Japan does not surrender after atomic bombs, how does the Soviet invasion of Manchuria go?

OTL, The Japanese actions were due to the emperor’s wishes rather than military defeat. The Kwantung Army was undefeated, and retreated back to the well fortified tunghua line. The Japanese planned to use chemical and bio weapons against the Soviets. The Soviets meanwhile had logistical difficultly operating in the Far East. The Americans expected 600,000 Soviet casualties, while Soviets themselves expected 1 million. How would the war in Manchuria look like if Japan didn't surrender after the nukes?
 
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Well,
......there's a good chance a of Korea falls to the Soviets. That's an interesting butterfly in itself. I doubt the Soviets would even attempt a landing at Hokkaido unless America or Britain lends them the amphibious assault ships though. The Soviets had a hard time with the Kurils, they won't be following that up with Hokkaido.
 
I would say hosed for the japanese because mainland cities will keep going poof, the usa will start shelling the coast all the while the soviets are advancing.

Japan new it was over, the problem was they thought the allies would just call it off and let them off the hook.

So after the war you get a soviet manchuria and korea. That means land annexation as well in many spots. Notably port artur region
 
Their operational goal of destroying the Kwantung Army before it could withdraw into Southern Manchuria/the Tunghua Redoubt had failed, and something on the order of 180,000 reinforcements were on the way for the IJA from the China Expeditionary Army. Soviet medical records before the attack were expecting close to 600,000 casualties but with the Japanese in their fortified positions, casualties would likely be much worse.
 
Their operational goal of destroying the Kwantung Army before it could withdraw into Southern Manchuria/the Tunghua Redoubt had failed, and something on the order of 180,000 reinforcements were on the way for the IJA from the China Expeditionary Army. Soviet medical records before the attack were expecting close to 600,000 casualties but with the Japanese in their fortified positions, casualties would likely be much worse.
How good were those fortifications? Were they Maginot level?
 
Reports are that the Tunghua position at the time was incomplete and unprepared, with woefully inadequate ammunition stockpiles and much of the armies heavy equipment and supplies had been abandoned in the hasty retreat. The reinforcements from China were blocked by the Soviet forces that had already reached the Bohai Sea by advancing over regions devoid of any Japanese troops. The Tunghua region itself also only covered one of the three main routes between Korea and Manchuria (the central route). Of the other two routes into Korea, the Soviets had already penetrated past the more northerly route around Tumen to the north. For the southernly route, the Japanese only have a blocking position at the city of Sinuijiu, but this only guards the city proper (and only, for some reason, from the city’s western approaches, leaving it vulnerable to being outflanked from the north) and not the wider west coastal plain, so it’s liable to be bypassed, isolated, and reduced.

On the whole, I’d expect that while the Kwantung hold outs in the tougher parts of Tunghua may last past September, otherwise the Soviets are liable to have everything secured everything that actually matters by then at only modest cost.

Soviet forecasts for 540,000 casualties, of which only 160,000 would be irrecoverable, were notably based on estimates of Kwangtung Army that projected it as rather stronger then it actually was (such as having more then 300,000 more men then it actually did, a common post-war Soviet claim).
 
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Reports are that the Tunghua position at the time was incomplete and unprepared, with woefully inadequate ammunition stockpiles and much of the armies heavy equipment and supplies had been abandoned in the hasty retreat. The reinforcements from China were blocked by the Soviet forces that had already reached the Bohai Sea by advancing over regions devoid of any Japanese troops. The Tunghua region itself also only covered one of the three main routes between Korea and Manchuria (the central route). Of the other two routes into Korea, the Soviets had already penetrated past the more northerly route around Tumen to the north. For the southernly route, the Japanese only have a blocking position at the city of Sinuijiu, but this only guards the city proper (and only, for some reason, from the city’s western approaches, leaving it vulnerable to being outflanked from the north) and not the wider west coastal plain, so it’s liable to be bypassed, isolated, and reduced.

On the whole, I’d expect that while the Kwantung hold outs in the tougher parts of Tunghua may last past September, otherwise the Soviets are liable to have everything secured everything that actually matters by then at only modest cost.

Soviet forecasts for 540,000 casualties, of which only 160,000 would be irrecoverable, were notably based on estimates of Kwangtung Army that projected it as rather stronger then it actually was (such as having more then 300,000 more men then it actually did, a common post-war Soviet claim).
What are your sources for the Bohai, the Tunghua, and the supply situation?
 
