Dread Nought but the Fury of the Seas

On the other hand, we have the Japanese 'Kiis', which are certainly fast battleships, although with the armour a bit on the light side. No one has responded to them yet, partly because they not sure what they are yet, due to building being delayed by the earthquake.
So far, nothing except Furious could both catch and kill a Kii, and I wouldn't bet on Furious in the engagement (plenty of other more powerful ships about, but they're all slower than the Kiis).
When the Kii's are understood they are going to cause a lot of head scratching because as you say there isn't a counter, anything that can catch them will lose, anything that can beat them is 5 knots slower. While their build has been delayed I would have thought that their rough outline would be know shortly after they were laid down. Japan isn't a hermit Kingdom at this point, it's still a fairly "liberal" place so I would think by late 1923 the wider world knows the Japanese are building two big fast battleships and would certainly know by the late 1924 prior to the second pair of Columbia's being laid down.

I see the Columbia's as being 'Large Cruiser' hunters - a recycling if you will of the original job of the first battlecruisers - that is the hunting down of 'Fast armoured cruisers' such as the new ships coming out of the Netherlands.

I do not see them as intended to go toe to toe with the Kii's or other, what are effectively 'Fast Battleships'.
Agreed, that's why I was surprised to see them built at this point, the Japanese cruisers are a problem that needs a solution but to my mind the Kii's are a bigger problem that needs to be solved first, but it's not my story and maybe it's for the best that the RN and USN have time to think about the Kii problem and have a well thought out rather than kneejerk response.
 
When the Kii's are understood they are going to cause a lot of head scratching because as you say there isn't a counter, anything that can catch them will lose, anything that can beat them is 5 knots slower. While their build has been delayed I would have thought that their rough outline would be know shortly after they were laid down. Japan isn't a hermit Kingdom at this point, it's still a fairly "liberal" place so I would think by late 1923 the wider world knows the Japanese are building two big fast battleships and would certainly know by the late 1924 prior to the second pair of Columbia's being laid down.



Agreed, that's why I was surprised to see them built at this point, the Japanese cruisers are a problem that needs a solution but to my mind the Kii's are a bigger problem that needs to be solved first, but it's not my story and maybe it's for the best that the RN and USN have time to think about the Kii problem and have a well thought out rather than kneejerk response.
Indeed.

I would note that OTL the USN did not address the slightly lesser but still existent problem at all prior to 1937 when it laid down the fist of its fast BBs

Here at least they have done something!
 
Agreed, that's why I was surprised to see them built at this point, the Japanese cruisers are a problem that needs a solution but to my mind the Kii's are a bigger problem that needs to be solved first, but it's not my story and maybe it's for the best that the RN and USN have time to think about the Kii problem and have a well thought out rather than kneejerk response.
The Kii's being a problem depends on Japanese doctrine more or less. If the Japanese are still as OTL planning on the decisive clash between battle lines, then they are not really a problem, as some of Japan's most powerful units they would be conserved for the decisive moment. If the Kongos have been kept rather than the Ise/Fusos then the Kiis are almost certainly not a problem, as the expendable Kongos would be used for the preliminary operations rather than risk having one of their key units be crippled and unavailable when they need it. Even if the Kongos have been gotten rid of, it is more likely that the Amagis would be risked rather than the Kiis so it would be the Amagi problem anyways. Japan has very logical economic reasons to go for the decisive battle in this timeline as in OTL, their economy is not robust enough to take a long war and they know it, they have to gamble on a big win
 
Well now, given my current perspectives, I have to ask: 9" belt is the minimum sufficient thickness in a medium-long (15-22k yards) range engagement to hold at least a couple of 16" hits, with any meaningful degree of confidence?, because if not, then Americans and British have the eggshells, STS-200 can you make a breakdown with the immunity zone of each one-off and class of battlecruisers currently in service please.
A 9" belt won't withstand 16" fire at any likely decisive range (maybe at 26-28,000 yards+ against an early 16" gun, but no-one would choose to fight at that range anyway)

The Columbias don't have an immune zone against their own guns, even assuming cruiser-like rules of a 30-degree target angle (i.e. the shells don't hit broadside-on). However, note that they're primarily intended as cruiser-killers, but with the American preference for balance designs, they're somewhat over-armoured for the role. Against a plausible 8" gun , they're immune down to about 4,000 yards!

