Improve the Churchill tank.

I will allow Nicholas Moran to make my rebuttal.

Note how the internal volume is distributed.
Wrong clip, exterior and drive train
He does note that
Army liked the twin Caddy setup from the M5
Windshield for driver
Four man Crew, no loader
Torsion bars can be a bitch to replace compared to VVSS

Part two
Not a lot of space, no turret basket. M7 has one. Torsion bars eat up space in the hull
1597019664198.png

Stabilizer equipped, like the M7
Nice hatch for TC, with late war direct vision cupola
'cozy' no ready rack for ammo, floor boxes only M7 photo above in post #74 shows ready round tubes

part three
Driver area, side opening hatch, area large enough he didn't have problem fitting into
High/low seat like near all US tanks
easy to drive. M7 also has torque converter and three speeds/1 reverse rather than transfer unit H/L/N/RL/RH
quieter running vs M4
No dedicated loader normally, four man crew
no sight for bow gun, again like most US tanks
basic driving controls for assistant driver/gunner

So what rebuttal were you trying to make? why is having an M7 in 1943 as a recon tank, a bad thing?
 
Kind of missed the point I aimed at. My fault. It is that if the Stuart had been built more like a Matilda II, it would have been more successful as an "infantry tank". Take a good hard look at the M7 and ask oneself why was it not built?

As has been related, changing circumstances rendered it a non-event. The M7 didn't happen and more than likely, like the M3 would have been a failure. You are wishing for something that by your admission, wasn't built. You might as well wish for a Russian T-34. Just wasn't going to happen. Why not deal with the real vehicles, the real events or is that too difficult?
 
I'll take something a little simpler like an A.E.C Armoured car with an Ordnance Q.F. 75mm and accept its limitations.
like poor off-road ability?

Now just 6 years postwar, you had this 14 ton Panhard EBR

Based on the early war 9 ton 1939 prototype Panhard 40 P

Still 4WD, but the center wheelset as there as idlers, so the chassis can't get high centered and loweres ground pressure remarkably.
60mm armor frontally, speed up to 50mph on roads

That's what you need for recon, but with a bit larger gun than the prototype
 
Wrong clip, exterior and drive train
He does note that
Army liked the twin Caddy setup from the M5
Windshield for driver
Four man Crew, no loader
Torsion bars can be a bitch to replace compared to VVSS

Part two
Not a lot of space, no turret basket. M7 has one. Torsion bars eat up space in the hull
View attachment 573866
Stabilizer equipped, like the M7
Nice hatch for TC, with late war direct vision cupola
'cozy' no ready rack for ammo, floor boxes only M7 photo above in post #74 shows ready round tubes

part three
Driver area, side opening hatch, area large enough he didn't have problem fitting into
High/low seat like near all US tanks
easy to drive. M7 also has torque converter and three speeds/1 reverse rather than transfer unit H/L/N/RL/RH
quieter running vs M4
No dedicated loader normally, four man crew
no sight for bow gun, again like most US tanks
basic driving controls for assistant driver/gunner

So what rebuttal were you trying to make? why is having an M7 in 1943 as a recon tank, a bad thing?
I admit it was a three parter and I hoped you would save me the trouble and autoplay through it, but I suppose I did need to cite all three; so here you go. Look at the other two and see how the tank is laid out.

[media]


You will note that somebody brought lessons learned over from the Stuart, including elbow room in the fighting Chaffee compartment as was suggested for the Churchill?
 
As has been related, changing circumstances rendered it a non-event. The M7 didn't happen and more than likely, like the M3 would have been a failure. You are wishing for something that by your admission, wasn't built. You might as well wish for a Russian T-34. Just wasn't going to happen. Why not deal with the real vehicles, the real events or is that too difficult?
Changing circumstances did not render it a non-event. Program development incompetence did. Also I never wrote that I wished that it had been. Let me quote me... because it seems I never "wished" for the M7. I used the M7 as an illustration for why you do not build a mistake.

