A Greater Dar al-Islam and an Ever Shrinking Dar al-Harb / a resurgent Islam TL

Very Nice chapter how the mixed but still overall sucess of the khalifah Al-Mu'tasin and how consolidated back the Caliphate, very nice update buddy
I was going to leave it till later, but the next chapter will be part of the big religion update; this part focusing on the non-Muslims in the Islamic world.
I was going to leave it till later, but the next chapter will be part of the big religion update; this part focusing on the non-Muslims in the Islamic world.
Very nice and interesting news buddy. The existence of Ruma literally over Rome and Vatican heads, and more successful Muslim Mediterranean would make unique the relationship with dhimmi and not dhimmi, specially the nazarean ones.
Non-Muslim Religions in the Dar al-Islam as of the Mid-Ninth Century CE
Non-Muslim Religions in the Dar al-Islam as of the Mid-Ninth Century CE

What is now the Islamic world was once considered to be the centre of the Christian world; three of the patriarchates of the Pentarchy (al-Quds [Jerusalem], al-Iskandariyya [Alexandria], and Antakiyya [Antioch]) are under the jurisdiction of the Abbasid Caliphate, and Christians remain a majority or plurality in many provinces of the caliphate. The Chalcedonian Roman Church, associated with the Roman Empire, has undisputed control over the patriarchates of Roma and Konstantinoupolis. The patriarchs of Roma had been growing distant from the Roman Empire, but the success of the Islamic conquests pushed the patriarchs back towards the Roman Emperor. The continuance of imperial iconoclasm has left the relationship strained however. Within the Dar al-Islam adherents of the Roman Church are the dominant denomination in Filastin, parts of al-Sham and the al-Thughur al-Shamiya, Tiflisi [Georgia], Ifriqiya, al-Maghreb, al-Andalus, al-Faranj, Ruma al-Gharbiya, and Siqilliya [Sicily]. The term Melkite is used to describe the Greek, Syriac, and Arabic adherents of the Roman Church in al-Sham.

Christianity however is as diverse as it is widespread. The dispute over the nature(s) of Christ resulted in a schism in the fifth century CE. The Miaphysite Churches remain in communion with each other and are divided on geography and ethnicity rather than theology. They are: the Coptic Orthodox Church in Misr; the Syriac Orthodox Church (also known as Jacobites after Jacob bar Addai) in parts of al-Sham, al-Jazira, and Iraq; and the Armenian Apostolic Church in Arminiya. The Copts are headquartered in al-Iskandariyya, the Jacobites in Antakiyya, and the Armenians in Dabil [Dwin]. In competition with the Jacobites is the (also Syriac) Nestorian Church of the East, headquartered in Baghdad. They are the dominant Christian denomination in al-Jazira, Iraq, Iran, Khurasan, Fararud, and al-Hind; outside of the Dar al-Islam their influence spreads even further east into China and among the Turkic nomads of the Eurasian steppe. Among the Armenians a Gnostic-influenced sect known as Paulicianism has been slowly growing over the last two centuries amidst persecution by Roman authorities, while in al-Andalus “Adoptionist” theology is unofficially supported by the Fihrid governors.

Formerly the state religion of Iran, Zoroastrianism has suffered a decline since the Arab conquest. Some of the Zoroastrian clergy (asronan) joined the Islamic administration but the loss of state patronage has all but impoverished those who have failed to retain their estates and temples. Due to the decline in the Zoroastrian population, the asronan, who traditionally transmitted the faith orally, have begun to preserve their scripture by writing it down. In addition to the official scripture, clerics are composing scriptural commentaries as well as original theological treatises and ritual manuals. The languages used for this corpus of compositions are Middle Persian, (New) Persian, and Avestan (for the scripture). Curiously some of this vernacular literary output has been patronised by the newly-converted Persian nobility; clearly, their history and culture exercises a hold over them despite their embracing of Islam.

Zoroastrianism is still strong in Fars, and has remained notable to varying degrees across the rest of Iran, Khurasan, and Fararud, while small communities in Iraq and eastern Arabiyya continue to exist. Additionally, refugees from the initial Arab conquests have spread eastwards to various locations across al-Hind. However the further west into Iraq, north into Daylam, and east into Khurasan and Fararud you go, the less orthodox Zoroastrianism becomes. Other deities of the Iranian pantheon become more dominant, and the religion is sometimes syncretised with neighbouring, related faiths. The last major Zoroastrian ruler within the Dar al-Islam is the Dabuyid ispahbadh of Tabaristan.

