Beyond the town of Gettysburg

Lee should have more ammo since he didn’t waste all of it on an retardedly thought out attack.

But he’s going to be nearing the end of his supply by now unless Jeb Stuart has either opened up the supply chain from VA or has managed to raid enough enemy munitions to equip the army.

Regarding Lee’s ammunition during the rainy retreat from Gettysburg, I’m almost certain he only had canister shot left for his artillery and that a concentrated attack on Lee would have resulted in at least a marginal Union victory.
 
And wasn’t there and issue with the fuses coming from a different factory and lasting a couple seconds longer than the artillery crews were used to?
 
And wasn’t there and issue with the fuses coming from a different factory and lasting a couple seconds longer than the artillery crews were used to?

I hope this answers the question.
Technically, the problem was generated by a change in base of supply for said fuses which occurred just before the beginning of the Gettysburg Campaign. Prior
to the early summer of 1863, the Army of Northern Virginia had received it's supply of fuses from Richmond arsenals. Due to shortages at the time of
resupply following the battle of Chancellorsville, fuses were shipped from arsenals and manufacturing facilities in Charleston, SC and Selma, Ala.
A week after the battle, Lt James Dinwiddie working for the Ordnance Dept conducted tests on the various fuses supplied from around the Confederacy at the
Richmond Labratories. His findings showed that while those fuses manufactured in Charleston and Selma were made of eceptional quality, the rate of burn for
those fuses was markedly less. In his findings compared with those fuses as previously supplied to the ANV from the Richmond arsenals it was found the fuses
from Charleston and Selma burned at a rate of one second longer for the same length of fuse. The result of course was that those fuses in shells intended to
explode over the Federal position at Gettysburg ranged anywhere from 150 to 200 yrds further to the rear before exploding. A 4 " fuse would burn at the
rate as one cut to 5 "
Following the report of Dinwiddie, Gorgas, Confederate Chief or Ordnance, ordered a study of all fuses and shells from various points throughout the
Confederacy. The study found a serious inconsistency in the rate of burn for Fuses manufactured from the various locations. Though positive action would be
taken to correct the problem it would be early the following January before the problem would be corrected.
The failure of the bombardment to be effective was simply due to technical problems beyond the control of the Artillerists on the field. It had nothing to do
with the poor ability of the gunners to aim their pieces properly. As was noted, Solid shot fired during the bombardment did indeed hit it's directed
target with no problem and were the result of the damage that was incurred upon the Federal line. https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/the...ate-artillery-overshot-on-day-thre-t1517.html
 
32 - Decisions
Chapter 32 - Decisions

The evening meeting of the commanders of the Army of Northern Virginia lasted late into the night. The committed attack on Meade's lines, which had failed, showed that another fight along Pipe Creek was not promising. The main objectives of the invasion of Pennsylvania had been achieved. The Union Army had suffered defeat on its own soil and Virginia's fields and farms had been relieved. The destruction of Meade's army or the capture of Washington had not been considered realistic by any of the leading officers.

Even during the current day's attack news had reached the camp that Pemberton and the garrison at Vicksburg had capitulated. This, it seemed at first sight, outweighed even the success before Cashtown. It was now open to debate whether, in view of this fact and the deadlock at Pipe Creek, a retreat to Virginia would really be the best signal. This was especially true in view of the fact that the army was still fit for action and in a comparatively good condition. Jubal Early in particular argued passionately for holding the line north of the Potomac River. A victorious army would not turn its back on the enemy, A. P. Hill also argued. Longstreet did not directly reject these arguments, but pointed out that his corps had been the hardest hit by the fighting so far and had suffered the highest losses.

Lee agreed with Early and Hill after a brief period of reflection. The Army of Northern Virginia had suffered just under 16,000 casualties to date, while the total losses of Union troops since the beginning of the march north exceeded 27,000 men. West Maryland seemed a logical choice for a base. The area was already known to commanders from the Maryland Campaign a year earlier, and the Catoctins and South Mountain seemed ideal bastions. The army would move west the next morning, while Stuart's cavalry would feint a flank attack against Manchester. The town of Frederick was chosen as the first target. Lee would also telegraph to Richmond and request support to hold his ground.

