AHC: Maximum plausible ship explosions from shell hits at Jutland

While 'mutual destruction' or severe mauling of both the British and German fleets or even the scenario occurring to one of the fleets is very impossible, with a pod after 24 January 1915 [Battle of Dogger Bank] for the British and German navies, try to get a scenario in which you can get more than 10 capital ships [of any side, including otl explosions from gunfire] explode on 31 May 1916, assuming the battle is still fought as per otl [butterflies may prevent this though].
If this is due to properly exploding shell hits exploding at the maximum explosive power, the better. Bonus points if every ship that exploded is British [although unnecessary and not really possible].
If the pod is on 31 May 1916, which ships do you think could have exploded at the Battle of Jutland due to shellfire, in addition to those that exploded otl [Queen Mary, Indefatigable and Invincible]?
[For sources, Campbell's book about the battle [Jutland:An Analysis Of The Fighting], The Battle Of Jutland 1916, Jutland: Death In The Grey Wastes, Dreadnought Gunnery At The Battle Of Jutland and From The Dreadnought To Scapa Flow: Volume III can be used. Plus any suitable books and reliable internet or other media sources you can find.]
:D[There's a link http://warships1discussionboards.yuk...lecruisers-WW1 for your information.]
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This seems cruel.

Anyway, even if every single Brit BC went pop you'd still only have nine, and BBs are much better protected - but of course no ship commander would stay in the fight down to the last ship if his ships kept exploding for no enemy loss.
This seems cruel.

Anyway, even if every single Brit BC went pop you'd still only have nine, and BBs are much better protected - but of course no ship commander would stay in the fight down to the last ship if his ships kept exploding for no enemy loss.

Well, there's always Beatty...:rolleyes:
Not likely, he was actually not as reckless as he's made out to be. He succeeded in his aim of drawing the Hochsee flotte out, besides.

It wouldn't be his decision anyway. If one more BC had blow he would have had to ask Jelicoe for permission to disengage and leave the Grand Fleet without battle cruisers. It would be more likely that it would be Jelicoe that would take the initiative of ordering him away, leaving only the QE class Battleships to act as a fast wing.

It is interesting to debate how many BC would have to explode before they were ordered back.
This seems cruel.

Anyway, even if every single Brit BC went pop you'd still only have nine, and BBs are much better protected - but of course no ship commander would stay in the fight down to the last ship if his ships kept exploding for no enemy loss.
Looking at the links, weren't HMS Malaya and Barham close to being hit on the magazines? In the case of the HMS Malaya, the fires were barely stopped before the 6 inch magazine ignited. If you talk about both sides, while less possible, it makes the job easier. And, at least there are links to Campbell's book online for evidence.
[For the Germans, the possibility of their ships exploding is extremely unlikely, however, properly working British shells or incompetence could've cost the Germans Konig. Plus, maybe a battlecruiser, but the German ships have better armour, cordite arrangement and flash protection, cordite types used and slightly better damage control. At most, maybe two battlecruisers, more like one or none.]
This seems cruel.

Anyway, even if every single Brit BC went pop you'd still only have nine, and BBs are much better protected - but of course no ship commander would stay in the fight down to the last ship if his ships kept exploding for no enemy loss.
Maybe if one or two German ships were severely damaged that they would be sunk the next day for any reason [torpedo hits launched at them, progressive flooding, scuttling and abandoning] or more likely, the battlecruiser force caught between German battleships or heavily outnumbered [due to explosions] and the British were stubborn or the Germans become overconfident, the British might still fight to the last battlecruiser. Of course, it's unlikely for the German ships to sink in sight of the Royal Navy.
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By the way, any more takers willing to participate?
And, the links are provided for evidence, especially for battleships [it is still possible for them to explode looking at the links].


Clearly not. Stop bumping your own threads.

Also the Germans could have lost ships to explosions too. The Koenig was very lucky with one hit that nearly caused a fire in her 5.9 mags which are next to the forward turrets 12 inch magazines. The Von Der Tann suffered a nasty battery fire and the Seydlitz suffered such a hammering its a miracle she survived.
