their forces without being unduly pressed by the enemy.
 
Right, and as can be seen there's a gap between the intermediate position at Sinjuin and the one at Fushun. Which is particularly odd given that the railway (and thus, presumably, the roads) from Mukden runs straight through that gap and then down behind the positions to Sinjuin. The fact they are listed as intermediate positions also indicates they were not intended to do more then impose a delay on any enemy before the forces withdraw to the Main Positions, which quite explicitly don't cover Sinjuin (and also apparently don't cover the approaches from the east/northeast, oddly enough, although perhaps that's more a limitation of the map just not showing that part of the fortified regions). So either way, the Southern Route (which also has historically tended to be the main route for invasions of Korea from the north) to the Soviets will be open.

It's a pretty big assumption to take a withdrawal as a counter, given armies routinely did this to economize their forces without being unduly pressed by the enemy.
You've got your cause-and-effect a little confused there: when one conducts a withdrawal to economize ones forces, that's routinely because the pressure of the enemy has made the maintenance of current positions uneconomical and therefore dangerous to hold onto.
 
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Right, and as can be seen there's a gap between the intermediate position at Sinjuin and the one at Fushun. Which is particularly odd given that the railway (and thus, presumably, the roads) from Mukden runs straight through that gap and then down behind the positions to Sinjuin. The fact they are listed as intermediate positions also indicates they were not intended to do more then impose a delay on any enemy before the forces withdraw to the Main Positions, which quite explicitly don't cover Sinjuin (and also apparently don't cover the approaches from the east/northeast, oddly enough, although perhaps that's more a limitation of the map just not showing that part of the fortified regions). So either way, the Southern Route (which also has historically tended to be the main route for invasions of Korea from the north) to the Soviets will be open.
The original contention was an attack from the North but that would be, as you note, blocked by the positions at Fushun. As for the gap between the lines, that is obviously covered by Mukden and the other blocking detachments, thereby also screening the East. No doubt, given their status as intermediate positions, they would be eventually abandoned but the keyword there is eventually. One important thing by Glantz: the Japanese expectation was the Soviet advance would collapse by late September due to the rains, delaying further offensive action until the following Spring.

You've got your cause-and-effect a little confused there: when one conducts a withdrawal to economize ones forces, that's routinely because the pressure of the enemy has made the maintenance of current positions uneconomical and therefore dangerous to hold onto.
Not necessarily; often logistics or the desire to straighten lines so as to create a strategic reserve is a cause. In the absence of compelling counter-evidence, I'm not inclined to accept that the Japanese withdrawal was done with anything other in mind other than that outlined.
 
The original contention was an attack from the North but that would be, as you note, blocked by the positions at Fushun.
Uh, no I did not note that. Indeed, I said quite the opposite by observing how the maps show quite clear how the Fushun positions terminate too far to the northeast to block the northern approaches to Sinjuin. Which it does. There’s a big old gap between the Sinjuin positions and the Fushun ones.

As for the gap between the lines, that is obviously covered by Mukden and the other blocking detachments, thereby also screening the East.
If you compare the posted two maps that actually show the fortifications Mukden’s fortifications in the first map are listed as incomplete. Given that the second map does not contradict this, as it does not purport to show how complete any of the positions are, and the IJA was in the process of abandoning the city as part of the withdrawal, that pretty much means that screen will cease to exist pretty soon, as it did OTL. With two full-strength Soviet mechanized division's about to show up and the garrison there was one of the Japanese formations that was only considered 15% of it's nominal combat effectiveness, so it was never going to last very long.

Now without the Japanese surrender, the forces of 6th Guards Tank Army are obviously going to have to pause after taking Mukden until the Trans-Baikals left-wing and the 2nd Far Eastern Front catch up and repair the main rail links coming off theTrans-Siberian to the north enough to bring in fuel. The 2nd Far Eastern seems to have been doing better on the rail repair front then the Trans-Baikal, but either way it’ll give them the fuel to then strike down the Mukden-Sinjuin railway, outflanking the Sinjuin fortified region to roll it up from the North.

No doubt, given their status as intermediate positions, they would be eventually abandoned but the keyword there is eventually. One important thing by Glantz: the Japanese expectation was the Soviet advance would collapse by late September due to the rains, delaying further offensive action until the following Spring.
Sure. And the Japanese expectation was that the Soviets couldn’t move tank armies across the Greater Khingan Mountain Range. How did that work out for them again?

Not necessarily; often logistics or the desire to straighten lines so as to create a strategic reserve is a cause.
Never heard of any case where a strategic withdrawal was conducted for purely logistical reasons. The creation of strategic reserves, yes, but that’s generally because the existing strategic reserves have been used up responding to enemy pressure and is generally done by withdrawing from quiet parts of the line that would crumble to a renewed enemy offensive. In this case, General Ishikawa wouldn’t be creating any sort of strategic reserve with his withdrawal (since he’d just have to engage the Soviets again I’ve they caught up) and there is no mention of logistical reasons (or, indeed, any reasons at all).

In the absence of compelling counter-evidence, I'm not inclined to accept that the Japanese withdrawal was done with anything other in mind other than that outlined.
Given that you have provided zero evidence as to the reason that General Ishikawa ordered his withdrawal, it’s pretty obvious that your inclinations are built on what you simply want to have been the case, rather then actual consideration as to why. It's likewise notable that if General Ishikawa keeps falling back 60 kilometers every couple of days, then that's hardly going to stop the Soviet advance down the eastern side of the peninsula, regardless of why precisely he's falling back.
 
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Uh, no I did not note that. Indeed, I said quite the opposite by observing how the maps show quite clear how the Fushun positions terminate too far to the northeast to block the northern approaches to Sinjuin. Which it does. There’s a big old gap between the Sinjuin positions and the Fushun ones.
Again, I was responding to the idea that the position could be attacked from the North; first, they'd have to go through Fushan. That was the original statement, no?

