Ahc: screw the Kriegsmarine even harder

Not clear what guns it was against, but pretty sure the USA put troops ashore, 'port to port' at Algiers during the Torch operation in 1942. Unless local resistance members had knocked out any and all harbour defences or something, the USA showed it could be done - and done successfully - during WW2.
At Algiers the resistance had indeed taken out much of the opposing artillery. They only really came into play hours after landing. At Oran and Casablanca, they were not so lucky. However, none of those were actually port landings. There were multiple landings on the flanks of the cities. The Cities were taken from overland. The allies (Not just US) did send men directly into harbour to try and keep the harbour facilities from being destroyed but in both cases it ended with most of the attacking force killed or captured and the ships used to get them there mostly sunk. Its not a ringing endorsement of Port to Port attacks.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
Would suggest that, if you want to see how a German attempt to seize Dover of Folkestone would go, you study Dieppe instead of Algiers. Also note at the latter the Allies had naval supremacy & air superiority.
 

nbcman

Donor
In order to invade you mostly need merchant ships for port to port landings- the rest can be achieved through deception and RN incompetence. Dito for the so called naval patrol & attack planes that were only able to detect 1 German ship out of every seven , during this period.
There's a not insignificant difference between trying to detect small groups of ships or individual vessels that are sailing and trying to not be detected to a big cluster of slow moving merchies and barges that are wallowing their way across the Channel in a very defined path. This isn't an apples to oranges comparison, it is watermelons to raisins.

If the USM was so easy as you are positing, why didn't it take place in OTL?
 
Would suggest that, if you want to see how a German attempt to seize Dover of Folkestone would go, you study Dieppe instead of Algiers. Also note at the latter the Allies had naval supremacy & air superiority.
Dieppe had Mountbatten in charge if you mean Jubilee/Rutter - Mountbatten being a British commander so... well, 'something'... that he insisted in late 1943 he needed 50,000 troops to mount an operation against the Andamans (estimated Imperial Japanese garrison: 5,000) when Roosevelt (whose military had experience of fighting the Imperial Japanese on islands) told Churchill it should be possible with 14,000. (See Churchill's The Second World War, Volume V, 'Cairo Again. The High Command.' (pages 364-366 in the 1952 edition.))
The American press identified Mountbatten as a 'British princeling and glamour boy'.
I get the impression that Mountbatten may have been able to have handled some of the commando stuff alright, but not to have had a clue about bigger, more formal, operations. Fortunately for the Americans, Mountbatten doesn't seem to have been involved in the Algiers assault, as far as I can make out.
 
Dieppe had Mountbatten in charge if you mean Jubilee/Rutter - Mountbatten being a British commander so... well, 'something'... that he insisted in late 1943 he needed 50,000 troops to mount an operation against the Andamans (estimated Imperial Japanese garrison: 5,000) when Roosevelt (whose military had experience of fighting the Imperial Japanese on islands) told Churchill it should be possible with 14,000. (See Churchill's The Second World War, Volume V, 'Cairo Again. The High Command.' (pages 364-366 in the 1952 edition.))
The American press identified Mountbatten as a 'British princeling and glamour boy'.
I get the impression that Mountbatten may have been able to have handled some of the commando stuff alright, but not to have had a clue about bigger, more formal, operations. Fortunately for the Americans, Mountbatten doesn't seem to have been involved in the Algiers assault, as far as I can make out.
I don't think the planning of Dieppe was Mountbatten's either. And Torch had its own hiccups (most particularly the actual attack on the ports themselves). Once again though, Torch had overwhelming naval superiority, friendly forces working with them ashore, easy access to the strategic lines of supply, their own aircover and the ability to neutralize most of the enemies airpower within hours of landing. Its a very different proposition crossing the English Channel.
 
I'll add that both the Dieppe Raid of 1942 (unsuccessful) and the Algiers assault of 1943 (successful) incurred Allied naval losses, as far as I can make out - which comes back to the point of this thread. If Hitler orders Sea Lion in the summer of 1940, regardless of whether Britain is conquered as a result, the Kriegsmarine is going to wind up with even fewer ships & crew at the end of the fighting than they had in the Sea Lion-less Original Timeline.
 