Clearly not. Stop bumping your own threads.

Also the Germans could have lost ships to explosions too. The Koenig was very lucky with one hit that nearly caused a fire in her 5.9 mags which are next to the forward turrets 12 inch magazines. The Von Der Tann suffered a nasty battery fire and the Seydlitz suffered such a hammering its a miracle she survived.
With a pod of 31 May 1916, I can only see Konig exploding out of the German ships. Between 24 January 1915 and 31 May 1916, maybe the Von Der Tann and Moltke [the objective is getting more magazine explosions].
From Campbell: [http://webpages.charter.net/abacus/news/jutland/CHAPTER%205.htm] [ http://webpages.charter.net/abacus/news/jutland/CHAPTER 7.htm]
1] HMS Tiger:
Hit on 'Q' barbette at 1554.`X' turret was hit on the 9in barbette armour near its junction with the 3in armour and the lin upper deck. A piece of 9in armour 27in x 16in was broken off, the 3in armour dented in about 3in and the upper deck holed, while the 4in armour plate adjoining the 3in was also dented at the top corner. The shell entered the turret through the revolving structure about 3ft below the lower edge of the turret shield, but did not explode properly, though the bursting charge ignited with a partial burst and partial rocket effect just inside the turn-table, and the body of the shell without the point, remained in the lower floor of the gun-house between the guns in the centre of the turret, together with large fragments of armour. The centre sight-setter was blown against the roof and killed but there were apparently no other casualties, respirators preventing any gassing.
9 This hit at 1555, pierced the 6in side armour a little below the upper deck, and 2ft forward of the after edge of `Q' barbette. The angle to the normal was estimated at 5-10°, and the shell made a hole of 12'/tin diameter in the side armour with a piece 6in wide broken away to the edge of the plate, passed through a 3/Bin bulkhead and burst against a second one, 22ft from impact and 8ft from the after 6in hoist. There were 2-6in charges near the top of the hoist which were set on fire, but the flash did not pass down the trunk to the shell room and magazine. Severe damage was done to light structures along the path of the shell and near the burst and some damage done well aft of the latter, and also to the middle line of the ship. Many holes were made in the 3/Bin main deck, and the base of the shell also went through the I in armour deck making a hole 101/2in x 9in, and penetrated the 3/4in thick web of the main steam pipe. Another fragment also went through the main deck, a 3/Bin bulkhead and the 1 in armour deck. The fire-main was perforated by small holes and the casualties were 12 killed and several wounded and gassed.
The after 6in magazine was flooded, and `Q' port magazine, a relatively small compartment as most of `Q' magazine was to starboard, also flooded through a ventilation pipe from the 6in magazine, as an attempt to close the 6in ventilation valve failed. When 'Q' port magazine was full, water leaked badly through the venting plates, and it appears that the after 6in shell room flooded, and water also entered `Q' shell room. It does not appear to have been necessary to flood the after 6in magazine, and it was done by the Stoker PO of the flooding party after consultation with the rating in charge of the magazine. Some water had previously entered from the cut fire-main.
Have the shells explode properly in either or both case and the ship explodes.
HMS Queen Mary, Indefatigable and Invincible explode as per otl [more or less, pod of Tiger sinking may not butterfly Queen Mary's fate and definitely not Indefatigable's explosion].
HMS Lion: [Q Turret hit destroyed turret and caused severe damage. The pod can be Francis Harvey dying and/or a less competent management of magazine flooding or cordite].
HMS Barham: hit at c1701.

The explosion blew a hole 7ft x 7ft in the main deck, and part of the shell head went through the 1 in middle deck and was found in the lower conning tower. The 3/8in lower deck, forming the roof of the forward 6in magazine directly below the lower CT, was holed and this magazine and the 6in shell room filled with smoke. Other fragments also pierced the middle deck, and the starboard forward hydraulic pump was put out of action by fracture of the pressure pipe to the hydraulic governor, though the remaining three pumps kept all four turrets going. The largest hole in the middle deck measured 18in x 15m and that in the lower deck over the 6in magazine 15in x 12m.