Kind of missed the point I aimed at. My fault. It is that if the Stuart had been built more like a Matilda II, it would have been more successful as an "infantry tank". Take a good hard look at the M7 and ask oneself why was it not built?
The Americans poured a lot of time and money into a project that made no operational sense. What they got for it was something that in many respects was worse than what they had. They turned a Stuart into a Sherman competitor that was nowhere near as good ergonomically as a Sherman. Why would I wish a wrong lesson be built? I used it to illustrate an American example of a fubar that should have been avoided.

What I wrote, and suggested, was that if one wanted a currently functional marginal tank that could be niche useful under special circumstances, then the M7, if built, could be used in the specialized circumstances where the Matilda II actually proved very useful.

Got to maintain context and not try to imply what was never there. For example: sort of like Korea when the Sherman proved to be a better hill country tank than the Pershing. WHY? It was not because the Sherman was a smaller tank and more agile. That was not it. It was of course the fact that the Sherman was just a better balanced mix of armor, mobility, firepower, awareness and communications than the underpowered and immaturely developed Pershing at the time but what the Hey? It, the Sherman, was a mature line of development that its crews knew how to use with ridiculous ease. Pershing to Patton for the problems ironed out and for the crews to learn would take a decade, sort of like the Lee/Grant to the Sherman 76.
 
like poor off-road ability?

Now just 6 years postwar, you had this 14 ton Panhard EBR

Based on the early war 9 ton 1939 prototype Panhard 40 P

Still 4WD, but the center wheelset as there as idlers, so the chassis can't get high centered and loweres ground pressure remarkably.
60mm armor frontally, speed up to 50mph on roads

That's what you need for recon, but with a bit larger gun than the prototype
CASE IN POINT (^^^)... called lesson learned. :openedeyewink: :openedeyewink: :openedeyewink: :openedeyewink:

And thanks for that one.
 
like poor off-road ability?

Now just 6 years postwar, you had this 14 ton Panhard EBR

Based on the early war 9 ton 1939 prototype Panhard 40 P

Still 4WD, but the center wheelset as there as idlers, so the chassis can't get high centered and loweres ground pressure remarkably.
60mm armor frontally, speed up to 50mph on roads

That's what you need for recon, but with a bit larger gun than the prototype
British Armoured cars did rather well in the desert. As for the Panhard I'd rather have the Saladin.
 
Changing circumstances did not render it a non-event. Program development incompetence did. Also I never wrote that I wished that it had been. Let me quote me... because it seems I never "wished" for the M7. I used the M7 as an illustration for why you do not build a mistake.





The Americans poured a lot of time and money into a project that made no operational sense. What they got for it was something that in many respects was worse than what they had. They turned a Stuart into a Sherman competitor that was nowhere near as good ergonomically as a Sherman. Why would I wish a wrong lesson be built? I used it to illustrate an American example of a fubar that should have been avoided.

What I wrote, and suggested, was that if one wanted a currently functional marginal tank that could be niche useful under special circumstances, then the M7, if built, could be used in the specialized circumstances where the Matilda II actually proved very useful.

Got to maintain context and not try to imply what was never there. For example: sort of like Korea when the Sherman proved to be a better hill country tank than the Pershing. WHY? It was not because the Sherman was a smaller tank and more agile. That was not it. It was of course the fact that the Sherman was just a better balanced mix of armor, mobility, firepower, awareness and communications than the underpowered and immaturely developed Pershing at the time but what the Hey? It, the Sherman, was a mature line of development that its crews knew how to use with ridiculous ease. Pershing to Patton for the problems ironed out and for the crews to learn would take a decade, sort of like the Lee/Grant to the Sherman 76.
You failed dismally to explain then why you brought the M7 up. You have done so, now after a lot of prodding. Still my question remains, why bring it up? Is it meant to be a competitor to the Churchill. I don't believe so. How can a Recce vehicle compete with a full blown Infantry Tank?
 
