Essai en Guerre: an FFO-inspired TL

[Geordie]

When Tommy goes marching to Saigon* is not a song I expected to be a mainstay of this TL. I understand why, but in universe, I expect it will be considered a costly and unnecessary mistake. De Gaulle will either be ungrateful or offended; Mandel's start is on the wane, and I can't see this rescuing him.

*To the tune of When Jonny comes marching home.

 

[spkaca]

in universe, I expect it will be considered a costly and unnecessary mistake

Towards the end of the war OTL, there were a few operations like that, still argued over today. OTL also the British did indeed enter Indochina, but not until the war had ended.
On to the final chapter now, sadly. First to wrap up Theo's odyssey.

 

[spkaca]

Part 17. Ou sont les neiges d’antan?

A Song at the Sacrifice, ch.21, by Theo Barker

...The Huns, of course, were long gone by this point. We now know that Berlin had thrown in the towel about the Balkans as soon as the Red Army took Ploesti, in fact they’d made the decision pretty much as soon as the Russians crossed the Dniester; it seems the oil was always their main interest in the entire region. When one reflects on it, it is remarkable the extent to which their lack of oil drove German strategy in the entire war - remarkable too that they went to war in the first place without a really reliable source.

Our lads pushed north in September, the Greeks occupied the rest of Albania and French V Corps pushed into the Vardar, some of our spearheads had pushed into Bulgaria, with an armoured column headed for Sofia while the New Zealanders took the high ground in the Rhodope mountains. So orders now came to me to leave Alex once again, as our troops needed people like me on the scene. Going back to Athens was a very different experience to my leaving it. Instead of a hair-raising trip by ship, at risk of being bombed, I went in great comfort aboard a French transport plane via Crete, where I stopped off for a couple of days. The population looked fairly fit: food had been less short on Crete than one might expect. Maleme had undergone a great transformation, the Americans had turned it into a massive logistical base for their air striking force in Attica. But it never really did much, since by the time it was ready, the Germans were already leaving Greece, and Piraeus handled their needs quite satisfactorily. But such things always happen in war. In the event it came in very useful later, during the Balkan relief efforts. But I get ahead of myself.

My feet barely had time to touch the ground in Athens before I was whisked off into days of almost continuous meetings in Salonika. The Government had no clear idea about policy towards its northern neighbours, the MEA had become shaky due to ongoing problems between the liberals and royalists. We did not want to dictate, and the various parties and groups were at loggerheads. In particular the Communists wanted a bigger role in government. They had real grievances of course, and they had put up with a lot, but we couldn’t let them take more power than they deserved. The Royalists wanted to kick them out entirely, and the Venizelists had no warm feelings.

Then - in Salonika especially - we had the problem of what to do about the collaborators. Feelings ran pretty high on this subject as you would expect. On the one hand the Communists - and others - felt the Government was letting them off lightly. It did sicken us to see known collaborators walking about quite freely - quite a number of them were shot in what one might call unofficial justice. On the other hand, northern Greece was still in a mess, and the last thing it needed was a purge, the country might have fallen into chaos. Perhaps that’s what the Communists wanted. We took the lead from London that we had no strong position on how to handle them, but we did want all the parties to agree on what should be done. A fool’s hope. The matter became a political football.

The Communists didn’t want to give up their weapons, not without making sure of rock-solid political gains. I left Athens in the New Year of ‘45, feeling that civil war had now become a real risk if the Venizelists split, and I had seen enough of war to want out. I expected that the Government would win - they had all the advantages - but I did not want to see the Greeks fighting each other. Once back in Alex, I told Eleni our return to Athens might be somewhat delayed. Although I was wrong about civil war breaking out - the Communists could see the odds against them as well as I could - I was right that our return would be delayed. In the end we didn’t get back for over a year, not until the elections, and you know what happened then. So while one chapter ended, another began. But that is another story.

 

[iddt3]

Huh, no Greek Civil War, what changed the calculations? Stronger government since no occupation?

