Can pre-revolutionary France reach the Rhine?

[Vinization]

Having the Rhine as a border was a longstanding goal of French foreign policy for centuries, but it only reached said goal in the days of the Revolution and, even so, only retained it for a decade. With a POD after 1526, could the Valois or Bourbon dynasties get a Rhine border, provided several things go right for them (better results in the later Italian Wars, fewer Wars of Religion, a nasty Habsburg screw, etc)?

 

[AltoRegnant]

If they're more conciliatory/focused in the lead up to the WoSS I would imagine so. Drop italy, go for the rhine, make britain look like the unreasonable party as much as possible

 

[Kellan Sullivan]

Question is as @Carp pointed out in the thread of Aix-la-Chapelle, France GETTING (in this case) to the Rhine is a very different question to France being able to KEEP her newly annexed lands. Case in point: Louis XIV HAD Lorraine for most of his reign, but was obliged to hand it back after the 9YW (due to outside pressure IIRC).

 

[alexmilman]

Question is as @Carp pointed out in the thread of Aix-la-Chapelle, France GETTING (in this case) to the Rhine is a very different question to France being able to KEEP her newly annexed lands. Case in point: Louis XIV HAD Lorraine for most of his reign, but was obliged to hand it back after the 9YW (due to outside pressure IIRC).

How about France of Louis XIV using what it did have differently? It’s OTL army was quite comparable in its numbers to the army circa 1793: 1688 - 338,000 (the Netherlands - 73,000, Hapsburgs - 50,000, Britain - 80,000), 1693 - 420,000, 1696 - 410, 657 (not counting the officers), 1700 - 360,000, 1702 - 392,000, 1710 - 377,000. http://totalwars.ru/board/index.php/topic/56393-французская-армия-людовика-xiv-в-цифрах/

With the exception of Montecuccoli, prior to the WoSS the French opponents had not been led by the really outstanding generals so the failure to achieve the outstanding results probably was mostly due to the French leadership, starting from the top, Louis and Louvois, and then down to the countless marshals (42, only Louis XV had more; can it be that the number of marshals was in a reverse proportion to their qualification? 😜).

For comparison, War of the 1st Coalition (border on the Rhine in 1793): 1792 - 150,000, 1793 - 270,000 (against 375,000), 1794 - 400,000. Notice that, like at the time of Louis XIV, armies of the Republic had been fighting on the multiple theaters and generally still suffering from the same “cordon strategy” approach (spreading forces all over the front trying to cover all possible roads ), still had a considerable number of troops as the garrisons, suffered from a shortage of the competent officers (well, competence of those at the time of Louis is a big question mark) and from very serious discipline problems. Plus, they were generally worse supplied than armies of Louis XIV. Probably, the armies of Louis XIV had been, generally, better organized than those of his opponents while for the 1st Coalition it was other way around.


Still, by the end of 1793 the French had been in possession of Belgium, Netherlands, the left bank of the Rhine and managed to end the war with the Rhine being French “natural border”. Which probably means that warfare of Louis XIV was extremely ineffective. So if we assume that this inefficiency is somehow being addressed (Louvois removed from his position, Louis stops meddling in the military operations, appointments are made by the merit instead of the pedigree or recommendation from Louis’s current mistress, etc.), the OP goal could be achieved.

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

If you are a believer of Great Man history, just kill off John Churchill of Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy. Without these two, the French-Bavarian alliance is unstoppable and the British-Hapsburg alliance is crushed in the War of Spanish Succession.

 

[Vinization]

I remember reading somewhere on this site that the Bourbon army was often unable to press on after scoring a major victory due to lack of money. Could that be remedied somehow? The OP provides two centuries to work with.

 

[alexmilman]

I remember reading somewhere on this site that the Bourbon army was often unable to press on after scoring a major victory due to lack of money. Could that be remedied somehow? The OP provides two centuries to work with.

Money were one of the factors but general mentality also was a major contributor. War still was a highly formalized activity where things had been done slowly according to “the rules of war” (*) with the officers paying a great attention to their appearances (**), armies being burdened by the huge baggage trains and the battles being secondary to the complicated maneuvers and the most important thing in a battle was to remain in possession of the field. Pursuit after a battle was generally considered a risky enterprise that could endanger the achieved result and quite often it was considered prudent to give a defeated enemy free passage.

____
(*) Louis wrote to Catinat that Eugene “does not tie himself down to the rules of war”. I wonder what these “rules” amount to.
(**) Battle of Steenkerque was “immortalized” by a steinkirk cravat: a lace cravat loosely or negligently worn, with long lace ends. According to Voltaire (l'Âge de Louis XIV), it was in fashion after the Battle of Steenkerque, where the French gentlemen had to fight with disarranged cravats on account of the surprise sprung by the Allies. It seems that an idea of going to the fight without cravat simply was not there. 😜

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

1) I think the 1600s would actually be a better time for France to advance to the Rhine than the 1700s.

- England has it's civil war as well as three wars with the Dutch to keep it occupied.

- The Ottomans are much stronger in the 1600s than the 1700s, and almost took Vienna.

