I mean, much of that blame should also be put on Fabianism (and outright socialism under Indira Gandhi) and the License Raj India before it was abolished in the 1990s.
Down the Parallel Road: An Afsharid Persia Timeline
- Thread starter Nassirisimo
- Start date
I mean, much of that blame should also be put on Fabianism (and outright socialism under Indira Gandhi) and the License Raj India before it was abolished in the 1990s.
longsword14
Banned
Lack of education, a bureaucracy from the colonial times, poor policies, bad infrastructure, inept local governance... the list is quite long. India performed at a mediocre level in all fields other than population increase.
The good bit to be taken away is that it had a stable government which was not comically corrupt.
Well that answers why it failed to become an economic juggernaut in comparison to the communist one party state that is China
longsword14
Banned
The CCP for all its faults managed to get a few things like education right. Indira Gandhi really killed a lot of opportunities that could have been in the late 60s and 70s. India, despite possibly having a better position, arguably at the time she gained her position, squandered it away. It took a balance of payment crisis cause by a belated development program by her son to finally open up the economy, that too with the IMF demanding reform.
The difference between underdeveloped and developed nations is that many things that have become popular to dislike often are great boons for the former.
The IMF plus FDI leading to capital flowing in, lead to stale industries being forced out etc. Only wish that the government had been wiser.
Last edited:
The CCP for all its fault managed to get a few things like education right. Indira Gandhi really killed a lot of opportunities that could have been in the late 60s and 70s. India, despite possibly having a better position, arguably at the time she gained her position, squandered it away. It took a balance of payment crisis cause by a belated development program by her son to finally open up the economy, that too with the IMF demanding reform.
The difference between underdeveloped and developed nations is that many things that have become popular to dislike often are great boons for the former.
The IMF plus FDI leading to capital flowing in leading to stale industries being forced out etc. Only wish that the government had been wiser.
Well trauma from Colonial Rule was a big factor in why many of these nations were hesitant or even unwilling in accepting western economics.
longsword14
Banned
Indira Gandhi was a despot, or as despotic as you could get. She also took the more socialist economic framework seriously, being much more closer to the USSR than any previous PM (actually there were only 3 before her).Well trauma from Colonial Rule was a big factor in why many of these nations were hesitant or even unwilling in accepting western economics.
Nehru could have steered things in a completely different direction had he been influence by classical liberals instead of Fabian socialists. More input from the West would have definitely have been preferable, even though US support for Pakistan would have been a major sticking point.
That would still leave the rigid social system, endemic corruption etc to be handled, but without a doubt all that would have been better done without the stifling atmosphere of the days before liberalisation.
Well given the length of their terms makes it very apparent how crooked the system was at the time
longsword14
Banned
The framework was not crooked, but there was never any meaningful challenger to the Congress. India does not have any term limits for its PM, and the very first one held the post for 17 years.
The problem was that there was no real challengers to the economic and social policies of the INC at the time that could have won at the national level.
Well that is definitely true to some extent, you do have to remember gdp per capita declined from 1750-1950, as evidenced by the fact that no drought had resulted in such enormous famines before British rule. It also means that the average Indian essentially lived with 18th century living standards in 1950.
longsword14
Banned
Yes, but the increase in living standards outside of the "West" in the whole world was not much, so India is hardly odd in that sense.
I would disagree with this. Most of the 'Non-Western' world* had a lower standard of living than India in 1750, while the opposite was true in 1950 except for a few places in Africa. Note that before the modern consumer economy, the difference between prosperity and abject poverty was often just a few more bales of wheat per harvest.
*Large Parts of 'the West' too as a matter of fact
*Large Parts of 'the West' too as a matter of fact
longsword14
Banned
Certainly not in HRE, France or Britain.
That does not disprove anything I wrote. The question is just how much of the decline in world share is because the overall production outside India changed.
It is simply the case, as you note, that many parts of the world benefited a lot more from the advances of the 19th century than India, which does not imply that India was ruled more harshly by the British than would have been the case otherwise.
Statistics are quite dubious from that era so the determinant in all arguments is bias. For every position given by an academician, there is another that opposes it, which in the absence of empirical evidence can not be proved/disproved beyond doubt.