If you compare the posted two maps that actually show the fortifications Mukden’s fortifications in the first map are listed as incomplete. Given that the second map does not contradict this, as it does not purport to show how complete any of the positions are, and the IJA was in the process of abandoning the city as part of the withdrawal, that pretty much means that screen will cease to exist pretty soon, as it did OTL. With two Soviet mechanized division's about to show up, it was never going to last very long.
I honestly see nothing to suggest the fortifications were still not formidable but, even taking that at face value, see the Battle of Mutanchiang.

Now without the Japanese surrender, the forces of 6th Guards Tank Army are obviously going to have to pause after taking Mukden until the Trans-Baikals left-wing and the 2nd Far Eastern Front catch up and repair the main rail links coming off theTrans-Siberian to the north. The 2nd Far Eastern seems to have been doing better on the rail repair front then the Trans-Baikal, but either way it’ll give them the fuel to then strike down the Mukden-Sinjuin railway, outflanking the Sinjuin fortified region to roll it up from the North.
How, exactly, is the 6th Guards supposed to take Mukden without fuel? Forward reconnaissance elements didn't reach it until August 19th, after resistance had ended for days, and thereafter they had to use surrendered Japanese trains just to reach their occupation objectives. As for the Japanese:

2. The Thirtieth Army will destroy the enemy, utilizing prepared positions in the following areas: a. The first line of defense (advance positions) will be the principal cities along the Dairen-Hsinking Railway; particularly, Hsinking and Mukden must be secured. b. The second line or intermediate positions will be the line connecting Hailung, Shanchengchen, Chingyuan, and the general vicinity of the uplands west of the Chilin-Mukden Railway, as well as the area of Penchihu, Fengcheng, Antung, and points on the Antung-Mukden Railway. c. Third line positions (main positions) will be the line connecting Chinchuan, Liuho, Hsinpin, and Huanjen. (See Map No 2.)​

Further:

The seriousness with which General Ushiroku viewed the situation and the firm determination he had to fight the decisive battle in the railway zone were indicated as late as 8 August to Lieutenant General Shojiro Iida, when the latter was departing for Yenchi to assume command of the newly formed Thirtieth Army. General Ushiroku told General Iida: I will defend Mukden to the last, and I want you to defend Hsinking to the last.

Sure. And the Japanese expectation was that the Soviets couldn’t move tank armies across the Greater Khingan Mountain Range. How did that work out for them again?
Pretty well, given the exploitation force exhausted itself and failed to do anything really decisive. Indeed, as Glantz notes their logistics were already borderline:

The most serious difficulties the Soviets encountered were in the realm of logistics. The Soviets had foreseen problems and done all in their power to alleviate them. The logistical factor was simply part of the risk the Soviets took. Fuel shortages headed the list of problems. Even before it crossed the Grand Khingan Mountains, the 6th Guards Tank Army was low on fuel. After the crossing, the chronic problem persisted until the day the unit arrived in Mukden. Any resolute-or even token-Japanese resistance could have compounded 6th Guards Tank Army's difficulty regarding fuel and ammunition resupply. Other units, including the 39th Army and 35th Army, experienced similar problems on a lesser scale.​

Never heard of any case where a strategic withdrawal was conducted for purely logistical reasons. The creation of strategic reserves, yes, but that’s generally because the existing strategic reserves have been used up responding to enemy pressure and is generally done by withdrawing from quiet parts of the line that would crumble to a renewed enemy offensive. In this case, General Ishikawa wouldn’t be creating any sort of strategic reserve with his withdrawal (since he’d just have to engage the Soviets again I’ve they caught up) and there is no mention of logistical reasons.
I can think of several instances where an army was reigned in due to logistical concerns or, as noted, a desire to shorten the line so as to make it more defendable. In fact, this is rather common, no?

Given that you have provided zero evidence as to the reason that General Ishikawa ordered his withdrawal, it’s pretty obvious that your inclinations are built on what you simply want to have been the case, rather then actual consideration as to why.
Then the proper thing to do is cite something in retort, not make an assumption. As it were, my speculations are based off what the documentation says, yours is based solely off speculation with no citations provided. I welcome you to actually post something, given your lack thereof so far.
 
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Whatever fortifications the Japanese prepared will be blown away by Soviet 152mm howitzers.
AFAIK the only fortification that could withstand Soviet 203mm and 152mm howitzers were German flakturms.
The Japanese in Manchuria have nowhere near the same level of fortifications.

In addition, Katyusha rockets will be raining by the hundreds if not thousands on those Japanese infantry.
IMHO the Kwangtang Army is going to have a short and exciting lifespan facing the Soviets.
 
The Japanese Army had several major disadvantages
1] resupply from Japan was not going to happen
2] most of their heavy weapons and automatic weapons have been sent back to Japan to repel an American invasion
3] their Air Force was depleted in many of their aircraft had been sent back to Japan
4] they were experiencing a fuel shortage
 
Again, I was responding to the idea that the position could be attacked from the North; first, they'd have to go through Fushan. That was the original statement, no?
But they wouldn't? Even a brief glimpse at the map shows a Soviet advance towards Sinjuin from the north would have to abruptly and suddenly somehow swing due east in order to make contact with the Fushan positions and the swing back around to the south to continue on to Sinjuin. I mean seriously, how do you look at this:

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And somehow get this:

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As anyone who looks at this can tell you, it's completely nonsensical when you can just do this:

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Fushun is in no way required for an advance on Sinjuin. I mean, if you are trying to take a ultra-literalist view of my statement "advancing from the north", then the Soviets would be able to outflank and bypass both the Fushun and Sinjuin positions by passing through the gap between the Fushun and Chingyuan positions like so:

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Or, hell, since the Soviets will have a surfeit of forces available when they finish clearing out the central plains...

Positions.png


There, exploit the gaps in the defense lines to pincer the Fushun positions and pin the Sinjuin positions against the sea, then exploit inward to overrun the main positions at Tunghua before the Japanese can retreat from the intermediate positions. This is without regard for whatever the fortification situation is further to the northwest.

