ITPH: Ottoman Empire (1595-1789)

[John Fredrick Parker]

So I'm trying to get a handle on how the Ottoman Empire fared in the 17th and 18th Centuries (the period from the death of Murad III to the rise of Selim III); specifically, how they fared economically, culturally, and politically, and to a lesser extent, in terms of military effectiveness (as opposed to military achievements, which are a far easier matter). I note this here because I'm getting a number of contradictary answers to this when I look online -- ranging from claims that this was a period of stagnation and decline on all noted fronts for the Ottomans, to claims that these institutions were healthy and competitive with Europe until no earlier than the latter third of the 18th Century.

For those who are better read on this matter than I am, what are your impressions of the period? Was "the Sultanate of Women", and how did Ottoman government operate under it? How did agricultural output, manufacturing, trade, and finance fare during this period, when compared to concurrent advances in Europe? What about things like the printing press and other technologies that were transforming the west?

If the Ottomans weren't falling behind in this period, when did they? And if they were, what would be the most effective post Suleiman PoD to help them keep up, so that they're at least as modern as a serious European power (eg Russia or France) by 1850?

Is there potential here?

 

[Dragos Cel Mare]

I really wish I can help, but I'm blind to this matter as well.

 

[Behemoth]

I apologize for my ignorance on the meaning of the acronym but what exactly is the meaning of ITPH? Just curious and would like to know beforehand...

 

[SavoyTruffle]

I'm definitely no expert on the Sublime Porte, but here are a few talking points:

* what is described as stagnation is also a period of relative quiet for the Ottomans. While Christian Europe was tearing itself apart in the Thirty Years' War, Ottoman Europe was relatively peaceful.
* it isn't so much that the Ottomans were outpaced as much as Western Europe got all the resources they needed from the New World, whereas the Ottomans only really had the Old World as a resource base.
* it must be noted that the Ottoman Empire was at its greatest territorial extent at this point of course

 

[Behemoth]

I've found contradictory answers as well but one source http://www.turizm.net/turkey/history/ottoman3.html provides a short summary of the time period that you are describing.

Since you have set the POD after the death of Suleiman in 1566 then having either his son Mustafa or Mehmed survive is out of the question. The younger brothers, Bayezid and Cihangir, would also be dead before 1566. That will leave Selim II still in power and, to be honest, I believe he set a precedent of where sultans relied on others to help rule the empire. So, for now, things will remain the same until Murad IV. I will explain that in a moment.

I'm definitely no expert on the Sublime Porte, but here are a few talking points:

* what is described as stagnation is also a period of relative quiet for the Ottomans. While Christian Europe was tearing itself apart in the Thirty Years' War, Ottoman Europe was relatively peaceful.
* it isn't so much that the Ottomans were outpaced as much as Western Europe got all the resources they needed from the New World, whereas the Ottomans only really had the Old World as a resource base.
* it must be noted that the Ottoman Empire was at its greatest territorial extent at this point of course

The first statement is not necessarily true. There was unrest in Anatolia and the Ottomans were not necessarily on good terms with the Safavids during the Thirty Years War. Those coupled with ineffective rulers and a low balance in the treasury made the situation undesirable. As far as resources are concerned, I am not necessarily sure about where the Ottomans got a lot of their resources but this sounds about right. Also, you are correct in your statement about the empire being quite large. IIRC, it reached its peak size in 1683 (approximately 5.2 million sq. km.).

If the Ottomans weren't falling behind in this period, when did they? And if they were, what would be the most effective post Suleiman PoD to help them keep up, so that they're at least as modern as a serious European power (eg Russia or France) by 1850?

I mentioned an idea I had in this thread: https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/ahc-persian-ottoman-conquest.413188/#post-14494712

Unfortunately, that project is on hold due to more interest in another POD not involving the Ottoman Empire. However, I think that there is promise when it comes to the reign of Murad IV and, if he didn't have the idea that he should drink all the alcohol that he could to prevent his subjects from doing so, then you might have the start of something. Also, if you can find a way to have an Auspicious Incident earlier then you might help on multiple fronts.

I am far from an expert on the Ottomans but I hope this helps...