Buddhism and Jainism
Buddhism within the Dar al-Islam is most popular in the frontiers of Khurasan and in Sind, though there are sizeable communities in Fararud and even to the west in Iran. In Khurasan the religion has even seen growth; this may perhaps be attributed to the Barmakid family. While part of the family converted to Islam and continue to serve the caliphate, the other branch has remained in Balkh as the hereditary pramukhas (abbots) of the large Nava Vihara/Naw Bahar monastery complex (the name Barmak is the Arabic rendering of pramukha). The pramukhas are almost the unofficial leaders of Balkh, and their links with both al-Hind and Baghdad has resulted in the transmission of Indian literature and knowledge in to the Dar al-Islam. Within the Imamate of Sind many rajas, now governors, were or still are Buddhist, as are their subjects.

Jainism, confined mostly to Sind, is considerably less widespread than either Buddhism or Hinduism. It is however no less important within Sind, where Jain establishments such as temples and monasteries are patronised by governors and sometimes even the Imam himself. Part of the Jain community’s prevalence is explained through their emerging role in trade and finance, both of which are vital to Sind’s continued survival.

Within the Dar al-Islam Hinduism is, like Buddhism, most prominent in Sind and the Khurasani frontier with al-Hind. A number of rulers in Khurasan who inconsistently pay tribute to Islamic governors are Hindu, though their beliefs are often syncretised with Buddhism and regional forms of Zoroastrianism. Some of the rajas-turned-governors in the Imamate of Sind remain Hindu, along with their subject populations. Buddhism and Hinduism alike in Sind are losing adherents to Shia Islam, but the recent theft of the famous Surya idol by the Pratihara king has shaken the population’s confidence in the Imam.

The Jewish diaspora had existed long before the Islamic era and so can be found in almost every part of the Dar al-Islam. The Abbasid rise to power, and the attendant relocation of Islamic rule to Iraq and the founding of Baghdad, has resulted in the increased prominence of Judaism. The lineage of exilarchs (Resh Galuta), allegedly descended from the Biblical King David, have been granted a place at the caliphal court to act as the nominal head of the Jewish community within the Dar al-Islam; the Sasanian Empire did the same. Furthermore, the move to Iraq has given greater prestige to the geonim, the directors of the local ancient academies of Sura and Pumbedita. These legal scholars are the de facto leaders of the Jewish diaspora, as their injunctions are considered to be binding. However an academy in Tabariyya [Tiberias] in Filastin provides an alternative to the authority of the Iraqi geonim. In the last century a new Jewish denomination, which will come to be known as Karaites, has appeared; they believe that the only source for religious law (halakha) is the Bible, and thus reject the rabbis and their oral traditions. The recent conversion of the Khazar elite, often an enemy of the Abbasid Caliphate, to Judaism has not resulted in major changes to Khazar society, and so has not resulted in a change in the treatment of Jews within the Dar al-Islam. Apart from Iraq, other important Jewish populations are located in Misr, Ifriqiya, al-Andalus, Filastin, and Fararud.

Mandaeism and Manichaeism
The Gnostic Mandaeans successfully convinced the Arab conquerors that they were the Sabians mentioned in the Quran. Since then they have been tolerated as one of the dhimma. Almost all of the Mandaeans inhabit Iraq and Khuzestan, with the area around Wasit being a particularly important centre of the religion.

Much like Christianity and Judaism, Manichaeism had spread across the civilised world before the arrival of Islam, though it had suffered a decline even before the Islamic conquests. Large communities of Manichaeans exist in Fararud and to the east outside of the Dar al-Islam, where many of the leading tribes of the Uyghur Khaganate have also converted. Recently a schism has occurred between the Manichaeans based in Baghdad, the religion’s traditional seat of power, and those based in Samarkand.

Various Indigenous Traditions
Straddling the border region of al-Andalus and al-Faranj are the Basque people. By the time of the Islamic conquests, Christianisation had achieved only minor progress among the Basques. Even though Muslim governors turn a blind eye to small Christian missionary efforts, the lack of state support has resulted in most of the Basque population retaining their ancient belief system. The diverse Basque pantheon is centred on the goddess Mari and her consort Sugaar; characteristically chthonic and animistic, the religion is strongest in the disparate rural settlements of the region.