So are you suggesting it's more in how the new technology was implemented?
longsword14
Banned
Yes, long term growth is because of better labour and improvements in technology, both of which India lacked.
Unrelated to the India discussion.
The Perak invasion notwithstanding, it's nice to see Kedah truly achieving it's moniker of "Darul Aman - Abode of Peace." With it's wealth and power, Kedahan society and court culture would be seen as the exemplar of Malay culture ITTL, and the local tongue could quickly become the language standard as well. The Bunga Mas though, Siam would definitely not like that! Siamese power was derived from those gifts.
And the Chinese immigration also makes sense, you'd need a Napoleon-sized POD to not have any emigration from China, in any case. No surprises with Johor, too (though I expected a bit more than 35%) and the sultanate seems to be heading along the same path as OTL. I can see mix-raced families becoming a thing among the Chinese workers and the other labourers/locals, with a similar Peranakan class arising ITTL among the merchants.
-----------------
Java though, seems to be in a worse shape ITTL. I take it that the “Régime d'exploitation” is more overbearing than the Cultuurstelsel ? I don't see any spice crop growing requirements among the peasantry (20% of a person's farmland and all that...), though the tax controls would bite a lot from the island.
The Perak invasion notwithstanding, it's nice to see Kedah truly achieving it's moniker of "Darul Aman - Abode of Peace."
With it's wealth and power, Kedahan society and court culture would be seen as the exemplar of Malay culture ITTL, and the local tongue could quickly become the language standard as well. The Bunga Mas though, Siam would definitely not like that! Siamese power was derived from those gifts.And the Chinese immigration also makes sense, you'd need a Napoleon-sized POD to not have any emigration from China, in any case. No surprises with Johor, too (though I expected a bit more than 35%) and the sultanate seems to be heading along the same path as OTL. I can see mix-raced families becoming a thing among the Chinese workers and the other labourers/locals, with a similar Peranakan class arising ITTL among the merchants.
-----------------
Java though, seems to be in a worse shape ITTL. I take it that the “Régime d'exploitation” is more overbearing than the Cultuurstelsel ? I don't see any spice crop growing requirements among the peasantry (20% of a person's farmland and all that...), though the tax controls would bite a lot from the island.
Alright, a lot to get through here, though an interesting discussion! I won't be replying to everything directly.
The advantage for France I suppose is the ability to isolate Java (only the British have the ability to break any French blockade of the island), as well as technological. The French hope is that by destroying the native institutions of Java, it can model the island as a junior version of itself. In regard to Ethical Policy, I think that it depends on the development of colonialism later in the 19th century, and whether the "White Man's Burden" ideology becomes as strong as it did in OTL.
The Spanish still hold on to the Philippines, as do the Portuguese to Goa, Macau and East Timor.
Okay, so in regards to the India discussion, I've always been under the impression that the historical consensus at the moment is that India's economy would likely have been harmed by the industrial revolution in Europe regardless of whether she had been colonised or not. However, even in areas geographically close to Europe such as the Ottoman Empire, artisanal production did manage to survive, so I don't think it's too much of a jump to suppose that Britain's rule in India was particularly debilitating. An interesting point of the debate is that no actual revenue was transferred from the Raj to the British Exchequer, but that Britain largely exploited India for the benefit of its industrialists (as a captive market) and to pay for the Indian Army, which more or less functioned as Britain's battering ram in much of her Asian conquests. Indeed, Britain made headway against the Ottomans in Iraq only with Indian soldiery.
I think it's a very dangerous game to shrug and say that academics disagree and that objective truth is hard to get at, if not impossible. The evidence for the British (or indeed, direct colonial governments in general) being particularly bad for manufacturing is pretty convincing. Whether it's the fact that India's economy became even more deindustrialised than China's, or that the first modern industrial enterprises in India all started outside the areas directly ruled by the British, I don't think it's particularly controversial to state that Britain's rule did retard India's manufacturing development somewhat. That isn't to say that it would have all been fine without industrialisation, and India hasn't exactly been following an optimal path for development since independence. Anyway, moving on...