I explained. It is up to the reader for me to mark what is important as I generally try to do a good job in a string of posts with the lesson learned to be illustrated. Perhaps if the table of M7 characteristics had been directly compared to Matilda as to size volume, and mass, and armament, then one could see the obvious comparison with the Matilda as to Australian size and sea lift requirements and limits.

Here (Tank Encyclopedia 1.) (Australian use.)

Same general source, different article HERE. (British development and characteristics of Matilda II, Infantry Tank Mk.II, A12 by David B.)

I usually do things for an obvious reason and tell the reader exactly what I am doing. Quoting me again.

It is no knock on either tank to suggest that the Australians used the wrong tank, the wrong way at Buna and Goa, but that was what they had, what they could lift and so the Stuart was used. Matilda II shows up and the Australians have a small tank with a thick hide and seemingly a better fit for British style combined arms. If it had been an M7 it might have fared as well as a Matilda II...

But one will never know, because the M7 was not built.
From Tank Encyclopedia online.
M7 Medium Tank Specifications (finalised design)
Dimensions (L-W-H)17'2'' x 9'4'' x 7'9'' 5.23 x 2.84 x 2.36 m
Total weight27 tons
Crew5 (driver, co-driver/bow gunner, gunner, loader, commander,)
PropulsionContinental R975 C1; 9 cylinder, 4 cycle, radial gasoline 350 hp
Speed (road)30 mph (48 km/h)
Armament75 mm (2.95 in) Tank Gun M3 2x 30 cal. (7.62 mm) machine guns
Armor13–64 mm (0.51–2.52 in)
IOW all the information was provided and the purpose for its introduction explained. The Matilda II was Australian used in a niche purpose and it worked fairly well in that time and that place for the reasons previously noted (British combined arms methodical battle drill). That is all that can be claimed for the tank in that time and place.

This is generally true for the use of most historical equipment. If it works at the time and place, it will be claimed as successful for that time and place. Now if a tank is claimed to be universally successful, one actually looks to see if the equipment is widely distributed in time, among multiple users, in many environments, and note the successful in outcome use GLOBALLY and temporally by many users in many terrains, climes and by many different users against many different enemies under multiple doctrines and different wars.

Guess what the Matilda II is not, the Churchill is not? Guess what the Sherman is? Chaffee is, the Stuart is? Lesson learned? You cannot claim what the historical evidence does not show. And you can dig into WHY that is so.

The chief thing we find is ergonomics in the desired performance of a tank. Look around, be aware, maintain it easily, use it easily communicate with cooperative arms, move it, survive in it, and shoot enemies. American tanks actually did it well. The British tanks cited here, did not.

So that is the thing I showed you. You may not like it, but it is the lesson learned from the historical record.

An M7 might have done as well as a Matilda in the niche in which the Matilda found itself in Australian service... IF it had been built.

I would not have built it.

McP
 
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You are once again applying 20/20 hindsight. Yes, American tanks were not Infantry Tanks, Matilda was. You cannot use a medium Cruiser type vehicle in a Jungle Environment. The Jungle is thick, the ground is more often than not, swampy. The M3 light tank was not capable of sustained use at low revolutions to maneuver in and around the Japanese strong points. Therefore, there would not be any improvements with the M7 or the M4 instead of the M3. It is obvious you've never been in a primary rainforest (commonly called "jungle"). When you have, you ideas on what would be a suitable tank might change.
 
Therefore, there would not be any improvements with the M7 or the M4 instead of the M3. It is obvious you've never been in a primary rainforest (commonly called "jungle"). When you have, you ideas on what would be a suitable tank might change.
Most Marine M4s had the dual GM 6-71 diesels, and they had very good low rpm performance vs the Radial.

Burma had rough jungle as well, and the M3 Medium was king thru end of the war, the high elevation of the 37mm proved useful against snipers, when cannister was used.

