How "should" WWII in 1940 have gone?

[Flavius Iulius Maiorianus]

Opinions on the fall of France in 1940 are greatly divided. The two main camps, as far as I can see, are as follows:

Camp 1 holds that the fall of France was a pure fluke. Manstein's plan even being implemented and the Ardennes offensive happening at all were rather unlikely, and it was only Hitler overriding the general staff that it happened. The French discovering Germany's previous plan and it confirming their thoughts was lucky for Germany, as was France's slow response times. Had Manstein's plan not gone through, which seems more likely than OTL, the Germans would have lost in 1940 and been ground down by the Entente. Same with a bluntet sickle.

Camp 2 holds that the fall of France was mostly inevitable without a pre-war PoD. The German use of radios in their tanks gave them a huge advantage in communications, and their concentration of armor formations, as opposed to the allies mixing their armor in with the infantry, along with German use of air power to a greater degree than the allies, made victory much more likely than defeat. It might take longer, but it would probably happen.

My question is, how "should" WW2 in 1940 have gone? From a timeline writing perspective, OTL's fall of France would be laughed at as ASB in pretty much any timeline. Would it be more probable for Manstein's plan for an Ardennes offensive to be rejected? Would the allies have ground down Germany by 1942, given that Germany, even before the annexation of Czechia, had a higher population and produced more steel and electricity than either Britain or France?

 

[Sekhmet_D]

That the Allies managed to escape Dunkirk at all could be viewed as ASB.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Opinions on the fall of France in 1940 are greatly divided. The two main camps, as far as I can see, are as follows:

Camp 1 holds that the fall of France was a pure fluke. Manstein's plan even being implemented and the Ardennes offensive happening at all were rather unlikely, and it was only Hitler overriding the general staff that it happened. The French discovering Germany's previous plan and it confirming their thoughts was lucky for Germany, as was France's slow response times. Had Manstein's plan not gone through, which seems more likely than OTL, the Germans would have lost in 1940 and been ground down by the Entente. Same with a bluntet sickle.

Camp 2 holds that the fall of France was mostly inevitable without a pre-war PoD. The German use of radios in their tanks gave them a huge advantage in communications, and their concentration of armor formations, as opposed to the allies mixing their armor in with the infantry, along with German use of air power to a greater degree than the allies, made victory much more likely than defeat. It might take longer, but it would probably happen.

My question is, how "should" WW2 in 1940 have gone? From a timeline writing perspective, OTL's fall of France would be laughed at as ASB in pretty much any timeline. Would it be more probable for Manstein's plan for an Ardennes offensive to be rejected? Would the allies have ground down Germany by 1942, given that Germany, even before the annexation of Czechia, had a higher population and produced more steel and electricity than either Britain or France?

Only Germany was ready for WW2 and of the European Democracies only the United Kingdom had a moat that it could retreat behind and prepare for the rematch.

With hindsight what should have happened is Hitler should have been told to stuff it at Munich back when Germany was effectively surrounded and outnumbered.

Or even better France opposing Hitler during the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 by calling his bluff and it was a bluff.

France for various reasons (IMO to many changes in government during the 30s - leading to inconsistent long term planning) was no where near ready for WW2 and its army unlike the Germans had yet to blow the cobwebs out and get rid of the dead wood.

The Germans had half a campaign with the occupation of Czech republic and then a full campaign with the Invasion of Poland with learnings of what worked and what did not, disseminated at Rgt Colonel level and cascaded down to their units over the Winter and Spring of 1940.

There was a real problem with the French army - soldier for solider it was a good as the Germans - but it lacked the ethos that made the Heer such a tough enemy.

I will give you one example that I heard - in early 1940 there was a young Lt in charge of an anti tank battery full of very green troops most of whom had never fired their units 25mm Hotchkiss AT guns.

He thought it would be a good idea to traipse down to a local disused opened mine and have his troops have a go at live firing their guns.

His Divisional commander found out and had him court marshalled basically for showing some initiative.

The French army was too rigid, to inflexible - junior commanders and even divisional and Corps commanders unable to exercise any initiative.

At the Ardennes the French armies 10th Corps had 3 days to conduct a counter attack and did nothing while the Germans sorted out the worlds most heavily armoured traffic jam.

10th Corps had it been better handled and acted aggressively would have very likely stopped the Panzer army in its tracks (no pun intended).