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

* it must be noted that the Ottoman Empire was at its greatest territorial extent at this point of course

Also, you are correct in your statement about the empire being quite large. IIRC, it reached its peak size in 1683 (approximately 5.2 million sq. km.).

That is true, and they were, for the most part, quite successful in preserving and stabilizing these far flung borders.

* it isn't so much that the Ottomans were outpaced as much as Western Europe got all the resources they needed from the New World, whereas the Ottomans only really had the Old World as a resource base.

As far as resources are concerned, I am not necessarily sure about where the Ottomans got a lot of their resources but this sounds about right.

Well again, some parts of Europe were getting more from colonial possessions and imperial power than others; some, like Spain and Portugal, owed pretty much all their influence in Europe to overseas possessions and activities, but I don't know if this explains European commercial and cultural modernization in this period as a whole.

* what is described as stagnation is also a period of relative quiet for the Ottomans. While Christian Europe was tearing itself apart in the Thirty Years' War, Ottoman Europe was relatively peaceful.

The first statement is not necessarily true. There was unrest in Anatolia and the Ottomans were not necessarily on good terms with the Safavids during the Thirty Years War. Those coupled with ineffective rulers and a low balance in the treasury made the situation undesirable.

Yeah, if I recall my Geoffry Parker correctly, the Ottoman Empire was not without its own problems during this time; plus, by the late 17th Century, some parts of Europe had not only recovered but were thriving, leading into the Consumer Revolution of the 18th Century. And speaking of Parker...

However, I think that there is promise when it comes to the reign of Murad IV and, if he didn't have the idea that he should drink all the alcohol that he could to prevent his subjects from doing so, then you might have the start of something.

Hm, not sure what this is referring to at the moment, though I do gather that the period of Murad IV is important to note; maybe I should see if I can't get my hands on that book...

Also, if you can find a way to have an Auspicious Incident earlier then you might help on multiple fronts.

I've seen that idea bandied about in roughly related threads on this board as well; looks promising.

I've found contradictory answers as well but one source http://www.turizm.net/turkey/history/ottoman3.html provides a short summary of the time period that you are describing.

Much thanks!

 

[Behemoth]

Hm, not sure what this is referring to at the moment, though I do gather that the period of Murad IV is important to note; maybe I should see if I can't get my hands on that book...

IIRC, Murad IV had banned tobacco, alcohol, and coffee at the capital during his reign. However, he was known to partake in quite a bit of alcohol. A couple of quotes that I recall: "Even if rivers become wine they wouldn't fill my glass." and "Wine is such a devil that I have to protect my people by drinking all of it." There are a couple of websites that have changed the wording around a bit but you may get the idea. That belief, in my opinion, is what led him to dying of cirrhosis at the age of 27.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

@Behemoth Reading the Ottoman chapter of Global Crisis currently; Parker does not paint a flattering portrait of Murad IV, at least to my eyes. Though I realize the rise of someone like Kadizade is... well, complicated; if nothing else, having a supporter of his puritan followers in office during the 1648 earthquake might take some of the winds out of their sails.

What about the next sultan's first Vizer, Kara Mustafa Pasha? Parker seems to have a really good impression of him, and if nothing else, it seems that his downfall in 1644 is absolutely preventable; even if Ibrahim wasn't the best material to work with. On possible effect -- the war with Venice that broke out in 1645, and lasted until 1669, would eat up three quarters of the Ottoman budget (at least according to Parker); if a more stable government doesn't let things with Venice get this bad, that gives the state plenty more resources to work with.

And even if Ibrahim was a pretty shitty person to become sultan, his mother was an ally of the Sufis, and did what she could to curb the *puritan* attempts at crushing them and controlling the Ottoman state as they had under Murad. Her fall in the attempted coup of 1651 apparently heartened this movement. And although Köprülü Mehmed Pasha (Vizer 1656 to 1661) made efforts to curb the Kazimadian leadership upon coming to power, it would seem his son Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Pasha (Vizer 1661 to 1676), who presided over the recovery from the worst of the 17th Century Crisis, was an ally of the movement; my guess is, this entrenched the "Islamic Puritans" further, making reforms in the 18th Century all the more difficult.