Assuming beam-on (zero-degree) impacts:
Vesuvio is well protected (although her armoured area is relatively small) - between about 15-23 kyds against the Lille's Model 1912M - which has as good or better performance than the Ottoman or Greek guns she's likely to encounter.

Thanks to her inclined armour, Lille is immune against her own guns between about 18-23.5 kyds, but note that most of her likely opponents have 12" guns.

And the best that Britain can wield are TTL County's, so the sooner a response plan is laid (just in case) the better.
:)
 
When the Kii's are understood they are going to cause a lot of head scratching because as you say there isn't a counter, anything that can catch them will lose, anything that can beat them is 5 knots slower. While their build has been delayed I would have thought that their rough outline would be know shortly after they were laid down. Japan isn't a hermit Kingdom at this point, it's still a fairly "liberal" place so I would think by late 1923 the wider world knows the Japanese are building two big fast battleships and would certainly know by the late 1924 prior to the second pair of Columbia's being laid down.
...
Yes, that's fair, along with obvious conclusions from what the Japanese would have to declare under the Treaty (i.e. the length, beam, draught). At 795', they're obviously not going to be slow, plus the Japanese have a recent history of building faster-than-average ships.
However, without detailed knowledge of the design and armour layout (it's just possible the British might have some details, far less likely the Americans would) they could be anything from a fast oil-fired battlecruiser (i.e. 9", maybe 10" side armour and a 2-4" deck), to a fast-ish mixed-fired battleship (like a Tosa, but trading a gun for an extra knot while having to cut displacement).
At this point, it's unlikely the true top speed of the Tosas is well known, as the Japanese were fairly cagey about those sort of details post-WNT.

Time will tell, and as you say they are very difficult ships to counter - which is exactly what the Japanese are going for.
 
The Kii's being a problem depends on Japanese doctrine more or less. If the Japanese are still as OTL planning on the decisive clash between battle lines, then they are not really a problem, as some of Japan's most powerful units they would be conserved for the decisive moment. If the Kongos have been kept rather than the Ise/Fusos then the Kiis are almost certainly not a problem, as the expendable Kongos would be used for the preliminary operations rather than risk having one of their key units be crippled and unavailable when they need it. Even if the Kongos have been gotten rid of, it is more likely that the Amagis would be risked rather than the Kiis so it would be the Amagi problem anyways. Japan has very logical economic reasons to go for the decisive battle in this timeline as in OTL, their economy is not robust enough to take a long war and they know it, they have to gamble on a big win
As you say, 'decisive battle' is still a logical doctrine for the Japanese, against either the RN or the USN.
3 Kongos are being scrapped 'pay for' the Kii tonnage. The Ise/Fuso will go afterwards to pay for whatever comes next.

That brings us to an interesting point; during the lifetime of the current Treaty, the Japanese can legally scrap and replace their entire stock of 14" ships.
By 1932, they could have a battle-line consisting entirely of 26+knot, 16" ships.
Meanwhile the USN will still have several 14" ships, with at least 7 ships that can only do 21-knots, plus 4 (or more) 23-knotters.
The RN is a bit better off, but will still have the 23-knot QEs and Royals, plus some 15" BCs that aren't really built for a 16" world.

If the Treaty falls then, and the Japanese play it smart, they could be in a position to complete another ship or two in 1932/3, perhaps even having been slow to start the actual breaking up of the last couple of 'Ises'.
Both economics and the Treaty ensure they'll never outmatch either of the bigger navies, but they could be at their peak relative strength in 1934-ish.
 
