By 1943 the Political Bureau was capable of observing that victory was not a matter of possibility, but of cost. Interesting that's about when the Soviet Union goes into ensuring a best-possible outcome.
By 1943 the War Cabinet was capable of observing that victory was not a matter of possibility, but of costs. Interestingly 1943 is when the UK War Cabinet stops manoeuvering for optimal outcomes, but basically gives in to interservice rivalry demands.
I don't know enough about US labrynthine bureaucracy to be reminded of the babe.
Mid to late 1942, when several items had come together. War legislation gave the Federal government firm control over production, which among other things resulted in a clearer understanding of the true US production capability. Fundamental questions about priorities for military mobilization were answered and a practical plan for full army/navy mobilization was implemented. Through 1941 the military mobilization had been difficult with competing political factions fighting for control. Again War legislation executed in early 1942 & Roosevelt coming down hard for some clear basic planning clarified things wonderfully as 1942 progressed. There were still some uncertainties into 1943, but those revolved more are the definition of what 'winning' or the end state might be. Roosevelts declaration of the Unconditional Surrender policy is a key indicator for the US leadership. That was not a spurious impulse. The President had been discussing the options for end state of the war during most of 1942, & policy papers like the Plan DOG memo of 1941, the RAINBOW Plan of the same year, and decisions for rearmament & mobilization as far back as 1938 required some thought about the desired goals or end state. Roosevelt had thought though the Unconditional Surrender policy for at least six months and went to the SYMBOL Conference at Casablanca in January 1943 confident Unconditional Surrender could be enforced in less than five years.
For Germany it was 1943. Since a teen ager I've been stumbling across German literature; autobiographies, historical references to the German leaders thoughts, fiction written by those who survived the war. Its evident any thinking German saw at some point in 1943 the war was lost. & not simply a negotiated peace leaving a viable nazi Third Reich. That is seeing the destruction of the current German state inevitable. Even if there were some sort of negotiated peace, Germany would still be occupied and the treaty imposed would make the Treaty of Versailles look fair and reasonable. What the nazi leaders & the senior marshals and Generals all thought is another matter. Some indicated in 1943 they saw the war as catastrophically lost. Others did not appear to admit this until 1944 or later. ie: Rommels papers and verbal statements recorded by others indicate he accepted the war as lost in the spring of 1944, when he joined the conspiracy.