Glantz discusses how the 17th Army reached the Bohai. The Tunghua and supply situations are mentioned in the monographs.
Which Glantz book and which page? I did a Ctrl+F search on both and found nothing. Not sure what monographs you're referring to either; can I get a title and page number please?
 
Which Glantz book and which page? I did a Ctrl+F search on both and found nothing. Not sure what monographs you're referring to either; can I get a title and page number please?
I'm afraid I don't have the page number for the monograph (although the title is "Record of Operations Against Soviet Russia") since I am running off of memory there, but the 17th Army's advance to the Bohai Sea is covered on page 103 in the Glantz's "August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria" (emphasis added):

"The 17th Army, marching toward Chihfeng, was hindered more by water shortage, intense heat, and sandy terrain conditions than by enemy opposition. After an arduous march, 17th Army units brushed aside light opposition by elements of the Japanese 108th Division and on 17 August occupied Chihfeng. During the following day, 17th Army moved toward the coast, occupying Pingchuan and Linguan and finally reaching the coast at Shanhaikuan opposite the Liaotung Peninsula."

Given that the Kwantung Army didn't cease resistance until after the 18th, we can expect the above to still occur.
 
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I'm afraid I don't have the page number for the monograph (although the title is "Record of Operations Against Soviet Russia") since I am running off of memory there,
I'm trying to find it, so if you have any more information, it'd be appreciated. I do know the Japanese prior to the campaign were experiencing equipment shortages but my understanding is they had avoided any serious ones during the campaign itself in terms of losses from the bulk of the Kwantung Army.

but the 17th Army's advance to the Bohai Sea is covered on page 103 in the Glantz's "August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria" (emphasis added):

"The 17th Army, marching toward Chihfeng, was hindered more by water shortage, intense heat, and sandy terrain conditions than by enemy opposition. After an arduous march, 17th Army units brushed aside light opposition by elements of the Japanese 108th Division and on 17 August occupied Chihfeng. During the following day, 17th Army moved toward the coast, occupying Pingchuan and Linguan and finally reaching the coast at Shanhaikuan opposite the Liaotung Peninsula."

Given that the Kwantung Army didn't cease resistance until after the 18th, we can expect the above to still occur.
Reading the following pages, my understanding is this was bare bones forward reconnaissance units, with the bulk of the Army a far distance back due to fuel shortages.
 
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I'm trying to find it, so if you have any more information, it'd be appreciated. I do know the Japanese prior to the campaign were experiencing equipmetn shortages but my understanding is they had avoided any serious ones during the campaign itself in terms of losses from the bulk of the Kwantung Army.
I'm trying to track down a source that I saw citing the monographs awhile ago without much luck at the moment. It's been several years though.

Reading the following pages, my understanding is this was bare bones forward reconnaissance units, with the bulk of the Army a far distance back due to fuel shortages.
I can't find anything that indicates that. Glantz mentions earlier that the 17th Army's two forward detachments were a pair of reinforced independent tank battalions with the main body only twenty-kilometers behind them (less then a one-day separation), but his only comment about their state after the quote of reaching the coast is noting that their left flank was up-in-the-air only to be plugged by the moving in of the 53rd Army (the Front's Reserve) on August 15th. The rest of the formations OOB doesn't seem like anything that'd be much affected by any supposed fuel shortages: three rifle divisions and the usual smattering of artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and mortar support units. Given that 1945 Soviet combined-arms armies were mostly (not entirely, but mostly) mobile horse-drawn armies and tended to rely on the employment of mass horse transport more then motor transport to service their mobility and logistical needs, I don't see any basis for the claim that the bulk of the army would be a far distance back due to fuel shortages. Indeed, it seems that the only part of the army that would be most affected by fuel shortages were the ones furthest forward!
 
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I'm trying to track down a source that I saw citing the monographs awhile ago without much luck at the moment. It's been several years though.
Take your time; I've started re-reading the 1983 edition of August Storm and looking at other sources. Figured we've argued this enough we might as well try to get to the bottom of it lol.