- Although they did technically lose in otl, the 30 Years War could have gone much worse for the Austrian Hapsburgs.

- The Swedes (a pro France ally) were at the height of their empire.

 

[Kellan Sullivan]

1) I think the 1600s would actually be a better time for France to advance to the Rhine than the 1700s.

- England has it's civil war as well as three wars with the Dutch to keep it occupied.

- The Ottomans are much stronger in the 1600s than the 1700s, and almost took Vienna.

- Although they did technically lose in otl, the 30 Years War could have gone much worse for the Austrian Hapsburgs.

- The Swedes (a pro France ally) were at the height of their empire.

Uh...France did annex Lorraine for a very long time in the 17th century. It was only given back post 9YW at Austria's insistence. And France tried to get it back pretty quickly in one of the Partition Treaties (ICR if it was London or The Hague) signed with England and the Dutch stipulated that the duchy of Lorraine was to be given to the dauphin, and the duke of Lorraine was to receive Milan or Naples in exchange for everyone acknowledging that Josef Ferdinand of Bavaria was the rightful king of Spain.

 

[Tibi088]

If you are a believer of Great Man history, just kill off John Churchill of Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy. Without these two, the French-Bavarian alliance is unstoppable and the British-Hapsburg alliance is crushed in the War of Spanish Succession.

Actually having the French decisivly win the War of the Spanish Succession is the wrong way to go. That might get the Bourbons Spain with their additions intact but a spanish bourbon (allied) belgium is way harder to obtain for France than the OTL Austrian one.

Actually what if we reverse the result of the war spanish sucession instead? France looses but not that badly, Spain goes to the Habsburgs but the french get belgium in compensation etc?

 

[alexmilman]

1) I think the 1600s would actually be a better time for France to advance to the Rhine than the 1700s.

- England has it's civil war as well as three wars with the Dutch to keep it occupied.

- The Ottomans are much stronger in the 1600s than the 1700s, and almost took Vienna.

- Although they did technically lose in otl, the 30 Years War could have gone much worse for the Austrian Hapsburgs.

- The Swedes (a pro France ally) were at the height of their empire.

Good point. You can add:
- France not yet i’m being economically exhausted by the endless wars and insane expenses of Louis’ court.

But Louis still is a major bonus for his opponents 😜.

By the reasons unclear he imagined himself a competent military person and, what ix worse (for the purpose of this OP) a great strategist. And when he somehow missed an opportunity to screw things up, the torch was picked up by another armchair military “genius”, Louvois.

Even if initially a war had some practical goal (none of them, AFAIK had border of 1793 as a goal but this is irrelevant), sooner rather than later the advantages of the bigger numbers, better organization and better generalship had been lost to pursuing numerous secondary goals and and a big army had been broken to the numerous small ones ‘maneuvering to no obvious purpose’ and lacking strength for achieving a serious strategic goal. The problem of inadequate logistics had been already mentioned but while Louvois looks inadequate for the task of managing a war time effort, neither was Carnot in 1793 and yet the Republic with its undersupplied armies led by the quite average (at best) generals managed to achieve what Louis failed to do. Probably a much more …er… “open-minded” approach to how the war should be conducted helped. 😜

You mentioned the Ottomans but, again, Louis had been hoisted by his own petard: his obsession with being a leading Christian king of Europe did not allow cooperation with the Ottoman allies at the most advantageous moment.

Quite agree about the WoSS being too late. Not just because of the great generals involved on the opposite side (Villars and Vendome were quite good as well) but because on the French side the regime deteriorated to the point of being self-destructive. Pretty much in all areas Louis was going the wrong way.

Vauban was, of course, a great military engineer and he made sieges into a science (which the enemies learned quite fast) but his defensive belt on the border was good for a purely defensive war allowing to keep a major untouched army in reserve capable to counter the enemies moves. WoSS was an offensive war on the French side and by the time the border fortifications came into the play, France did not have enough field troops to prevent breaching if the lines while 20-30% of the available troops had been locked in the fortresses.

While the French army was still big, thanks to Louis “contribution” it’s effectiveness was illusional. He was ordering to raise the new regiments and there were numerous single battalion regiments (with both regimental and battalion command structure). Saddling armies with the royal princes was another “brilliant” idea resulting in loss of Italy.

During the earlier wars most of these factors were not, yet, in place.

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

Uh...France did annex Lorraine for a very long time in the 17th century. It was only given back post 9YW at Austria's insistence. And France tried to get it back pretty quickly in one of the Partition Treaties (ICR if it was London or The Hague) signed with England and the Dutch stipulated that the duchy of Lorraine was to be given to the dauphin, and the duke of Lorraine was to receive Milan or Naples in exchange for everyone acknowledging that Josef Ferdinand of Bavaria was the rightful king of Spain.

There is more to the Rhine border than just Lorraine.

 

[Kellan Sullivan]

There is more to the Rhine border than just Lorraine.