 

[spkaca]

Huh, no Greek Civil War, what changed the calculations? Stronger government since no occupation?

Yes - stronger in every sense. Politically stronger, because they never went into exile; economically stronger, since much of the country never suffered occupation and has received abundant Lend-Lease aid; and militarily stronger, since they have an army of several divisions (perhaps as many as 10) in the field. Therefore the KKE/ ELAS is in no position to even start fighting, though they might bluff as a negotiating ploy.

 

[spkaca]

Extract from ch.8 of Herbert Molins, Du sel et sol: histoire militaire de la campagne en Europe

Snow fell heavily that winter. In December and January the Germans undertook local counter-offensives at various points on the front, in order to exploit the bad weather, which kept Allied aircraft mostly grounded. These gained ground in a few places, but hardly repaid the cost. Typical was the experience of the Vosges offensive in mid-January, launched to deny French 1st Army control of high ground west of Colmar. General Bethouart handled the defence deftly, giving ground in places in order to economise on forces, and waiting for a spell of clear weather before launching a successful counter-attack. By the end of the month the Germans had returned to their start lines, having inflicted some 10,000 casualties but suffered just as heavily.

At about the same time, two further blows fell on the Germans. General O’Connor’s 2nd Army and General Bradley’s Army Group closed up to the Rhine in several places. During February the Allies laid their plans for the final offensives. But the strain of the long defensive battle, and the crushing weight of the Allied air offensive, had taken such a toll on the Germans that the line began to crack even before the planned assaults across the Rhine could take place. ‘There are long sectors of the river that have no meaningful defence,’ noted Kesselring on February 22nd. ‘It is only a matter of time.’

The Americans were first across. Troops of the US 7th Army took a fortuitous opportunity on the last day of the month, seizing a bridgehead in chaotic circumstances, while 3rd Army followed suit soon after. British and Canadian troops soon followed. On March 1st - St David’s Day - 53rd (Welsh) Division exploited a gap torn open by 11th Armoured Division, and seized the partially demolished remnants of the Rhine bridge at Arnhem. Within three days 2nd Army had two corps across. Finally, on March 3rd the French 1st Army launched its final offensive, operation MURIEL. ‘Finally we could prove the truth of Napoleon’s saying, that it is with the artillery that one makes war,’ said General Olry, who came to the front to witness the culmination of France’s long trial. ‘The bombardments at Verdun seem small next to this.’ French armour surged forward on a ten-mile front and seized two crossings. ‘Berlin by Easter,’ became the cry; though in fact French 1st Army directed their victorious arms towards Munich…

March became the month when the Allied armies reaped their rewards. In the north, General Alexander’s 21st Army Group liberated eastern Holland and drove across the north German plain, with 2nd Army taking Bremen on the 27th and Hamburg on the 2nd April. ‘Resistance had become patchy,’ noted General O’Connor, ‘enemy co-ordination had broken down, the Germans had nothing left in the tank.’ US 12th Army Group did even better, taking Nuremberg and reaching the Elbe in early April, where they halted. ‘Stand firm and wait for the Red Army,’ ran the order. Meanwhile, French 1st Army entered Czechoslovakia on 20th April. The same day - Hitler’s birthday - he and several other leading Nazis committed suicide as the Red Army, having stormed into Berlin, came within just a few hundred yards of his bunker.

The successor regime, known as the ‘Himmler Government’ (although Himmler himself never actually attended any of its meetings) assembled briefly in Prague, the last capital in German hands, before French troops arrived…

 

[Amon34]

so with the end of the war in europe, what is the future for germany? does france have enough political capital to have the saarland? Germany with be balkanized or end up like otl?

 

[diestormlie]

so with the end of the war in europe, what is the future for germany? does france have enough political capital to have the saarland? Germany with be balkanized or end up like otl?

The Allies halting on the Elbe for the Soviets implies a much as OTL Yalta Conference analogue. Though with French Troops in Prague, I don't see Czechoslovakia ending up on the inside of the Iron Curtain.