Sometimes is the troops, and not the gear. Douglas A-24s divebombers did not find favor, while Douglas SBDs in Marine service were beloved thru end of war.
Just removing the tailhook should not have made that much difference,eh?
 
Burma has several climate/vegetation types and Indian engineer support plus the M3 Mediums were in a surplus availability and adequate to overmatch Japanese tanks and AT guns generally. New Guinea etc. is denser, damper and with more convoluted terrain. Obviously a generalisation and there are examples of terrain in each that better match the other. In each case they found that they had tanks which were in hand and suited to the special demands of their service. Even though they might be useless somewhere else. The Matilda in New Guinea etc by Australia, the Valentine in Guadalcanal, the Soloman Islands etc. and the M3 Medium by the British and Indians in Burma.

The New Zealanders kept their Valentines, the Australians their Matildas for years after the war even though newer tanks could have been obtained during and after the war. The Indians had to form their new army's armour to meet threats in any and all Indian terrains so could not afford to specialise in jungle armour so their M3s were sent to scrap.

In these particular theatres the improvements would still have to fit the classic firepower, mobility and protection triangle. For firepower 75mm is normally the rule of thumb minimum effective HE equivalent. More would only impinge upon ammunition space and mobility. Protection was vital as the tank would be moving slowly and close up to the enemy so must expect to be hit and must survive against likely weapons. The terrain is awful and requires much torque at low revolutions. The Matilda and Valentine managed these bar the firepower in a small package. They technically used 76.2mm guns but the old weak close support howitzers. In Burma the tank had to work also in open ground as well as close so is a different case. To improve the performance but keep the proven combination of firepower, protection and mobility a larger tank is inevitable and a look at the Valiant (proposed for Burma) shows what happens when you try to squeeze it into the existing small package. Thus one looks for a larger tank with great protection, a 75mm HE gun and very good mobility at low speed in steep and close terrain. Ideally one with a proven record. That can only be the Churchill and the hull MMG is a definite benefit and worth the flat face. Improvements to the Churchill (bar the ergonomics etc.) would be a canister round, possibly a choice of front or base fused HE. Possibly the QF95mm gun or the 290mm Mortar, Recoiling, Spigot, 290mm, Mk I or II. That latter should deal with any Japanese bunker but needs some exposure of the loader to reload and takes some time and needs the tank to be within 80 yards of the target. Maybe some mix in the Troop/Squadron? The QF95mm could be a better compromise and the short barrel allows an easier traverse in dense jungle. Perhaps an even lower final drive to keep it making progress in even more difficult ground. It is never going to need speed to maintain the advance or close with the enemy. Perhaps some further attention to cooling with heavy work at low revolutions. Electric cooling fans not tied to engine revolutions?

However, at the end of the day, these are very specialist circumstances so maintaining adequate supplies for these obsolete tanks to keep the known effectives in service or also increase their numbers and logistics if necessary. However, in the spirit of the OP, their best replacement would be the Churchill.
 
You cannot use a medium Cruiser type vehicle in a Jungle Environment.
Australia's first Sherman, an M4A2, arrived in Australia in 1943 with a further two M4s (sometimes mis-labeled as M4A1s) arriving for tropical trials in New Guinea in 1944. The tanks were manned by crews drawn from the Australian 4th Armoured Brigade.
Results? Same source.

The results of these trials showed that the British Churchill tank was better suited to jungle warfare's low-speed infantry support than the Sherman. As a result, the Australian Government ordered 510 Churchills, of which 51 were delivered before the order was cancelled at the end of the war, and did not order any further Shermans. Following the war, the three trials tanks were placed on display at Australian Army bases and one was later destroyed after being used as a tank target.[8]
However...


Via Wiki...