The push factors from China are largely similar to those of OTL, but the Chinese aren't just heading to South East Asia in this TL (one of their other destinations will be covered in a few weeks) so there is somewhat lesser immigration to the Malayan peninsula than OTL. In some areas such as the Kinta Valley in Perak, the Chinese are likely to form a community more discriminant of the mainstream Malaysian Chinese community of OTL through sheer weight of numbers, but we are likely to see more Peranakan Chinese than in OTL as well, as smaller Chinese communities will integrate a bit better into the fabric of existing Malay society.
Java is indeed in a very bad shape. As you point out, the Dutch were rather quite controlling in OTL as it was, though the French see Java as a rich island which they can milk to fund their ambitions elsewhere.
Well, acquiring Singapore from Johor is a good start for Sardinian (and later Italian) colonial ambitions, and it is likely that there will be more emphasis on commercially viable colonies rather than the prestige ones that we saw in OTL, which will probably help Italy in the long run.
The advantage for France I suppose is the ability to isolate Java (only the British have the ability to break any French blockade of the island), as well as technological. The French hope is that by destroying the native institutions of Java, it can model the island as a junior version of itself. In regard to Ethical Policy, I think that it depends on the development of colonialism later in the 19th century, and whether the "White Man's Burden" ideology becomes as strong as it did in OTL.
The Spanish still hold on to the Philippines, as do the Portuguese to Goa, Macau and East Timor.
It's certainly a possibility. Of course, the traditions of Java are quite different to those of India and will likely have its effect on any future independence movements. As I mentioned before, it depends on how colonial ideologies pan out as well.
Okay, so in regards to the India discussion, I've always been under the impression that the historical consensus at the moment is that India's economy would likely have been harmed by the industrial revolution in Europe regardless of whether she had been colonised or not. However, even in areas geographically close to Europe such as the Ottoman Empire, artisanal production did manage to survive, so I don't think it's too much of a jump to suppose that Britain's rule in India was particularly debilitating. An interesting point of the debate is that no actual revenue was transferred from the Raj to the British Exchequer, but that Britain largely exploited India for the benefit of its industrialists (as a captive market) and to pay for the Indian Army, which more or less functioned as Britain's battering ram in much of her Asian conquests. Indeed, Britain made headway against the Ottomans in Iraq only with Indian soldiery.
I think it's a very dangerous game to shrug and say that academics disagree and that objective truth is hard to get at, if not impossible. The evidence for the British (or indeed, direct colonial governments in general) being particularly bad for manufacturing is pretty convincing. Whether it's the fact that India's economy became even more deindustrialised than China's, or that the first modern industrial enterprises in India all started outside the areas directly ruled by the British, I don't think it's particularly controversial to state that Britain's rule did retard India's manufacturing development somewhat. That isn't to say that it would have all been fine without industrialisation, and India hasn't exactly been following an optimal path for development since independence. Anyway, moving on...
The concept of a Bahasa Malaysia (or whatever the Malayan national language is called in TTL) based on the Kedahan dialect is certainly an interesting one (though it's bad enough how much Kedahan Malay I have to listen to in OTL...). The position that Kedah is assuming among the other Malay sultanates will ensure great amounts of cultural influence flowing from the state, which may later be matched with political influence, with Johor playing something of a second fiddle. It is unlikely that Siam will smile on the expansion of another power to its south though.Unrelated to the India discussion.
The Perak invasion notwithstanding, it's nice to see Kedah truly achieving it's moniker of "Darul Aman - Abode of Peace."
And the Chinese immigration also makes sense, you'd need a Napoleon-sized POD to not have any emigration from China, in any case. No surprises with Johor, too (though I expected a bit more than 35%) and the sultanate seems to be heading along the same path as OTL. I can see mix-raced families becoming a thing among the Chinese workers and the other labourers/locals, with a similar Peranakan class arising ITTL among the merchants.
-----------------
Java though, seems to be in a worse shape ITTL. I take it that the “Régime d'exploitation” is more overbearing than the Cultuurstelsel ? I don't see any spice crop growing requirements among the peasantry (20% of a person's farmland and all that...), though the tax controls would bite a lot from the island.