Even though most Berbers have converted to some form of Islam, some have retained their traditional belief in a pantheon of gods, some of whom exhibit ancient Graeco-Roman and Kemetic influences. Some of the tribes of the Barghawata confederacy have even syncretised their traditional beliefs with Islam under the direction of their former ruler Salih ibn Tarif.

In the centre of the Dar al-Islam the religions of the ancient Semitic peoples have dwindled to negligibility, mostly due to the advance of Christianity. There are some cities however such as Arbil, Harran, and Sur [Tyre] where the ancient gods still have their followers.
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Great piece as always. Nice to see some insight into how the incredibly diverse array of religions are doing under Islamic rule.

How large is the Islamic population currently? Certainly still a minority in most of the Caliphate, but is it restricted mostly to the upper classes or has there been any widespread conversions?
How large is the Islamic population currently? Certainly still a minority in most of the Caliphate, but is it restricted mostly to the upper classes or has there been any widespread conversions?
Actual numbers and percentages of conversion are notoriously contested within Islamic historiography, but Richard Bulliet's Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period: An Essay in Quantitative History is as good a place to start as any. Here are the graphs from his book:


Egypt and Tunisia




The thing to note is that Bulliet's methodology was based on biographical dictionaries on urban figures in Iran and extrapolating that to other areas. Therefore, in my opinion, conversion would have been slower than what we see in these graphs (especially when taking into account the urban/rural divide).
The Beginnings of the Zanj Revolt
The Beginnings of the Zanj Revolt

After the ructions of the Misr affair, wazir Sa’id ibn Yahya ibn Abu Mansur decided to focus on domestic affairs and prevent further entanglements in foreign ventures (not counting the annual ghazwa against the Romans). Sa’id noticed, with concern, that the revenues from the Iranian provinces had been declining for some time. As the Banu al-Munajjim remained close to the Iranian nobility, the wazir knew that the reduced income was due to previous policies of tax-free land grants of former sawafi (crown lands) to the dihqans. Though this achieved the purpose of creating a new army that lessened the caliphate’s reliance on the abna al-dawla, it had also resulted in the loss of a large amount of land-based revenue. Revoking the land was out of the question; the dihqans would revolt and likely win against any loyalist armies. Additionally, the Iranian nobility had been granted full ownership of the land, so the legal ramifications of the revocation would have been far-reaching. Sa’id’s solution was to increase revenue on land the government still had ownership of; namely that of the mawat (dead lands) around the Shatt al-Arab near Basra. The aforementioned lands were considered “dead” because they remained uncultivated, but not irreclaimable. Previous land reclamation and irrigation projects in Iraq had been accomplished through a combination of state and private initiatives, though in many cases private individuals were often employees of the state in some manner or other.

The wazir chose to continue the joint state-private approach for the Shatt al-Arab. Competent bureaucrats who shared Sa’id’s drive for efficiency were rewarded with qati’a land grants in which they gained full ownership of the land in return for payment of the ‘ushr tax, which was considerably less than the kharaj, as long as they restored the productivity of said land. Meanwhile the bureaucracy prepared for the state’s land reclamation effort by amassing a labour force: prisoners of war from the annual raids against the Roman Empire were utilised, and those enslaved by private mutatawwi’ ventures were purchased by the government. Previously an important source for servile labour was Sind and other parts of al-Hind but the successful Shia rebellion in Sind had reduced their exports of manpower, leading to the government having to procure more slaves from the lands of al-Zanj [East Africa]. The dramatic increase in slave purchases was costly in the short-term, but it would be justified by the long-term rise in revenue. The first stage of the land reclamation involved the removal of the salt crust from the salt flats of the mawat; this was laborious work and was assigned mostly to the Zanji slaves. Once the land was reclaimed, it was to be irrigated or drained, as appropriate, through the construction of canals or the repair of damaged ones. Sa’id ibn Yahya ibn Abu Mansur was greatly influenced by the writings of a previous bureaucrat, Abu Yusuf,[1] on the importance of maintaining Iraq’s delicate yet intensive irrigation system. In addition to the growth of staple crops like barley, wheat, and rice, and cash crops such as sugarcane, the irrigation works were vital to bringing drinking water to Basra.