 

[Driftless]

The Allies halting on the Elbe for the Soviets implies a much as OTL Yalta Conference analogue. Though with French Troops in Prague, I don't see Czechoslovakia ending up on the inside of the Iron Curtain.

Maybe on the order of the current Czechia Republic in size and border?

What of Austria, as well?

 

[spkaca]

The Allies halting on the Elbe for the Soviets implies a much as OTL Yalta Conference analogue.

Agreed.

Though with French Troops in Prague, I don't see Czechoslovakia ending up on the inside of the Iron Curtain.

Also agreed - the next update covers the beginning of what will doubtless be a delicate ATL question...

Maybe on the order of the current Czechia Republic in size and border?

Perhaps a 'Velvet Divorce' four decades early.

What of Austria, as well?

I assume roughly as OTL, to begin with, since the Red Army will get to Vienna first. But whether the USSR would take the same line postwar as OTL (with the occupation ending in the 1950s) might be more doubtful if Prague/ Czechia is an active issue.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

... 20th April [1945]. The same day - Hitler’s birthday - he and several other leading Nazis committed suicide as the Red Army, having stormed into Berlin, came within just a few hundred yards of his bunker.

So after all that, the Hitler war ends only 10 days sooner? Suicide in the bunker 1,778 days after the 8 June 1940 PoD, instead of 1,788 days OTL. ISTM that is a pretty low estimate of France.

 

[spkaca]

So after all that, the Hitler war ends only 10 days sooner? Suicide in the bunker 1,778 days after the 8 June 1940 PoD, instead of 1,788 days OTL. ISTM that is a pretty low estimate of France.

It is more a low estimate of what the Allied decision-makers - especially in London - were willing to commit to; complicated by considerations of weather. My reasoning is as follows:

1. The main way we can postulate to accelerate the war's ending would be by a cross-Channel invasion in 1943. I don't think, even in the more favourable circumstances of the ATL, that the decision-makers would have felt willing to try that. OTL a 1943 OVERLORD would have been highly risky; ATL the possibility is better, but I still think people like Churchill and Brooke would have hesitated. For a 1943 invasion, the decision would have to be made in mid-1942 (roughly), i.e. before the battle of the Atlantic had been clearly & decisively won. That, psychologically, seems unlikely. The London decision-makers knew better than anyone that a successful invasion - and just as important, the follow-up - depended on a secure trans-Atlantic supply line. Now, in 1942 one might have high confidence in winning the battle of the Atlantic in 1943, given the increases in Allied capabilities that they could reasonably expect (and in the ATL the battle of the Atlantic goes noticeably better). Against this, Churchill especially felt that a failed cross-Channel invasion might have such disastrous consequences (potentially up to & including a decisive change in US policy, towards the Pacific) that his risk appetite was low. Therefore he would want to feel certain about the Atlantic, not merely optimistic. Even if Washington and Algiers favoured quicker action, they would not have been able to override London's views.
Edit: although Washington & Algiers could not override London, they might have persuaded Churchill if the battle of the Atlantic had gone significantly better, and I accept the possibility that I have under-stated how much better it would have gone in the ATL. This is a particularly tricky issue to judge since the advantages are compounding. That is, lower attrition in 1940 would have meant still lower losses in 1941 and perhaps much bigger effects in 1942. However - and here I think is the really hard morsel to swallow - the heavy shipping losses of the 'Second Happy Time' (1st half of 1942) arose primarily from poor US naval decisions. An FFO scenario doesn't really affect the likelihood of Admiral King's errors - one could construct a scenario in which some smart Anglo-French naval delegation manages to get King's ear in late 1941 and convinces him to change policy/ doctrine - but it seems unlikely to me. And - to reiterate - in order to get a cross-Channel invasion in 1943, Washington & Algiers would need to convince London no later than late summer 1942 i.e. in the immediate aftermath of the horrendous losses of Paukenschlag. I don't believe they could have done so.