I am not sure how this can be fixed before May 1940 but the men where there, the weapons where there, the leadership however was not.

And that IMO is more important than any weapon system, mission command method or reliance on out dated communications.

France, like all of the Western Democracies was not ready for a war it did not want.

 

[Not James Stockdale]

The dysfunction in the French Army was such that the first German breakthrough that could get to operational depths would collapse the entire front for 2-4 weeks. It just happened that IOTL the Germans went with the high-risk, high-reward Sickle Cut. If the Germans had concentrated their armored forces in the Gembloux Gap instead and broken through against the French First Army, the French still would have struggled to maneuver against the penetration because of their problems with leadership, logistics, and communication.

 

[alspug]

The French Army was absolutely world class at the individual soldier level, once you go above company level the communication and control was terrible.

Then you look at the French Air Force and the situation regarding how many aircraft actually had fighting equipment needed. The majority of the French Air Force was grounded due to lacking guns or gun sights etc.

The Army had a huge armoured force but no way to control it.
The Navy was literally the best equipped force and was still months away from being ready.

 

[Sekhmet_D]

The Army had a huge armoured force but no way to control it.

And it nevertheless still managed to give the Germans a good run for their money. Surviving Panzer crewmen gave pretty harrowing accounts of what it was like to battle Char B1s.

 

[Band in China]

The French decision to fully lunge north into the Netherlands without reserves was the problem: they couldn't do anything if something happened down south. It's relatively easy to change the circumstances or personalities involved in that. If it wasn't the case and they left the Dutch they'll be a decent chance they can just pinch off a panzer thrust.

 

[Maniakes]

A key factor in the OTL outcome of the Battle of France is that German command and control was set up for a much faster decision loop than the Allies. The French Army in particular was built for a WW1-style tempo, with operations planned weeks in advance and command messages being hand-carried by runners and staff cars.

On paper, the Sickle Cut was horrifically vulnerable to counterattack at a number of stages, starting with the aforementioned Ardennes traffic jam. But every time the Allies tried to organize a counterattack, either the plan was obsolete long before it was ready to execute, or the operation was a pitiful uncoordinated mess (e.g. the 1940 Battle of Arras) because that's all that could be improvised on the required timetable.

The Manstein Plan was pretty much ideal for exploiting this advantage, since it forced a rapid battle of maneuver that was very different from what the Allies were prepared for. And it was a very high risk and high reward plan, with the risks enormously mitigated by the C&C advantages. Had the Germans gone with the original plan and given the Allies the head-on clash they had expected, and the C&C advantage is still going to be a major leg up for the Germans, but it will likely be much less dramatic than OTL's, more in the nature of repeated tactical victories rather than one big sweeping encirclement.

 

[Driftless]

Step back to April, and have the Norwegians heed the several credible warnings of impending German invasion and actually mobilizing their forces. Would that prevent the conquest of Norway? Probably not, but perhaps the Fallschirmjagers get shot up more on the air assaults at Oslo and Stavanger, plus increased loss of Ju-52s and their crews. Those losses may have some impact on later ops in the following month. Have more of the Norwegian coastal batteries engage German ships entering Norwegian territorial waters. Again, probably not enough to stave off conquest, but the Kriegsmarine and landing forces take damage and casualties. Up at Narvik, have the ancient Pansarskeps start shooting right away, as soon as the Kriegsmarine Destroyers enter the fjord. They were largely manned by low-experience reservists, so stopping the landing altogether was highly unlikely, but:

Every little bit helps and has knock-on effects in the next few days of that campaign, and probably alters some OTL events for the May invasions

Of course, that requires a different set of Norwegian Parliamentary leadership to take those decisive actions.

 

[von Adler]

Step back to April, and have the Norwegians heed the several credible warnings of impending German invasion and actually mobilizing their forces. Would that prevent the conquest of Norway? Probably not, but perhaps the Fallschirmjagers get shot up more on the air assaults at Oslo and Stavanger, plus increased loss of Ju-52s and their crews. Those losses may have some impact on later ops in the following month. Have more of the Norwegian coastal batteries engage German ships entering Norwegian territorial waters. Again, probably not enough to stave off conquest, but the Kriegsmarine and landing forces take damage and casualties. Up at Narvik, have the ancient Pansarskeps start shooting right away, as soon as the Kriegsmarine Destroyers enter the fjord. They were largely manned by low-experience reservists, so stopping the landing altogether was highly unlikely, but:

Every little bit helps and has knock-on effects in the next few days of that campaign, and probably alters some OTL events for the May invasions

Of course, that requires a different set of Norwegian Parliamentary leadership to take those decisive actions.