The push factors from China are largely similar to those of OTL, but the Chinese aren't just heading to South East Asia in this TL (one of their other destinations will be covered in a few weeks) so there is somewhat lesser immigration to the Malayan peninsula than OTL. In some areas such as the Kinta Valley in Perak, the Chinese are likely to form a community more discriminant of the mainstream Malaysian Chinese community of OTL through sheer weight of numbers, but we are likely to see more Peranakan Chinese than in OTL as well, as smaller Chinese communities will integrate a bit better into the fabric of existing Malay society.
Java is indeed in a very bad shape. As you point out, the Dutch were rather quite controlling in OTL as it was, though the French see Java as a rich island which they can milk to fund their ambitions elsewhere.
Indeed. They can get away with it while Java's population is small, but when French has to deal with a Java of tens of millions, it may be a serious strain for the French, especially if nothing changes and the Javanese become restive once again.
Last edited:
Political Thought in the Muslim World - 1829 to 1862
Empires of the Mind - Philosophy and Ideology in the 19th Century
Liberalism and Secularism in the Muslim World
Liberalism and Secularism in the Muslim World
As the Muslim state physically closest to Europe, it was no surprise that it would be the Ottoman Empire that would first encounter some of the new philosophical ideas concerning religion that originated in Western Europe. Whereas the Enlightenment of the 18th century had barely had an impact on the largely illiterate Empire of the time, the Ottoman Empire of the 19th century with its reformed education system proved a more receptive ground for new ideas coming from Europe. With the rise of “National Liberalism” in Western Europe at the beginning of the 19th century, the first ideas of a Turkish Nation appeared in the heads of some intellectuals in Constantinople, but they made little impact on the largely traditional society as a whole, which still saw Islam as the basis for the Ottoman State. However, as the first universities came to the Empire and literacy rates rose, an increasing number of people within the Empire, both Christian and Muslim, were exposed to radical ideas emanating from the West.
The idea of the separation of Church and State is still something of a troublesome subject in the Islamic world. While many Muslim thinkers argued that without established religious institutions parallel to the Catholic Church and various state churches in Europe, that the concept was redundant when used in an Islamic context, lesser numbers argued that the concept worked best when understood as a call to break the social power of the ulema, and to weaken the hold of the Sharia on Islamic societies. In the 1840s, their numbers were few, but these early secularists in the Ottoman Empire were gaining ground amongst the educated in Ottoman society. While the punishments for apostates had been quietly dropped in 1849, society as a whole took a very dim view upon those who challenged Islam’s traditional position. There are very few recorded instances of violence in this period, though it was common for the “New Thinkers” to be shunned by traditionalists. Although European ideas of secularism and anti-clericalism had established themselves within the ideological mix of the Empire, they appeared to be peripheral at best, limited to intellectuals who were increasingly isolated from the mainstream of Ottoman Society.
However, the “New Thinkers” were becoming more numerous in one key section of society. The Ottoman Army had made the education of its officers a greater priority from the 1820s onward, with all officers required to be literate in a decree in 1839. A surprising number of senior Ottoman officers had received a secondary education, still a rarity in the mid-19th century. As well as improving the efficiency of the Ottoman Officer Corps, the education of the officers made them more open than the general population to the ideas of the “New Thinkers”. In the army that was still thought of as the “Sword of Islam”, a startling number of officers had open sympathy with secular ideas. However, these ideas were still not common enough to lead to disobedience when the Sultan called for a Jihad, or Holy War against the Russians during the Russo-Turkish War. While prior to the war, some in the officer corps wanted to move away from an emphasis on religion in government, following the great wave of patriotism stemming from the victory at Çatalca ideological differences between the army and the government as a whole seemed to wane.
However, as the Sultan’s unpopularity began to mount following the economic troubles of the 1860s, the army now more than ever seemed to take a different stand to that of the government. In 1862, the Sultan had reportedly mulled over a purging of the officer corps to remove independently minded generals with those more loyal to the Sultan. He was reportedly dissuaded when warned that the disloyalty of the army was such that it could not be guaranteed that a purging of the ranks would not be met by mutinous action on the part of the army. This was a watershed moment in the history of the Empire, and marks the first time since the assassination of Osman II that there was a serious threat to the Sultan from his own army. In the Ottoman Empire, the rise of secularism and similar ideologies only seemed to add to the many divisions within Ottoman society.