A magnificent breakdown there Admiral Charles. The Light BB seems to be kind of settling into a Battlecruiser esque role. As the Americans made what is basically a 14-inch gunned Lion class BC but on a lighter, faster hull. This of course comes with the same risk as the WW1 ships where they'll face ships like themselves or force the evolution of fast Battleships which will render them moot.

But, they still have their role. First, I would assume that any fast Battleship would be expensive so not that common, and this means that the main threats to a BBL are ships of its own kind or the few still existant battlecruisers, all of which can be hurt by the BBL's.

A BBL can quite happily go after CAs and CLs but there's no risk of making them 'extinct' because BBLs are still going to be expensive to build, man and operate and unless there's a SERIOUS building fad for them by the big three naval powers, there's simply not going ot be enough to threaten cruisers and then they'd be operating as squadrons to deal with one another, which brings them back to the WW1 Battlecruiser role.
Thanks pal, it taken me quite some time to define my position and hard to reach some or any meaningful non-self-contradicting conclusions, but now I have made my mind and planned to stay in the line until a better argument can change my mind.

There's a plus side to that, though. The Americans have already built an 8" cruiser (the 6-gun Newarks - a slightly scaled-up Omaha), so they should have seen what an over-gunned small cruiser looks like, and be able to avoid the worst bits of the Pensacolas.
Well, I expect to see no bloody cranes and catapults on the fighting units, if the admirals want a scouting unit there are plenty of battlecruisers and CAs in service, if they want planes then get themselves to Congress/Parliament and claim for either carriers or Tone style tender-cruisers, but for God's sake, get away those things of my precious (Gollum's voice).

That's the idea - give the cruiser squadrons some teeth, hopefully buy them some time until the fleet shows up.
It's a good idea, maybe rescuing the old idea of mix cruiser squadrons.

Yes, those are her intended roles, she's not regarded as a battleship in any traditional sense. With the smaller 12-14" gunned ships going out of service in Japan and Britain, there's less chance of her being considered a 'fast battleship' in the way that the Lions occasionally were when they were built (more a piece of public disinformation than within the Navy, to be fair).
Well I agree, but first of all is to give a proper training for the personnel of Rank status so to make sure that no 'bloody ships' scene happens in the future, although the Americans are probably the least likely to be susceptible to such a an event, first because they already knew how they wanted it to use theirs and second the propellant they use and the strict application of the security measures they have, makes nearly unlikely such a development, however there's the shadow of the Arizona cast over them in my perspective and it's not reasonable to have said situation discarded or disregarded at least as a possibility.
 
When the Kii's are understood they are going to cause a lot of head scratching because as you say there isn't a counter, anything that can catch them will lose, anything that can beat them is 5 knots slower. While their build has been delayed I would have thought that their rough outline would be know shortly after they were laid down. Japan isn't a hermit Kingdom at this point, it's still a fairly "liberal" place so I would think by late 1923 the wider world knows the Japanese are building two big fast battleships and would certainly know by the late 1924 prior to the second pair of Columbia's being laid down.
Don't get obsessed with matching ships with ships. You use systems to take out ships. Eg, a scout carrier puts a couple of 18" torps into a Kii and the slow BBs catch up.
 
Well, I expect to see no bloody cranes and catapults on the fighting units, if the admirals want a scouting unit there are plenty of battlecruisers and CAs in service, if they want planes then get themselves to Congress/Parliament and claim for either carriers or Tone style tender-cruisers, but for God's sake, get away those things of my precious (Gollum's voice).
given the value placed in the ability for cruisers and capital ships to have aircraft organically attached to the ship in order to scout, do ASW patrols, and spot for their gunfire in otl by every major navy somehow I doubt this
 