Actually nevermind that, because I doublechecked and got the full map of the region rather then that cropped one and found that another thrust could likewise pincer the Chingyuan-Hailung positions:

Positions.png


I'm really honestly baffled as to why the Japanese intermediate positions don't cover most of the rail routes. Generally, the road networks also run with the rail ones so they make a natural path of advance for any attacking force. The lack of coverage for the southern and northernmost railroads is quite strange given the opportunities the overall layout opens up for an attacking force.

I honestly see nothing to suggest the fortifications were still not formidable
Well, I haven't seen anything to suggest the fortifications were formidable. What evidence do you have for that?

but, even taking that at face value, see the Battle of Mutanchiang.
Mutanchaing? You mean where the Soviets took the city in four days with only ~3.5% losses to their total forces while the Japanese lost ~41.6% of their total forces? And all in terrain where the Soviet forces were channeled into relatively predictable approach routes rather then the wide-open Central Manchurian Plain where the Soviet forces could freely wheel in from any direction?

How, exactly, is the 6th Guards supposed to take Mukden without fuel? Forward reconnaissance elements didn't reach it until August 21, after resistance had ended for days, and thereafter they had to use surrendered Japanese trains just to reach their occupation objectives.
6th Guards Army had fuel to reach and take Mukden, as historically that is precisely what it did (and it was the main force, not reconnaissance elements which took the city on August 21st). That it did not have the fuel to take another 362 kilometer march across the countryside all the way to Port Arthur and had to get there by railway is in no way evidence that it lacked the fuel for the tactical maneuvering to take Mukden. That it had the fuel for the operational march to Mukden is pretty self-evident by the fact it did so with the actual march to Mukden.

As for the Japanese:

2. The Thirtieth Army will destroy the enemy, utilizing prepared positions in the following areas: a. The first line of defense (advance positions) will be the principal cities along the Dairen-Hsinking Railway; particularly, Hsinking and Mukden must be secured. b. The second line or intermediate positions will be the line connecting Hailung, Shanchengchen, Chingyuan, and the general vicinity of the uplands west of the Chilin-Mukden Railway, as well as the area of Penchihu, Fengcheng, Antung, and points on the Antung-Mukden Railway. c. Third line positions (main positions) will be the line connecting Chinchuan, Liuho, Hsinpin, and Huanjen. (See Map No 2.)​

Further:

The seriousness with which General Ushiroku viewed the situation and the firm determination he had to fight the decisive battle in the railway zone were indicated as late as 8 August to Lieutenant General Shojiro Iida, when the latter was departing for Yenchi to assume command of the newly formed Thirtieth Army. General Ushiroku told General Iida: I will defend 3Mukden to the last, and I want you to defend Hsinking to the last.
Yes, General Ushiroku disobeyed the orders from higher command and caused confusion amidst his own forces in doing so in a classic case of Japanese insubordination derailing their own plans. However, that does not change the fact that said forces were inadequate for the task facing them. That he compounded this error by concentrating his forces north and south of Mukden (Glantz, page 91) rather then within it or on the avenue of 6th GTA's approach from the east means it wouldn't be appropriately set-up to contest the 6th GTA's assault very much.

Pretty well, given the exploitation force exhausted itself and failed to do anything really decisive. Indeed, as Glantz notes their logistics were already borderline:

The most serious difficulties the Soviets encountered were in the realm of logistics. The Soviets had foreseen problems and done all in their power to alleviate them. The logistical factor was simply part of the risk the Soviets took. Fuel shortages headed the list of problems. Even before it crossed the Grand Khingan Mountains, the 6th Guards Tank Army was low on fuel. After the crossing, the chronic problem persisted until the day the unit arrived in Mukden. Any resolute-or even token-Japanese resistance could have compounded 6th Guards Tank Army's difficulty regarding fuel and ammunition resupply. Other units, including the 39th Army and 35th Army, experienced similar problems on a lesser scale.​
Yes, resolute or token Japanese resistance would have seriously held up 6th Guards Tank Army from reaching Mukden. But seeing as Glantz notes that there were no Japanese units in the way to seriously hold up 6th Guards Tank Army, then that is academic with or without the surrender. Nor is there any evidence in the work for the claim that the exploitation force had exhausted itself.

In any case, as to the original point, the mere fact that the 6th GTA was able to cross the Greater Khingan Mountain Ranges and penetrate into the Central Manchurian Plains was in direct contradiction of Japanese expectations who held that the Khingan Mountain Ranges were impassable and that in fact Japanese expectations about them did not, in fact, work out "pretty well" for them. Hence, that they expected the Soviets to have to cease operations at the end of September in no way indicates that said expectations were realistic.

I can think of several instances where an army was reigned in due to logistical concerns or, as noted, a desire to shorten the line so as to make it more defendable. In fact, this is rather common, no?
I acknowledged the latter case, but again I can think of no instance of a strategic withdrawal that was done purely out of logistical concerns, at least not in the 20th century. I'm also curious as to how Ishikawa thought he would somehow shorten the line by withdrawing from a valley that is around 5 miles wide to one that is around 7-10 miles wide. If he couldn't halt the Soviets on the former frontage with his forces, he certainly won't be able too on the latter.

Plus, I can't help but notice that if Ishikawa isn't able to logistically maintain his position, which was south of the Tunghua region, that speaks for bad things for the logistics of the larger Japanese forces who would have to defend it.

Then the proper thing to do is cite something in retort, not make an assumption.
Maybe once you substantiate your claim in this regard...?

As it were, my speculations are based off what the documentation says, yours is based solely off speculation with no citations provided.
Erm, that is a horribly dishonest portrayal of how the conversation evolved, which is equally baffling since anyone can look at our discussions. Both of our speculations is based off the document you provided, which says pretty clearly that General Ishikawa commenced a 60 mile retreat on the 18th, two days after the city of Chongjin fell. You are also wrong that I cited nothing in retort: in fact, I threw in an additional citation noting that on the day of the 17th, the Soviets managed a 5 mile advance (the distance required to advance from Chongjin to secure Ranam-Guyok, at the minimum) despite somehow being "halted", but admitted I'm uncertain how much that relates to whatever defensive position General Ishikawa's forces were holding. Ultimately, you have cited nothing to substantiate your speculations as to why the retreat occurred any more than I have.