While this hit is unlikely to destroy the ship, better fighting conditions [for the Germans] might get the 6 inch magazine to explode and start a chain reaction to destroy the ship.
HMS Malaya: second hit at 1730. [close call in reality]

Two hits at 1730. One of these hits was unimportant, the shell striking the lower boom stanchion and causing damage'to the starboard forward superstructure, but the other came near to bringing about the destruction of the ship.
This SAP shell which had an angle of descent of 20-25° pierced the I in forecastle deck, 6ft from the ship's side, near No 3 starboard 6in gun, making a hole Sit x 4ft, and burst 7ft from impact, seriously damaging the gun, which had to be replaced, and wrecking the mounting. The tin upper deck was forced down several inches by the explosion and fragments wrecked the galley and canteen inboard of the battery. A large part of the head of the shell was deflected off the upper deck, went through the 1/41n battery rear bulkhead and stopped against the tin C/L bulkhead about 30ft from the burst. It was usual at this time to have 12 charges per 6in gun stowed in the battery in rectangular `W' cases (each containing four charges) for which small racks were provided, and shell fragments penetrated some of these cases and ignited the charges. The resultant cordite fire involved other 6in cartridges in the battery, including those still in their cases which were made of soft-soldered sheet brass and were not fireproof. The whole starboard battery was put out of action for a time with 102 casualties, and all electric cables in the battery were destroyed. Two of the six guns were in action again by 1925.
The flash from the cordite passed down the 6in ammunition hoist into the 6in shell room and was only prevented from igniting a group of 10-6in cartridges, hooked on ready for hoisting, by the prompt action of PO Day and L/S Watson in removing smouldering debris. If these cartridges had ignited, there is little doubt that the forward 6m magazine, above the shell-room, and with two handing scuttles open to the latter, would have exploded, and as this magazine was adjacent to the forward 151n magazines, the loss of the ship must have followed.
Damage control incompetence or maybe the officers involved incapitated [due to more shells or flames] might have destroyed the ship when the magazines explode.
HMS Princess Royal: Around 1822
Of the 2-12in shells coming from abaft the beam, which struck the Princess Royal at about 1822, one hit the 9in armour of `X' barbette obliquely on the forward side about 2ft above the upper deck, glanced downwards through the I in plating of the latter and burst just below it, about 8ft from impact. A large fragment of the 9in armour measuring 6ft x 20in, was broken off with concentric cracks in the plate, and the fragment was driven through the turntable into the gun-house at the left side of the left gun, coming to rest on the platform at the rear, after
hitting an unfused shrapnel shell in the shell-bin. All the crew of the left gun were killed, the breech mechanism damaged and pressure pipes destroyed on the left side, but the gun could still be worked. The turret, however, was out of action, as it was jammed in training by the displacement and distortion of the 9in barbette armour. In addition to breaking a large piece off the 9in plate, the impact of the shell had sheared the armour fastenings to the upper deck and completely broken the key to the plate, which was lifted 9in at one end and 51/tin at the other. The frames behind the armour were carried away, and the Bin plate adjoining the 9in above the upper deck was cracked at the lower and chipped at the upper corner, while the 3in plate which extended up to the upper deck was deformed below the 9in plate and a piece 3 ft x 1 in fractured.
The shell tore a 9ft x 2 ft hole in the upper deck, and the burst badly damaged two 1/4in bulkheads, and caused considerable damage to light structures, as well as cutting trunks and breathing pipes from the ventilation and cooling plant of `X' magazine.
The other shell pierced the 6in side armour just above the main deck, and a little forward of `X' barbette. The angle of impact is given as 15-20° to the plate normal, and the hole as 12in x 12in with a number of concentric cracks. The shell tore the 3/bin-5/16in main deck over the starboard after reserve bunker for 17ft from the ship's side to the fan-room bulkhead, was deflected upwards, badly damaged the casings of both condenser rooms and burst 52ft from impact on the port side below the 1 in upper deck, in which a hole 6ft x 6ft was blown, while the main deck over the port after reserve bunker was riddled. Many casualties were caused among the after 4in crews and salvage party, and
the flash of the burst ignited some cordite on the main deck. Both after engine-rooms filled with dense smoke and some penetrated to the starboard forward engine-room, but dispersed after the fires were subdued.