2. All that in turn means the invasion would still occur in 1944 rather than 1943. Given Northern European weather, that means no earlier than May 1944. The extra month (relative to OTL) would help, and in the ATL the Allies make it further than OTL, but again the weather exerts its crucial influence. By October, or November at the latest, the weather would make truly decisive actions or breakthroughs unlikely. The winter of 1944-5 appears to have been especially bad. So unless the Allies can cause a total collapse of the Wehrmacht by October (a possibility I wouldn't exclude, but felt just a bit too optimistic for the story), the war will go on into 1945.

3. Again, since the weather doesn't favour the offensive until March, this means the war is unlikely to end before April. One could easily advance this by a few days, but for storytelling purposes, the symmetry of April 20th appealed to me.

Originally I thought differently. I expected a FFO scenario to accelerate the ending of the European war significantly, but I can't see a major flaw in the reasoning above. There's an important caveat here: in a FFO scenario, random butterflies might mean that one of the assassination attempts against Hitler might have succeeded, with perhaps decisive consequences.
The main way, I think, to get a significantly shorter European war is a Blunted Sickle scenario, not just a FFO scenario. The main changes & benefits of the ATL are elsewhere, above all in the Mediterranean and Far East, and I have a post coming up that tries to synthesise them.

Edit 2: in the above I now realise that I have set out many of the same factors that I have stated in the Postscript to this TL, which I had already written.

 

[spkaca]

Extract from The Footsteps of History: the war diary of Eustace Marcel

April 6th 1945

My plane arrived in the dim morning, amidst a light fog - once upon a time such weather would have prevented us flying at all, but the airmen nowadays show much more confidence thanks to their new gadgets. Perhaps too much confidence; we have all heard the tragicomic circumstances around the death of General Patton, and he is not the only one. Our plane did shake alarmingly as we approached Orly. It would doubtless have given some satisfaction to my enemies, who have kept me in Algiers through a dismal winter, if I had perished.

No matter. All’s well that ends well, and finally before 10 a.m. I reached the boss’ office. I had heard he looked older, but he shows the wear of five years of heavy responsibilities. Still he played his part, and asked me much about how things go in Algiers these days. Not as well as we would hope, I told him, but could certainly be worse. He hopes the recent demonstrations merely reflect the easing of pressure, rather than the start of serious developments; I wish I could share the hope.

But our main talk discussed the central European question. With our army at last marching across Bavaria (and how blithely we talked of such ideas, five years ago!) we encounter sudden diplomatic complications. The matter of Germany we settled between ourselves, and with the Soviets - if not amicably - at least clearly. But now a glance at a map shows a new wrinkle. Bethouart will, at his present rate of advance, reach Prague some days ahead of the Red Army, and Moscow has made its displeasure clear, even at the risk of upsetting Roosevelt, who in general seeks always to accommodate them.

M. Mandel is of one mind with De Gaulle on this particular question, though as he says himself, “it would not matter if I did differ - at this point I have become De Gaulle’s messenger-boy merely”, with some bitterness. The honour of the fatherland, the prestige of our country, our place in the world of the future - all these come together on this question. Paris is afire with the demand: ‘Prague for our arms’. Any public man who opposed the demand would go in peril of his place.

But Washington ponders giving Prague to the Red Army, Mandel says, for the sake of concord. A laughable idea, in my opinion. London backs us, and who knows - perhaps this is all that stops the Americans from cutting off the fuel that keeps Bethouart advancing. Would Washington ever go so far? I hope not. Counsels seem divided there, so the fuel flows, for now. But this makes the case so strongly that we must have our own source of oil if we wish to enjoy diplomatic freedom of action - and so our conversation led us back to Algiers, and Tripoli. The prospects of trouble there - with the natives, and with the Anglo-Saxons - seem considerable…

Sadly, it seems my first springtime in Paris in five years has started poorly, so far as the prospects go. I must collect myself. Here I am in Paris once more, and victory is at hand.