EDIT: An additional interesting thing to note here from that other thread:

All we knew was that the main forces of the First Front of the Kwantung Army were falling back on Harbin after their defeat at Mutanchiang. They formed a very considerable force."
I only just realized that the geographic details here are interesting, because it means the Japanese forces that retreated from Mutanchiang were not falling back towards Tunghua, which was to the southeast, but towards Harbin, which was to the northeast. This means, in fact, that not only were the main Japanese forces retreating away from the Tunghua redoubt, they were also retreating deeper into the forming pocket as the 2nd Far East Front's main axis of advance was generally angled eastward towards the Changchun-Harbin direction. In other words, the entire Japanese defense plan on a strategic level was at threat of being pre-empted by the Soviet offensive because the bulk of it's forces were retreating in the wrong direction.

The fact that the Japanese estimated that the Battle of Mutanchiang reduced their forces effectiveness by up to half their pre-battle rate is also suggestive of significant abandonment of material and supplies.

EDIT2: AH-HA! Found the cite on the state of Japanese fortifications!

"As regards the fortification of Manchurian cities and towns which were scattered in an area of extensive depth and would constitute the strongpoints for sustained warfare, and also as regards the construction of positions in the Tunhua and Antu sectors which would constitute the redoubt for the Area Army, no work had been
begun by the close of July because of the shortage of manpower and materials. The only thing completed by this time was the reconnaissance of the intended locations for positions." -JM-154, Page 47.

So yeah, this discussion about the state of the intermediate positions and the is somewhat academic because the only work the Japanese had done by that point was survey work. The Tunghua redoubt was in a bit better shape, but not by much:

"Construction of fortifications in the newly-designated [redoubt] positions to be used by main forces in accordance with the operational plan was begun in March 1945. In carrying out this work emphasis was placed on underground defenses in view of the enemy's superior capability for artillery and air bombardment. Although this work was pushed, it was hindered by the shortage of mason's tools and dynamite, and recuired more time than was expected. By the time the Soviet Union entered the war, although almost all caves for emplacing large guns had been completed in each position, other important installations such as communication trenches, field positions, and, what was particularly important, tank obstacles, were in imperfect condition." -Page 46-47
 

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But they wouldn't? Even a brief glimpse at the map shows a Soviet advance towards Sinjuin from the north would have to abruptly and suddenly somehow swing due east in order to make contact with the Fushan positions and the swing back around to the south to continue on to Sinjuin. I mean seriously, how do you look at this:

View attachment 573508

And somehow get this:

View attachment 573571

As anyone who looks at this can tell you, it's completely nonsensical when you can just do this:

View attachment 573573

Fushun is in no way required for an advance on Sinjuin. I mean, if you are trying to take a ultra-literalist view of my statement "advancing from the north", then the Soviets would be able to outflank and bypass both the Fushun and Sinjuin positions by passing through the gap between the Fushun and Chingyuan positions like so:

View attachment 573574

Or, hell, since the Soviets will have a surfeit of forces available when they finish clearing out the central plains...

View attachment 573583

There, exploit the gaps in the defense lines to pincer the Fushun positions and pin the Sinjuin positions against the sea, then exploit inward to overrun the main positions at Tunghua before the Japanese can retreat from the intermediate positions. This is without regard for whatever the fortification situation is further to the northwest.

Actually nevermind that, because I doublechecked and got the full map of the region rather then that cropped one and found that another thrust could likewise pincer the Chingyuan-Hailung positions:

View attachment 573584

I'm really honestly baffled as to why the Japanese intermediate positions don't cover most of the rail routes. Generally, the road networks also run with the rail ones so they make a natural path of advance for any attacking force. The lack of coverage for the southern and northernmost railroads is quite strange given the opportunities the overall layout opens up for an attacking force.

So, in other words, they either have to go through Fushan or Mukden, which are defended. Your alternative strategies are not present in the STAVKA planning or, indeed, in the operational course of events; the obvious reason for this is that this exposes Soviet forces to defeat in detail by encirclement. Your original statement was an attack from the North, which would require an advance through Fushan, not a two stage assault first from the East through Mukden.

Well, I haven't seen anything to suggest the fortifications were formidable. What evidence do you have for that?
From JM-155:

The Area Army plan was to meet the Soviet forces along the Hsinking-Mukden segment of the Dairen-Hsinking Railroad. Therefore, the division at once undertook the construction of field fortification around Mukden, but in doing so ran into some problems relative to the type of fortifications. The Area Army's fortification plan for Mukden in effect up to this time was called "Nago," and stipulated that defenses be constructed of concrete and steel. Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the Area Army, in view of the urgency of the situation, hastily revised this plan and prescribed that the fortifications be constructed of wood instead of the more durable materials in order 168 to hasten completion. The division commander requested that the original "Nago" plan be implemented, but the Area Army commander rejected his request on the grounds that this would be impracticable under the urgent circumstances.​
It was finally decided to start work in accordance with the revision and to reduce the radius of the fortification area.3 3 The construction of antitank obstacles along the main roads leading to Mukden was begun on 11 August, as was also the construction of firing positions in the suburbs and the open areas of the city. Third Area Army gave the division commander the additional duty of commander of the Mukden Defense Sector, and for this purpose placed all units and military offices in the Mukden area under his jurisdiction. On 12 August the Area Army assigned a second staff officer to General Nakayama's staff in view of the additional load. 34​

Mutanchaing? You mean where the Soviets took the city in four days with only ~3.5% losses to their total forces while the Japanese lost ~41.6% of their total forces? And all in terrain where the Soviet forces were channeled into relatively predictable approach routes rather then the wide-open Central Manchurian Plain where the Soviet forces could freely wheel in from any direction?
Mutachiang, which even Glantz concedes was a Japanese defensive success, which inflicted 11,000 casualties upon the Soviets and the IJA forces still managed an effective withdraw in which they remained a potent combat force according to to the Soviets themselves?

