Sliding Down the Greasy Pole
Sliding Down the Greasy Pole
To some, the ‘Serbian Strategy’ of 1915 was a good idea, badly executed, to others, it was just a bad idea. After the Battle of Vieste, the Austro-Hungarian Fleet retreated to Pola, and the Allies had naval supremacy in the Adriatic. A mission to reinforce Serbia was possible through Montenegro, and the first Allied troops landed there in early July.
The second part of the plan was to break Austria-Hungary, firstly by capturing Sarajevo, and fermenting rebellion in Serb-majority areas of the Empire.
With the exception of coastal gunboats and the efforts of the Monitors and bombardment forces, the war at sea in the Adriatic ground to a halt. The Austrian fleet refused to sortie, and Allied attempts to destroy it met with little success, with the notable exception of E-11’s entry into Pola harbour on the night of 18th August, disguised as an Austrian U-boat. She succeeded in torpedoing the pre-dreadnought Radetzky and a freighter before withdrawing in the confusion, in an action that earned her commander the DSO.
The start of the plan to defeat Austria was a series of landings on the islands of Solta, Brac and their smaller neighbours, to cover the approaches to the port of Spalato (Split).
Despite the slow pace of the build-up, which had given the Austrians some time to prepare, the islands were taken with relative ease by British Empire forces at end of July. However, the next step required a much larger invasion, and it took nearly two weeks for a combined force to be assembled.
Landings to the north and south of Split took place on the 12th August, and met with fierce opposition from well-prepared positions. Over the next few days, despite making four assaults, the Italian troops to the south never established a workable beachhead, while the British, Australians and New Zealanders to the north made it ashore, but were held by the Austrian lines in the hills above.
A bloody stalemate followed, until further landings were made near Sibenik in early September, this time supported by heavy naval gunfire from close inshore. This assault made better progress, as raw Austrian troops from the periphery of the Empire were faced with determined ANZACs and tough French Foreign Legionnaires. The Austrian lines were pounded every day with guns from 6” up to 12”, from up to six pre-dreadnoughts at a time, besides numerous smaller craft.
All seemed to be going well for the first three days, until the morning of the 8th September, when Austrian and German submarines managed to sneak close to the landing grounds. Within the space of two confused hours, torpedoes hit two transports and the battleships Ocean, Formidable and Diderot. Ocean exploded moments after she was hit, while the other two limped towards the coast. Diderot capsized before she reached it, but Formidable was successfully beached. She was later patched and re-floated, but she sank in heavy seas while under tow to Taranto.
By October, most of the battleships had been withdrawn while shallow-draft Monitors took over in support of the troops ashore. Nevertheless, the front lines had hardened, and the situation was as deadlocked as the Western Front. Meanwhile to the East, Serbian forces were collapsing, as the modest influx of Allied troops was overwhelmed when Bulgaria declared war.
That same month the situation was equally volatile at the Admiralty in London, if rather safer than the battlefields of Serbia. Lobbying by the Admiralty, spearheaded by Admiral Fisher had finally succeeded in persuading the government that there should be a 1915 naval construction programme, to include four capital ships. However in recent months, Fisher’s brusque demands for everything from the use of convoys to extremely fast battlecruisers were starting to turn increasing numbers of people against his leadership. Although he was still much-loved and respected in the Fleet, his treatment of several senior officers and his blind insistence that ‘speed is everything’ was not doing his reputation any good.
The losses of Allied warships and the total lack of progress on land had finally soured Fisher to the ‘Serbian Strategy’. Through September, he started to tell everyone that his own idea, of landing troops in the Aegean, would have helped Serbia by allowing a direct attack on Bulgaria, while ‘removing the need for us to rely on the Italians’ so-called help’. Late in October, a proposal by Churchill to reinforce the fleet in the Adriatic and use it to force landings near Fiume and support an Italian advance along the coast resulted in one of the pivotal meetings of the war.
Unfortunately, no-one other than Churchill and Fisher were present in the room, the Admiral having marched into the First Lord’s office, ordering everyone else out as he did. A loud discussion was heard through the door for several minutes by one of Churchill’s aides, a man who would be close to him for many years to come. He later wrote, ‘Fisher entered looking like an enraged bull’, and that upon his departure, ‘it was one of the few occasions when I ever saw Winston sitting quietly, looking white as a sheet.’
The break between the First Lord and the First Sea Lord seemed irreconcilable, and both men pursued their separate goals. In November, Fisher threatened to resign over the matter of the 1915 capital ships, demanding that they be based on his preferred fast design. He had made such threats before and it had always led to him getting his way, but this time the Cabinet hesitated to give in to his demands, and on November 16th, he resigned and started to move out of the Admiralty.
Whether he wanted anyone to stop him remains unknown. As the man who had been the driving force behind the modern Navy, he had previously been too valuable to lose. For many years he had been an irascible genius, but now, he seemed merely irascible, while his increasingly erratic behaviour and inability to work with others had led to a loss of confidence in his leadership.
In the Adriatic, British and French troops would help exiled Serbs hold a line in the south, and near the sea on the borders of Montenegro and Albania, but by the end of 1915, the Central Powers had almost completely conquered Serbia.
Churchill remained at the Admiralty for a few more weeks, but Fisher’s attacks had damaged his ability to work effectively. The evacuation of troops from the islands off the Dalmatian coast in late December highlighted the total failure of his ‘Serbian Strategy’, making his position ultimately untenable.