The first signs of trouble occurred in 835 CE in the form of a work stoppage by Zanji slaves on a state project near Basra. The local shurta forced the slaves back to work with little effort and the foremen increased the workload to make up for lost time. Basra had long been a centre for the Kharijites despite constant repression by caliphal authorities. The local Kharijites of course heard of the unrest and decided to investigate; Yazid ibn Umar al-Shaybani, a veteran instigator of Kharijite unrest in al-Jazira, was chosen for the mission. Al-Shaybani posed as a slave dealer in order to gain access to the Zanji slaves, where he discretely encouraged them to rebel and promised significant aid from his fellow Kharijites. Many of the Zanji slaves remained noncommittal though, so al-Shaybani shifted his efforts towards other slaves and the prisoners of war. Meanwhile, the other Kharijites began to spread discontent in Basra, focusing on the promise of the shura and rightly-guided government descending into factionalism and petty politics. After a year of preparation the rebels struck: the shurta in Basra were massacred, the governor executed, and the city’s treasury looted. Simultaneously, the pro-Kharijite elements of the labour force killed their overseers and terrorised the estates of new landowners in the area. The rebels in Basra withdrew from the city and united with those in the marshes, and together they established themselves at a vacated estate to the south of Basra. Participating in the revolt alongside the slaves and veteran Kharijites were Zaydis and some discontented rural Arab tribesmen.

Caliph al-Mu’tasim and wazir Sa’id ibn Yahya ibn Abu Mansur immediately convened a meeting of senior government officials when they were informed of the rebellion. For once, the wazir and khalifah were in agreement; decisive military action was needed, though Sa’id convinced al-Mu’tasim not to lead the campaign himself. Bugha al-Kabir’s reputation for ruthlessness secured him the position of commanding the army, while the increasingly notable al-Hasan Farrukhan ibn Manuchihr al-Sirafi would bring reinforcements from Iran. The ghulam and his army of ghilman and abna al-dawla marched for Basra right away. Bugha al-Kabir’s army encountered no resistance when they entered Basra and learned that after the success of the first revolt the rest of the slaves had either joined the rebels or dispersed. As such, the food situation of Basra and nearby towns would become critical in the near future if supply lines were not established. True to form, Bugha al-Kabir had no patience for consolidating control of Basra beyond garrisoning his infantry there, and instead went out with his cavalry to hunt the rebels. The Persian army under al-Hasan Farrukhan ibn Manuchihr al-Sirafi arrived soon afterwards and were appraised of the situation. A first-generation convert, al-Sirafi’s forebears had wisely decided to invest what little surplus capital they had into the new trading opportunities of their port city as a way of coping with the burden of the jizya. In Basra’s supply situation, there was an opportunity for al-Sirafi to both improve his political and financial power, and to achieve the goals of the military campaign; that is, to end the rebellion.

Bugha al-Kabir’s hunt for the rebels meanwhile was proving to be fruitless. The Abbasid cavalry ran into a small band of rebels not long after leaving Basra, and massacred them with ease. The ghulam came across a few more small bands in the following weeks; his string of victories continued, but large armies of rebels remained elusive. As the Abbasid commanders would later discover, the rebels had hidden their loot and dispersed their forces across the region, taking up refuge in deserted estates and sympathetic villages. The Kharijite leaders of the rebellion were convinced that previous large revolts against caliphal authority had failed because they had created parallel governments with easily identifiable centres, which in turn resulted in sieges and pitched battles which the rebels ultimately lost. As such, the strategy for this rebellion revolved around attacking powerful landlords, local shurta units, and trade caravans while preaching Kharijite doctrine was eschewed in favour of a broader anti-government message. The Abbasid commanders were unprepared for countering this strategy and so continued their separate plans: Bugha al-Kabir hunting for the rebels with his mobile cavalry, while al-Hasan Farrukhan ibn Manuchihr al-Sirafi consolidated control of Basra.

[1] OTL he was a famous jurist and student of Abu Hanifa (of Hanafi fame). Abu Yusuf also wrote the Kitab al-Kharaj about taxation and finance.
End of the Bulgars?
End of the Bulgars?