6th Guards Army had fuel to reach and take Mukden, as historically that is precisely what it did (and it was the main force, not reconnaissance elements which took the city on August 21st). That it did not have the fuel to take another 362 kilometer march across the countryside all the way to Port Arthur and had to get there by railway is in no way evidence that it lacked the fuel for the tactical maneuvering to take Mukden. That it had the fuel for the operational march to Mukden is pretty self-evident by the fact it did so with the actual march to Mukden.
This is false, however:



Further, on the same page:

On 13 August this army resumed the offensive by pushing reconnaissance units towards Tungliao and Taonan. A reinforced tank or mechanized brigade from each corps followed the reconnaissance units as each corps's forward detachment. All available fuel in each corps was put at the disposal of these forward detachments. Other units remained in static positions awaiting fuel. At nightfall on the fourteenth, after a march hindered by wet weather and by Japanese kamikaze attacks, the forward detachment of the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps occupied Taonan, while that of the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps continued to drive southeastward toward Tungliao and Kailu.​

All but a few brigades were static by the 14th. Indeed, as Glantz notes specifically on the matter of Mukden:

The gap between the two units was more than 100 kilometers wide. Reconnaissance units (motorcycle battalions), assisted by flights of reconnaissance aircraft, operated between the corps. On 16 August the forward detachments of 5th Guards Tank Corps and 9th Guards Mechanized Corps secured Tungliao and Kaitung, respectively. On the nineteenth the main force closed in on the two cities. From Tungliao the 5th Guards Tank Corps and 9th Mechanized Corps marched in single column along the railroad bed in what was essentially an administrative march on Mukden. On 21 August 6th Guards Tank Army units occupied both Changchun and Mukden, two days after the arrival of Soviet air-landed detachments at both locations. Because of a shortage of fuel, further movement of the 6th Guards Tank Army to Port Arthur and Dalny was by rail.28​

So here we find that the actual advance on Mukden was administrative in nature, which makes sense given the Japanese had ceased resistance on the 14th/15th. Even before that, fuel shortages had already immobilized all but a brigade from each corps and even keeping them supplied was a stretch. Note also that Glantz specifically says units, not the entire force of 6th Guards Tank Army. This is consistent and explains Soviet Operational Art by John Elg, which states only forward reconnaissance detachments had reached Mukden by August 21.

Yes, General Ushiroku disobeyed the orders from higher command and caused confusion amidst his own forces in doing so in a classic case of Japanese insubordination derailing their own plans. However, that does not change the fact that said forces were inadequate for the task facing them. That he compounded this error by concentrating his forces north and south of Mukden (Glantz, page 91) rather then within it or on the avenue of 6th GTA's approach from the east means it wouldn't be appropriately set-up to contest the 6th GTA's assault very much.
As already cited, fortifications were being built on all roads and the concentration on the North and South was in response to the major roads passing through there. The 6th Guards Tank is only going to be able to shuttle in two corps for the fight, meaning it's going to be a 1:1 fight with very little in the way of armor and artillery to help the Soviets.

Yes, resolute or token Japanese resistance would have seriously held up 6th Guards Tank Army from reaching Mukden. But seeing as Glantz notes that there were no Japanese units in the way to seriously hold up 6th Guards Tank Army, then that is academic with or without the surrender. Nor is there any evidence in the work for the claim that the exploitation force had exhausted itself.
Beyond the fact the Japanese had division level assets in and around Mukden, had been constructing fortifications for nearly two weeks and the Soviets can only shuttle in a few brigades, so yes, I'm content to say the Japanese can hold them for a time. See the Battle of Manilla where the Japanese help up the equivalent of a U.S. Corps for a month with improvised defenses. Replicating that in Manchuria gets the Soviets taking Mukden, just as the rainy season hits....

In any case, as to the original point, the mere fact that the 6th GTA was able to cross the Greater Khingan Mountain Ranges and penetrate into the Central Manchurian Plains was in direct contradiction of Japanese expectations who held that the Khingan Mountain Ranges were impassable and that in fact Japanese expectations about them did not, in fact, work out "pretty well" for them. Hence, that they expected the Soviets to have to cease operations at the end of September in no way indicates that said expectations were realistic.
As already cited via Glantz, the 6th Guards Tank Army was dependent on truck based supply lines extending back 700 kilometers. What happens when it starts to rain and the entire length of their supply line turns into swamp? IOTL, just crossing the mountains forced them to abandon large numbers of Shermans due to the terrain there turning to muck; what happens when all of it is?

I acknowledged the latter case, but again I can think of no instance of a strategic withdrawal that was done purely out of logistical concerns, at least not in the 20th century. I'm also curious as to how Ishikawa thought he would somehow shorten the line by withdrawing from a valley that is around 5 miles wide to one that is around 7-10 miles wide. If he couldn't halt the Soviets on the former frontage with his forces, he certainly won't be able too on the latter.

Plus, I can't help but notice that if Ishikawa isn't able to logistically maintain his position, which was south of the Tunghua region, that speaks for bad things for the logistics of the larger Japanese forces who would have to defend it.
I welcome any citations to the counter of JM-155, but I think you're making way too many assumptions here without any evidence by trying to read into the Japanese the same way you accuse me of the Soviets. For one difference between Tunghua and Northwest Korea, the Central Manchurian Railway passes through the former.

Maybe once you substantiate your claim in this regard...?
I already have via the original citation of JM-155. If you disagree with it, fine, but that's on you to cite something in counter.

Erm, that is a horribly dishonest portrayal of how the conversation evolved, which is equally baffling since anyone can look at our discussions. Both of our speculations is based off the document you provided, which says pretty clearly that General Ishikawa commenced a 60 mile retreat on the 18th, two days after the city of Chongjin fell. You are also wrong that I cited nothing in retort: in fact, I threw in an additional citation noting that on the day of the 17th, the Soviets managed a 5 mile advance (the distance required to advance from Chongjin to secure Ranam-Guyok, at the minimum) despite somehow being "halted", but admitted I'm uncertain how much that relates to whatever defensive position General Ishikawa's forces were holding. Ultimately, you have cited nothing to substantiate your speculations as to why the retreat occurred any more than I have.
You spoke of the Congjin move without any reference to what citation that was from. As for the matter at hand, the source we are both using notes the Soviets were checked; admittedly, anything as to why the withdrawal was ordered is unknown, but in light of the fact that, again, the same source we are both using notes the Soviets were checked leads me to take that position.