These two shells, which together killed 11 and wounded 31, were from one salvo from the Markgraf at a range of about 13,000yds.
Have either one or both of the shells explode properly or better fighting ranges for the Germans and it may explode. However, if the British were sane, they'd have retreated following the destruction of 4 battlecruisers [and maybe a fast battleship] to magazine explosions.
HMS Invincible, New Zealand and Indomitable: [maybe] possible due to butterflies from the exploded British battlecruisers and fast battleships and/or better fighting conditions for the Germans. [Note that HMS New Zealand suffered hit on X barbette that resulted in fire, dubious if it is threatening, but probably not. HMS Colossus was also hit around 1916 and suffered a small fire from cordite, unlikely to be threatening though because of cordite arrangement, however, a properly exploding shell would have greater impact to explode the ship, wouldn't it?]
With a pod of 31 May 1916, at least the HMS Lion and Malaya could've exploded. Working shells could've exploded [at least] the Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal. Better fighting ranges for the Germans could've exploded the HMS Tiger, Princess Royal, Lion [?] and maybe New Zealand, Barham and Malaya. Incompetence would have exploded HMS Lion, Malaya and maybe other ships. [HMS Colossus could also have been lost to an explosion through any of the above factors, although they need to be combined [two at least].] And this is in addition to otl losses. Remaining battlecruisers due to butterflies can be sunk through explosions from gunfire.
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For the Germans:

Now that the British side has been discussed, let's look at the Germans' side. As stated, a pod of 31 May 1916 could've only exploded the Konig as far as German dreadnought capital ships are concerned.
However, with earlier pods, incompetent German damage control and/or cordite arrangement, plus properly exploding shells could've cost them some ships. But the pods would be very likely before 1916 and may butterfly at least the otl fighting at Jutland, if not the battle itself.
From Campbell:
1] SMS Seydlitz
4 -13.5in/14001b hit at 1617. This shell struck the hull plating immediately abaft the aftermost starboard 5.9in casemate, and then the junction between the 8in-9m port sill plate, (8'/4in where hit) and the 6in transverse battery bulkhead. It burst in holing the armour, making a large hole in the 6in bulkhead plate, and breaking a large piece off the upper corner of the port sill plate which was also much cracked. The hit was about 11/2ft above the battery deck, and a hole of about 20sq ft was blown in this where 1 in thick outside the casemate. Armour fragments and shell splinters entered the casemate, and splinters pierced the 1.4in casemate roof, the battery deck, here 0.8in, and the 0.8m longitudinal casemate bulkhead. Much damage was done, ventilation trunks being wrecked, and shell fragments travelled across the ship abaft the battery, and holed the port side plating, wrecking five cabins and causing fires. The aftermost starboard 5.9in gun which was loaded, was put out of action, the ammunition hoist damaged, and all but one of the men in the casemate killed. There was no ammunition fire though the anti-flash flaps were pressed against the hoist trunk and badly bulged and a cartridge laying behind was crushed but not ignited. The magazine party felt the pressure and put a wooden cover on the lower opening of the hoist trunk. In the casemate ready base-fuzed shells were smashed but not detonated.
There was a serious danger from smoke and gas in the starboard HP and LP turbine rooms, and the latter had to be vacated for a short time. This shell was the only one, other than No 2 above, of those that struck the Seydlitz, to show a great explosive effect and, like it, was presumably APC. The range at the time was about 18,000yds.