Most of these screws i see come from external problem, but i wanna see how can we screw them internally like mismanagement and wasting resources on useless stuff. So have fun screwing them!

Oh yea i allowed this one particular thread with POD around 1935 onward so have fun!
 
In order to invade you mostly need merchant ships for port to port landings- the rest can be achieved through deception and RN incompetence. Dito for the so called naval patrol & attack planes that were only able to detect 1 German ship out of every seven , during this period.
ah so the RN, coastal defences and British ports are going to let unidentified, un-escorted merchant ships sail across the channel (having embarked from ports that can seen from the British coast with binoculars, and/or were under constant recon watch), and unload divisions of troops without telling anyone.

You got us brushing our teeth with lead paint again?
 
Contrary to popular belief [at least with 21 century internet crowds] , Most RN was mediocre at best in first year of the war and were always a day behind KM movements in and around UK...MOST Germany/ KM ships got threw un molested . Even after good Intel , RN squadrons were often 6-12 hours behind KM movements, which is probably why the KM bested the RN in most of the time in such naval clashes.

As FSL Pound reported to Churchill after Dunkirk , such a port to port invasion was not only possible but up to 200,000 German troops could be landed this way before RN could intervene. Churchill accepted this report but added that landed troops would be more likely ~ 100,000 troops. German steamers planned for such operations to carry 200 tons munitions for a typical battalion unit...something like two weeks fighting ability....to say nothing of foraging to extend this amount of time. The effect of the sudden appearance of dozen such ports SIEZED around the UK, B-4 Dunkirk finished would likely topple HMG.

Admiral Reader actually floated such a suggestion a year or two before the war began.
 
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What could be done easily and believably?
(1) Don't faff about with the development of ASV radar. Have the RN make it a priority. ASV radar available in 1940 (even if its not perfect yet) would make the OTL losses to the KM off Norway look a success (the KM avoided a number of disasters due to bad weather and being missed).
Norway will likely fall (no amount of RN success will stop them taking southern Norway), although holding in the north (Narvik would stay in allied control) would be possible.
(2) Have the RN take over Coastal Command as well as the FAA (OK, they can keep the RAF pilots). With a les screwed CC, the loss of Courageous (and a few scary near misses) would go away - the carriers were only deployed because the intended CC aircraft weren't there.
(3) Realise a realistic A/S school is needed in the 30's, set it up in Scotland so you aren't using the easy Channel. Learn the lesson that you need to train an escort group (yes, your still short of escorts, but it helps). The RN experimented with forward-throwing A/S weapons in the early 30's, but they weren't accurate. have them realise the magic single-shot accurate weapon isn't going to happen any time soon, and develop Hedgehog or Squid. Hedgehog is simple, they already have everything but the special fuze (and that didn't take long to work out). Squid is a bit more complex, but the only new gear is the sonar system. Depth detection again requires no major technical breakthrough. Actually train using this prewar so its mainly working when war starts.
If the escorts have hedgehog and depth-defining sonar in 1939, a lot of those early U-boat attacks will be successes not misses. Losing a lot of the pre-war crews in the first year, and even if you build more boats your experience for training new crews is shot.
(4) The U-boats like to attack on the surface. The star-shell simply doesn't illuminate well, AND requires a 4" gun. Ditch those (replace with more 20mm AA weapons), and develop the Snowflake rocket early. Again, no big technical issues.
(5) Realise that flak on its own isn't so scary, but flak with tracer is, and load the light AA with it. It all helps, at little cost or development effort.

None of the above are technically difficult or require magic breakthroughs. Most of them aren't even that costly. But they will cause a LOT more success in the first couple of years, and enough success then poisons the well for later KM actions.
 