I can't find anything that indicates that. Glantz mentions earlier that the 17th Army's two forward detachments were a pair of reinforced independent tank battalions with the main body only twenty-kilometers behind them (less then a one-day separation), but his only comment about their state after the quote of reaching the coast is noting that their left flank was up-in-the-air only to be plugged by the moving in of the 53rd Army (the Front's Reserve) on August 15th. The rest of the formations OOB doesn't seem like anything that'd be much affected by any supposed fuel shortages: three rifle divisions and the usual smattering of artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and mortar support units. Given that 1945 Soviet combined-arms armies were mostly (not entirely, but mostly) mobile horse-drawn armies and tended to rely on the employment of mass horse transport more then motor transport to service their mobility and logistical needs, I don't see any basis for the claim that the bulk of the army would be a far distance back due to fuel shortages. Indeed, it seems that the only part of the army that would be most affected by fuel shortages were the ones furthest forward!
Correct, I was thinking of 6th Guards, which was the exploitation force.

Page 104:

The 6th Guards Tank Army continued its march on 15 August along two axes opposed by decaying elements of the 63d and 11 7th Japanese Infantry Divisions and Manchurian cavalry forces. The 7th Guards Mechanized Corps moved east toward Changchun, while the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps and 5th Guards Tank Corps moved southeast toward Mukden. The gap between the two units was more than 100 kilometers wide. Reconnaissance units (motorcycle battalions), assisted by flights of reconnaissance aircraft, operated between the corps. On 16 August the forward detachments of 5th Guards Tank Corps and 9th Guards Mechanized Corps secured Tungliao and Kaitung, respectively. On the nineteenth the main force closed in on the two cities. From Tungliao the 5th Guards Tank Corps and 9th Mechanized Corps marched in single column along the railroad bed in what was essentially an administrative march on Mukden. On 21 August 6th Guards Tank Army units occupied both Changchun and Mukden, two days after the arrival of Soviet air-landed detachments at both locations. Because of a shortage of fuel, further movement of the 6th Guards Tank Army to Port Arthur and Dalny was by rail.28
 
(the soviets are the tank; and the japanese/manchukuos the car)

The only obstacule the Soviets will face are their overestending themselves from the supplies lines
 
Take your time; I've started re-reading the 1983 edition of August Storm and looking at other sources. Figured we've argued this enough we might as well try to get to the bottom of it lol.
Still hunting, but I honestly can't find much about the state of the Kwantung's equipment and supply park during the period of retreat one way or the other outside of the monographs. It's possible that's simply because things developed too fast for there to be much recording to be done, but then I recall it getting a mentioned somewhere in the monographs yet those are things I don't actually own.

Correct, I was thinking of 6th Guards, which was the exploitation force.

Page 104:

The 6th Guards Tank Army continued its march on 15 August along two axes opposed by decaying elements of the 63d and 11 7th Japanese Infantry Divisions and Manchurian cavalry forces. The 7th Guards Mechanized Corps moved east toward Changchun, while the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps and 5th Guards Tank Corps moved southeast toward Mukden. The gap between the two units was more than 100 kilometers wide. Reconnaissance units (motorcycle battalions), assisted by flights of reconnaissance aircraft, operated between the corps. On 16 August the forward detachments of 5th Guards Tank Corps and 9th Guards Mechanized Corps secured Tungliao and Kaitung, respectively. On the nineteenth the main force closed in on the two cities. From Tungliao the 5th Guards Tank Corps and 9th Mechanized Corps marched in single column along the railroad bed in what was essentially an administrative march on Mukden. On 21 August 6th Guards Tank Army units occupied both Changchun and Mukden, two days after the arrival of Soviet air-landed detachments at both locations. Because of a shortage of fuel, further movement of the 6th Guards Tank Army to Port Arthur and Dalny was by rail.28
Oh, yes. Although they aren't quite battalions, but rather divisions (well... corps, but this is 1945 Soviet Union, so distinction without difference). I do believe Glantz did mention elsewhere they were led by brigade-sized forward detachments.
 

CalBear

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It really depends on how long the Japanese try to hold on.

If they are still fighting when Olympic was planned to occur (but almost certainly couldn't have happened thanks to the October Typhoon) than the Red Army is in Pusan. If, as the tides were shifting toward (mainly because Truman didn't worry a lick about MacArthur), the Olympic and Coronet Invasions does NOT happen, the WAllies may content with capturing Hokkaido to use as a TacAir base. *The Japanese had largely left the Island in the hands of light infantry, and not the best they possessed, and their fuel situation was such that making a pivot to the far north was close to impossible, especially for their Kamikaze force.*

That would mean enacting the Boa Constrictor option, starving the population through blockade/mining, burning via B-29/B-32 from the 8th (scheduled to stand up its B-29 Bomb Groups in September) and 20th Air Forces along with Tiger Force's Lancasters/Lincolns, and tossing a weekly nuke at Hokaido or Kyushu. That happens and your answer is harder to definitely supply beyond: "Stalin takes exactly as much of Manchuria and China as he wants, at least until the U.S. threatens to turn off Lend Lease".