*​

Extract from A Pilgrim to Mount Lebanon, by Marc Malik

Fortune smiled on us on the 21st April. The other regiments of the division faced delays from demolished bridges and traffic jams caused by broken-down vehicles, so the Regiment du Liban had the honour of liberating Prague. We found the city the scene of fierce fighting between Czech patriots and the Germans, a curious scene where in one street the people greeted us with joy and song, whereas in the next street we would find fighting still going on. Our armoured cars and half-tracks, with their ferocious quadruple machine guns, repeatedly settled these fights to the detriment of the Germans… The Colonel assigned my company the task of seizing the Gestapo headquarters. They had set up in the Emmaus Monastery, a fine old Baroque building. I dreaded to think what had become of the monks.

Concerning what followed, I can only give my own eyewitness account, amplified by the accounts I heard from others shortly after. Bachir had taken his men to pursue some of the enemy who they saw fleeing towards the river. I saw two cars emerge from a side street, which then halted and reversed when they saw us approach. The lead vehicle collided with the second, and two of the enemy emerged, firing in our direction, happily missing. We took cover and returned fire - a one-sided battle to be sure; our half track caught up with us at that moment and laid down heavy fire which rapidly reduced the two vehicles to wrecks. Bachir and his men joined us, and we cautiously moved forward and examined the bodies.

‘Happy to shoot up some Gestapo swine,’ commented Bachir, after I explained what had happened. However I sensed immediately that these might be something else. So it proved. As it turned out, many of the top Nazis had briefly set up shop there, thinking that nowhere else but Gestapo headquarters could be safe for them. A false hope indeed! So there, among their bodyguards, we found the remains of Ernst Kaltenbrunner, von Ribbentrop and Albert Speer. In one sense I regret that they never faced justice for their innumerable crimes, but I assure myself that they undoubtedly went before a more terrible and just court than any that men could set up…

On 27th April Germany’s surrender became official, and the Allies could grapple with the enormous problems of peace, and the ominous portents of cold war. As for us, we looked forward to home, and prayed that the evils foreseen by poor Charles would not befall.

 

[diestormlie]

Spkaca has, IMO, laid out good reasons for why FFO hasn't lead to a much shorter European War. I hadn't considered just how much the weather dictated the tempo of operations on the Western Front, TBH. It was eye-opening.

FFO absolutely, however, changes the situation in the Far East immensely. French Indochina not being bullied into Japanese hands changes the starting positions immensely. Additional naval, air and land assets are available to the Allies. The Japanese jumping-off point is further back. A quicker and less-lossy Mediterranean theatre means more and better resources available for the Far East, as does a less knuckle-down, dragged out Battle of the Atlantic.

I earnestly can't remember how much this TL has focused on the Far East. But IMO, I would expect the Japanese offensives to get bogged down in the DEI. Which is disastrous for them, because that's where the Oil and Rubber they desperately need are. ITTL, it makes even less sense for Imperial Japan to pull the trigger. But it's Imperial Fucking Japan. They'll do it anyway.

The real big changes, perhaps ironically, won't be seen in the War itself. But it'll manifest in a broadly stronger Anglo-French position. Less devastated. Less in debt. More able to have maintained Pre-War trade patterns, and thus having their debts denominated in Pounds or Francs rather than Dollars. Less tapped out on manpower. Retained more prestige, and perhaps most importantly, less shackled to the USA.

 

[iddt3]

Spkaca has, IMO, laid out good reasons for why FFO hasn't lead to a much shorter European War. I hadn't considered just how much the weather dictated the tempo of operations on the Western Front, TBH. It was eye-opening.

FFO absolutely, however, changes the situation in the Far East immensely. French Indochina not being bullied into Japanese hands changes the starting positions immensely. Additional naval, air and land assets are available to the Allies. The Japanese jumping-off point is further back. A quicker and less-lossy Mediterranean theatre means more and better resources available for the Far East, as does a less knuckle-down, dragged out Battle of the Atlantic.

