how would the Mexican Revolution look like with a delayed WW1?

The Mexican Revolution got hot exactly around the time WW1 started, how would no WW1 in 1914 change the cards in Mexico? How likely is an armed intervention by the US? Would european powers get involved?
 

Driftless

Donor
I'm not so sure of the full-on war with the US, even without a more imminent threat of going to war in Europe. While the Jingos and US businesses with investments in Mexico would pound their chests for war in 1916, the US Army's own assessment was that it would take over 200,000 men for the Mexico invasion alone. At that point, the entire world-wide US Army was less that 150,000.

The Revolution definitely hamstrung any idea of centralized efforts by any Mexican government, evidence seen in both the Veracruz caper of 1914 and the Pancho Villa Expedition of 1916. However, the 1915 campaigns of Alavaro Obregon against Villa showed that the Mexican Army was both substantial in size and quite capable in performance, using then current European battlefield tactics. US General Frederick Funston was an observer at the battle of Celayo, where Obregon's outnumbered forces used trenches, barbed wire, machine guns, and prepared artillery to decimate Villa's army.

When one of Pershing's cavalry regiments got into a firefight with Mexican government forces at Parral (400+ miles south of the border), both sides hastily convened a parley between the big chiefs to dial back the confrontation. Neither side was ready for a full-on war between the country's. Mexico already had its handsful in the internal fights, and the US was hard pressed to keep Pershing's 10,000 cavalrymen supplied south of the border. (Ultimately there was about another 100,000 US regulars and National Guard spread along the US side of the border - in part, much easier to supply.

Then, there's the possibility of Mexican revolutionary factions largely setting aside their differences long enough to confront an external enemy. That Mexican force would be larger at the start than the US force and every bit as well armed. (That make-nice idea is largely speculation on my part - but the reality of the Mexican Army of that time was real)
 
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I'm not so sure of the full-on war with the US, even without a more imminent threat of going to war in Europe. While the Jingos and US businesses with investments in Mexico would pound their chests for war in 1916, the US Army's own assessment was that it would take over 200,000 men for the Mexico invasion alone. At that point, the entire world-wide US Army was less that 150,000.

The Revolution definitely hamstrung any idea of centralized efforts by any Mexican government, evidence seen in both the Veracruz caper of 1914 and the Pancho Villa Expedition of 1916. However, the 1915 campaigns of Alavaro Obregon against Villa showed that the Mexican Army was both substantial in size and quite capable in performance, using then current European battlefield tactics. US General Frederick Funston was an observer at the battle of Celayo, where Obregon's outnumbered forces used trenches, barbed wire, machine guns, and prepared artillery to decimate Villa's army.

When one of Pershing's cavalry regiments got into a firefight with Mexican government forces at Parral (400+ miles south of the border), both sides hastily convened a parlay between the big chiefs to dial back the confrontation. Neither side was ready for a full-on war between the country's. Mexico already had its handsful in the internal fights, and the US was hard pressed to keep Pershing's 10,000 cavalrymen supplied south of the border. (Ultimately there was about another 100,000 US regulars and National Guard spread along the US side of the border - in part, much easier to supply.

Then, there's the possibility of Mexican revolutionary factions largely setting aside their differences long enough to confront an external enemy. That Mexican force would be larger at the start than the US force and every bit as well armed. (That make-nice idea is largely speculation on my part - but the reality of the Mexican Army of that time was real)
So how do you think the US government would handle the situation? Since a large scale invasion would be too risky
 

Driftless

Donor
So how do you think the US government would handle the situation? Since a large scale invasion would be too risky
I'm not certain at all, but I think Wilson would try to step away as quickly as he could, while trying to avoid "losing face". By the time of the scrap at Parral, it was becoming more evident the idea of capturing or killing Pancho Villa had slipped away. (General Scott had laid out the unreality of that expectation before Pershing was sent South). The cavalry had done what was possible, chasing phantoms given the immensity of that rugged part of Mexico. IMO, the Parral fight paradoxically both helped bring the end to the Expedition and dragged it out for a bit. It was becoming obvious that the US was getting diminishing returns on chasing Villa's dispersed force, but it wouldn't do to look like Mexico was forcing us to leave....

Some wildcards were the US Business groups, who might benefit from keeping US forces south of the border and the US Ambassadors to Mexico tended to work for those business groups more so than Washington. They might throw a monkey wrench into the works. The growing threat of becoming involved with the war in Europe made OTL withdrawal an easier operational decision and an easier political sell too.
 
I'm not so sure of the full-on war with the US, even without a more imminent threat of going to war in Europe. While the Jingos and US businesses with investments in Mexico would pound their chests for war in 1916, the US Army's own assessment was that it would take over 200,000 men for the Mexico invasion alone. At that point, the entire world-wide US Army was less that 150,000.