When Meade learned during the course of July 8 that Lee had withdrawn, it was a relief. The heavy losses of his army over the past few days had greatly reduced his combat capabilities. French's garrison troops had been able to fill some of the biggest gaps, but the troops were still far below target strength. As quickly as the Pennsylvania militias had been brought in from Lancaster, they withdrew again. They had crossed the state border grumbling anyway and were now ordered back by the governor, as heavy draft riots had broken out in New York and it was feared that they would spread to the big cities of Pennsylvania. Meade informed the High Command that he had finally beaten Lee back after a changeable battle, but that his army was not able to follow the enemy forcefully. The men would need rest and other people to strengthen their ranks, veterans at best. Meade told his subordinates that he considered the army unable to move for at least the next four weeks.

confederate-camp-mountain-dreams.jpg
 
Nice work.
Looks like Lee will live to fight another day and the Union does not get the propaganda victory they had OTL at Gettysburg.
Jeb Stuart might even be able to raid the supply waggons heading for meades army.
I imagine the railways will be destroyed as lee's troops leave.
 
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33 - Vicksburg and Port Hudson
Chapter 33 - Vicksburg and Port Hudson

Since May 18, the fortress city of Vicksburg that dominated the last Confederate-controlled section of the Mississippi River, lay under siege. Five army corps of Major General Ulysses S. Grant's Army of the Tennessee had assembled and surrounded Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton's 33,000 defenders in four divisions. Before the siege ring had closed around the city, Joseph E. Johnston, who was in Jackson, Mississippi with 30,000 men, ordered Pemberton to evacuate the city and save his army. Pemberton, however, considered a retreat impracticable and held the position. During the six-week siege, several frontal attacks by Union forces failed, but the constant bombardment and dwindling food and ammunition supplies forced Pemberton to surrender on the historic 4th of July 1863. With him, 29,500 men surrendered, but they were paroled and, after surrendering their weapons, were released south, as Grant was pragmatic and simply could not feed such a mass of prisoners. In recognition of his success, the Union commander was promoted to Major General in the regular army with retroactive effect from 4 July, and from that date was considered a strong candidate for the post of General in chief.

Another, less significant siege took place almost simultaneously on the lower Mississippi. At Port Hudson, 35,000 Yankees under Major General Nathaniel P. Banks had surrounded 7,500 Confederates under Major General Franklin Gardner since May 22nd. Although Port Hudson was far from dominating the Mississippi River like Vicksburg, capturing the town would have made navigation from the Gulf Region through the Deep South much easier.

Banks was in competition with Grant for faster progress and also had political ambitions that forced him to act more quickly as elections approached. In a series of brutal attacks against Port Hudson, all of which failed, Banks had already lost 5,000 killed and wounded, while Gardner's losses were limited to around 750 men. However, 5,000 other Union soldiers had died of disease or sunstrokes, which had severely affected Banks' forces. Gardner had already vigorously refused to surrender before 4 July, and in the face of the capture of Vicksburg, Banks, now focused solely on the elections, tried again on 9 July. Although the supply situation was slowly becoming critical, Gardner decided to play poker one last time due to the news of the success in Pennsylvania. In a letter to Banks, which was later leaked to the press, Gardner stated that his honour would not allow him to surrender his command as long as Confederate troops were victorious on northern soil.

With no knowledge of the enemy supply situation, Banks was forced to launch another attack. In contrast to the piecemeal assaults before, he would have all four of his divisions, 25,000 combat-capable men after all, attacked simultaneously along the entire front. The attack in the centre, with divisions under Major General Christopher C. Augur and Brigadier General William Dwight, came to a halt after only a few hundred yards in heavy defensive fire from the Confederates under Brigadier General William Beall. The combined fire of half a dozen artillery batteries, including two 24-pounder smoothbores, swept the Union lines off the field. Cuvier Grover's 4th Division managed to break into the positions on the left wing of the rebels. Hand-to-hand-combat broke out in the trenches and the troops from Mississippi and Arkansas in Colonel Isaiah G. W. Steedman's first line of defence were thrown back. Only a counterattack by the 1st Alabama and several Louisiana Reserves allowed the positions to be regained. On the left flank of the Union troops, Colonel Hawkes Fearing's division was already held up by abatis and buried torpedoes, which tore up his ranks.

After his troops had endured enemy fire for over two hours, no terrain gains and a further 4,000 casualties, a frustrated Nathaniel Banks broke off the attack. When he subsequently promised to try again the following day, a mutiny almost broke out among his officers. All four division commanders let Banks know that they would strictly refuse to carry out another attack order. When Banks then threatened a court martial, they declared that they would lay down their command if in doubt. Neither pleas nor curses brought Banks any further, as he had completely turned his subordinates against him. Completely disillusioned, on 10 July 1863 he gave the only order he had left, the command to retreat to New Orleans.

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Vicksburg under siege.
 
Pretty sound reasoning, and I would think true to the Confederate characters involved. If I can make a few suggestions? Would Meade really tell Lincoln he was going to keep the AOP camped along Pipe Creek for 4 weeks? That might sound too much like McClellan sitting at Antietam, wasting the fine Autumn weather. If Lee marches on Fredrick the AOP would have to move immediately to cover Washington. From Fredrick Washington is only a 50 mile march down the old National Road. Alternatively Baltimore is about equal distance, with good roads to travel on. Meade would need to concentrate at a location like Damascus MD, to cover the roads to both cities. He can't afford to let Lee get past him.