I earnestly can't remember how much this TL has focused on the Far East. But IMO, I would expect the Japanese offensives to get bogged down in the DEI. Which is disastrous for them, because that's where the Oil and Rubber they desperately need are. ITTL, it makes even less sense for Imperial Japan to pull the trigger. But it's Imperial Fucking Japan. They'll do it anyway.

The real big changes, perhaps ironically, won't be seen in the War itself. But it'll manifest in a broadly stronger Anglo-French position. Less devastated. Less in debt. More able to have maintained Pre-War trade patterns, and thus having their debts denominated in Pounds or Francs rather than Dollars. Less tapped out on manpower. Retained more prestige, and perhaps most importantly, less shackled to the USA.

A more confident France might actually be in a worse position in the long run though - They still won't be able to maintain their colonial empires, and they're still suddenly a middle power in a world of superpowers. The best thing France could do would be to divest its colonial empire on good terms with the native population, form a strong alliance with the UK and the US to ward off the Soviets, and focus on rebuilding domestically. Algeria in particular might go even harder than OTL.

 

[Starinski]

A more confident France might actually be in a worse position in the long run though - They still won't be able to maintain their colonial empires, and they're still suddenly a middle power in a world of superpowers. The best thing France could do would be to divest its colonial empire on good terms with the native population, form a strong alliance with the UK and the US to ward off the Soviets, and focus on rebuilding domestically. Algeria in particular might go even harder than OTL.

Since ITTL the French rely even more on colonial manpower than OTL, I think that laws have already been passed to grant more autonomy to their empire's subjects.

 

[Driftless]

A more confident France might actually be in a worse position in the long run though - They still won't be able to maintain their colonial empires, and they're still suddenly a middle power in a world of superpowers. The best thing France could do would be to divest its colonial empire on good terms with the native population, form a strong alliance with the UK and the US to ward off the Soviets, and focus on rebuilding domestically. Algeria in particular might go even harder than OTL.

There would be a perilous path to tread with some colonies I'm sure. But still, with others (North Africa, Eastern Med) there should be some better relations coming out of the war, I'd guess. I don't know enough of French politics or colonial history to make anymore than that generalization though.

 

[iddt3]

Since ITTL the French rely even more on colonial manpower than OTL, I think that laws have already been passed to grant more autonomy to their empire's subjects.

I can't remember what passage it was, but I believe it was mentioned that France was stubbornly resisting Anglo American pressure to do exactly this. In particular because the French government isn't willing to alienate the pied-noirs.

 

[spkaca]

I hadn't considered just how much the weather dictated the tempo of operations on the Western Front, TBH.

Rain, cold, mud, ice, fog and more mud. Just contrast the experience of a countryside walk anywhere in Northern Europe in winter and summer. Then recall that maritime operations of all kinds are even more heavily affected.

I earnestly can't remember how much this TL has focused on the Far East. But IMO, I would expect the Japanese offensives to get bogged down in the DEI

Agreed. Basically they captured Borneo and Java but not Singapore or Sumatra. The key updates on this score are 4.1, 9.1, and 10.2.

ITTL, it makes even less sense for Imperial Japan to pull the trigger. But it's Imperial Fucking Japan. They'll do it anyway.

Yes. Part 5.6 constructs what I think a likely chain of events. The whole tendency of Japanese policy was towards war, and I believe the Tokyo decision-makers would have used whatever happened as a justification for war.

The real big changes, perhaps ironically, won't be seen in the War itself. But it'll manifest in a broadly stronger Anglo-French position. Less devastated. Less in debt. More able to have maintained Pre-War trade patterns, and thus having their debts denominated in Pounds or Francs rather than Dollars. Less tapped out on manpower. Retained more prestige, and perhaps most importantly, less shackled to the USA.

Stronger, certainly, though the broad contours of the post-war world won't change in fundamentals.