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given the value placed in the ability for cruisers and capital ships to have aircraft organically attached to the ship in order to scout, do ASW patrols, and spot for their gunfire in otl by every major navy somehow I doubt this
My point still stands, as I said is better to get either a carrier, a small one, even a fast tender fitted with catapult should suffice to make the job, or if you really really want an organic component on a cruiser squadron, then a Tone style should be sufficient, posted at the rear of the line were is less probable to get hurt. To be sure, am not negating its usefulness just the necessity to fit every cruiser with such a heavy and cumbersome equipment, that for all intents and purposes it seems to me just an accident waiting to happen, I mean, you can't expect that any or every shell won't pass through or close to the fuel tanks, that even without exploding, it can do real damage and make the ship a floating beacon that attracts all attention even if not a night action. Am sure that many in OTL make that same point, and surely there will be people in TTL that will do the same, pointing out that the catapult block space for torpedo tubes or AA or armor or a combination of two or all of them, it just doesn't seems vital, eyes on that, vital not unnecessary.
 
My point still stands, as I said is better to get either a carrier, a small one, even a fast tender fitted with catapult should suffice to make the job, or if you really really want an organic component on a cruiser squadron, then a Tone style should be sufficient, posted at the rear of the line were is less probable to get hurt. To be sure, am not negating its usefulness just the necessity to fit every cruiser with such a heavy and cumbersome equipment, that for all intents and purposes it seems to me just an accident waiting to happen, I mean, you can't expect that any or every shell won't pass through or close to the fuel tanks, that even without exploding, it can do real damage and make the ship a floating beacon that attracts all attention even if not a night action. Am sure that many in OTL make that same point, and surely there will be people in TTL that will do the same, pointing out that the catapult block space for torpedo tubes or AA or armor or a combination of two or all of them, it just doesn't seems vital, eyes on that, vital not unnecessary.
A seaplane for a cruiser certainly isn't optimal, but for trade protection, at least, they are very helpful-they can spot fire, increase the chances of detecting other ships, and continue to pursue other ships. They are definitely a fire hazard with little use in a fleet engagement but they did well in the first years of WW2 hunting raiders before being replaced with AA for the attriting fleet actions for the final 4ish years, the job done.
 
My point still stands, as I said is better to get either a carrier, a small one, even a fast tender fitted with catapult should suffice to make the job, or if you really really want an organic component on a cruiser squadron, then a Tone style should be sufficient, posted at the rear of the line were is less probable to get hurt. To be sure, am not negating its usefulness just the necessity to fit every cruiser with such a heavy and cumbersome equipment, that for all intents and purposes it seems to me just an accident waiting to happen, I mean, you can't expect that any or every shell won't pass through or close to the fuel tanks, that even without exploding, it can do real damage and make the ship a floating beacon that attracts all attention even if not a night action. Am sure that many in OTL make that same point, and surely there will be people in TTL that will do the same, pointing out that the catapult block space for torpedo tubes or AA or armor or a combination of two or all of them, it just doesn't seems vital, eyes on that, vital not unnecessary.
I completely understand your point of view but the simple fact is that cruisers and Battlecruisers are used as scouts and having the ability to massively increase the area to be searched(and be useful in other tasks like spotting and ASW work) is too good to give up hence why everyone had seaplanes on their modern cruisers in otl, with spotting being the primary reason why most capital ships got refited for them in otl as well. That utility was deemed worth the cost in space and vulnerability in otl and the rational hasn't changed.
 
A seaplane for a cruiser certainly isn't optimal, but for trade protection, at least, they are very helpful-they can spot fire, increase the chances of detecting other ships, and continue to pursue other ships. They are definitely a fire hazard with little use in a fleet engagement but they did well in the first years of WW2 hunting raiders before being replaced with AA for the attriting fleet actions for the final 4ish years, the job done.
Of course by the time they were pulled from the crusiers radar did make them mostly unneeded in the spotting and short range scouting role and moreover the carrier spam took over the long range scouting and ASW role. This being said when they were pulled varyied greatly on a ship to ship and navy to navy basis with most USN cruisers and capital ships retaining at least half of their designed seaplane compliment through wars end...mind you they were mainly used for SAR and ASW when they didn't have carriers attached to support them(it did happen from time to time)
 
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Talking about battle cruiser scouts without carriers reminded my about divisional tactics.
Pre WWI ships operated in fleets if only because the command systems weren't up to the task of coordinating smaller units. This had some major draw backs during the war.

