Great Turkish War: How much could the Ottomans lose?

The Great Turkish War lasted from 1683 to 1699 and ended with the Ottomans being expelled from Hungary and the Morea IOTL. However, the Holy League troops marched as far south as Nis (in Serbia) and Macedonia before being driven back to the north of the Danube, and there were uprisings in Bulgaria that were eventually defeated. The Russian also made two attempts to conquer the Crimea (in 1687 and 1689) but failed in their objectives.

So, how much worse could the Ottomans be plausibly defeated ITTL? Could they lose Crimea, Bosnia and perhaps even Bulgaria if everything goes right for the Austrians and their allies?
 
Here's a potential POD.

The Holy League besieged Buda in 1684, one year after their victory in Vienna, but they were defeated by the Ottoman garrison. They eventually captured it in 1686 and defeated the Turks in the second battle of Mohács, which ended the Empire's control of Hungary.

What if the first siege was successful, and the allies reach the Danube and eventually Serbia and Macedonia a couple of years earlier? Could they take advantage of Ottoman infighting (Mehmed IV was overthrown in 1687)?
 
The Great Turkish War lasted from 1683 to 1699 and ended with the Ottomans being expelled from Hungary and the Morea IOTL. However, the Holy League troops marched as far south as Nis (in Serbia) and Macedonia before being driven back to the north of the Danube, and there were uprisings in Bulgaria that were eventually defeated. The Russian also made two attempts to conquer the Crimea (in 1687 and 1689) but failed in their objectives.

So, how much worse could the Ottomans be plausibly defeated ITTL? Could they lose Crimea, Bosnia and perhaps even Bulgaria if everything goes right for the Austrians and their allies?
After the failed Crimea expeditions Russians captured and retained Azov and the adjacent coast area. It can realistically get Kerch thus controlling entry to the Black Sea.

As far as the Crimea was concerned, the contemporary warfare was making approach to the Peninsula extremely difficult due to the clumsy logistics. However, it is probably safe to say that to the great degree these expeditions failed due to the leadership: Vasily Golitsin was an outstanding statesman but he was not a military commander. I’d say that with a better leadership and more carefully chosen troops ( no feudal militia, no streltsy, just the Western style regiments and the Cossacks with a minimal supply train) and the timing (not allowing the Tatar to burn steppe, etc,) the army could reach Perekop. Taking Perekop fortifications was not a problem: there was a dry moat and the earthworks approximately 10km long with a stone fort in the center guarding a sole bridge (picture below). The Tatars simply did not have troops to defend perimeter that long and it was taken easily by the Munnich expedition in 1835, then by Lacy in 1738 and finally by Dolgorukov in 1771.
The problem was with what to do next. On one hand it was rather simple. Practically all cities were in the coastal area and I’ll-protected. Taking them was not a big problem in 1735-38. The problem was in finding a food for the troops afterwards because center of the peninsula is mostly arid semi-desert and the cumbersome marching arrangements combined with the tendency to keep the whole army together made catching up with the Tatars impossible. Both in 1735 and in 1738 the Russians got in and then had to leave the peninsula due to the lack of food.
OTOH in 1771 conquest started from creating a base in newly-conquered “Novorossia” (map below) and Dolgorukov had been active in a fast and aggressive manner with a reasonably small force, forcing the Crimeans to capitulate and in 1777 the Tatars simply dispersed when the Russians entered the Peninsula. The main differences between the earlier and final expeditions were:
(a) Doing conquest in the stages: first the steppes and then the peninsula. This immensely improved both “getting there” and supply situation eliminating a need in a huge supply train and minimizing exhaustion of the troops.
(b) A much greater tactical flexibility
(c) Psychological factor: the Tatars (and Ottomans, also present in the Crimea) were not feared anymore.

I don’t think that even with the better preparedness the Crimea could be taken and held (but this was still within a real of possibility) but at least a big chunk of “Novorossia” surely could be occupied. Of course, as a prerequisite, tactics of the Western style regiments had to be brought up to the Western (Austrian) standards and the war trusted to the generals (not sure if there were qualified cadres on the top level: Peter exiled not just Vasily Golitsin but also his subordinate commanders and we know too little on the subject).
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Could a more successful campaign against Crimea alow Sophia to maintain her power as regent for longer?
It is possible but her position remained shaky: both her brothers had been grown-ups and not everybody was happy with her. IMO, there were two solutions: 1st, the radical one, get rid of Peter (but how to do this without generating suspicions) and 2nd - to force Ivan to play an active Tsar.

Actually, Peter himself was not an immediate problem: after the victory he concentrated on entertaining himself by sailing the boats, drinking, etc. until death of his mother forced him to start ruling. But his mother and her clique were a different story. I’m not sure up to which degree she was important personally but after the victory her brother became de-facto PM (*), Patriarch was supportive and so were other influential people like Romodanovsky and Boris Golitsin.


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(*) No noticeable talents and it seems that with all their closeness to the ruling family all the way to 1917 the Naryshkins failed to produce a single noticeable figure.
 
Could Peter have remained an irresponsible fratboy while Sophia did the ruling in his place? Or would he eventually get tired of his lifestyle?
 
Could Peter have remained an irresponsible fratboy while Sophia did the ruling in his place? Or would he eventually get tired of his lifestyle?
Sophia was ruling as a regent for two co-tsars out of which Peter was junior. So the only things needed for her to continue was (a) to force her brother Ivan to start playing an active role (or at least to pretend) and (b) to get rid of Peter’s mother and uncle. Ivan asserting his authority would invalidate all attempts of a power grab from Naryshkin clan (*) and death of the senior members of the family would eliminate the leadership of the opposition.
Probably success against the Crimea, even if peninsula itself was not taken, would be a major bonus for Sophia. The problem was that the Russian diplomacy of that period was quite naive. Tsardom got Kiev from the PLC permanently (before that it was Russian “temporarily”) for the promise to join a war. To start with, the PLC was not in a position to get it back if Tsardom refused to do so peacefully. Then, Kiev had a purely token value adding very little, if anything, economically or strategically. Most definitely it was not worthy of a major war with unclear outcome. But if they decided to be honest, there was no obligation of taking the Crimea and it was quite possible to launch a “conventional” war by chipping out the pieces of the border Crimean territories steadily preparing a base for the future invasions. Even Peter’s Azov campaigns were making more strategic sense because they had a better logistics (supply by Don River) and marginalized possible Tatar intervention.
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(*) The OTL coup was strictly about Sophia and her alleged attempt to assassinate Peter. With an active senior tsar pulling the schema would be much more difficult.
 
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