Going head on at Washington might result in a do or die battle against the cities massive defenses, supported by the AOP. Success would be unlikely, and losses would be very high. Lee could stand and wait for Meade to attack him, and fight at Fredrick. That could be an even battle, but losses could be high. If Lee listens to Longstreet he'll try to draw Meade west to a defensive position like South Mountain, and fight a battle there. It's up to you to be the best Lee you can be.

If Lee will be staying North of the Potomac for an extended campaign, maybe the Union should reinforce the army south of the James. In July 1863 IV & VII Corps were operating on the Peninsula, and SE Virginia. With some reinforcements they could threaten Richmond, or parts of North Carolina, to draw Lee's attention back to Virginia. Again it's up to you to be the best Lincoln & Halleck you can be.
 
Pretty sound reasoning, and I would think true to the Confederate characters involved. If I can make a few suggestions? Would Meade really tell Lincoln he was going to keep the AOP camped along Pipe Creek for 4 weeks? That might sound too much like McClellan sitting at Antietam, wasting the fine Autumn weather. If Lee marches on Fredrick the AOP would have to move immediately to cover Washington. From Fredrick Washington is only a 50 mile march down the old National Road. Alternatively Baltimore is about equal distance, with good roads to travel on. Meade would need to concentrate at a location like Damascus MD, to cover the roads to both cities. He can't afford to let Lee get past him.

Going head on at Washington might result in a do or die battle against the cities massive defenses, supported by the AOP. Success would be unlikely, and losses would be very high. Lee could stand and wait for Meade to attack him, and fight at Fredrick. That could be an even battle, but losses could be high. If Lee listens to Longstreet he'll try to draw Meade west to a defensive position like South Mountain, and fight a battle there. It's up to you to be the best Lee you can be.

If Lee will be staying North of the Potomac for an extended campaign, maybe the Union should reinforce the army south of the James. In July 1863 IV & VII Corps were operating on the Peninsula, and SE Virginia. With some reinforcements they could threaten Richmond, or parts of North Carolina, to draw Lee's attention back to Virginia. Again it's up to you to be the best Lincoln & Halleck you can be.

Thank you for your input which is valid and much appreciated.

Concerning Meade: Even with the addition of French he is reduced to 59,300 infantry and 9,100 cavalry which is way less than at any point before. He has to incorporate the 10,000 into the existing seven corps to bolster those and that forces him to reorganize the whole command structure. Lincoln and Halleck are not stupid and will recognize the difference between Meade and McClellan. Lee has 44,500 infantry and 10,000 cavalry without the burden to reorganize any of his divisions. Those odds are not promising a major victory.

Concerning the distance: You are right, I might have to change Meade's position in order to again fully cover Washington.

Concerning relieving attacks in Virginia: Dix got nowhere in the end of June and separate serious offensive movements did not work before with McClellan and Pope. Also, I think nobody in the north cares for advancing on the peninsula when there are rebels unmolested in Maryland. More likely, those forces will be ferried back to be put under Meade's command.

I am right now not committed to any future battlefield in Maryland although a multi-layered defence seams reasonable (first along the Monocacy, then in the Catoctins and lastly at South Mountain, all under the premise that Meade doesn't order a pincer movement and advances troops from Chambersburg)
 
Pretty sound reasoning, and I would think true to the Confederate characters involved. If I can make a few suggestions? Would Meade really tell Lincoln he was going to keep the AOP camped along Pipe Creek for 4 weeks? That might sound too much like McClellan sitting at Antietam, wasting the fine Autumn weather. If Lee marches on Fredrick the AOP would have to move immediately to cover Washington. From Fredrick Washington is only a 50 mile march down the old National Road. Alternatively Baltimore is about equal distance, with good roads to travel on. Meade would need to concentrate at a location like Damascus MD, to cover the roads to both cities. He can't afford to let Lee get past him.

Going head on at Washington might result in a do or die battle against the cities massive defenses, supported by the AOP. Success would be unlikely, and losses would be very high. Lee could stand and wait for Meade to attack him, and fight at Fredrick. That could be an even battle, but losses could be high. If Lee listens to Longstreet he'll try to draw Meade west to a defensive position like South Mountain, and fight a battle there. It's up to you to be the best Lee you can be.