EDIT: An additional interesting thing to note here from that other thread:

I only just realized that the geographic details here are interesting, because it means the Japanese forces that retreated from Mutanchiang were not falling back towards Tunghua, which was to the southeast, but towards Harbin, which was to the northeast. This means, in fact, that not only were the main Japanese forces retreating away from the Tunghua redoubt, they were also retreating deeper into the forming pocket as the 2nd Far East Front's main axis of advance was generally angled eastward towards the Changchun-Harbin direction. In other words, the entire Japanese defense plan on a strategic level was at threat of being pre-empted by the Soviet offensive because the bulk of it's forces were retreating in the wrong direction.

The fact that the Japanese estimated that the Battle of Mutanchiang reduced their forces effectiveness by up to half their pre-battle rate is also suggestive of significant abandonment of material and supplies.
You do realize First Front was not the Army formation tasked with defending the Tunghua, no?

EDIT2: AH-HA! Found the cite on the state of Japanese fortifications!

"As regards the fortification of Manchurian cities and towns which were scattered in an area of extensive depth and would constitute the strongpoints for sustained warfare, and also as regards the construction of positions in the Tunhua and Antu sectors which would constitute the redoubt for the Area Army, no work had been
begun by the close of July because of the shortage of manpower and materials. The only thing completed by this time was the reconnaissance of the intended locations for positions." -JM-154, Page 47.

So yeah, this discussion about the state of the intermediate positions and the is somewhat academic because the only work the Japanese had done by that point was survey work. The Tunghua redoubt was in a bit better shape, but not by much:

"Construction of fortifications in the newly-designated [redoubt] positions to be used by main forces in accordance with the operational plan was begun in March 1945. In carrying out this work emphasis was placed on underground defenses in view of the enemy's superior capability for artillery and air bombardment. Although this work was pushed, it was hindered by the shortage of mason's tools and dynamite, and recuired more time than was expected. By the time the Soviet Union entered the war, although almost all caves for emplacing large guns had been completed in each position, other important installations such as communication trenches, field positions, and, what was particularly important, tank obstacles, were in imperfect condition." -Page 46-47
Sure, but as Bob pointed out before to you, consider the state of Saipan being "imperfect" versus the finished results of high casualties for the U.S. despite having several advantages the Soviets wouldn't have here. As it were, as already pointed out, the Japanese were actively constructing the fortifications and expected Tunghua to be completed by November.
 
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The scenario is rather ASB since Japan would know that continuing to resist after nuclear bombs were just dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is not a good idea. But for the sake of this scenario let's just say Japan does continue to resist. The main reason why America managed to occupy the southern half of Korea (aka South Korea/Republic of Korea) is that after bombing Japan they were able to send their military forces there while the Soviet Union had already taken control of the northern half of Korea (aka North Korea/Democratic People's Republic of Korea). But if Japan does continue to resist and fight the United States then they will likely be tied up with their soldiers invading the country and forcing it surrender by late 1945 or early 1946 while the Soviet Union takes all of Korea and makes it into a communist state.
 
The scenario is rather ASB since Japan would know that continuing to resist after nuclear bombs were just dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is not a good idea. But for the sake of this scenario let's just say Japan does continue to resist. The main reason why America managed to occupy the southern half of Korea (aka South Korea/Republic of Korea) is that after bombing Japan they were able to send their military forces there while the Soviet Union had already taken control of the northern half of Korea (aka North Korea/Democratic People's Republic of Korea). But if Japan does continue to resist and fight the United States then they will likely be tied up with their soldiers invading the country and forcing it surrender by late 1945 or early 1946 while the Soviet Union takes all of Korea and makes it into a communist state.
Except that it wasn’t ASB. Japan was split into pro war and pro peace faction. After the atomic bombs, Hirohito made the decisive decision. And then the pro war militarists tried to coup him... their God emperor. Also, I don’t see how all of Korea turns Communist since the post war borders were already set in various agreements.
 
The scenario is rather ASB since Japan would know that continuing to resist after nuclear bombs were just dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is not a good idea. But for the sake of this scenario let's just say Japan does continue to resist. The main reason why America managed to occupy the southern half of Korea (aka South Korea/Republic of Korea) is that after bombing Japan they were able to send their military forces there while the Soviet Union had already taken control of the northern half of Korea (aka North Korea/Democratic People's Republic of Korea). But if Japan does continue to resist and fight the United States then they will likely be tied up with their soldiers invading the country and forcing it surrender by late 1945 or early 1946 while the Soviet Union takes all of Korea and makes it into a communist state.
See the Kyūjō incident, an attempted coup to prevent the surrender at the last moment. Even before then, until the Emperor's intervention the War Council was deadlocked on the matter of seeking peace.
 
Except that it wasn’t ASB. Japan was split into pro war and pro peace faction. After the atomic bombs, Hirohito made the decisive decision. And then the pro war militarists tried to coup him... their God emperor.
Yeah. It may seem irrational - suicidally so - to us, but quite clearly, there were many Japanese officers, right up to General Anami, who were willing to fight on even in the face of a sustained atomic bombing campaign by the Americans.

And it certainly wasn't at all impossible for a military coup to have succeeded that week.

Also, I don’t see how all of Korea turns Communist since the post war borders were already set in various agreements.
That's true, but...if Soviet troops are occupying the entire American zone as the result of combat operations aimed at destroying 17th Area Army, the question likely becomes one of what tradeoff will need to be made to get Stalin to observe the terms of the deal. "Facts on the ground" are difficult to avoid.
 

CalBear

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The scenario is rather ASB since Japan would know that continuing to resist after nuclear bombs were just dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is not a good idea. But for the sake of this scenario let's just say Japan does continue to resist. The main reason why America managed to occupy the southern half of Korea (aka South Korea/Republic of Korea) is that after bombing Japan they were able to send their military forces there while the Soviet Union had already taken control of the northern half of Korea (aka North Korea/Democratic People's Republic of Korea). But if Japan does continue to resist and fight the United States then they will likely be tied up with their soldiers invading the country and forcing it surrender by late 1945 or early 1946 while the Soviet Union takes all of Korea and makes it into a communist state.
Actually the division of Korea was a result of a section of the Yalta Agreements.
 

