…The Republican convention of 1928 was a foregone conclusion. With a booming economy and a successful record of handling the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 President Curtis saw no opposition to renomination. For a Vice President, former governor Channing Cox of Massachusetts was chosen as a Progressive and Easterner to balance the ticket…
…The Democratic Convention of 1928 saw the final destruction of the Wilson wing of the Democratic Party. Not one Wilson man was in serious contention for the top spot. Instead it was merely a question of whether Al Smith of New York would receive the nomination or not. Smith was an unusual candidate for the party and time, being both a wet and a catholic, things which did not endear him to the Democratic base in the Solid South.
Smith did have rock solid support from the urban political machines and the increasingly wet northern delegations. Furthermore he had the advantage that his opposition was lacking. With Curtiss’s popularity and advantages of incumbency and a booming economy, his victory seemed inevitable, thus the heavyweights of the party decided to stay out of the race. Because of this no clear leader of either the progressive or conservative opposition to Smith emerged and he was elected on the first ballot. As a balance to the ticket Senator Duncan Fletcher of Florida was chosen as Vice President…
…Smith performed better than any democrat since Wilson in 1916. However his Catholicism held him back, with the religion being seen as foreign and unamerican by many at the time. Similarly despite an openly dry platform, his wet sympathies cost him many votes as many thought he would backdoor an end to prohibition. Finally of course the general prosperity of the period induced a don’t rock the boat attitude in voters, Curtis had done well so why change things now?
Smith managed 39% of the vote compared to Curtis’s 59%, but only won six southern states and Massachusetts. This saw Curtis win 449 to 87 in the electoral college as a candidate in his own right…
-Excerpt from Unfinished Business: The Making of the Second World War, New American Press, Chicago, 2007
…On the eve of the Depression there were few indeed who would believe that the United States might again enter a world war. For many of course the horrors of another World War were simply too horrible to contemplate. Surely no one would dare risk a repeat of such butchery. For those who could contemplate such occurring, the thought was that the United States would stay out.
The US felt burned by its participation in the First World War, as the elation of the so called victory faded the costs were clearly seen alongside the lack of benefits. The United States had gained nothing from the war, while her cobelligerents had profited mightily. Claims of making the world Safe for Democracy rang hollow as nation after nation in Europe fell into dictatorship. Entente propaganda was seen for the lies it was. The Central Powers were seen as little better, with Prussian militarists, Austrian tyrants and Ottoman genocides coloring opinions. The general feeling was “a pox on both their houses,” let the Europeans kill each other if they want, we will stay out of this.
That this would change in less than a decade and a half was impossible to foresee…
-Excerpt From Deals with Devils: Diplomacy before and During the Second World War, Johnstone Press, Seattle, 2005
…PODs involving the Great Depression are significantly harder to manage. For all the temptation to blame matters on Curtis, the fact is the situation was already baked in by the time he took office as Vice President, let alone became president. The nature of WWI saw an enormous inflow of capital into the United States, turning the nation from a debtor to a creditor. While much of this was lent back out, enough was retained to increase the amount available for lending within the United States considerably. This saw credit terms loosened to insane degrees.
As long as there was a Great War such a thing is inevitable. Actions could have been done to avoid it. Increased taxation and greater government spending on things other than debt repayment would have mitigated the impact. A surviving Leonard Wood, or a different Vice President than Curtis might have done that, on the other hand there were influential voices such as Andrew Mellon calling for much greater tax cuts and others calling for less government spending.
Curtis did actually attempt to react to the warning signs present, however he did so within what he saw as the limits of executive power. He thus pressured the federal reserve to rescue rural banks, who were failing one a day, and to raise interest rates to avoid excess borrowing. He endorsed a statement by the treasury department warning against buying stock on margin and provided informal support for a rural bank rescue bill that died in committee. Another may have been more vigorous, yet another may have ignored the warning signs altogether.
Curtis’s actions after the outbreak of the Depression were orthodox for the time and according to the advice of then reputable economists. Most other possible president candidates in 1928 would have done the same in his shoes, and the others based on their expressed views would have done worse. Thus it is very hard to avoid the depression purely through changing the top man in the office…
…The effects of the depression world wide were to create a class of angry unemployed people who would vote for whoever promised a solution to the issue. In many countries the established parties were unable to provide such and the electorate began turning to the far left and right. This saw the latter take power in many fragile democracies in Eastern and Southern Europe, seeing Sanna’s Italy as a success and seeing the communists as a greater threat. It further exacerbated the instability in France and contributed to the takeover of the SVP in Germany. In doing so it set the geopolitical stage for the Second World War.
It further made a long war possible. The democratic powers were compelled to cut arms spending by the Depression, giving a chance for the Fascists and Communists to catch up and achieve near parity if not superiority…
…Avoiding the Depression would likely avoid WWII as we know it, without the Depression the nature of the Emergency coalition in Germany is different and the SVP is not formed and Germany retains sane leadership. Germany is still likely to eventually unite with Austria in a peaceful manner, and may fight either Czechoslovakia or Poland for territory. No plausible alternative government however would be willing to take a risk and start a war that may lead to the involvement of Britain or France.
Similarly Sanna would start a war with Greece or Yugoslavia if he was certain they were diplomatically isolated and there would be not intervention. At the same time he would not risk a possible confrontation with Britain or France on his own.
Stalin was a monster, but he was a cautious and patient one, he may start a war, but like Sanna would not risk coming in conflict with one of the Great European powers, and thus would not start a world war.
Japan is the most likely to start a major war, given the tendencies of her junior army officers, but events in Asia are unlikely to cause an outbreak of war in Europe. Even if the French and British battle fleets were drawn off, their armies and air forces would still be mostly at home and remain a powerful deterrent. Japan at best could cause a large regional war.
Thus without the Great Depression the world would avoid the Second World War and all the horrors that came with and followed it…
-Excerpt from Sideways: An Examination of Common Divergences in Counterfactual History, Gate Publishing, Atlanta, 2016
This Concludes Part III of Ghastly Victories: The United States in the World Wars
Part IV: Dark Depression will begin shortly
Yes this is a day late, I spent three and a half hours yesterday sitting in my car waiting for a Covid test with the highest fever I'd had in ten years. I should have ignored that clerk and gone home for two hours, would have been much less miserable and maybe updated on time