The Germans comitted their C-team to Norway. Except four regiments of moubtain troops and three companies of paratroopers, none of the troops sent in had more than 90 days of training they had no mortars, their artillery was weak and ww1 vintage.

The Norwegian army was 116 000 men if mobilised and they could with a few days warning pretty much shut off any port and fjord with remote-detonated mines if they actually tried to fight.

Norway that has allbits navy out and ready, mines deployed and a ready army defending the ports can prevent the initial German landing force of some 20 000 from taking any ports and then slowly whittle the bridgeheads which will lack artillery and mortars, down.

Any air support would have to come from Denmark, which would seriously limit its usefulness.

Noreay got two warnibgs from Oster and four from Sweden, but chose to ignore them.

 

[Pblouin21]

If we think about it carefully, "Fall Gelb" was the only chance for the allies to block the advance, given the configuration of the sector, provided they allocated other means and a coherent counterattack force. Unlike a renewal of the 1914 offensive, which would have seen 10 panzer divisions attack head-on, with a good chance of breaking through at several points.

 

[mack8]

I'm in camp 2 so to say, but imo it is conceivable that a bit more luck/inspiration/decisiveness from the part of the french (be it hight command, or various tactical commanders on the ground etc.) might have bought them a few more weeks of resistance in the metropolis. But the major "should" is this, whatever happened, the french shouldn't have put the white flag up so easily. As much as possible conduct a fighting retreat to the Med ports, get whatever they could across the Med and continue the war from North Africa. This could have had massive repercussions for the rest of the war. I don't expect the kind of FFO wank to happen for the french troops in NA, imo they will have couple of tough years ahead just fighting not to be evicted from NA by a likely greatly augmented Rommel and the italians, but this alone will greatly increase the italian/german attrition, with all kinds of consequences on all fronts as the war drags on.

 

[Dorknought]

Should?
Everyone goes (not you Japan) to Helsinki for the Olympics and we all have a great time.

 

[thaddeus]

That the Allies managed to escape Dunkirk at all could be viewed as ASB.

Step back to April, and have the Norwegians heed the several credible warnings of impending German invasion and actually mobilizing their forces. Would that prevent the conquest of Norway?

if we are in a "should" thread the German torpedoes "should" have been in better working order? the German planning "should" have sent longer range vessels to Narvik rather than the problematic DDs?

can see more upside for the KM at Norway and to an extent Dunkirk (and the subsequent evacuations) and more upside for the Allies with some possible delaying actions in the Netherlands and the Ardennes? or go back to an earlier time as has been suggested.

 

[lionhead]

Is there a camp 3 that says that the collapse of France was mainly due to poor leadership, as the French government was weak and corrupt? I am part of that camp. They were so terrified. They just handed France over. Nobody was as surprised by the fall of France as the Germans were.

Maybe they should have kept on fighting. Let Paris be destroyed. Let the Germans work for it. Would they have been able to go all the way? What about after?

 

[Eric C Johnson]

If I may be so bold and ugly; I think more of this discussion should include what Belgium "should" have done. Beginning with the occupation of Prague in March 1939, and especially after Weserubung drove the last nail in the coffin of "safety through strict neutrality". A month is a long time, and a month to place Allied armies in Belgium in April/May - from which they are breathing hard on the assembly areas for Army Group B - do not bode well for an Ardennes Offensive.
To a degree, this critique also applies to the Netherlands.

 

[DougM]

I tgink France and GB should have been able to put up a bit better resistance, Once the colapse comes i tgink France should have been able to fight a retreat (not a witch draw but and actual retreat) south with government and troops evacuating to North Africa.

I think the French Fleet should. have moved to N.A. as well and the French Government in excile takes up in North Africa.
This would have hurt Germany by A) slowing the advance, B) cost them loss troops and equipment by making them fight for all of France, C) Cost the troops in occupying all of France. D) made them fortify the South of France
This would in my opinion made Africa worse for Germany as they have less troops per points B and C above and now they have to fight or at oeast defend against GB AND France in N.A.
Add in that this obviously still fighting France will probably be one of the main recipients of Lend Lease and North Africa can become a sticking point for Germany. Especially with the French Navy helping GB.
Heck i would have to look at the numbers but it may help with the battle of the Atlantic as the French Navy activily helping the Royal Navy may free up ships to help protect the convoys from the Uboats.