5 13.5in/ 14001b hit at 1557. This APC shell struck the 9in barbette armour of the after super-firing turret, about 6ft above the battery deck and very near a vertical joint between two plates, though the l4in x 14in hole was confined to one plate, except for some damage to the other plate edge, and the armour plates were not displaced. The range was about 14,500--15,000yds. The shell, which struck at an angle of c330 to the plate normal, burst in penetrating, and fragments of armour and shell splinters tore a hole c5ft x 5ft in the ring bulkhead and entered the working chamber. The turret training and elevating gear, the hoists and cartridge transfer rails were put out of action, and two main and two fore charges were laying in the working chamber ignited. The flash entered the gun-house where the left gun was loaded, and two main and two fore charges lay in the cartridge loading trays but these were not ignited. It also passed down between the fixed and revolving structures of the turret as well as down the main trunk, but in one of the lower cartridge cages which was down, the main charge was only blackened and the fore charge not ignited, though the silk bag was singed. Only two fore charge magazine cases were open, and the charges in these did not ignite, though the paper labels of the fore charge magazine cases were in part burnt. Only two main and two fore charges were involved in the fire as compared with 62 at the Dogger Bank, and the regulations introduced after that action, prohibiting an accumulation of charges between magazine and gun, proved their worth. The magazine and shell room parties survived with the aid of gas-masks, but all those in the handing rooms were killed (except one who later died) as well as all in the working chamber and switchboard room. The power training gear had previously broken down, and one gun's crew were manning the hand training gear in the working-chamber. From the gun-house six managed to escape through an open manhole but they were badly burnt and three later died, while there were another ten survivors from the magazines and shell room.
The magazines were flooded by the shell room party, and emptied as soon as the fire was put out. About 3ft or so of water entered and some found its way through leaking voice-pipes and a ventilation trunk into the pump room below and put the after pump out of action, while water also leaked into the shell room of the aftermost turret.
With the arrangement of cordite, flash protection and cordite types used; the hits are not threatening, however, a properly exploding shell, plus incompetence in damage control and cordite arrangement might've exploded the ship. Note that 4 charges ignited in the turret with a slower burning rate compared to the British cordite means that a 31 May 1916 pod is impossible for Seydlitz to explode [sinking, which is very possible, is another matter].
2] SMS Moltke
The hit at 1616 was from a 15in at about 18,000yds range. This shell apparently APC, pierced the Bin upper side armour below No 5 starboard 5.9in gun and 83/oft above the legend water-line, making a circular hole of 21 in outer and 3 9in inner diameter. The after edge of the armour plate was forced 1'/4in to 2in outwards, and the forward edge 3/gin to 1 in, while the bin casemate plate was displaced outwards by up to 3/bin. The shell burst in an outer bunker, and the armour deck, which was here lin at main deck level with a high 2in slope, held and was not pierced, but splinters and armour fragments tore open the 1/4m inner bulkhead of the bunker towards the main deck passage, the 5/16in battery deck was bulged up and holed from below close in rear of the gun, and the 5.9in hoist was torn open by splinters. No 5 gun was out of action and immovable, and the ready ammunition caught fire so that all 12 men in the casemate were killed. Flash passed down the hoist to the magazine, badly burning two men of the magazine party, though two were unhurt. It also entered the main deck passage via the torn bunker bulkhead and caused some casualties there.
Both Nos 4 and 6 starboard 5.9in were temporarily out of action from smoke and gas, and after this cleared the leak was stopped and the only flooding was that of the outer bunker to the top of the armour deck slope for a length of 20ft. Exact details of the coal content of the bunker are lacking, but the Moltke's outer bunkers were not full, though the coal was trimmed to give protection on the outboard side.
A properly exploding shell or fully loaded coal bunkers may cause the ship to explode. However, the fully loaded coal bunkers are easier as a pod, but more impossible. Given German cordite, it is more likely the magazines get flooded or the fire to be extinguished, but both factors combined would've doomed the ship to exploding.
3] SMS Von Der Tann
Hit at 1620. This shell struck the fore barbette armour where it was Bin thick, at an angle of about 25° to the plate normal, and 9in below the upper edge of the barbette. The range was about 17,000yds. It burst on striking the armour, and made a hole 35in x 22in at the plate edge with concentric cracks over a large area and deep cracks running to the forecastle deck, while the armour plate was somewhat bowed though the armour fastenings were undamaged. The forecastle deck, 0.3 in plus 0.6in reinforcement, distant 3'/zft from the hit, had a hole 14'/2ft x 31/oft blown in it, and the 0.3in upper deck was pierced by splinters. The turret was severely shaken, and a large piece of armour flew in and damaged equipment, so that the turret was jammed at 30° abaft the starboard beam, and was out of action for the rest of the battle. There was no fire in the turret and apparently little gas, but the magazines were at once flooded. A small fire occurred in a cabin, and the only casualties were some men slightly injured by flash from the shell burst.