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The last page or so of debate has been very interesting, however, it ignores the most important aspect of the scenario; time.

It really doesn't matter if the Red Army runs into a short term supply problem, not even a little. The have the ability to resupply, while the Kwantung Army has no ability to interdict that supply, If Japan doesn't surrender the U.S. isn't going to invade Kyushu until November 1st, 1945, at best, much more likely that gets pushed WAY back because of the October 1945 Typhoon, possibly to the Spring of 1946.

The Red Army isn't in a sprint, doesn't have to be. It has at least three months, likely six months, before the WAllies set foot on Kyushu (see my initial post in the thread regarding the likelihood of that happening). All that even spectacularly successful defensive stand achieves is increased casualties on both sides. If the Red Army is stalled long enough Stalin gets pissed and sends either Rokossovsky or Konev, probably with their Front, to the Far East with orders to set things right. If the first one sent fails, Stalin simply sends the the other. What longer resistance actually means is that the Soviets take transport more Japanese PoW into the USSR as forced labor, eventually letting the survivors go around 1955-56.

Its like the Winter Line in Italy. Lots of casualties. Rome still was taken by the Wallies.
 
The last page or so of debate has been very interesting, however, it ignores the most important aspect of the scenario; time.
We're both in agreement the Japanese eventually lose. We're mainly just debating when; he's arguing late September, I'm think Spring '46.

It really doesn't matter if the Red Army runs into a short term supply problem, not even a little. The have the ability to resupply, while the Kwantung Army has no ability to interdict that supply, If Japan doesn't surrender the U.S. isn't going to invade Kyushu until November 1st, 1945, at best, much more likely that gets pushed WAY back because of the October 1945 Typhoon, possibly to the Spring of 1946.
To quote Gianreco, as this is an interesting point in of itself:

The divine wind, or kamikaze, of a powerful typhoon destroyed a foreign invasion fleet off Japan in 1274 and again in 1281. It was for these storms that Japanese suicide missions were named. 25 On October 9, 1945, a similar typhoon named Louise, packing 140-mile-per-hour winds, struck the U.S. staging area on Okinawa, which would have been expanded to capacity by that time if the war had not ended in August yet was still crammed with aircraft and assault shipping. There was enough time to fly most aircraft out of harm’s way to bases on Luzon, but 12 ships were sunk, 222 grounded, and 32 very heavily damaged as eighty-three men were lost and more than one hundred severely injured. Fully four-fifths of all the military structures on Okinawa were destroyed or rendered unusable with vast amounts of the carefully assembled war stocks suffering the same fate. U.S. analysts at the scene matter-of-factly reported that the storm would have caused up to a forty-five-day delay in the invasion of Kyushu. 26​
The point that goes begging, however, is that while these postwar reports from the Pacific were correct in themselves, they understandably stayed within the purview of their authors’ orders or responsibility and did not make note of the critical significance of such a delay if the war had continued. Simply stated, a forty-five-day postponement would have entailed launching Olympic well past the initial, and unacceptable, target date of December 1, retarding the completion of base construction on Kyushu and, consequently, forcing the Honshu invasion to be pushed back as far as mid-April 1946. If there had been no atom bombs and Tokyo had attempted to hold out for an extended time (a possibility that even bombing and blockade advocates in Washington granted), the Japanese would have immediately appreciated the impact of the storm in the waters around Okinawa. Moreover, they would know exactly what it meant for the follow-up invasion of Honshu, which they had predicted as accurately as the invasion of Kyushu. But even with the storm delay plus friction of combat on Kyushu, the Coronet schedule would have propelled U.S. engineers to perform virtual miracles to make up for lost time and implement Y-day as early in April as possible. Unfortunately the divine winds packed a one-two punch.​
From March 27 to April 7, 1946, yet another typhoon raged in the Pacific. On April 3 Barbara struck Luzon, where it inflicted only moderate damage— ripping roofs off of Base M warehouses at Lingayen Gulf, grounding an Army tugboat, and sinking a ship in Manila Bay, where waves briefly reached an unusual thirty-five feet in the harbor—before pounding toward Taiwan. Coming more than six months after the war, it was of no particular concern. The Los Angeles Times gave it several short paragraphs on the bottom of page 2 and didn’t even mention the storm’s name. 27 But if Japan had held out, this typhoon would have had profound effects on the world we live in today.​
Barbara would have been the closest-watched weather cell in history. If the delayed invasion of Honshu was not already in the process of being launched, the typhoon’s long, lumbering approach to the Philippines would allow First and Eighth Army soldiers (many of whom would have lived in tents instead of barracks because it was expected that they would have moved north a month earlier) to make the best preparations they could under the circumstances. Ships and craft that could not be sent south would be secured and likely ride out the storm with minimal losses. However, if Coronet was in the midst of its execution from the twenty-five-day window Y-15 to Y+10, chaos would ensue because the storm’s track and intensity could only be guessed at within the parameters of the limited data available.​
Would slow, shallow-draft landing craft be caught at sea or in the Philippines, where loading operations would be put on hold? If they were already on their way to Japan, how many would be able to reach the Koshiki Retto anchorage and Kyushu’s sheltered bays or get back to Luzon? And what about the breakwater caissons for Ironhorse, the massive artificial harbor to be assembled east of Tokyo? The 1945 construction of the harbor’s prefabricated components carried a priority second only to the atom bomb, and the first packages of this precious towed cargo would have begun arriving in the western Pacific at this time. They could not be allowed to fall victim to this and other seasonal storms and be scattered across the Philippine Sea.​
Whatever stage of deployment U.S. forces were in during those first days of April, a delay of some sort—certainly no less than a week and perhaps much, much more—was going to occur. A delay that the two U.S. field armies invading Honshu could ill afford and that Japanese militarists would see as yet another sign that they were right after all. And while much of the land around Tokyo today contains built-up areas not there during the war and deceptively smooth terrain, thanks to the delays over which the United States had absolutely no control, any soldier or Marine treading this same flat, dry “tank country” in 1946 would, in reality, have been up to their calves in muck and rice shoots by the time the invasion actually took place.​