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Contrary to popular belief [at least with 21 century internet crowds] , Most RN was mediocre at best in first year of the war and were always a day behind KM movements in and around UK...MOST Germany/ KM ships got threw un molested . Even after good Intel , RN squadrons were often 6-12 hours behind KM movements, which is probably why the KM bested the RN in most of the time in such naval clashes.
Think you're whaling against a straw man here. It's entirely unsurprising that the RN was behind KM operations, given that the KM held the strategic initiative by choosing when and where to operate, and the RN had to detect the move and react - which would take 6-12 hours on a good day. Same problem as in WW1 and the Scarborough raid etc., with the speed of the Twins to boot.

As FSL Pound reported to Churchill after Dunkirk , such a port to port invasion was not only possible but up to 200,000 German troops could be landed this way before RN could intervene. Churchill accepted this report but added that landed troops would be more likely ~ 100,000 troops. German steamers planned for such operations to carry 200 tons munitions for a typical battalion unit...something like two weeks fighting ability....to say nothing of foraging to extend this amount of time. The effect of the sudden appearance of dozen such ports SIEZED around the UK, B-4 Dunkirk finished would likely topple HMG.

Admiral Reader actually floated such a suggestion a year or two before the war began.
As written, this is tosh.

Yes, you can shove a load of troops on to a few steamers and slip a good fraction through the RN light forces to attack some minor ports within one night's sail of Germany in early 1940. And some of them will work really well and you now have some small ports on the east coast!

Now what?

What you've actually done is to dump some poorly supplied light infantry in fixed locations known to the enemy, without hope of significant resupply or air cover. While simultaneously denuding the armies needed for the decisive theatre in the Low Countries and France. This is Operation Wightlowe levels of stupidity.

Such a coup de main will certainly give Britain a shock because they'll have to drop existing operations to counter it - to move divisions across the rail net, ships from convoy duty and Scapa, and be forced to bombard their own towns. But two weeks later Chamberlain/Churchill will be crowing about the defeat of the invasion.

Raeder suggested it because he knew he'd only be responsible for the "getting them there" bit. He didn't have to care about how the subsequent land battle would go.
 
I don't know of any UK coastal ports within 'one nights sail' in August. Not given the typical freighter speed.
So basically you need to leave and start off in daylight, assuming you want to do the really dangerous bit at night then land at dawn.
Lets hope those RAF reconnaissance aircraft stay on base drinking tea. And that the RN patrols don't spot you. And that you actually arrive where you were aiming at (off the East Coast in daylight isn't the best time to correct your aiming point).
And, since you don't have naval support (that's either in drydock or sunk off Norway), and no short range fighters (doing without them went so well when they tried raids from Norway), one does wonder as to how far and how fast they will get inland.
Pretty sure the East Anglian 'ports' are out of Stuka range too, but don't worry, the RN only has cruisers and destroyers in the area, the heavies will take most of a day to arrive...

As you might be able to tell, I'm slightly sceptic about this plan...
 
So how can we screw the U-boat in the Battle of the Atlantic?
IIRC there was a British organisation looking at forward throwing anti-submarine weapons a couple of years before WWII started but due to people moving about it got disbanded. Have that continue and you could have something like Hedgehog in service before the start of the war, and from there it's a short hop to Squid. For best results you want a specialised explosive like Torpex which would benefit not just these but depth charges, torpedoes, bombs, mines etc. but I don't know if it's possible to speed that up. This does break the post-Weserübung condition that I didn't originally notice. Staying within that the easiest solution is to dedicate more aircraft to Coastal Command for anti-submarine patrol over the North Atlantic.


HMS Pinafore did a good story on this on the Warships1 board.... we even get a hit on Scharnhorst from the 14-inch shore battery.
And Let Slip the Dogs of War. Links to the story are Part 1a - In the Beginning, Part 1b; Part 2a - The Narrows, Part 2b, Part 2c; Part 3a - A Deadly Sting, Part 3b; Part 4a - The Run for Home, Part 4b, Part 4c; Part 5a - Gotterdammerung, Part 5b, Part 5c.
 
Raeder suggested it because he knew he'd only be responsible for the "getting them there" bit. He didn't have to care about how the subsequent land battle would go.
He would be shot for not attending to the little detail called "sustainment". Goering would be smoking his last cigarette, too, and standing next to him.

Have I mentioned that those two idiots made my "ten worst military commanders list of WWII"?
 
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