Hit at 1623. The shell struck the recessed side of the hull just above the main deck and about 3 ft forward of the centre of the after barbette. It passed through the side plating and 1 in main deck, making holes of cl6in x 20in and c35in x 16in, respectively, and then through a cabin bulkhead and a bunker longitudinal bulkhead, before bursting 40m below the main deck and 50in above the armour deck, in front of the after barbette which was here only 1.2in thick. The barbette was holed for c12ft and from the main to the armour deck, and forced against the supporting structure of the turret guns. This structure was also bowed inwards and holed in places so that the turret was jammed, and splinters put the power training and elevating gear and the power drive for the lower hoists, out of action.
A fire was started among the practice targets stowed below the turret, and clouds of dense smoke were given off, which in addition to gas, entered both steering engine rooms through torn ventilation trunks, and made them untenable for 20 minutes. The fire smouldered for some hours, and enveloped the ship in smoke. The turret magazines could not be flooded at once as the valves were buried under wreckage, but no ammunition ignited and two main and two fore charges in the working chamber, between the main and upper decks, and 6 or 7ft from the hit on the barbette, were undamaged.
The only way the ship could explode would be different cordite types used [as German cordite required higher ignition temperatures]. Maybe, properly exploding shells could do the trick as well, but unlikely.
4] SMS Derrflinger
The hit at 1713 was on the armour belt below the water line, and a little forward of No 1-5.9in. The ship was violently shaken, but initially only two outer wing compartments were flooded and 85 tons water entered. However by shortly before 1800 No 1 port 5.9in magazine had flooded and had to be abandoned, while water also entered No I starboard 5.9in magazine, which was drained, and a port protective bunker and probably some other compartments. It is not clear how this latter flooding occurred, and it may have been due in part to cut fire hoses. [Otl hit on Lutzow, properly exploding shell could've exploded either Lutzow or Derrflinger depending on ship hit, if 5.9 inch magazines could be penetrated.]
Between 1900 and 1945,the Derfflinger was hit by fourteen shells in this phase. The first hit at 1914 was one of five by 15in APC shells from the Revenge. This struck the roof of the aftermost turret 3ft to the right of the right gun axis, and close below the join between the 4.3in sloping and 3.15in horizontal roof plates. The sloping plate inclined at c15° to the horizontal, was heavily depressed and scooped where struck for a length of 55in with two long cracks, and most of the calibre size hole was in this plate, though the edge of the flat roof was also broken away, for 18in X 261/2in. The turret, trained about 3 7° abaft the port beam, was jerked round to the limit of its port bow training by the impact. The shell burst on the right cartridge hoist about 4ft from impact, and ignited one main and one fore charge on the right cartridge loading tray, and also one main and one fore charge in the cage of the right upper cartridge hoist which was down in the working chamber. The flash spread to the magazine handing room immediately below the working chamber, and ignited one main and one fore charge in the loading tray of each of the two lower cartridge hoists, as well as three main charges being transported to the hoists, and nine fore charges which were still in opened magazine cases. A total of seven main and thirteen fore charges were thus ignited, but in the gun-house which had a splinter bulkhead as in the Lutzow, two main and two fore charges at the left gun were not burnt, though the outer coat of the double silk bags of the fore charges was singed. In the magazine handing room two fore charges in an opened case were also unburnt though similarly singed. No charges in unopened magazine cases were burnt.
The flames and gas killed all the turret crew of 75, except two who escaped through one of the holes for throwing out used cartridge cases, but one of them later died. Large amounts of gas spread through voice pipes to the starboard transmitting station which had to be abandoned for 8 minutes, and gas also affected some of the steering compartments. The magazines and shell rooms were flooded, though if the Derfflinger's damage control record is correct, this was not done until some time after those of the after superfiring turret, hit 2 or 3 minutes later, had been flooded.