The Red Army isn't in a sprint, doesn't have to be. It has at least three months, likely six months, before the WAllies set foot on Kyushu (see my initial post in the thread regarding the likelihood of that happening). All that even spectacularly successful defensive stand achieves is increased casualties on both sides. If the Red Army is stalled long enough Stalin gets pissed and sends either Rokossovsky or Konev, probably with their Front, to the Far East with orders to set things right. If the first one sent fails, Stalin simply sends the the other. What longer resistance actually means is that the Soviets take transport more Japanese PoW into the USSR as forced labor, eventually letting the survivors go around 1955-56.

Its like the Winter Line in Italy. Lots of casualties. Rome still was taken by the Wallies.
They can't send more reinforcements as the Trans-Siberian Railway is already at capacity.
 

CalBear

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We're both in agreement the Japanese eventually lose. We're mainly just debating when; he's arguing late September, I'm think Spring '46.



To quote Gianreco, as this is an interesting point in of itself:

The divine wind, or kamikaze, of a powerful typhoon destroyed a foreign invasion fleet off Japan in 1274 and again in 1281. It was for these storms that Japanese suicide missions were named. 25 On October 9, 1945, a similar typhoon named Louise, packing 140-mile-per-hour winds, struck the U.S. staging area on Okinawa, which would have been expanded to capacity by that time if the war had not ended in August yet was still crammed with aircraft and assault shipping. There was enough time to fly most aircraft out of harm’s way to bases on Luzon, but 12 ships were sunk, 222 grounded, and 32 very heavily damaged as eighty-three men were lost and more than one hundred severely injured. Fully four-fifths of all the military structures on Okinawa were destroyed or rendered unusable with vast amounts of the carefully assembled war stocks suffering the same fate. U.S. analysts at the scene matter-of-factly reported that the storm would have caused up to a forty-five-day delay in the invasion of Kyushu. 26​
The point that goes begging, however, is that while these postwar reports from the Pacific were correct in themselves, they understandably stayed within the purview of their authors’ orders or responsibility and did not make note of the critical significance of such a delay if the war had continued. Simply stated, a forty-five-day postponement would have entailed launching Olympic well past the initial, and unacceptable, target date of December 1, retarding the completion of base construction on Kyushu and, consequently, forcing the Honshu invasion to be pushed back as far as mid-April 1946. If there had been no atom bombs and Tokyo had attempted to hold out for an extended time (a possibility that even bombing and blockade advocates in Washington granted), the Japanese would have immediately appreciated the impact of the storm in the waters around Okinawa. Moreover, they would know exactly what it meant for the follow-up invasion of Honshu, which they had predicted as accurately as the invasion of Kyushu. But even with the storm delay plus friction of combat on Kyushu, the Coronet schedule would have propelled U.S. engineers to perform virtual miracles to make up for lost time and implement Y-day as early in April as possible. Unfortunately the divine winds packed a one-two punch.​
From March 27 to April 7, 1946, yet another typhoon raged in the Pacific. On April 3 Barbara struck Luzon, where it inflicted only moderate damage— ripping roofs off of Base M warehouses at Lingayen Gulf, grounding an Army tugboat, and sinking a ship in Manila Bay, where waves briefly reached an unusual thirty-five feet in the harbor—before pounding toward Taiwan. Coming more than six months after the war, it was of no particular concern. The Los Angeles Times gave it several short paragraphs on the bottom of page 2 and didn’t even mention the storm’s name. 27 But if Japan had held out, this typhoon would have had profound effects on the world we live in today.​
Barbara would have been the closest-watched weather cell in history. If the delayed invasion of Honshu was not already in the process of being launched, the typhoon’s long, lumbering approach to the Philippines would allow First and Eighth Army soldiers (many of whom would have lived in tents instead of barracks because it was expected that they would have moved north a month earlier) to make the best preparations they could under the circumstances. Ships and craft that could not be sent south would be secured and likely ride out the storm with minimal losses. However, if Coronet was in the midst of its execution from the twenty-five-day window Y-15 to Y+10, chaos would ensue because the storm’s track and intensity could only be guessed at within the parameters of the limited data available.​
Would slow, shallow-draft landing craft be caught at sea or in the Philippines, where loading operations would be put on hold? If they were already on their way to Japan, how many would be able to reach the Koshiki Retto anchorage and Kyushu’s sheltered bays or get back to Luzon? And what about the breakwater caissons for Ironhorse, the massive artificial harbor to be assembled east of Tokyo? The 1945 construction of the harbor’s prefabricated components carried a priority second only to the atom bomb, and the first packages of this precious towed cargo would have begun arriving in the western Pacific at this time. They could not be allowed to fall victim to this and other seasonal storms and be scattered across the Philippine Sea.​
Whatever stage of deployment U.S. forces were in during those first days of April, a delay of some sort—certainly no less than a week and perhaps much, much more—was going to occur. A delay that the two U.S. field armies invading Honshu could ill afford and that Japanese militarists would see as yet another sign that they were right after all. And while much of the land around Tokyo today contains built-up areas not there during the war and deceptively smooth terrain, thanks to the delays over which the United States had absolutely no control, any soldier or Marine treading this same flat, dry “tank country” in 1946 would, in reality, have been up to their calves in muck and rice shoots by the time the invasion actually took place.​



They can't send more reinforcements as the Trans-Siberian Railway is already at capacity.
Of course they can send more. Just takes a bit more time. U.S. is still sending them rail stock so it isn't like their equipment is going to wear out. Add a locomotive and three flat cars per train. Hell, add trackage, got all those German PoW setting around, along with folks in the Gulags, transported Tatars, etc. We are talking Stalin's USSR; the work kills half the PoWs? It might bother Nikita in a few years, but Stalin?
 
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