The only other Islamic societies in which secularism was present in the ideological landscape were Persia and Egypt, the only Islamic States with ties strong enough to Europe for secularist modes of thought to be introduced, and populations large enough for an intellectual class of sufficient size to exist. In smaller nations such as Tunisia or Morocco, this trend would not appear until later on in the 19th century. However, unlike the Ottoman Empire in which the various stresses and strains encouraged the propagation of secularist thought as well as a general suspicion of the Ulema, those who identified as secularists remained a minority in Persia and Egypt, and did experience something in the way of discrimination in both societies. This was particularly true in Persia, where the Ulema remained a highly organized strata of society, a holdover from the days when Persia had been a Shia country in the Safavid era.
The political power of secularists was limited in these pre-democratic societies. Whereas the Ottoman Empire had a sufficient representation of secularists in the educated sphere to ensure some representation in government, especially in the army, this was not the case especially in Persia. As such, those who openly criticised existing religious authorities were likely to face discrimination or worse. Perhaps the only avowedly secular and possibly atheist Persian of his time, Ruhollah Kasra, was famously jailed after condemning escalating intercommunal violence in “Kafiristan”, the region now known as Kalashestan. No other voices were raised when the local government used Pashtun militias motivated by religious fervour to attack the pagan people of the region and forcibly convert them to Islam in the 1860s, and the very public defence of the “unbelievers” of the region went quite some way towards leaving the impression upon mainstream Persian society that secularists were simply the sympathisers of unbelievers, and quite possibly unbelievers themselves. However, in Egypt, where intercommunal violence was far less marked, secularism was seen as an ideology that would allow for the coexistence of the Muslim community and the sizeable Coptic Christian community.
* * * * * *
Muslim Reactions to the loss of Political Pre-Eminence
Muslim Reactions to the loss of Political Pre-Eminence
For much of the Eastern half of the Islamic world, the middle of the 19th century was a time of an adjustment to a strange new reality. Whereas previously, few Muslims had been ruled by non-Muslim rulers, and generally Islamic states were among the most vigorous in the region, this had swiftly changed in the closing years of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th. In Java, the most populous Islamic land of the East Indies, the relatively light hand of the Dutch was replaced by the French, who imposed direct rule on the whole island and went some way toward suppressing organized Islam on the island. With the possibilities for the political articulation of Islam largely taken away, the Muslims of Java began to look at the reform of the personal practice of their religion, and many syncretic practices were now abandoned as a version of the religion that more closely resembled that practiced in the rest of the Islamic world took a hold. Clothing changed to cover more of the body of both males and females, and the veneration of Hindu gods largely disappeared with the exception of isolated rural areas. This standardisation of Islamic practice mirrored what had already taken place in the more maritime areas of Islamic South East Asia.
In India, the previously powerful Muslim community was sidelined following the Indian Wars, which saw much of the subcontinent divided by the Sikh ruled Punjab and the British Raj. Although the Muslims were able to draw concessions from the British when it came to missionary activity aimed at the Muslim community, the Muslims of India remained politically weak and increasingly economically deprived. The Muslims of India began to embrace a reformist school which was named the Rohtaki movement, which advocated a purification of belief and practice and a non-interference of politics. The movement benefited from relative toleration on the part of both the British and Punjabi authorities, which saw the movement as a bulwark against schools of thought which advocated for a more muscular role for the Muslim community in India. Elsewhere in lands where Muslims were a minority, there began to be a gradual articulation toward an anti-Western and in some respects, an anti-Christian line of thought. In China, the Hui Muslims gave their support to the anti-missionary White Turban movement, and were rewarded with relatively preferential treatment under the Wu Dynasty.
* * * * * *
Author's Notes - Just a short update to give a bit of flavour to the Muslim world. Next update we'll have a look at South East Asia and the developments going on there, before moving on with the rest of the world.