…With the recovery from the depression underway naval building accelerated as the early thirties transitioned to the mid 30’s…
…After the fourth Panzerschiff Germany laid down a pair of light battleships on the model of the French or Italians, though somewhat larger. These vessels mounted 9 30.5cm guns in three triples, along with 12 15cm and 14 10.5cm secondaries in twins, could make 31 knots and were very well armored for their size. Officially they were 30,000 tons in practice they were closer to 35,000.
These battleships were to be escorted by a set of five 12,500 ton heavy cruisers. These cruisers however, despite only mounting 8 20.3 cm guns in a conventional arrangement, along with 12 10.5cm secondaries, a 32 knot speed, and moderate armor, ended up displacing over 18,000 tons standard due to inefficiency in the German design office. A light carrier half sister of these vessels was planned to give Germany a start in naval aviation…
…Upon the realization that their rivals were also building light battleships at about the same time France and Italy both changed their plans. Rather than four light battleships and four heavy, they decided on two light and six heavy. Again for reasons of convergent evolution both designs ended up as fairly similar adaptations of their existing light battleships.
The French design retained the all forward arrangement and upgunned to 380mm guns with 9 155mm and 12 100mm secondaries. Speed was increased to 32 knots and armor increased to resist 15” shellfire on 40,000 tons displacement.
The Italians similarly scaled up their design to 45,000 tons and 15” guns. 9 152mm and 16 100mm secondary guns were carried, the former all on the centerline in a superfiring arrangement reversed from the main battery. The Italian ships were two knots slower than their French counterparts, but had more powerful guns and an unique armor arrangement. Namely they had an additional 75mm plate of armor held in front of their main belts to tear the armor piercing caps off enemy shells of up to 15 inches so that the main belt could bounce them.
Both the French and Italians had considered 16” guns, but rejected them due to reasons of development time. If they were to be incorporated both navies thought it would be on the seventh and eight units they were planning to build…
…After years of neglect the USSR started building large warships again. Not able to start constructing capital ships immediately they started with a set of destroyer leaders, followed by a set of 7500 ton cruisers armed with 9 180mm guns. These cruisers were lightly armored but theoretically capable of 37 knots, in practice this turned out to be 35 knots given they were around 700 to 1000 tons overweight, with a main battery with both horrible rates of fire and poor barrel life…
…The United Kingdom had perhaps the thorniest situation of any of the great naval powers. They had the largest fleet, yet also the largest commitments, worse they had ten capital ships that needed immediate replacement. This along with tight budgets dominated their thinking. Thus they were operating on the assumption that they would have to work within the existing WNT limitations and would do their best to tighten them further.
It was this thinking that dominated the planning process for replacing their capital ships. They needed to start immediately once the holiday expired, but at the same time they had to work within the limits of the treaty. Given that they had about 280,000 tons to work with, that translated to 6 45,000 ton ships, 7 40,000 ton ships, 8 35,000 ton ships or 9 30,000 ton ships.
The 45,000 ton ships if built would be 16” fast battleships, the 40,000 ton ships either 16” fast battleships of 15” battlecruisers, the 35,000 ton ships 15” or 14” fast battleships, 15” or 14” battlecruisers or 16” slow battleships and the 30,000 ton ships 15” or 14” battlecruisers or 14” fast battleships of 15” or 16” slow battleships. Given the proliferation of fast capital ships and large cruisers the slow battleship options were discarded as unfitting of the current strategic environment. Similarly given the need for quantity to replace ten ships, the 45,000 ton option was removed. The decision by both the Italian and French to move to building larger capital ships and the expected renewal of Japanese capital ship building made any 30,000 ton ship liable to be too weak.
This left the options at a 40,000 ton 16” fast battleship, a 35,000 ton 15” or 14” fast battleship or a 35,000 ton 15” or 14” battlecruiser, the difference between the fast battleship and battlecruiser being around 3 knots of speed and paid for by a reduced main battery. Given the desire to stuff the genie back into the bottle and return to a lower tonnage limit, 35,000 tons was chosen. 15” was chosen as the caliber of main armament to give a better chance of hurting the 16” armed ships that currently existed. There was an argument that the Americans were more likely to agree to 14” as a limitation as they had guns of that caliber, but that was ignored given American intentions to design a new gun for their new ships. This left a choice between a battlecruiser or a battleship, given that the RN had 7 battlecruisers and 10 battleships it was retaining, it was decided that battleships were the greater need…
…The USN had taken advantage of FDRs generosity in allocating emergency relief funds in 1933 and 1934 to fund a trio of 25,000 ton carriers and the remainder of the 10,000 ton 6” cruisers they were authorized. Thus 1935 saw them lay down the first 3200 ton “scout cruiser”, that was totally not a destroyer leader…
…USN capital ship building assumed that the 6 14”/45 armed battleships would be replaced by a quartet of 16” armed battlecruisers as soon as the building holiday expired. This would be followed by the rest of the standards being replaced by 6 16” battleships, which would follow a 1 for 1 replacement of the existing ships as they aged out. Intention for the battlecruisers was for 33 knot ships with 9 16” guns in a 3x3 arrangement, the battleships would be 28 knot ships with a thicker belt and a fourth turret. Both would have 20 5” DP guns as a secondary armament and be built out of Special Treatment Steel to save weight and increase strength.
The United States gave no thought to the idea of constructing smaller capital ships, having tried that in 1904 with the Mississippi class pre-Dreadnoughts and not liked it. They would build the largest possible warships they could do, anything less would be poor value for money and would have difficulty with whatever they thought Japan was going to build next…
…After the Typhoon incident of 1933 the Japanese were forced to refit much of their construction. In trying to put as much firepower on as little tonnage as possible they had left their ships structurally weak and top heavy, upon encounter with a Typhoon several ships suffered severe damage and a destroyer capsized but remained afloat. This led to a great deal of work in reinforcing existing ships and modifying those under construction. It also led to the demise of the idea of using “600 ton” torpedo boats as unlimited destroyer substitutes.
Instead the IJN looked at the relative success of the “Special Type Gunboat” in riding out the heavy seas and decided to build a fleet of “shadow destroyers”, gunboats that could be rapidly converted into destroyers in the leadup to a war. This would go with the fleet of “shadow carriers” they were building from fast tenders and subsidized merchantmen who would also be converted into the leadup to war and complement the two fleet carriers of the Shoukaku class they had built and the two officially 22,500 ton Taiho class they were currently building…
…As the Second Wilmington Naval Conference approached the IJN made what in hindsight looks like a foolish decision from the outside but made perfect sense when one considered internal politics. The IJA was growing and had gained in prestige from its establishing of a protectorate in Manchuria, and the subsequent expansion of that protectorate and neutralization of KMT activities in parts of Northern China. Thus in an increasingly nationalistic time the IJA had been seen as standing up for Japan and received budgetary increases to match.
The IJN had to do something to gain the same public perception and justify budget increases as not to be left behind in influence by their rivals. Thus they made the decision that unless they received serious concessions at the coming Second Wilmington Conference they would withdraw from the Naval Treaty system…
-Excerpt from Naval History Between the Wars, Harper & Brothers, New York, 2007
Okay another naval update, not really a timeline progression one, sue me I wanted to write something fun after 19 pages about a coffee shop chain that will not be named