The explosive effect of the shell was considered to be relatively small. In the gun-house, the right cartridge hoist shaft was destroyed, as was the range-finder, while all fittings belonging to the right gun were badly damaged by splinters, but the right gun itself received only trifling damage, as did the left gun, and the I in splinter bulkhead was not pierced nor was the armouring of the rear of the turret damaged. In the working chamber and handing room all hoists, except the left upper cartridge hoist, were much distorted and torn, but apart from splinter damage all cables and electrical equipment appeared to be usable. The wood of the magazines was slightly scorched.
The next hit from the Revenge was at 1916 or 1917. This shell coming from 41° abaft the port beam, struck the after superfiring barbette 18in below the upper edge of the fixed armour, and on a line between the two guns, but nearer to the right gun, the position of impact, measured radially from the barbette centre, being 33° aft of the transverse diameter. It pierced the 10'/4in armour and burst in the upper part of the turn-table between the two guns and below the Captain of turret's platform. One main and one fore charge on the right cartridge loading tray were ignited, and also one main and one fore charge in the cages of both upper cartridge hoists, which were down in the working chamber, as well as one main and one fore charge on both the right and left transfer conveyors in the working chamber. The flash spread to the magazine handing room, which in this turret was below the switch room and the shell handing room, and ignited one main and one fore charge in the cages of both lower hoists which were down. In all, seven main and seven fore charges were ignited, but in the gun-house which had a longitudinal splinter bulkhead, one main and one fore charge at the left gun remained unburnt, as did two main charges which were out of their magazine cases in the handing room, and two fore charges in an opened case.
Of the turret crew six men managed to escape through the left entrance port or through the left hole for used cartridge cases. Gas affected all four main engine rooms, both turbo-dynamo rooms and a number of other compartments, but gas-masks enabled the crews to continue working, except that some compartments on the main deck had to be evacuated for a few minutes, and on this deck flash caused a fire to port. The magazines and shell rooms were flooded, and about an hour later, leaking water caused a switchboard short-circuit that put one turbo-dynamo out for some time.
Have properly exploding shells and/or poor cordite arrangement and it's possible for the Derrflinger to explode due to said hits. However, pods needed are well before May 1916.
5] SMS Konig
Hit at 1835. This was the most damaging hit. The shell struck the extreme lower edge of the armour belt 5'/2ft below lwl, so that only half the 14'/tin diameter hole was in the Tin armour and half in the armour shelf. The position of the hit was in line with the after part of `B' barbette. The shell then traversed a wing-compartment and burst while passing through the wing longitudinal bulkhead 6'/2ft inboard of the hit. A hole of 25sq ft was made in this bulkhead, and a transverse wing bulkhead Sft away destroyed. The explosive effect of the shell with many fragments, went through a 6'/2ft wide protective bunker, which was full of coal, and struck the 2in torpedo bulkhead, 13ft from the ship's side between the upper and lower platform decks. The torpedo bulkhead was holed for an area of 27sq ft with three large cracks running upwards from the hole, and was also bowed inwards by up to 9in above the hole. No 14 magazine on the lower platform deck, immediately inboard of the torpedo bulkhead, was completely destroyed. As usual with the secondary armament in German ships, there were no separate shell rooms, and magazine cases,
5.9in shells and charges were buried under coal hurled into the magazine from the protective bunker, and some cases were smashed by splinters and fragments of the torpedo bulkhead, and though shells were not damaged, it was afterwards found that the fuze of one 5.9in HE had become armed. About 15 charges ignited, but sea-water flooding rapidly in from the hole in the ship's side prevented a worse disaster. The base-plate and some pieces of the shell were found among the coal' n the magazine, close to the torpedo bulkhead, with the head about 5-6ft further inboard. No 12 magazine on the upper platform deck was also damaged, and was quickly flooded by sea-water entering through the cracks in the torpedo bulkhead, while some shell and torpedo bulkhead fragments also entered a l2in magazine.