After the war there was a move to operating in divisions. In part because of better communications and war experience, and in part because a modern battleship was a lot more expensive and less numerous.

I am not quite sure what the effect would be here, with first, second, and third (heavy cruisers) class battleships.
 
A seaplane for a cruiser certainly isn't optimal, but for trade protection, at least, they are very helpful-they can spot fire, increase the chances of detecting other ships, and continue to pursue other ships. They are definitely a fire hazard with little use in a fleet engagement but they did well in the first years of WW2 hunting raiders before being replaced with AA for the attriting fleet actions for the final 4ish years, the job done.
I acknowledged the useful aid they provide to that effect and certainly they often prove even decisive in early war engagements.
I completely understand your point of view but the simple fact is that cruisers and Battlecruisers are used as scouts and having the ability to massively increase the area to be searched(and be useful in other tasks like spotting and ASW work) is too good to give up hence why everyone had seaplanes on their modern cruisers in otl, with spotting being the primary reason why most capital ships got refited for them in otl as well. That utility was deemed worth the cost in space and vulnerability in otl and the rational hasn't changed.
I agree that the rational has not lost its validity at all, an actually I acknowledged as a internationally recognized necessity at present. Yes they were a valuable asset in peace and war, but allow me to convince you of an amendment to reduce the risk, namely: to limit the number according to the size(type) of vessel, a maximum of 2 planes and catapults on capital ships and 1 of each on cruisers and lesser vessels.

Of course by the time they were pulled from the crusiers radar did make them mostly unneeded in the spotting and short range scouting role and moreover the carrier spam took over the long range scouting and ASW role. This being said when they were pulled varyied greatly on a ship to ship and navy to navy basis with most USN cruisers and capital ships retaining at least half of their designed seaplane compliment through wars end...mind you they were mainly used for SAR and ASW when they didn't have carriers attached to support them(it did happen from time to time)
Exactly and that's why I fervently support for a cruiser-tender especifically intended to fit in that role in wartime, assign to each division or squadron so that the other ships can be spare of that burden, if you're not agree then the second option is just to continue to retain the pre-war complement on the basis stated above, but just onboard ships selected to act as flagships, if is possible to apply both options then there are to be plenty of options at hand.
Talking about battle cruiser scouts without carriers reminded my about divisional tactics.
Pre WWI ships operated in fleets if only because the command systems weren't up to the task of coordinating smaller units. This had some major draw backs during the war.

After the war there was a move to operating in divisions. In part because of better communications and war experience, and in part because a modern battleship was a lot more expensive and less numerous.

I am not quite sure what the effect would be here, with first, second, and third (heavy cruisers) class battleships.
Yes, the span of control and the system of command relationships was much reduce at the time merely because the radios were still too new a device and not completely trusted back them. Still, as you're saying, when the traditional way failed to past the test of the modern times all rush to get the possible best reliable gear to equip their ships, to be certain that missed opportunities would be the exception rather than the norm. That led to the move to smaller tactical units, which actually was just incidentally match by the increase size and cost of the new generation, that combined to get as a result what we now know as the single actions that were so common during the war.

And definitely, neither I know how all that can affect, or better said, in which direction can pull the cart.
 