CONSOLIDATE: Then again, all this is putting our PoD in the heart of the Crisis period; but this sidesteps the question of the recovery from these chaotic decades. To quote Parker:

The "decline" of the Ottoman Empire was thus relative rather than absolute: it eventually recovered from the mid-17th century crisis -- but its European rivals recovered more quickly and more completely.

So given this, does anyone have any thoughts on how to meet the OP with post 1660 PoDs?

 

[chr92]

If you have the time, you might like to read the books: Marcus' 'The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity', Grehan's 'Everyday Life and Consumer Culture in 18th-Century Damascus' and Hathaway's 'The Arab Lands Under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800'.

 

[Halagaz]

The impression one gets is that the Ottomans consistently tried to punch above their weight class in the 17th and 18th centuries - which not only resulted in failures, but actively caused and worsened problems.

For example, this entire period was underlined by extreme overtaxation to fund the Empire's wars and struggles, straining much of society to the breaking point. Early into the period the cizye (non-Muslim head tax) rose to 400% or so of its earlier level. A bunch of tributes which used to be extraordinary measures now became yearly taxes and a major source of revenue for the state, and new extraordinary tributes were introduced. Provincial governors were now expected to finance their own administration, and they would often introduce an extra layer of taxes on top of all that just to fill their own coffers.

This contributed to the crumbling of the traditional Ottoman Timar land system and the rapid rise of Chiftliks - which was, arguably, a capital-B Bad Thing. Both from the point of view of the peasants (as the Chiftliks were much more oppressive than the Timar system) and the Ottoman state itself (as the Chiftliks were basically private property, and not conditional on military service like the Timars). Not to mention the other things that accompanied this phenomenon: mass dislocations and depopulations, the economic ruining and destabilization of regions, an explosion of banditry and more and more frequent full-blown rebellions...As a result, even as taxes rose to crippling levels, the Empire's revenues didn't - if anything, they declined. Soldiers, increasingly often unpaid, tended to desert and turn to banditry or pillaging of the Ottomans' own subjects, leading to even more economic devastation in the border provinces. And so on.


The Cambridge History of Turkey vol. 3, by Suraiya Faroqhi, is probably worth looking at if you haven't already.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

<snip>

While a very good point, hadn't the Ottomans largely finished transitioning to the Chiftlik system by 1600? FWIG, the height of the Timar system was early in the reign of Suleiman the Great.

If you have the time, you might like to read the books: Macus' 'The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity', Grehan's 'Everyday Life and Consumer Culture in 18th-Century Damascus' and Hathaway's 'The Arab Lands Under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800'.

Those look like some very informative books; unfortunately, it seems the LAPL system doesn't have any of them

 

[Deleted member 67076]

I wonder if you could have Osman II be able to remove the Jannisaries and start up a French style standing army if he were to reign for much longer.

That would go a long way into removing some of the corruption and instability in the court.

 

[Halagaz]

While a very good point, hadn't the Ottomans largely finished transitioning to the Chiftlik system by 1600? FWIG, the height of the Timar system was early in the reign of Suleiman the Great.

AFAIK that wasn't the case. In central Anatolia, the Chiftlik-ization was already underway in the late 1500s; but in the Empire as a whole, it really kicked off in the 1600s, and reached its zenith in the 1700s.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

I wonder if you could have Osman II be able to remove the Jannisaries and start up a French style standing army if he were to reign for much longer.

My impression of his reign in Global Crisis is someone who would have, at best, an extremely difficult time keeping things in line, much less reforming the empire in such a fundamental way; plus, apparently he lacked support in the harem.

AFAIK that wasn't the case. In central Anatolia, the Chiftlik-ization was already underway in the late 1500s; but in the Empire as a whole, it really kicked off in the 1600s, and reached its zenith in the 1700s.

If that's true, I imagine the chaos of the early to mid 17th Century had a lot to do with that (eg the outlandishly expensive Cretan War, etc).

So it does sound like there's a lot of potential for things going better for the Ottomans and/or making things easier for the reformists in the crisis period of the 17th Century. Is there any after 1660 (and, again, prior to 1789)?