In addition, the wing compartments and protective bunkers were flooded for a length of 60ft, and it was calculated that 494 tons of water had entered the ship which would give a list to port of 3° 47'. This was corrected by counter-flooding some of the starboard wings with 362 tons of water, but further flooding also occurred. In view of the magazine fire caused by this hit or perhaps on account of the
fires caused by hits No 4 and 6, orders were given to flood the whole forward magazine group. Flash and gas which came through the flooding pipes, prevented the flooding system of the other magazines of the group being promptly isolated from that of Nos 12 and 14, with the result that some of `B' turret magazines flooded, though except for one magazine in which the water was 20in deep, those of `A' turret remained dry. Apart from Nos 12 and 14, five magazine compartments filled completely, and two more - apparently `B' shell rooms - were half full. Most of the affected magazine compartments were not drained until after the action was over, while `B' turret's repeater compass was put out of action and cables leading to `A' and `B' were under water, though apparently unaffected.
The only ship to be in danger of exploding with a 31 May 1916 pod, however, incompetence among the crewmembers is needed. A properly exploding shell and/or different storage of cordite would've destroyed the ship, but the pod is very likely to be before May 1916.
6] SMS Lutzow
Of the German ships, the Lutzow was hit five times between 1915 and 1918 by the Monarch and/or the Orion at c 18,500yds. Of these hits two were from the port side and three from starboard. One shell coming from the port side struck the right gun of `A' turret just outside the gun port. The whole of the upper part of the jacket outside the turret was torn away but the shell was deflected by the 103/4in turret face armour and the gun port shield, and only small splinters entered the turret destroying the right sight and wounding two men. The elevating gear was not affected, but the gun was completely disabled.
The other shell coming from the port side apparently entered through the battery roof deck just abaft the third barbette and burst on or below the lin upper deck, causing heavy casualties in the after dressing station, and cutting power cables for the sternmost turret which were here led above the armour deck. The sternmost turret was thus reduced to hand-working which meant that it was virtually out of action, but power was restored before the Lutzow sank. The 1.2m armour deck was apparently torn up by this shell but without damage to the ammunition spaces below. After these two hits the Lutzow turned to starboard and the three remaining hits were from this side. One shell struck the starboard side armour somewhere below `B' barbette, and as a result No I starboard 5.9in magazine filled and had to be abandoned, while it appears that other flooding also occurred as a direct or indirect result of this hit.
After these two hits the Lutzow turned to starboard and the three remaining hits were from this side. One shell struck the starboard side armour somewhere below `B' barbette, and as a result No I starboard 5.9in magazine filled and had to be abandoned, while it appears that other flooding also occurred as a direct or indirect result of this hit.
Another shell struck low down on the after part of the 83/4in right side wall of `B' turret and made a hole of c2l/2sq ft in area though no shell splinters entered the turret. Fragments of armour, however, were driven in, and part of the armour plate was found on the right cartridge loading tray. The right upper hoists and the loading gear and elevating pump belonging to the right gun were wrecked so that this gun was put out of action. A 12in fore charge (761b) laying in the right upper cartridge hoist, which was in the upper position, caught fire, but the main charge (201lb) immediately above it did not, as it was protected by flash-doors which had been fitted to the Lutzow, and flash-doors also prevented flames reaching the working chamber.
Have the 1713 shell hit explode properly or any of the shell hits by the Monarch and/or Orion explode properly and the Lutzow exploding is possible. However, in the case of Lutzow, the crew incompetence and/or cordite issues need to surface before you can think of Lutzow blowing up.
Of course, butterflies may prevent the hits from taking place more or less as per otl. Working shells could've exploded the Konig and Derrflinger and when combined with other factors, the Seydlitz, Moltke, Von Der Tann and Lutzow. Better fighting ranges couldn't explode any of the said ships above [Konig maybe, but it didn't explode otl although closest to,so not much difference.]. Crew incompetence would've exploded the Konig and Derrflinger and maybe the Seydlitz, Moltke and Von Der Tann. Arrangement of cordite similar to the British would have cost the Konig and Derrflinger and maybe the other battlecruisers. Possibility of said German ships exploding may be low due to German cordite differences to the British, including arrangement and [maybe] better flash and armour protection, especially with a pod no earlier than May 1916.
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