Yes France would have been occupied hut so what? Vichy France Was for all intents and purposes doing the work of Germany for them without the cost of occupying the part of France. So Germany is not getting much it didnt bt occupying Southern France and this time they have to use there own troops and equipment doing it.

It also makes operation Torch completely different. The US can just stage in French North Africa without having to invade it, And just invade German occupoid Africa assuming GB and France have not chased them out of Affrica by then. So we may see an invasion of Sicily sooner.

In general i dont think this speeds the war up much and D Day is probably more or less when and where it was but I think it will go better/faster and i think the Southern Invasion (Dragoon) will be more integrated with Overlord from the start. Will probably happen sooner and may have a lot more support from French troops.

So i suspect the war in France goes faster and Russia does not get as far but that probably does not change much as they will have less time to invade Germany but they probably face a bit smaller number of troops as Germany has yo protect and occupy all of France from day one.
So i think the USSR occupies less of Germany.

But not by huge numbers.

 

[BeardedHoplite]

Starting a 1940 French reenacting group, so been reading a lot about the period. I've only read about half of the sources I had planned to read so far, but the overall takeaway I am getting is that France had everything it needed to beat Germany in 1940.

The issue was not material things like manpower, weapons or even necessarily tactics (although their inability to concentrate their objectively better tanks is a painful "WHY DIDN'T YOU DO THAT" thing when reading the sources), but national will. France suffered enormously in World War I and there just wasn't the will to continue the fight. It is especially disheartening because the French were starting to learn how to deal with the Germans - fully half of all Heer casualties were taken after Dunkirk. There just wasn't the will to send another generation to the graveyard. Of course, hindsight is what it is, but the French people in 1940 didn't know how bad things were going to get (and to their credit, many did change their allegiance after once it was shown how bad things would get).

Avoiding a big defeat like the French suffered in 1940, and you keep them in the war and grind the Germans down.

 

[Reggieperrin]

Step back to April, and have the Norwegians heed the several credible warnings of impending German invasion and actually mobilizing their forces. Would that prevent the conquest of Norway? Probably not,
…
Of course, that requires a different set of Norwegian Parliamentary leadership to take those decisive actions.

The Germans comitted their C-team to Norway. Except four regiments of moubtain troops and three companies of paratroopers, none of the troops sent in had more than 90 days of training they had no mortars, their artillery was weak and ww1 vintage.

Noreay got two warnibgs from Oster and four from Sweden, but chose to ignore them.

Its also worth mentioning that the Worlds Greatest Navy ®️™️ was based within a days brisk steaming of this entire debacle and at the time of kickoff was not only busy aggressively violating Norwegian neutrality but even had an amphibious force in the starting blocks ready to pre-emptively invade Norway for their own protection*.

Yet just like the French command and the Norwegian government, at every opportunity to demonstrate a degree of competence the RN instead chose to shit in their hands then applaud. To a frankly unrealistic degree.
So. Many. Cockups.

*This whole “even our best friends are champing at the bit to invade us” vibe probably didn’t help the Norwegian decision making very much when deciding whether to declare mobilisation, which would signal both Germany and the UK they have to invade right now or miss their chance.

 

[lionhead]

If I may be so bold and ugly; I think more of this discussion should include what Belgium "should" have done. Beginning with the occupation of Prague in March 1939, and especially after Weserubung drove the last nail in the coffin of "safety through strict neutrality". A month is a long time, and a month to place Allied armies in Belgium in April/May - from which they are breathing hard on the assembly areas for Army Group B - do not bode well for an Ardennes Offensive.
To a degree, this critique also applies to the Netherlands.

But are they allied armies in your country if there is no war yet? Or are they an occupation force trying to tell these nation what to do, how to defend? Technically Belgium and The Netherlands were not in a military alliance with UK and France, so any foreign soldiers entering a sovereign country would be a violation of independence. They may as well just let German troops in instead. Or, they declare war on Germany themselves. Just to be first.

If they do grant military access and go in a military alliance, which is months/years earlier, you can bet your ass Germany will respond in kind.

Thats not how The Netherlands and Belgium wanted to play it though.