Dilyarek Khan had reached an advanced age by the time he died in 826 CE. His khanate at Preslav had become wealthy and prosperous, but this hadn’t ameliorated the pagan boilas’ hostility towards the growth of that foreign poison named Christianity. Following Dilyarek’s death, the virulently anti-Christian Ugyek was elected to be the new khan. Awkwardly though Ugyek Khan was also strongly opposed to Omurtag Khan’s realm in Singidunon, so a reconciliation between the two halves of the Bulgar Khanate remained an unlikely prospect. The new khan’s opening move was to officially restore Pliska as the capital, though this was more a fait accompli as the pagan boilas had long spurned Preslav and its cosmopolitan Christian character. The shift of capital did however serve as a prelude to Ugyek’s grand plan: a pogrom against the Christians. The khan personally led the boilas and their retinues in massacring the civilian Christian population of Preslav; the scenes of mayhem were replicated across the major cities of the khanate. Economically speaking, the policy would prove to be disastrous. Besides the Christian priests and monks, large portions of the artisanal and mercantile communities had embraced Christianity. Ugyek Khan and the anti-Christian faction failed to appreciate the irony that the wealth that had outfitted their soldiers was made possible by the people they were now killing. Survivors of the pogrom fled south to the protection of the Roman Empire.

Later Roman depiction of the Bulgar persecution of Christians

The Bulgar pogroms had a galvanising effect on the Roman Empire. Since the scandal surrounding Emperor Constantine VI’s duplicitous womanising, much of the imperial nobility and bureaucracy had been stonewalling any and all of the emperor’s initiatives. The martyrdom of fellow Christians, some of whom were the emperor’s subjects, just across the Bulgar border was an intolerable offence however. Constantine and his court were unanimous in their desire for a punitive war against Ugyek Khan. The Romans mobilised an army from all of the mainland European themes and some of the western themes of Mikra Asia. The Roman forces converged near the often contested fort of Markellai, before advancing further north into Bulgar territory. The bloodlust of Ugyek Khan’s troops was up after the massacres of the Christians and so the Bulgars eagerly marched south to intercept the Romans. The two armies met near the Ticha [Kamchiya] River in 827 CE; what the Bulgars lacked in numbers they made up for in morale, yet the Romans also fought with a righteous fury to avenge the martyrs of Preslav and elsewhere. The Bulgar army was defeated and almost annihilated, but the Romans also suffered heavy casualties. Both Emperor Constantine and Ugyek Khan survived the gruelling ordeal; the latter returned to Pliska while the Romans moved to Odessos to recuperate.

It was at this point that two actors waiting in the wings decided to make their move. Omurtag Khan saw his chance to expand his realm and seized it, hastily raising an army and marching to take Badin [Vidin]. The garrison opened the city’s gates and surrendered voluntarily to Omurtag though as news had reached them of Ugyek’s defeat. Omurtag then dispatched riders to demand fealty from the nearby towns to the west of the Danube. To the east, at the fortress of Ovech [Provadia] was a boila named Isbul. Though opposed to the joint influence of the Romans and Christianity in the khanate, he was intelligent enough to recognise that it was a terrible decision to persecute the Christians, and even warned Ugyek that the Romans would retaliate. Isbul and his men retired to his fortress and was of course proven correct. With Ugyek’s defeat and Pliska being all but open to the Romans, Isbul surmised that the eastern Bulgar Khanate was done for. The shrewd boila sent messengers to Odessos to request an audience with Emperor Constantine; the emperor replied in the affirmative. Isbul was escorted to Odessos for his meeting. Following the diplomatic pleasantries Isbul boldly stated that he knew that the Romans were going to annex the khanate outright, and that it was a sensible plan, but the emperor would need local partners to effectively rule the conquered territories. The boila unsurprisingly offered his services as the local partner in question. Constantine was intrigued; he had been hoping to annex the Bulgar Khanate in its entirety, but was unsure of how he would actually go on to do that. Isbul’s offer seemed too good to be true, but the emperor would be a fool to turn it down out of hand so he accepted. Isbul was appointed as the arkhon of the Bulgar lands to the south of the Danube.