If Lee will be staying North of the Potomac for an extended campaign, maybe the Union should reinforce the army south of the James. In July 1863 IV & VII Corps were operating on the Peninsula, and SE Virginia. With some reinforcements they could threaten Richmond, or parts of North Carolina, to draw Lee's attention back to Virginia. Again it's up to you to be the best Lincoln & Halleck you can be.
Lincoln would understand the main difference between McClelland and Meade. Meade had been thrown into command in late June. McClellan had more time
 
Great timeline so far, read it all today! If I’ve learned one thing about the Civil War, you can always rely on Nathaniel Banks to mess things up.
 
Nice job. Though, for all the Southern "victories", Vicksburg is still in the Northern hands, and that is the going to hurt Confederacy further. Not to mention Grant is now going to be seen by Lincoln as somebody who wins, and when he gets East, he will not stop and he will bleed the AoNV dry. Not to mention that some guy called Sherman is likely going to have himself a barbecue in Atlanta before embarking on a sightseeing tour of Georgia.

BTW, I very much enjoyed the Confederate attack at the Pipe Creek Line, attempt at getting the men in and using melee/shock action to break through, instead of trying to shoot it out with dug in troops. I do hope that some Union officers recognize that such tactics do have a chance of taking defensive lines.

Lastly, is there a chance of Union changing the way their recruitment works? I mean, they kept raising new regiments, while it may have been better to reinforce existing ones, to have some experience and hard won knowledge to rub-off on new recruits.

Keep it up!
 
The main issue on the Mississippi was that Port Hudson was considered useless without Vicksburg. I also doubt Banks wouldn't know the confederate supply situation. The confederate were also were in poor shape so they probably can't hold it any longer even with Bank's withdraw. I think Meade can't stay in the position he's in for long if Lee looks to be moving away at the very least he would need to maneuver his army to a position to cover Baltimore and Washington from the west. The main difference between McClellan and Meade is that so far McClellan had"drove" Lee out of the north Meade has not.
 
Lastly, is there a chance of Union changing the way their recruitment works? I mean, they kept raising new regiments, while it may have been better to reinforce existing ones, to have some experience and hard won knowledge to rub-off on new recruits.

Then you disrupt all the political favors that can be traded by influencing who gets to command all those regiments.
 
The main issue on the Mississippi was that Port Hudson was considered useless without Vicksburg. I also doubt Banks wouldn't know the confederate supply situation. The confederate were also were in poor shape so they probably can't hold it any longer even with Bank's withdraw. I think Meade can't stay in the position he's in for long if Lee looks to be moving away at the very least he would need to maneuver his army to a position to cover Baltimore and Washington from the west. The main difference between McClellan and Meade is that so far McClellan had"drove" Lee out of the north Meade has not.
I agree that Port Hudson is not sufficient to block Union traffic along the Mississippi River and therefore this did in no way reverse any of Grant's gains. However the rebels have now still some presence left in eastern Louisiana and at that point it might even be possible, for a certain time frame, to ferry troops over the river. Concerning the knowledge of the supply situation I have to disagree. OTL the siege lasted for 48 days and Gardner in the end only surrendered due to the capture of Vicksburg and no promising news from the east. The situation was not nearly as bad as in Vicksburg where the men literally were starving. For the Federal side OTL it was very annoying and surprising that the Confederates even held out so long and the repeated attempts to pursuade them to surrender and the two failed assaults showed, that they did not know the whole picture.

Lastly, is there a chance of Union changing the way their recruitment works? I mean, they kept raising new regiments, while it may have been better to reinforce existing ones, to have some experience and hard won knowledge to rub-off on new recruits.
The recruitment process is sort of my weakness and up to now I relied on the OTL measures. I do not see the reason for the actors involved to change that system, that even was continued in the face of the brutal casualties of the Overland Campaign.

As it looks right now, there will not be any transfer of troops from Lee's army to the west in August or September which makes a Rosecrans victory against Bragg almost a certainty. The Confederates most likely will be driven from Tennessee for good and have to experience a change of commander in northern Georgia. Having to remove Bragg from command due to public pressure will anger Davis and appointing Johnston seems less likely than in OTL, especially, because there will be a desire to recover the lost ground. I am toying with the idea of Longstreet taking command in the West, facing off with Rosecrans in Georgia and maybe Breckinridge taking command of his corps in Lee's army. This only leaves the question what to do with Johnston.
 
Actually from what I read at Port Hudson they were down to eating rats and where suffering from serious illness. If you notice their weren't any assaults after mid-June which means Banks probably came to the same conclusion Grant did it was only a matter of time until the confederates would surrender. Another thing is that no major confederate force could or would cross the Mississippi for numerous reasons. The problem with Longstreet is that he is not a full General and only full Generals could command armies on a permanent basis. Furthermore until the fallowing year there were no legal way to temporary promote officers in the Confederate Army.
 
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