Agreed. But any Rhine border WILL include Lorraine

 

[Comte de Dordogne]

Agreed. But any Rhine border WILL include Lorraine

In a parallel universe:

 

[Kellan Sullivan]

In a parallel universe:
View attachment 678631

So Lorraine as a sort of Lesotho (for size, otherwise I'd have likened it to San Marino or Monaco)

 

[Vinization]

Assuming the Wars of Religion are somehow averted, could France take advantage of the Dutch Revolt? There was this one thing in Antwerp involving the Duke of Anjou in 1583, but it was a debacle.

 

[alexmilman]

Assuming the Wars of Religion are somehow averted, could France take advantage of the Dutch Revolt? There was this one thing in Antwerp involving the Duke of Anjou in 1583, but it was a debacle.

“Advantage” as what? It could grab some border territories from Spain (as it did in OTL) but to have an ability to establish border on the Rhine it would need an army big enough to conquer all that territory from the HRE and Spain and to effectively garrison that territory. France, prior to LXIV did not have a big standing army so you need France approximately century ahead of the schedule to get a standing high quality army of at least 100 - 150,000 (with the garrison troops).

 

[Vinization]

“Advantage” as what? It could grab some border territories from Spain (as it did in OTL) but to have an ability to establish border on the Rhine it would need an army big enough to conquer all that territory from the HRE and Spain and to effectively garrison that territory. France, prior to LXIV did not have a big standing army so you need France approximately century ahead of the schedule to get a standing high quality army of at least 100 - 150,000 (with the garrison troops).

Taking advantage as in conquering territories like the counties of Artois and especially Flanders. They could serve as a starting point of a steady march toward the Rhine.

 

[Fabius Maximus]

I remember reading somewhere on this site that the Bourbon army was often unable to press on after scoring a major victory due to lack of money. Could that be remedied somehow? The OP provides two centuries to work with.

As I recall, the French government in the 18th century had about the same income as the English government, despite France having some three times the population.

So yes, there's definitely scope/need for more effective fundraising.

Even if initially a war had some practical goal (none of them, AFAIK had border of 1793 as a goal but this is irrelevant), sooner rather than later the advantages of the bigger numbers, better organization and better generalship had been lost to pursuing numerous secondary goals and and a big army had been broken to the numerous small ones ‘maneuvering to no obvious purpose’ and lacking strength for achieving a serious strategic goal. The problem of inadequate logistics had been already mentioned but while Louvois looks inadequate for the task of managing a war time effort, neither was Carnot in 1793 and yet the Republic with its undersupplied armies led by the quite average (at best) generals managed to achieve what Louis failed to do. Probably a much more …er… “open-minded” approach to how the war should be conducted helped. 😜

I don't think you can really compare the situation in 1793 with the situation a hundred years earlier, for the simple reason that the Agricultural Revolution had taken place in the intervening period, making it much more feasible to supply large armies in the field. French Revolutionary armies could march virtually anywhere and be confident of living off the land; 17th-century armies couldn't, and consequently needed much larger baggage trains, and were much more constrained about where they could campaign.

 

[alexmilman]

As I recall, the French government in the 18th century had about the same income as the English government, despite France having some three times the population.

So yes, there's definitely scope/need for more effective fundraising.

I don't think you can really compare the situation in 1793 with the situation a hundred years earlier, for the simple reason that the Agricultural Revolution had taken place in the intervening period, making it much more feasible to supply large armies in the field. French Revolutionary armies could march virtually anywhere and be confident of living off the land; 17th-century armies couldn't, and consequently needed much larger baggage trains, and were much more constrained about where they could campaign.

You seemingly forgot that even earlier, during the 30YW, the armies had been living off the land.

The difference was not agricultural revolution but “regularity” of the armies: drill and a harsh discipline had been causing mass desertions, training of a soldier was a long and tedious process and in an absence of universal conscription finding the new recruits was not an easy task. As a result, starting with post-30YW period one of the main tasks was to keep soldiers within their units. Old Fritz even ordered to use the hussars to guard the marching troops to prevent the desertions. So, generally, the soldiers had to be provided with the food in a centralized way from the depots, which resulted in the huge supply convoys. However, even during that period living off the land was happening. Turenne was using it when Louvois failed to supply his army with money, Duke of Luxembourg used it in at least one of his campaigns, Charles XII used it regularly, etc.

But supply needs were only a part of these huge baggage trains. They had been carrying the tents for the whole army and they were including a huge number of wagons and carriages with the individual luggage of the officers and generals. But they were not carrying food all the way from their home land: it was usually collected locally by special commissariat services (usually paid for, especially on the friendly territories) and then carried to the supply depots from which they had been sent to the army (as was done during the 7YW).

Armies of the French Revolution got rid of the tents and individual luggage had been minimalized. Living off the land with a resulting damage to the discipline and desertions was not considered a major problem because due to the conscription the new troops could be raised easily (and the official line was that the deserters will return to their units due to the patriotic feelings) and requirements to the soldier’s training had been minimal. Centralized food/forage collection was rudimentary just because everything else also was badly organized. I’d assume that inadequate supply of the shoes and uniforms can’t be a direct byproduct of the agricultural revolution even if the shoes could be “collected” from the local population. 😂

Anyway, the opponents of the French revolutionary armies had been using the old supply methods being seemingly unaware of the benefits of agricultural revolution.