The Revolution definitely hamstrung any idea of centralized efforts by any Mexican government, evidence seen in both the Veracruz caper of 1914 and the Pancho Villa Expedition of 1916. However, the 1915 campaigns of Alavaro Obregon against Villa showed that the Mexican Army was both substantial in size and quite capable in performance, using then current European battlefield tactics. US General Frederick Funston was an observer at the battle of Celayo, where Obregon's outnumbered forces used trenches, barbed wire, machine guns, and prepared artillery to decimate Villa's army.

When one of Pershing's cavalry regiments got into a firefight with Mexican government forces at Parral (400+ miles south of the border), both sides hastily convened a parley between the big chiefs to dial back the confrontation. Neither side was ready for a full-on war between the country's. Mexico already had its handsful in the internal fights, and the US was hard pressed to keep Pershing's 10,000 cavalrymen supplied south of the border. (Ultimately there was about another 100,000 US regulars and National Guard spread along the US side of the border - in part, much easier to supply.

Then, there's the possibility of Mexican revolutionary factions largely setting aside their differences long enough to confront an external enemy. That Mexican force would be larger at the start than the US force and every bit as well armed. (That make-nice idea is largely speculation on my part - but the reality of the Mexican Army of that time was real)
In 1919, there was a major war scare with Mexico over a attack on an American diplomat and a threat to nationalize the oil industry (largely owned by Americans), which came at the worst possible point as America was already in the throes of the First Red Scare. Congress at this time also produced documentation of Pro-German and Pro-Bolshevik actions within Mexico, inflaming the crisis. Ultimately, it came down solely to President Wilson making a timely recover in November of that, enabling him to safe off the efforts of his Secretary of State to start such a conflict.

For more info:
Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Interventionist Movement of 1919
1919: William Jenkins, Robert Lansing, and the Mexican Interlude
Tempest in a Teapot? The Mexican-United States Intervention Crisis of 1919

Of note, to me personally, is this statement before Congress by Congressman J.W. Taylor of Tennessee:
"If I had my way about it, Uncle Sam would immediately send a company of civil engineers into Mexico, backed by sufficient military forces, with instructions to draw a parallel line to and about 100 miles south of the Rio Grande, and we would...annex this territory as indemnity for past depredations . . and if this reminder should not have the desired effect I would continue to move the line southward until the Mexican government was crowded off [the] North America."
These feelings were the culmination of a decade of frustration and anger with Mexico, stretching back into the height of that country's Revolution/Civil War. To quote from "An Enemy Closer to Us than Any European Power": The Impact of Mexico on Texan Public Opinion before World War I by Patrick L. Cox, The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Jul., 2001, Vol. 105, No. 1 (Jul., 2001), pp. 40-80:
The Wilson administration and the military again blamed the conflict on Villa. Governor Ferguson expressed the feelings of many when he advocated United States intervention in Mexico to "assume control of that unfortunate country." J. S. M. McKamey, a banker in the South Texas community of Gregory concluded, "we ought to take the country over and keep it." As an alternative, McKamey told Congressman McLemore that the United States should "buy a few of the northern states of Mexico" because it would be "cheaper than going to war." The San Antonio Express urged the Mexican government to cooperate with Pershing's force to pursue those who participated in "organized murder, plundering and property destruction."
 

Driftless

Donor
In 1919, there was a major war scare with Mexico over a attack on an American diplomat and a threat to nationalize the oil industry (largely owned by Americans), which came at the worst possible point as America was already in the throes of the First Red Scare. Congress at this time also produced documentation of Pro-German and Pro-Bolshevik actions within Mexico, inflaming the crisis. Ultimately, it came down solely to President Wilson making a timely recover in November of that, enabling him to safe off the efforts of his Secretary of State to start such a conflict.

For more info:
Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Interventionist Movement of 1919
1919: William Jenkins, Robert Lansing, and the Mexican Interlude
Tempest in a Teapot? The Mexican-United States Intervention Crisis of 1919

Of note, to me personally, is this statement before Congress by Congressman J.W. Taylor of Tennessee:

These feelings were the culmination of a decade of frustration and anger with Mexico, stretching back into the height of that country's Revolution/Civil War. To quote from "An Enemy Closer to Us than Any European Power": The Impact of Mexico on Texan Public Opinion before World War I by Patrick L. Cox, The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Jul., 2001, Vol. 105, No. 1 (Jul., 2001), pp. 40-80:
You may be right about 1919. What reading of history I've done has mostly been on the lead-up and follow on's for the Veracruz/Tampico Incident in 1914 and the Pancho Villa Expedtion 1916-17.

My gut feeling is that Wilson wanted no part of any war. He pretty much left the handling of the AEF and the Navy to their respective Secretary's during the Great War.

*later edit* What happens if the delayed Great War opens up in 1918, or thereabouts?
 
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