A more confident France might actually be in a worse position in the long run though - They still won't be able to maintain their colonial empires, and they're still suddenly a middle power in a world of superpowers. The best thing France could do would be to divest its colonial empire on good terms with the native population, form a strong alliance with the UK and the US to ward off the Soviets, and focus on rebuilding domestically. Algeria in particular might go even harder than OTL.

This is a risk. It's much the most important question for the period 1945-60, and in a sense I have chickened out of dealing with it by cutting off the story in 1945. But there are too many imponderables. Paris is in a much better position in both tangible (economic) and intangible (prestige) terms. Could that pose such a daunting prospect that the Algerians are willing to accept whatever offers Paris makes, at least in the short term? Of course this raises the question that "the Algerians" is not a well-defined term, leading us to...

There would be a perilous path to tread with some colonies I'm sure. But still, with others (North Africa, Eastern Med) there should be some better relations coming out of the war, I'd guess. I don't know enough of French politics or colonial history to make anymore than that generalization though.

I can't remember what passage it was, but I believe it was mentioned that France was stubbornly resisting Anglo American pressure to do exactly this. In particular because the French government isn't willing to alienate the pied-noirs.

Paris has the problem of trying to square the circle in Algeria. Any concession to the Arabs will alienate the settlers, and though the settlers can't impose any deal themselves, they do have the ability to scupper any deal. In a sense, mutatis mutandis, the political dynamics of the Algeria situation feel a bit like Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, where the metropole might want a power-sharing solution, but neither major community can realistically accept a deal that the other would accept, and both communities have the potential to prevent any deal from sticking. I would further expect though that the realities of the situation would take many years, perhaps decades, to work themselves out.

One major complicating factor in the North African context is Libya. I haven't touched on it much in the TL, and perhaps I should have. ITTL Libya was conquered by Anglo-French invasion in early 1941, with the British occupying Cyrenaica and the French Tripolitania. Clearly Italian rule must end, I've tried to imply that even Italians (like Girolamo) understand that Mussolini's folly brings that as a natural consequence, but lots of scope for tears before bedtime about what replaces Italian rule. I might try to write something on this theme.

In general, as I've noted previously, I think that the changes of a FFO scenario, though substantial, are probably not enough to fundamentally change the contours of post-war developments on the grand scale.

 

[spkaca]

Extract from La Follia by Girolamo Leoni, ch. 18


We had spent most of the winter in Florence, helping to rebuild. Occasionally we visited the front, which in places was right on the river Po, where we could look over to the unredeemed shore opposite... It was a curious polyglot Army that mounted the final offensive. Most of the Americans and all the French land forces had gone to join operation PRECIPICE, though there were still many of their aircraft above; the famous Storks stayed in Italy to the end. In their place had come a Brazilian division, many Poles, and many fresh Americans. British 8th Army, of course, had men from across their Empire and beyond, including three of our Combat Groups.

I had the honour of accompanying the Bologna Combat Group at the crossing of the Po near Ferrara, on April 10th. I took command of a machine-gun company upon the wounding of its commander, and saw several small engagements: the Germans resisted patchily by this point, in places they surrendered easily while elsewhere knots of resistance inflicted painful casualties. My dear friend Pietro perished in one such small fire-fight, not far from Padua where he had been born. With such cruelties war abounds. We reached Padua on the 15th, to find that the local Partisans had secured the place, taking the German garrison prisoner. There had also been some settling of accounts - it was still going on in fact, we heard occasional gunshots. On the one hand, we had to maintain order, but on the other, we had little sympathy with the collaborators. We were glad to leave such problems behind us and continue the advance…

My war came to a close in Venice, where my battalion paraded through St Mark’s Square on the same day we heard the news of Mussolini’s death in a French air strike: a final ‘kill’ for the Storks. Better all round for him to go that way than in some tiresome show-trial. That evening, a party of us went out to the Lido, and swam in the free waters, glad that the madness was finally over.