With a post-war settlement negotiated, Emperor Constantine, Isbul, and their armies marched on Pliska. Against expectations, Ugyek Khan and some of his loyal boilas fled to Badin, expecting Omurtag Khan to be there and hoping to take refuge. Omurtag was pitiless however and had the exiles detained then beheaded. After the Romans had taken Pliska and Preslav with ease, they went to Badin with the goal of taking Ugyek’s western territories. Constantine was surprised to find Omurtag already there, but also torn between relief at not having to overextend his reach and annoyance at part of his prize being lost. The remaining Bulgar khan offered peace and friendship with the Romans, supplemented with the gift of the heads of Ugyek and his followers. Omurtag further claimed that Christians in his realm were treated with respect and protected from harm,[1] though this was an exaggeration as there were few Christians in his khanate and they were mostly ignored. Constantine graciously accepted the gifts and concluded a formal non-aggression treaty with Omurtag; though Ugyek’s former territories north of the Danube were left conspicuously absent from the negotiations. Constantine would have liked to regain those long lost territories but he had far more than enough to consolidate after the war. The treaty was thus a tacit cession of those lands to Omurtag Khan who wasted no time in imposing his authority over the Bulgar, Slavic, and Vlach tribes in the region. Meanwhile arkhon Isbul set to work on attempting to simultaneously revitalise the devastated cities under his administration and accommodate both the Bulgar boilas and the new Roman garrisons on the Danube frontier.

[1] Ironic given that OTL it was Omurtag who engaged in persecution of Christians.
Interlude: A Glimpse Into a Possible Future, No. 3
Interlude: A Glimpse Into a Possible Future, No. 3

The Provisional Revolutionary Government of Hindustan (Hindustan ki Arzi Inqelabi-yi Hukumat) was the world’s first socialist (ishtiraki) state, founded in YEAR after a military coup against the monarchy of REGION. The coup was carried out by the Revolutionary Military Council (Inqelabi Fauj-i Khural), a clandestine organisation of socialist and progressive military officers, in response to economic depression and worsening industrial unrest under the rule of the SOMETHING dynasty. A period of warfare after the coup between the Provisional Revolutionary Government, loyalists to the monarchy, and neighbouring states resulted in the rapid expansion of the new government’s territory.

Espousing a THEORIST form of revolutionary socialism, the Revolutionary Military Council was the sole permanent legislative and executive authority. However, the local workers’ councils that appeared during the revolutionary period were encouraged to maintain multi-factional democracy and sent delegates to the Workers’ Advisory Committee (Mazdur ka Mashawarti Anjuman), which convened twice a year for two weeks to coordinate government policy with the Revolutionary Military Council. As the original members of the Revolutionary Military Council died or were purged in factional struggles, they were replaced by career officers with little to no revolutionary credentials. A period of stagnation set in, characterised by growing conflict between the Revolutionary Military Council and the Workers’ Advisory Committee, culminating in the former’s suspension of the latter body in YEAR. A short civil war between the two organisations broke out, with the enlisted ranks and a minority of the Revolutionary Military Council supporting the rump Workers’ Advisory Committee. The latter alliance was victorious in YEAR and the Provisional Revolutionary Government was succeeded by the present-day Federal Socialist Republic of Hindustan (Hindustan ki Wifaqi Ishtiraki-yi Jumhuriat).

The foreign relations of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Hindustan were generally adversarial, especially among the other countries in al-Hind. From the beginning, the socialist state was treated as a pariah by the international community. Even the member parties of the World Congress of Socialists (al-Mu’tamar al-‘Alamia li-l-Ishtirakiyyin), some of whom later rose to government in other countries, were wary because of the dominating role of the military in Hindustan’s government. On the other hand, Hindustan was strongly supportive of anti-colonial movements across the world and in return was regarded as a beacon of anti-imperialism by those movements. During the long conflict between the Revolutionary Military Council and the Workers’ Advisory Committee, many members of the international community supported the latter organisation.
So that is how the Socialist/Communist India happen, the redacted take away the fun but is telling how nations and doctrines evolved, specially other socialist nations consider India too radical her own sake( a reverse OTL SU just cop outed all the moderated movements), that well..
So that is how the Socialist/Communist India happen, the redacted take away the fun but is telling how nations and doctrines evolved, specially other socialist nations consider India too radical her own sake( a reverse OTL SU just cop outed all the moderated movements), that well..
It's not that foreign socialist parties consider the PRG to be too radical, but because they are justifiably worried that the government is a mostly unaccountable military junta.
And the redacted parts are necessary as I don't actually know the specifics just yet.
It's not that foreign socialist parties consider the PRG to be too radical, but because they are justifiably worried that the government is a mostly unaccountable military junta.
And the redacted parts are necessary as I don't actually know the specifics just yet.
Interesting, that still count as too radical for other more 'mainstream/moderated' factions, specially that redacted theorist version of socialist ideology.... and yeah a literal Army with a worker union than double as state...too radical more pinkos out there.

Still seems India will be something Unique ITTL.