RamscoopRaider
Donor
...The Nationalists made no plans for a major offensive until Spring of 1938. Time was on their side and the Popular Front was growing weaker by the day. They planned to wait and raise new forces to cover for the withdrawal of the German Condor Legion and half of the Italian contingent. Fate however would have something else in store for them. It started with a simple bombardment of a Popular Front blocking position at the town of Puerto Rey by the Nationalist heavy cruisers Canarias and Baleares in January. A few hundred 8” shells and half as many 4.7” shells were lobbed at an exposed frontline coastal position and the reserves immediately behind it, more to justify the Spanish Navy’s postwar budget than anything else.
That this bombardment resulted in the frontline forces fleeing and allowing their position to be taken by the Nationalists was not entirely out of left field. What was out of left field was the Nationalist forces acting aggressive enough to not only force the somewhat shaken reserves to withdraw but to seize the next river line before popular front forces could arrive. What was further unexpected was that the Popular Front forces immediately inland of there would disintegrate upon being outflanked rather than withdraw creating a true breach in the lines.
The gap would only continue to grow as even modest attempts by Nationalist leaders saw tertiary Popular Front forces seem to disintegrate on contact. In an uncharacteristic display of initiative the Nationalist Corps commander in the area took the opportunity to push his reserves through a gap in the mountains and take the city of Cartagena. That alone should have been the end of it but the fall of Cartagena, along with so much other bad news broke Popular Front morale on the southern front.
Blocking positions in the mountains of Murcia that should have taken Nationalist forces weeks and heavy artillery to break through often broke after the first desultory bombardments. Despite not wanting or planning it General Franco found himself with a general offensive going on as glory seeking commanders pushed their troops onwards. The Nationalist war leader quickly realized that he had to get ahead of things and deployed his air and naval forces to prevent the Popular Front from taking advantage of the overextended Nationalist forces.
On February 20th the port of Alicante fell and the situation utterly collapsed for the Popular Front. Only Valencia was left to provide a source of supply for the Popular Front pocket in central Spain, and that city was within range of Nationalist heavy artillery. It was soon clear to everyone that the Popular Front forces were about to be cut off and morale already faltering collapsed on the western and northern fronts as well. Units shot their commissars and went home, while efforts to recruit emergency units of old men, young boys and women to replace them proved fruitless. Only a small hard core of communist fanatics remained to resist the Nationalist tide and they were quickly overwhelmed, by the beginning of April only Catalonia remained in Popular Front hands...
-Excerpt from European Wars for Americans, Harper & Brothers, New York, 2004
...1937 saw the US Army reverse one of its long standing war plans. Until that point the Army had followed the lead of the Navy in the defense of the Philippines, given that the Navy had concluded for the past decades that they could not relieve the islands for at least 24 if not 36 months given a need to secure advanced bases and crash build auxiliaries, the Army had like them written the islands off. Nothing more than a tripwire force to deter rebellion and aggression was placed on the islands. If the Japanese attacked it was small enough to be an affordable loss, if the islands revolted it was large enough to hold Manila until reinforcements arrived. With the decision to grant the islands their freedom in 1944 rebellion became a distant concern as most would be rebels would not jeopardize a known date for American withdrawal and the Army garrison was drawn down further.
In 1937 however Army plans began to change. There are a number of reasons for this. The famous but apocryphal story is that a racist Army observer at a Navy Wargame saw that the Navy rated IJN crews as being as good as their own and since “Nips can’t fight like White Men,” concluded that the Navy was sandbagging and actually could immediately relieve the islands. The actual reasons were…
...Army planning focused on holding the Bataan Peninsula. Doing so would deny the Japanese the use of Manila Bay and make retaking control of the Bay easier when the Navy Relief force arrived. Bunkered stockpiles and prebuilt defense lines would be created there, along with an internal railway to move troops and operate railway artillery. Several additional heavy coast artillery batteries would be placed to cover the western side of the Peninsula while airfields would be built to protect the skies.