Well, I expect to see no bloody cranes and catapults on the fighting units, if the admirals want a scouting unit there are plenty of battlecruisers and CAs in service, if they want planes then get themselves to Congress/Parliament and claim for either carriers or Tone style tender-cruisers, but for God's sake, get away those things of my precious (Gollum's voice).
...
A seaplane for a cruiser certainly isn't optimal, but for trade protection, at least, they are very helpful-they can spot fire, increase the chances of detecting other ships, and continue to pursue other ships. They are definitely a fire hazard with little use in a fleet engagement but they did well in the first years of WW2 hunting raiders before being replaced with AA for the attriting fleet actions for the final 4ish years, the job done.
Of course by the time they were pulled from the crusiers radar did make them mostly unneeded in the spotting and short range scouting role and moreover the carrier spam took over the long range scouting and ASW role. This being said when they were pulled varyied greatly on a ship to ship and navy to navy basis with most USN cruisers and capital ships retaining at least half of their designed seaplane compliment through wars end...mind you they were mainly used for SAR and ASW when they didn't have carriers attached to support them(it did happen from time to time)
A good discussion you've all been having - my view is that aircraft are inevitably going to be viewed as valuable on most cruisers.
As has been said, in a fleet context, perhaps that scouting role could be taken by carrier aircraft. However, as regards the design of cruisers, why risk it when the same ships might also be used for trade protection, raiding or on colonial stations, where there are unlikely to be any carriers around.
In fleet usage, there is the opposite point of view, as taken by the Japanese in the '30s; that cruiser aircraft are for scouting, while carrier aircraft are for striking.

We're still rather too early in the story for a coherent aircraft doctrine to have emerged, so expect to see ships both with and without aircraft for some time yet.

What I was thinking of as regards 'issues with the Pensacolas' was the dubious armour scheme, the tendency to roll and the lack of hangars for the seaplanes.
In the story, the USN has already built an 8" gun 'light cruiser', with indifferent armour and stability. They therefore have an opportunity to make the first 10,000-ton 'Washington cruiser' better (or at least different...) to reality.
 
Talking about battle cruiser scouts without carriers reminded my about divisional tactics.
Pre WWI ships operated in fleets if only because the command systems weren't up to the task of coordinating smaller units. This had some major draw backs during the war.

After the war there was a move to operating in divisions. In part because of better communications and war experience, and in part because a modern battleship was a lot more expensive and less numerous.

I am not quite sure what the effect would be here, with first, second, and third (heavy cruisers) class battleships.
There are some parallels and some differences - battleships are going to become slightly fewer in number, so the idea of a 'Grand Fleet' becomes steadily less likely.
In the story, the rigidity of the fleet was already being challenged during the war, with units on both sides being wholly or partly detached to try to raid, decoy or pursue battle (the late-war battles back in the instalments 'Stalemate' and on).
Like Jutland, Stavanger certainly showed the Grand Fleet as being so big that it was difficult to control, so divisional tactics are likely to become much more prevelant.

I can see the 'Fleet' concept remaining for the big, slow battleships (although the fleets will be a bit smaller and organised in looser divisions).
The vulnerability of 'second class' ships (BCs and fast Light BBs) suggests that they shouldn't be forming lines as per wartime BCF tactics. In a fleet action, they might be better off in small squadrons (of 2 or 3) to allow them to manoeuvre.
Partly thanks to the need to group compatible ships, that's how I imagine the RN battlecruisers are organised by this time (when they're not detached on independent flag-showing duties);
1BCS of Furious, Howe and Hood (all 31-knot ships)
2BCS of Rodney, Renown and Repulse (all 28-29 knot ships).

Meanwhile, (for the RN anyway) cruisers are becoming more independent, due to declining numbers and the need to send them around the world once again.
 
Scout aircraft are a vital component of anything bigger than a light cruiser until the advent of high power long range radar and it's cheaper and easier to allow 500 tons of margin on a ship for an aircraft fit out vs having to build a compromised cruiser full of scout aircraft, which can only be in one place unlike say a class of 5 cruisers that each have two aircraft that can be anywhere in the world.

A seaplane carrier to work with cruises or Battlecruisers is going to expensive to build and run as it's going to have to be tactically compatable with the ships it will work with, so it needs to be as fast as a cruiser or it will constrain the forces it's supposed to be supporting. The cost of building, equipping and operating the seaplane carrier will probably be equal to the cost of another cruiser.
 
There are some parallels and some differences - battleships are going to become slightly fewer in number, so the idea of a 'Grand Fleet' becomes steadily less likely.
In the story, the rigidity of the fleet was already being challenged during the war, with units on both sides being wholly or partly detached to try to raid, decoy or pursue battle (the late-war battles back in the instalments 'Stalemate' and on).
Like Jutland, Stavanger certainly showed the Grand Fleet as being so big that it was difficult to control, so divisional tactics are likely to become much more prevelant.