To some, the ‘Serbian Strategy’ of 1915 was a good idea, badly executed, to others, it was just a bad idea. After the Battle of Vieste, the Austro-Hungarian Fleet retreated to Pola, and the Allies had naval supremacy in the Adriatic. A mission to reinforce Serbia was possible through Montenegro, and the first Allied troops landed there in early July.
The second part of the plan was to break Austria-Hungary, firstly by capturing Sarajevo, and fermenting rebellion in Serb-majority areas of the Empire.
With the exception of coastal gunboats and the efforts of the Monitors and bombardment forces, the war at sea in the Adriatic ground to a halt. The Austrian fleet refused to sortie, and Allied attempts to destroy it met with little success, with the notable exception of E-11’s entry into Pola harbour on the night of 18th August, disguised as an Austrian U-boat. She succeeded in torpedoing the pre-dreadnought Radetzky and a freighter before withdrawing in the confusion, in an action that earned her commander the DSO.
The start of the plan to defeat Austria was a series of landings on the islands of Solta, Brac and their smaller neighbours, to cover the approaches to the port of Spalato (Split).
Despite the slow pace of the build-up, which had given the Austrians some time to prepare, the islands were taken with relative ease by British Empire forces at end of July. However, the next step required a much larger invasion, and it took nearly two weeks for a combined force to be assembled.
Landings to the north and south of Split took place on the 12th August, and met with fierce opposition from well-prepared positions. Over the next few days, despite making four assaults, the Italian troops to the south never established a workable beachhead, while the British, Australians and New Zealanders to the north made it ashore, but were held by the Austrian lines in the hills above.
A bloody stalemate followed, until further landings were made near Sibenik in early September, this time supported by heavy naval gunfire from close inshore. This assault made better progress, as raw Austrian troops from the periphery of the Empire were faced with determined ANZACs and tough French Foreign Legionnaires. The Austrian lines were pounded every day with guns from 6” up to 12”, from up to six pre-dreadnoughts at a time, besides numerous smaller craft.
All seemed to be going well for the first three days, until the morning of the 8th September, when Austrian and German submarines managed to sneak close to the landing grounds. Within the space of two confused hours, torpedoes hit two transports and the battleships Ocean, Formidable and Diderot. Ocean exploded moments after she was hit, while the other two limped towards the coast. Diderot capsized before she reached it, but Formidable was successfully beached. She was later patched and re-floated, but she sank in heavy seas while under tow to Taranto.
By October, most of the battleships had been withdrawn while shallow-draft Monitors took over in support of the troops ashore. Nevertheless, the front lines had hardened, and the situation was as deadlocked as the Western Front. Meanwhile to the East, Serbian forces were collapsing, as the modest influx of Allied troops was overwhelmed when Bulgaria declared war.
That same month the situation was equally volatile at the Admiralty in London, if rather safer than the battlefields of Serbia. Lobbying by the Admiralty, spearheaded by Admiral Fisher had finally succeeded in persuading the government that there should be a 1915 naval construction programme, to include four capital ships. However in recent months, Fisher’s brusque demands for everything from the use of convoys to extremely fast battlecruisers were starting to turn increasing numbers of people against his leadership. Although he was still much-loved and respected in the Fleet, his treatment of several senior officers and his blind insistence that ‘speed is everything’ was not doing his reputation any good.
The losses of Allied warships and the total lack of progress on land had finally soured Fisher to the ‘Serbian Strategy’. Through September, he started to tell everyone that his own idea, of landing troops in the Aegean, would have helped Serbia by allowing a direct attack on Bulgaria, while ‘removing the need for us to rely on the Italians’ so-called help’. Late in October, a proposal by Churchill to reinforce the fleet in the Adriatic and use it to force landings near Fiume and support an Italian advance along the coast resulted in one of the pivotal meetings of the war.
Unfortunately, no-one other than Churchill and Fisher were present in the room, the Admiral having marched into the First Lord’s office, ordering everyone else out as he did. A loud discussion was heard through the door for several minutes by one of Churchill’s aides, a man who would be close to him for many years to come. He later wrote, ‘Fisher entered looking like an enraged bull’, and that upon his departure, ‘it was one of the few occasions when I ever saw Winston sitting quietly, looking white as a sheet.’
The break between the First Lord and the First Sea Lord seemed irreconcilable, and both men pursued their separate goals. In November, Fisher threatened to resign over the matter of the 1915 capital ships, demanding that they be based on his preferred fast design. He had made such threats before and it had always led to him getting his way, but this time the Cabinet hesitated to give in to his demands, and on November 16th, he resigned and started to move out of the Admiralty.
Whether he wanted anyone to stop him remains unknown. As the man who had been the driving force behind the modern Navy, he had previously been too valuable to lose. For many years he had been an irascible genius, but now, he seemed merely irascible, while his increasingly erratic behaviour and inability to work with others had led to a loss of confidence in his leadership.
In the Adriatic, British and French troops would help exiled Serbs hold a line in the south, and near the sea on the borders of Montenegro and Albania, but by the end of 1915, the Central Powers had almost completely conquered Serbia.
Churchill remained at the Admiralty for a few more weeks, but Fisher’s attacks had damaged his ability to work effectively. The evacuation of troops from the islands off the Dalmatian coast in late December highlighted the total failure of his ‘Serbian Strategy’, making his position ultimately untenable.