No plans were made to contest the beaches, given that it was assumed that the Japanese could bring together enough firepower to eliminate any beach defenses not covered by battleship grade artillery. This of course ignored that doing so was not IJN doctrine, something that the Navy would have been happy to point out.
Similarly there were no plans to fight a mobile campaign on Luzon, as that approach was thought to expose the defenders to more casualties than a fixed defense of Bataan would and would not expose the IJA’s lack of heavy artillery that a fixed defense would. While true this approach would also neutralize the IJA’s greater relative lack of mobile artillery and motorized transport, something that would be especially felt given the bottlenecks imposed by over the beach logistics. This was a matter that the Marine Corps had studied extensively in the interwar era, yet like the Navy they were not consulted on the matter…
...An alternative plan was floated later on in 1938 with input from the Navy and Marines. It called for a mobile defense of Luzon from the beaches all the way back to Bataan, where a much reduced stand would take place. The forces freed up by a smaller force at Bataan would instead be used to fight a combined land and naval guerrilla campaign in the countless islands that made up the center of the Philippine archipelago. This plan was wargamed and found to potentially allow forces to remain in being until relieved, unless the IJN was prepared to pay a very steep price in blood and ships to force them out. The Army brass refused to consider this plan...
-Excerpt from Forging Columbia’s Sword, The United States Army between the Wars, Norwich University Press, Northfield, 2009
...In 1937 Hitler formally established the Volkskampfverband or VKV as the successor to the myriad of Weimar era paramilitaries that had been unified as the Kampfbund with the creation of the German National Front. Following the Consolidation of the National Front into the SVP and the repudiation of the Versailles Treaty the paramilitaries had been allowed to languish and shrink. No longer needed for political purposes with Hitler’s consolidation of power and no longer useful as a hidden reserve with the expansion of the Heer the Kampfbund was surplus to requirements and generated too much bad PR with the law and order crowds to be worth it. By 1937 the organization was less than a tenth its 1932 size and shrinking.
In 1937 however Hitler saw a use for it. Officially it was used as a source of military manpower that would not stress the already full training and expansion pipeline of the Heer that could be used for third lines roles in occupations or internal security. Unofficially the VKV was created to counter the possibility of a coup by the Wehrmacht. While Hitler had not discovered any of the conspiracies to oust him that had floated around the Wehrmacht High Command he was aware that he was not well liked and that many saw his course of action as exceedingly reckless. Thus he desired to break the Wehrmacht monopoly on military force…
...Another key motivation behind the creation of the VKV was that as a purely political and ideological creature it lacked the ingrained traditions of honor and duty that permeated the Wehrmacht. Thus the VKV could be used for dirty work that the Wehrmacht would refuse to stoop to. Given Hitler’s plans to “purify” the areas he conquered the need for a military force without a conscience was clear...
-Excerpt from Steel Talons: Armed Forces of the Interwar, Dewitt Publishing, Los Angeles, 2011
…The Myth of the Clean Wehrmacht is an enduring one in popular consciousness. The idea that the VKV was responsible for all, or almost all, of the bad things that the German military forces did in WWII is well accepted. Careful collation of data in recent years casts doubt on this. While data on many of the worst crimes of the German state during WWII is difficult to come by, to the point that records of many atrocities are undoubtedly lost, data from American and British Commonwealth military sources has survived intact. This paper will show that data indicates that the Wehrmacht carried out a significant number of warcrimes on its own, ranking third in confirmed cases per capita behind the IJA and VKV during WWII…
...An obvious reason for the scapegoating of the VKV was its relatively smaller size. Quite simply far fewer Germans served in the VKV than the Heer. Given that almost all German men of appropriate age, and many above or below that line, served in WWII, accusing the Heer of committing large scale war crimes would be akin to accusing the entire population, something obviously not popular with that population. Blaming a smaller minority was thus far easier politically...