I can see the 'Fleet' concept remaining for the big, slow battleships (although the fleets will be a bit smaller and organised in looser divisions).
The vulnerability of 'second class' ships (BCs and fast Light BBs) suggests that they shouldn't be forming lines as per wartime BCF tactics. In a fleet action, they might be better off in small squadrons (of 2 or 3) to allow them to manoeuvre.
Partly thanks to the need to group compatible ships, that's how I imagine the RN battlecruisers are organised by this time (when they're not detached on independent flag-showing duties);
1BCS of Furious, Howe and Hood (all 31-knot ships)
2BCS of Rodney, Renown and Repulse (all 28-29 knot ships).

Meanwhile, (for the RN anyway) cruisers are becoming more independent, due to declining numbers and the need to send them around the world once again.
R&R weren't 30-32 knt ships?

A good ORBAt there however, and yes is clearly more reasonable to group similar ships in a single squadron or division, if you ask me, in that line of thought, I proposed this: 1st squadron, Furious and Rodney; 2nd squadron, Hood and How's and 3rd squadron, R&R. A second consideration I had take is the gun calibre and size of the ships, apart of their obvious similarities, so in wartime, as autonomous divisions, they are to give support (I guess) to the heavy cruiser squadrons and flanking fire in support of the battleships, which means that, whilr autonomous, they are to respond and come more directly under the control of the admiral as detached divisions in advance of the battleships, this is just a little tricky because it implies that the commanders of those divisions are expected to work in consonance, but it won't work if they bad blood between them.

On the other hand, there is the possibility of the mix squadrons, i.e. attaching 3-4 heavy cruisers directly to said battlecruisers to round up their numbers as a unit and maximize their fire power, apart of the psychological impact of seeing in the horizon as a full division of oncoming capital ships closing fast on you.

A seaplane carrier to work with cruises or Battlecruisers is going to expensive to build and run as it's going to have to be tactically compatable with the ships it will work with, so it needs to be as fast as a cruiser or it will constrain the forces it's supposed to be supporting. The cost of building, equipping and operating the seaplane carrier will probably be equal to the cost of another cruiser.
I don't know, I think that, given the arguments in favor here exposed, many in any Admiralty could see it as a worthy investment, and in any case my idea was just that, that the tender has to be able to keep pace with the rest.
 
I don't know, I think that, given the arguments in favor here exposed, many in any Admiralty could see it as a worthy investment, and in any case my idea was just that, that the tender has to be able to keep pace with the rest.
I haven't seen any convincing arguments to suggest that removing aircraft from cruisers or capital ships is a good idea at all, in your scenario how do we search the south Atlantic with a squadron of 6 cruisers spread across the trade routes when you only have one tender equipped with seaplanes instead of 6 separate cruisers with their own scout aircraft? How is a dedicated seaplane tender more efficent in this scenario? How do you spot the fall of your shot when the closest seaplane tender is 500 miles away? How do you fly the Admiral to a meeting when the seaplane carrier is in dock getting torpedo damage repaired as it has to keep stopping to pick up aircraft in a war zone?

For fleet work a seaplane tender is also a liability in comparison to an actual CV, the seaplane tender will have to be as fast as a carrier to allow operations to pick up the float planes, to operate enough aircraft it will be of cruiser size and it will only have a tenth of the capability of an actual CV which probably would not cost much more to build and operate than the fast seaplane tender or aviation cruiser.

There is a reason that only the IJN built the kind of aviation cruiser is they had a very narrow veiw of how they would fight a battle, the RN and USN have a greater need for flexibility for their ships which is why they spent a lot of time working how to use them efficiently.

Removal of floatplanes will happen once radar becomes commonplace and the threat of air attack becomes so much that the top weight is needed for air defence weapons, till then they are as vital to a cruiser as the torpedoes are.
 
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