When folks discuss the Manchurian scenario the tendency is to stare at the Red Army's logistical issues. This ignores the absolute hooror show facing the Kwantung Army; no replacements parts, no fuel supply, no reinforcements, AT ALL, save those that can come from elsewhere in China while being pursued by Chinese Troops and under regular air attack by both Chinese and American forces (Stilwell isn't going to be sitting on his hands all this time). You fairly quickly are left with an almost literally stupid brave light infantry force with extremely limited ammunition, zip for air cover, no motorized, much less mechanized, formations, and a smattering of Type 95 Shinhoto Chi-Ha medium tanks with the 47mm HV gun (with performance is close to a 1940 Pz III with the 5cm KwK 38) to face T-34-76/-85 and IS-1/2/3 (all the later IJA medium designs, both the Type 3 Chi-Nu and Type 4 Chi-To, a total of around 320 tracks, were retained on the Home Islands, which is now blockaded from here to sunset, and Japan had no heavy tank worth the term).

Couple Million poor starving extremely brave infantrymen with limited ammo vs. the summer 1945 Red Army? For poetic reasons, maybe the main engagement can happen on October 21st.
 
The Japanese do not have much heavy equipment and not nearly enough to match the Soviets. The Japanese have few things that can take out the T-34s and IS tanks.

The Soviet air force will operate almost completely unopposed and can strafe and attack any target at leisure.

And just as CalBear writes the Japanese also have few spare parts so once something breaks it is gone.

The longer the war continues the more it becomes a militia vs fully equipped and trained military.

And this talk about "fortified positions" is just ridiculous, the red army can simply blast any position into 1 million pieces, the amount of artillery the red army in 1945 can bring onto a target is YUUUUGE and at the same time the Japanese can not respond in kind because they do not have the same amount of artillery and no where near the same amount of supplies.
 
Yep just to reiterate what's already been said, the Kwantung is still fundamentally the same army it was in the 30's when the Japanese were 'just' fighting the Chinese and the Chinese kept them plenty busy! Although in 1945 it is if anything less well supplied and more reliant on living off the population it's entrenched within than they were in 1938. Plus of course it has to do two jobs, fend off the red army and hold down/fend off the Chinese. In term of opposition the red army in 1945 is whole different threat compared to what they're used to.

Don't get me wrong they'll fight hard and make the Russians pay every step of the way*, but the German armed forces did that and the Kwantung is no where near as well equipped or supplied as they were. (The German's were at least able to retreat back along their supply lines to what was left of their starting point/industrial base, the Kwantung don't get this)

I also agree Russian artillery supported by Russian air-force will make mincemeat of any fortification or anytime the Japanese muster to hold a significant position, while Russian armour will cut it off, and the Kwantung will be any able to stop if from doing so.



*Yes there will be Russian causalities, (there are always Russian casualties) especially as they will be running offensive operations against a determined opposition. But it's not going to change the end result
 
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Still hunting, but I honestly can't find much about the state of the Kwantung's equipment and supply park during the period of retreat one way or the other outside of the monographs. It's possible that's simply because things developed too fast for there to be much recording to be done, but then I recall it getting a mentioned somewhere in the monographs yet those are things I don't actually own.



Oh, yes. Although they aren't quite battalions, but rather divisions (well... corps, but this is 1945 Soviet Union, so distinction without difference). I do believe Glantz did mention elsewhere they were led by brigade-sized forward detachments.
Tunghua.PNG


Of note, the Southern route was covered by the Tunghua defensive redoubt. Also, according to the JM-155 monograph:

"Nanam Divisional District Headquarters had lost contact with higher headquarters due to the severance of communications, and was unaware of the Imperial Rescript of 15 August. Its force continued to engage the enemy from the 16th to the 18th and by holding previously prepared defense positions, it checked the enemy's southward advance. On the morning of 18 August, General Nishiwaki decided to move his troops to the vicinity of Kilchu, about sixty miles south of Chongjin. At about 1800 hours, while en route, a staff officer of the Korea Administrative Defense Army joined the retreating columns, bringing word of the cease-fire order."​
Effectively, the Soviet advance into Korea was blocked on all routes.
 
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