...Collation of Americans and Commonwealth regimental histories shows that recorded POW massacres by Wehrmacht units occur only 40% less frequently than those by VKV units after adjusting for differences in frontline strength...
-Excerpt from Revisionist Viewpoints in History Volume XXX, University of California Press: Berkley, 2020
Okay no word on my laptop so still borrowing a computer to write these, corrections may be slow in coming
That this bombardment resulted in the frontline forces fleeing and allowing their position to be taken by the Nationalists was not entirely out of left field. What was out of left field was the Nationalist forces acting aggressive enough to not only force the somewhat shaken reserves to withdraw but to seize the next river line before popular front forces could arrive. What was further unexpected was that the Popular Front forces immediately inland of there would disintegrate upon being outflanked rather than withdraw creating a true breach in the lines.
The gap would only continue to grow as even modest attempts by Nationalist leaders saw tertiary Popular Front forces seem to disintegrate on contact. In an uncharacteristic display of initiative the Nationalist Corps commander in the area took the opportunity to push his reserves through a gap in the mountains and take the city of Cartagena. That alone should have been the end of it but the fall of Cartagena, along with so much other bad news broke Popular Front morale on the southern front.
Blocking positions in the mountains of Murcia that should have taken Nationalist forces weeks and heavy artillery to break through often broke after the first desultory bombardments. Despite not wanting or planning it General Franco found himself with a general offensive going on as glory seeking commanders pushed their troops onwards. The Nationalist war leader quickly realized that he had to get ahead of things and deployed his air and naval forces to prevent the Popular Front from taking advantage of the overextended Nationalist forces.
On February 20th the port of Alicante fell and the situation utterly collapsed for the Popular Front. Only Valencia was left to provide a source of supply for the Popular Front pocket in central Spain, and that city was within range of Nationalist heavy artillery. It was soon clear to everyone that the Popular Front forces were about to be cut off and morale already faltering collapsed on the western and northern fronts as well. Units shot their commissars and went home, while efforts to recruit emergency units of old men, young boys and women to replace them proved fruitless. Only a small hard core of communist fanatics remained to resist the Nationalist tide and they were quickly overwhelmed, by the beginning of April only Catalonia remained in Popular Front hands...
-Excerpt from European Wars for Americans, Harper & Brothers, New York, 2004
...1937 saw the US Army reverse one of its long standing war plans. Until that point the Army had followed the lead of the Navy in the defense of the Philippines, given that the Navy had concluded for the past decades that they could not relieve the islands for at least 24 if not 36 months given a need to secure advanced bases and crash build auxiliaries, the Army had like them written the islands off. Nothing more than a tripwire force to deter rebellion and aggression was placed on the islands. If the Japanese attacked it was small enough to be an affordable loss, if the islands revolted it was large enough to hold Manila until reinforcements arrived. With the decision to grant the islands their freedom in 1944 rebellion became a distant concern as most would be rebels would not jeopardize a known date for American withdrawal and the Army garrison was drawn down further.
In 1937 however Army plans began to change. There are a number of reasons for this. The famous but apocryphal story is that a racist Army observer at a Navy Wargame saw that the Navy rated IJN crews as being as good as their own and since “Nips can’t fight like White Men,” concluded that the Navy was sandbagging and actually could immediately relieve the islands. The actual reasons were…
...Army planning focused on holding the Bataan Peninsula. Doing so would deny the Japanese the use of Manila Bay and make retaking control of the Bay easier when the Navy Relief force arrived. Bunkered stockpiles and prebuilt defense lines would be created there, along with an internal railway to move troops and operate railway artillery. Several additional heavy coast artillery batteries would be placed to cover the western side of the Peninsula while airfields would be built to protect the skies.
No plans were made to contest the beaches, given that it was assumed that the Japanese could bring together enough firepower to eliminate any beach defenses not covered by battleship grade artillery. This of course ignored that doing so was not IJN doctrine, something that the Navy would have been happy to point out.
