Extract from ch.1, The Fall of the Rising Sun, Brendan Green
The Allies made no secret of their reinforcement of the East. In 1941 the War Council devoted as much time to this subject as to any other. Once the Germans had failed at Olympus and invaded Russia, the pace quickened. The Japanese began to see their window of opportunity closing.
In order to understand Japanese actions we must recall that a genuine peace policy had become impossible. Those politicians who preferred it lived in terror of their lives. Politics, in the true sense of the word, had in fact ceased in Japan some years earlier; what Japan now had instead was inter-service rivalry. Almost unconsciously, peace had vanished from the set of options before Japanese policy-makers, the question had become who to fight (and when), not whether to fight.
The Army was undecided whether to fight Russia or the Western powers, while the Navy preferred the latter, as a war with Russia would give them little to do. The Japanese armed forces had obtained an excessive share of Japan’s GDP for many years, and now felt they had to justify this by results. Adding a further twist, even those senior officers who prudently feared war could not act on this belief. They too feared assassination...
The Japanese had occupied the southernmost portion of China, Kwangsi province, adjacent to the Indochina border, in 1939. During 1940 and into 1941, Kwangsi became their main base for operations against Indochina. IJA incursions into French territory became frequent. In April 1941 the whole of Japanese 5th Division crossed the frontier in the region of Lang Son, looting and burning several villages in an apparent attempt at discrediting French authority. The French forces in the area were too weak to permit anything but diplomatic protests, which significantly were now joined by Washington. But the IJA hotheads ignored this portent, and further raids occurred during the summer.
The pace of events towards war became irreversible after the Long Chau Incident. The Japanese had occupied this island, along with several others, in 1940 during their initial period of pressure following the fall of France. A French outpost on the island had temporarily been abandoned during July 1940, and the local Japanese forces seized the opportunity. They had withdrawn from the other islands during the winter, but despite promising to do so, never pulled out of Long Chau. During the spring of 1941 instead they reinforced the place with more troops and artillery. Japanese aircraft regularly patrolled over the island, and occasionally landed.
The French authorities had by now grown weary of protests. In the late summer, the first reinforcements arrived, including thirty D.520 fighter aircraft, and these were based near Hanoi. French aircraft flew over Long Chau, and before long there were clashes. A French aircraft was shot down on July 21st. In retaliation French ships moved up from Cam Ranh and bombarded the island. The Japanese escalated by attacking and sinking a French transport, with over 500 people aboard, on the 28th, and two more French ships on the 30th. At the same time the IJA had moved troops towards the frontier between China and Indo-China, and border incursions followed. All these Japanese actions, it seems, were on the initiative of bellicose local commanders; Tokyo was unable or unwilling to order de-escalation.
The French and British responded by ordering more reinforcements to the East, despite their commitments in Europe. Both sent a pair of capital ships to the region and began planning to send larger reinforcements. ‘We have a responsibility in the East, and we must also give encouragement to Chungking,’ wrote de Gaulle. ‘The best bet to restrain Tokyo is to build up China.’ The British, for their part, sought American assistance in upgrading the Burma Road. ‘We want to increase the capacity to a thousand tons a day, if possible,’ wrote General Wavell. ‘That should give Tokyo something to think about.’
US opinion sided strongly with the French. ‘History tells us that the Chinese used to call the Japanese pirates, and what they are doing in the Gulf of Tonkin is nothing less than piracy,’ thundered one Los Angeles newspaper. ‘The Gulf of Tonkin incident makes it imperative that Washington takes a stand,’ wrote the Washington Post.
The US government now acted, freezing Japanese assets in the USA. This act has received endless speculation as to how to interpret the President’s intentions. It appears to me that President Roosevelt wanted to force Japan to choose between either ending or expanding its war, knowing that either option would ultimately suit America, and the Tonkin incidents gave him the perfect opportunity. In fact the President misjudged Tokyo if he believed there was any chance they would choose to end their unjust war in China. But his misjudgement was as nothing to that of the decision-takers in Tokyo. The embargo, more than any other action, persuaded the Japanese Government to commit to the so-called Southern Operation. The Emperor gave his assent, with a show of reluctance…