The original IWM caption reads, "Sherman tanks and trucks of 62nd Motorised Brigade advancing on the road between Nyaungyu on the Irrawaddy bridgehead and Meiktila, March 1945." This however is slightly incorrect, possibly as the result of deliberate wartime disinformation. No 62nd Brigade was involved at Nyaungu or Meiktila (being part of 19th Division, engaged at Mandalay); the 63rd Brigade, part of 17th Division was part of the advance on Meiktila.
Sergeant R Stubbs, No.9 Army Film and Photographic Unit. - This is photograph SE 3071 from the collections of the Imperial War Museums.


============================

The British did not agree with Australian conclusions. They had reached the "global tank" perspective.

Furthermore...

Don't assume that someone is ignorant of terrain or circumstances and use.

Okeefenokee swamp
and Fort Stewart was part of my life experience.

They used M1s in the swamp and tank ranges on that post based on Vietnam lessons learned. Ever try to pull a 65 tonne tank out of a swamp bog after it fell off a bridge?
 
The British did not agree with Australian conclusions. They had reached the "global tank" perspective.
The British did not agree because they were answering a different question of a MBT for all likely environments from arctic to desert via hills and jungles. The Australians were answering the question of a tank to act in support of infantry in dense uneven jungle. Both answers were right - for their own questions.
 
The British did not agree because they were answering a different question of a MBT for all likely environments from arctic to desert via hills and jungles. The Australians were answering the question of a tank to act in support of infantry in dense uneven jungle. Both answers were right - for their own questions.
I think we both wrote that conclusion.
 
Results? Same source.



However...


Via Wiki...

The original IWM caption reads, "Sherman tanks and trucks of 62nd Motorised Brigade advancing on the road between Nyaungyu on the Irrawaddy bridgehead and Meiktila, March 1945." This however is slightly incorrect, possibly as the result of deliberate wartime disinformation. No 62nd Brigade was involved at Nyaungu or Meiktila (being part of 19th Division, engaged at Mandalay); the 63rd Brigade, part of 17th Division was part of the advance on Meiktila.
Sergeant R Stubbs, No.9 Army Film and Photographic Unit. - This is photograph SE 3071 from the collections of the Imperial War Museums.


============================

The British did not agree with Australian conclusions. They had reached the "global tank" perspective.

Furthermore...

Don't assume that someone is ignorant of terrain or circumstances and use.

Okeefenokee swamp and Fort Stewart was part of my life experience.

They used M1s in the swamp and tank ranges on that post based on Vietnam lessons learned. Ever try to pull a 65 tonne tank out of a swamp bog after it fell off a bridge?
No I have not. Ever tried to pull a Centurion or Leopard tank out of a swamp in Australia? Australian swamps, in the Top End are comparable to New Guinea or Papua swamps by all accounts. Thick, gelatinous mud, filled with leaches and spiders and Mosquitoes. Not a nice environment.

New Guinea, near the coasts is basically one continuous swamp, with an occasional beach facing it on the ocean side. Not conduscive to armoured warfar at all. Which is why it was basically an effort by PBI which drove the Japanese back, supported occasionally by armour. Sometimes successfully, sometimes not. The Battle of the Beachheads is one where they only just succeeded. There were no places for mass armoured warfare there. Infantry tanks ruled supreme. I have seen films of trials conducted by the RAAC of various armoured vehicles, just post war in PNG. M3s, Lights and Mediums, M4 Mediums, Mathildas, Valentines and Churchills. They go into the jungle completely clean and they would emerge completely covered in foliage and mud. Guess which vehicles performed the best?
 
I know what I wrote. I also know what I quoted from Hyperwar. Please compare and reach your own conclusions. My opinion is not written in stone. But I trust the USAAF narrative more than my opinion and they said what I said.
If you're interested in what Tedder, Conningham, Broadhurst and the Desert Air Force actually did in North Africa (or at least the RAF version :)), then that is also available on Hyperwar.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RAF-II/UK-RAF-II-11.html
 

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