Similarly there were no plans to fight a mobile campaign on Luzon, as that approach was thought to expose the defenders to more casualties than a fixed defense of Bataan would and would not expose the IJA’s lack of heavy artillery that a fixed defense would. While true this approach would also neutralize the IJA’s greater relative lack of mobile artillery and motorized transport, something that would be especially felt given the bottlenecks imposed by over the beach logistics. This was a matter that the Marine Corps had studied extensively in the interwar era, yet like the Navy they were not consulted on the matter…
...An alternative plan was floated later on in 1938 with input from the Navy and Marines. It called for a mobile defense of Luzon from the beaches all the way back to Bataan, where a much reduced stand would take place. The forces freed up by a smaller force at Bataan would instead be used to fight a combined land and naval guerrilla campaign in the countless islands that made up the center of the Philippine archipelago. This plan was wargamed and found to potentially allow forces to remain in being until relieved, unless the IJN was prepared to pay a very steep price in blood and ships to force them out. The Army brass refused to consider this plan...
-Excerpt from Forging Columbia’s Sword, The United States Army between the Wars, Norwich University Press, Northfield, 2009
...In 1937 Hitler formally established the Volkskampfverband or VKV as the successor to the myriad of Weimar era paramilitaries that had been unified as the Kampfbund with the creation of the German National Front. Following the Consolidation of the National Front into the SVP and the repudiation of the Versailles Treaty the paramilitaries had been allowed to languish and shrink. No longer needed for political purposes with Hitler’s consolidation of power and no longer useful as a hidden reserve with the expansion of the Heer the Kampfbund was surplus to requirements and generated too much bad PR with the law and order crowds to be worth it. By 1937 the organization was less than a tenth its 1932 size and shrinking.
In 1937 however Hitler saw a use for it. Officially it was used as a source of military manpower that would not stress the already full training and expansion pipeline of the Heer that could be used for third lines roles in occupations or internal security. Unofficially the VKV was created to counter the possibility of a coup by the Wehrmacht. While Hitler had not discovered any of the conspiracies to oust him that had floated around the Wehrmacht High Command he was aware that he was not well liked and that many saw his course of action as exceedingly reckless. Thus he desired to break the Wehrmacht monopoly on military force…
...Another key motivation behind the creation of the VKV was that as a purely political and ideological creature it lacked the ingrained traditions of honor and duty that permeated the Wehrmacht. Thus the VKV could be used for dirty work that the Wehrmacht would refuse to stoop to. Given Hitler’s plans to “purify” the areas he conquered the need for a military force without a conscience was clear...
-Excerpt from Steel Talons: Armed Forces of the Interwar, Dewitt Publishing, Los Angeles, 2011
…The Myth of the Clean Wehrmacht is an enduring one in popular consciousness. The idea that the VKV was responsible for all, or almost all, of the bad things that the German military forces did in WWII is well accepted. Careful collation of data in recent years casts doubt on this. While data on many of the worst crimes of the German state during WWII is difficult to come by, to the point that records of many atrocities are undoubtedly lost, data from American and British Commonwealth military sources has survived intact. This paper will show that data indicates that the Wehrmacht carried out a significant number of warcrimes on its own, ranking third in confirmed cases per capita behind the IJA and VKV during WWII…
...An obvious reason for the scapegoating of the VKV was its relatively smaller size. Quite simply far fewer Germans served in the VKV than the Heer. Given that almost all German men of appropriate age, and many above or below that line, served in WWII, accusing the Heer of committing large scale war crimes would be akin to accusing the entire population, something obviously not popular with that population. Blaming a smaller minority was thus far easier politically...
...Collation of Americans and Commonwealth regimental histories shows that recorded POW massacres by Wehrmacht units occur only 40% less frequently than those by VKV units after adjusting for differences in frontline strength...
-Excerpt from Revisionist Viewpoints in History Volume XXX, University of California Press: Berkley, 2020
Okay no word on my laptop so still borrowing a computer to write these, corrections may be slow in coming
Last edited: