Heeresgruppe A
Banned
Is it then also reasonable to assume that French deaths are around 1.7 million, British Empire deaths around 1.4 million, Russian deaths around 2.3 million and US deaths reaching up to the 500,000-600,000 range, perhaps?
A Day in July: An Early 20th Century Timeline
- Thread starter Zulfurium
- Start date
Initially thought you might be off, but going back through what I have written you seem to be about right. Had forgotten how bloody I had written the last few offensives as being, particularly for the Americans - they would be close to the middle mark, and I think you can cut down the number for the French by around 100,000, and Russians by maybe the same. Worth remembering that after the initial days of the Parsky Offensive, when the crack troops including the Czechoslovak Legion are fed into the meat grinder, the Russians fall apart quite quickly, their casualties more due to desertions and captured than wounded or dead, so working off some of the lower casualty estimates for the Russians from OTL should give around 2.2 total. The British casualties are particularly heavy for the Canadian CEF, which is completely shattered during Operation GEORG, and the British bear more of the brunt of the fighting during the Spring Offensive than IOTL.
Heeresgruppe A
Banned
And where is Goering in this timeline? Does he rule Deutsch-Mittelafrika as its Statthalter as he does in the HOI4 Kaiserreich timeline?
In KR, Goering got the MittelAfrika governorship through a very specific circumstances and it could be argued that he got sent there as a form of "soft" exile to curtail his influences in the far right populist movement in mainland Germany. I dont think the circumstances will be repeated here
Goering spent quite a bit of time following Manfred von Richthofen around barnstorming in the early days of the German Liberty Party (DFP), but eventually fell out with the movement and Richthofen himself because of Goering felt his military contributions during the Great War were being overshadowed by Richthofen in the public discourse. He spent some time working in the aviation industry, as a test pilot and advisor and wrote a bunch of semi-popular biographies telling of his experiences during the Great War (the books are rather negative in their portrayal of Richthofen, which causes controversy and drives up sales), before jumping back into the military, working for the Luftstreitkraft where he gets involved in the development of aerial tactics. Without his various injuries during the early Nazi days, Goering never ends up addicted and continues to be a rather productive individual, making a mark in the military. After his initial experiments with the DFP, he largely ends his involvement in politics, soured by the whole experience. He is noted for having a rather touchy pride which is easily wounded particularly when it related to Richthofen. He isn't a particularly prominent figure in anything like the role of KR or OTL, rather being a specialist in fighter technology and tactics in the LSK.
Speaking of Kaiserreich, A Day in July as a Hearts of Iron mod would be neat. Though that would probably require some form of World War II, which may not be the direction this TL is heading.
That would be awesome to see, but @the Imperium of Canada is right in that it probably doesn't quite fit with the direction of the TL. However, setting the start some time around the start of the JCW, with everything going on, could be a good set-up for a WW2 regardless of what plans I have for or the direction of ADiJ. There are plenty of ways in which things could spin out from there and we have plenty of major characters and factions to work with in the various countries. If Paradox had a Cold War sim, it might be a better fit though.
Heeresgruppe A
Banned
Furthermore, is it reasonable to assume that during the Russian Civil War, all factions participating in it lost around 5.5 million military men dead or missing, with approximately twice as many civilian deaths? If so, the total combined deaths that Russia ITTL has suffered both during the Great War and the Russian Civil War would have reached the lower bound of IOTL total Soviet deaths during the Great Patriotic War. Have the intervening foreign actors in the RCW suffered around 40,000 dead or missing (this figure includes both the US-Japanese forces in Siberia and the Freikorps in the Don Republic and Estonia)?
Total Russian deaths are probably somewhat lower, closer to 15 million than the 16.5 you are suggesting although the military-to-civilian deaths are too skewed towards the military - it is more like 3.5-4 million military men, with the rest being civilian deaths. The Great War followed by the Civil War are absolutely cataclysmic events, and with both the larger number of sides in the war and the fighting lasting so much longer it will have major consequences for the death numbers. As regards intervening foreign actors, I think that your number might be a bit low, particularly for the forces in Siberia - more like 40-50k there alone, with maybe 10k Germans at most in the Don (the Estonian-based campaign is very, very one sided in German favor and casualties are very low from it, whereas their involvement in the Don has a good deal more casualties).
This actually makes me really curious what the butterflies did to Canadian politics. IOTL the LPC (particularly under Mackenzie) generally took Canada in an anti-British direction, WLMK especially took every opportunity to push Canada's autonomy from Britain, the Chanak Crisis and the DoW on Germany being prominent examples; so from what you've said, if the LPC stayed the dominant party as IOTL it seems there wouldn't be much change there. However the big question is, what changed with the CPC? IOTL they were the pro-British party, pushing for Canada to remain loyal and maintain imperial unity, so how do they react to Britain ITTL? If they also take an anti-British position, what is there to differentiate them from the LPC? Remember back then the LPC were the party of Canadian nationalism, pushing for a more North American identity and an independent path from the UK, especially pushing for stronger relations with the US.
Also this raises questions like does the difference in Communist ideology affect the Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation? While they were definitely more in the Social Democratic camp than outright Socialist or Communist, with TTL's "softer" and more malleable ideology it does beg the question if it inspires key figures in that party.
One other I wanted to mention, by 1917 Canada had already established its reputation as the Empire's shock troops, so I'm not sure if butterflying the 100 Days would entirely negate their reputation, unless the Offensive happens before Vimy Ridge which was THE defining battle for the CEF's reputation. I know, this is going way far back in the TL, but I only just remembered my little nitpick so thought I'd shoehorn it in
One thing to remember is that ITTL the Progressive Party ended up absorbed by the LPC rather than the CPC, which includes a good deal of Socreds. The CPC remain pro-British, but they are distant second to the LPC and don't have the progressives to absorb. For the time being Canadian politics is very much a two-horse race, with the LPC far, far in the lead by this point - although the LPC is very much divided between a radical, progressive reform, wing and the more moderate faction around King.
There have been various attempts at establishing a left-wing party in the Communist, Socialist or Labour camp, but most of these attempts have floundered without the shock of the Great Depression to propel them to prominence - there are still various smaller leftist parties but none of them have really achieved national prominence. When it comes down to it, the greatest threat to King's leadership actually comes from his own party in the form of the progressive wing, who are gathering ever more popularity and are campaigning for reforms of various sort - increasingly in the Socred mold. Notably, the progressive wing are still anti-British in outlook and look to the American Progressive Party as an ideological counterpart in many ways (although they are as disconcerted by Long's rise to prominence as many Americans are).
The Canadian reputation is very much still established at Vimy Ridge - but you need to bear in mind that those very shock troops, who were celebrated and venerated for their achievements, were subsequently utterly shattered in the German Spring Offensives. It is precisely because they had become such a great symbol that their loss hit so hard, and there are many in Canada whose reaction is to wonder why so many great men should have died in such a seemingly pointless conflict (the pointlessness on the allied side is magnified considerably with how the war plays out) for the British.
Update Forty (Pt. 5): The World At The End Of The 1930s
The World At The End Of The 1930s
Nikolai Bukharin, Chief Ideologue of the Soviet Communist Movement
A Plague of Ideas
Nikolai Bukharin, Chief Ideologue of the Soviet Communist Movement
A Plague of Ideas
The Liberal-Conservative Synthesis
While the defining feature of the long 19th century, stretching from the French Revolution in 1789 to the start of the Great War in 1914, had been the struggle between Liberalism and Conservatism, the decades that followed would be marked by the transformation and subjugation of these movements to more modern and radical movements. The end of the Great War would mark a true turning point in this regard, as it on one hand saw the retrenchment and consolidation of monarchical conservatism while at the same time unlocking the powers of mass politics through the sweeping set of constitutional and liberal reforms which the public demanded in the aftermath of the Great War. The result was thus a melding and watering down of both ends of the traditional political spectrum, Conservative and Liberal political structures merging and forming the foundations for the political struggles that were to come. While the most obvious example of this occurred amongst the former Central Powers, major democratic reforms would occur across much of Europe and in the Americas, with the proliferation of women's suffrage, extension of the franchise and the fracturing of the old political elite as new political players on both ends of the political spectrum rose to true prominence. In some ways, the post-Great War political structures which emerged could thus be considered a synthesis of the long-held dispute between Conservative and Liberal forces, with neither side victorious, but both sides holding an inordinate influence and impact upon the structures which were to define the post-Great War period (55).
The post-Great War era would require changes to the political and ideological approaches taken by both Liberals and Conservatives as the need to expand their political reach beyond their traditional bases of support in the middle and upper classes became ever more pressing. This transition was to take time, with Liberal or Liberal-Conservative forces initially heading the response to the immediate post-war crisis in most countries with varying degrees of success as the populaces of the western world sought comfort and security in experienced and trusted leadership. However, as soon as the political situation began to settle down, new and radical political forces began to dominate the political field, drawing their support from formerly marginalized bases of support and pulling in voters from a broad spectrum of groups - the first true examples of mass party politics - which came in the form of Social Democratic, Reform and Labour parties. While Liberal parties initially sought to deal with this new and intimidating political force through coalition-building and cooptation of leftist political power, hoping to use their greater governing and political experience to tame their leftist counterparts, the Conservatives largely met the rise of leftist forces with open hostility, seeing them as a threat to the safety and security of the nations which they had helped to build and bled for over the preceding centuries. Had the political aftermath of the Great War been more acrimonious, this might well have proven a model for success amongst conservative forces, but the spate of Unionist, Nativist, Militarist, Revanchist and Jingoist tendencies which reared their head amongst conservative movements during this period would find themselves floundering, outmaneuvered by not only their leftist opponents but by their Liberal rivals as well. The result was to see conservative political powers struggle on a wide scale across much of Europe as massive societal and political reforms were undertaken by the new left-leaning governments who had swept to power, their former Liberal partners, who had vastly underestimated their new partners, ripped along in the wake of the reformers without much of an ability to moderate the massive changes being wrought upon their nations. Thinkers from both sides would greet this period with confusion and uncertainty, disconcerted by the rise of rival ideologies and their seeming inability to build mass followings sufficient to secure governing power without resorting to coalitions or partnerships across the political spectrum (55).
Another turning point would come with the Two Rivers Crisis, in which the left-wing governments of both Great Britain and France stumbled and opened a path up for a challenge to their dominance - with a similar occurrence coming four years later in Germany. However, the reaction to these opportunities would prove quite different from country to country, with the Liberals holding sufficient sway and a popular leadership to take up the mantle from the fallen Labour Party on the back of a more populist and personality-oriented political campaign by Winston Churchill, while in France the traditional parties proved insufficiently united to achieve any real sense of stability in the constant carousel which soon ensued there. While the Liberal parties were swifter to find their balance following the political collapse of the 1920s, their recovery would prove relatively short-lived and they were never quite able to truly expand beyond their traditional bases of support. The Conservative movements, by contrast, would prove significantly more adept in the long run when it came to building up their position for proper mass politics - either by letting go of some of their long-held positions in favor of more popular modern policies or embracing more radical reactionary policies, often through the integralist movement. Of the former, the German Conservative Coalition would be the foremost exemplar, with its embrace of a variety of conservative yet popular policies based around appealing to monarchism, patriotism and social conservatism while tacitly embracing many of the more popular societal reforms implemented by their rivals, while for the latter it would be the Union de la Droite in France which people took note of, with its appeals to social conservatism, monarchism, religion and integralism being balanced by a moderate permissiveness towards their opponents and an understanding of the complex socio-political circumstances present in France at the time (55).
Perhaps the most surprising trend of the post-Great War era would be the shocking resurgence of monarchism in a vast welter of guises with the traditional monarchical structures diverging in numerous different directions over the course of the following decades. In some cases monarchism fell into starkly reactionary models of absolutist rule, as was the case in Spain and Chosun, while in others the monarchs adopted a position of mediator as part of a growing democratic and constitutional tendency, as occurred in much of the Zollverein - most significantly Germany and the Ottoman Empire, and a wholly third group either returned to or adopted monarchical structures in a more symbolic role, as in France and Great Britain. Regardless of what form these monarchies took, they all represented a major step back in the global push towards republicanism which had traditionally been connected to liberalism which saw the latter ideology pushed into a situation of needing to find a path towards accommodation and acceptance of the monarchy, or faced widespread popular opposition should they refuse to do so. Republicanism as a movement took several steps back, losing one of its foremost exemplars with the French January Restoration, and the growing association between republican states and semi-democratic, left-leaning states such as the Italian Peoples' Republic, the Soviet Republic or the Iranian Socialist Republic. Even on the left wing did republicanism fail to emerge as the sole state system, with the Shogunate demonstrating the capacity for even communist states to adopt monarchical structures in a process which would help to greatly ease the ideological integration of communism into more traditional societies and social systems (55).
While Conservatism began to find its feet over the course of the 1930s, developing policies and ideological positions of mass appeal, it would still find itself in a precarious position at the close of the decade, seeking to find a new position of stability in the incredibly fraught and tumultuous ideological spectrum which dominated the period. While appeals to patriotism, patriarchal authority and an emphasis on societal tranquility remained core features of conservatism during this era, it had found itself forced to compromise and re-explore its ideological foundations, considering the role of the state in the affairs of its citizenry, the role of the citizen in the state, the degree of freedom and power held by the average individual and the broad popular belief in having a say in their own affairs. While idealization of the past remained a steadfast aspect of conservative thought and belief, this period would also see an acceptance of modernity and the need for change amongst many conservative thinkers - collectively coming to be known as the Conservative Counter-Revolution, so named for its changes and adaptations in the face of new and revolutionary threats. The conservatives sought to restore a measure of order and rationality to a world which seemed ever more insane. Liberals, perhaps due to its long-held belief in the broad appeal of their ideology, would be far harder pressed to adapt to the situation than their conservative counterparts when it eventually dawned upon them that they were no longer the radical change-makers to the stiff-necked conservatives, but rather guardians of the middle road in the face of radical reformers on the left and combative conservatives on the right. Efforts to address this changed status were undertaken by a variety of thinkers, from the Austrian converted socialist Karl Raimund Popper, who began to champion social liberalism and democratic liberalism - with the liberal as a defender of humanism, decency and the popular will, and William Bevridge's progressive welfare liberalism, with its belief in unemployment and social security and the state's role in enabling the freedom of all its citizens, to Walther Rathenau's Mechanistic Liberalism, whereby Rathenau sought to marry machine-focused positivism with Christian values of love and altruism. Rathenau would view humanity as divided between two major types of human beings - the Furchtmensch, who represented mechanistic and rational capitalism, and the Mutmensch, who symbolized the world of art, social progress and morality, the two groups engaged in a constant struggle for dominance. To resolve this conflict Rathenau developed a theory of cooperative economics whereby a "Reich of the Soul" would be created through technocratic guidance and sustainable regulated competition, in which industrial growth, material wellbeing, responsible consumerism, resource-saving, free competition and private initiative would all be achieved while avoiding the rigorous ranking of classes and the pursuit of excessive wealth in order to create the conditions for a balance between the classes and an equal distribution of wealth within the population - stressing the interplay and cooperative dynamics necessary between the public sector, private sector and the civil sector. While none of these Liberal models would rise to the top during the 1930s, all would find their adherents, alongside dozens of other models, as the Liberal movement fought to prevent fracturing into a hundred different movements (55).
Let Society Be Reformed
Social Democratic and Labour-oriented reform parties had been rising to prominence in the immediate leadup to the Great War, but it would take until the post-Great War era for them to truly emerge as the leading political movements of many of Europe's most prominent nations. While societal tensions had been nearing a boiling point in the immediate aftermath of the Great War and the need for comprehensive change was clear to almost everyone, the fact that it would be reform-oriented parties in partnership with the traditional conservative or liberal parties rather than revolutionary violence and change which prevailed in most major European nations would come as a surprise to many - not least the Communists, Maximalists and other revolutionary leftists who had widely predicted that the post-war circumstances would be a time ripe for revolution, not reform. Nevertheless, it took time before the electoral gains and societal shifts of the period saw actual political gains for the reformist left-wing which allowed them to make an attempt at actually implementing their reform programmes, and when the opportunity finally came the results were not always met with widespread approval they had expected. Perhaps the single most defining development of the 1930s for the Reform Left movements of Europe was to be the proliferation of hubris, willfulness and a refusal to compromise with their political counterparts- often the direct or indirect result of political chicanery from more established political entities eager to water down and undermine the work done by the reformist left - and a resultant level of intransigence which compromised their political viability as ruling parties. This was further coupled with a troubling lack of governmental experience amongst many of these parties, who were forced to either seek experience from an often hostile governmental bureaucracy or work to replace it with new and unexperienced administrators more inclined towards the reformers - with a resultant dip in performance which often left government services at least somewhat compromised (56).
These twin developments, the growing hubris of the left and the concurrent lack of governmental experience, were to combine into a deeply problematic mixture which eventually pulled the leftist reformers from power with varying degrees of backlash. In Great Britain the collapse of the Labour Government in the aftermath of the Two Rivers Crisis was cataclysmic, reducing the unity of the left into half a dozen squabbling camps. At the same time, Labour's rise to prominence in the British dominions saw sharp challenges not only domestically, but significantly also through the colonial ties to Britain, where the rise of Labour in particularly Australia was met with widespread disapproval and worry. In France, the SFIO were to play a central role in setting the framework for the start of the Indochinese Revolt and the long years of war which followed, while their participation in the repeated fragile governmental coalitions after their fall from power were to so provoke tensions within the party that it collapsed into open internal conflict between reformist and revolutionary wings, in the process helping to pave the way for the monarchist Union de la Driote's rise to prominence and the subsequent January Restoration - in effect a complete reversal from the movement's high point a decade prior. In Germany the reformist movement was to reach its apogee with the SPD, which utterly dominated German politics on a federal level from 1928 to 1936, implementing some of the most ambitious and wide-ranging reforms of any of these governments and fundamentally overturning the political status quo, bringing prosperity and economic growth to half a continent with their involvement at the head of the Zollverein. Nevertheless, it would be a sudden and scandalous collapse which followed, as the government's overreliance upon their ties to their more revolutionary counterparts in the Soviet Republic and arrogant command of German politics saw the SPD's standing federally fundamentally undermined. With their political powers undermined, social democratic thinkers were forced back to the drawing-board, searching to figure out what had gone wrong - analyses ranging across a wide range of topics and issues, some arguing for a greater patriotic and nationalistic focus as a way of countering accusations of disloyalty from the right, others in favor of adapting the Communist dual-focus on the peasant alongside the worker as a political base of support and an emphasis on more radically reformative policies, and a whole third group oriented around promoting social and economic freedoms in an effort to occupy the ground lost by the weakened and fractured liberal movements (56).
Further afield, in the United States and China, affiliated reform movements also rose to a position of significance although they did so under different guises and names than that of Social Democracy or Labour. Progressivism, while sharing many features with reform socialism and social democracy, never considered itself part of that European-born development - instead viewing itself as an American-grown movement focused upon avoiding unfair economic structures and taking care of the poor and marginalized population through socially liberal policies, market regulation and welfare reforms. Notably, Progressive ideology found a wide and diverse base of support well before the Great War, influencing politicians and taking over the political discourse for decades during the First Progressive Era. However, the rise of Huey P. Long and his supporters were to see the movement and ideology diverge significantly from that which had dominated the Pre-Great War era. More radical and populist, willing to set aside political niceties in order to achieve its ideological and political goals, the Longist Progressive movement was significantly more willing to engage in government intervention and sought to build up the federal state bureaucracy to a point where it could ensure economic equality and social welfare for all American citizens - goals which, while sought after, had not been a key focus of the progressive movement. The Longists drew to an unheard degree upon a wide base of minority populations, from African-Americans and Mid-Western farmers to Irish-American industrial workers and poor Southern whites, and explicitly sought to enfranchise and strengthen these populations - often to the detriment of more elite and established populations, working in identity-based politics and class divisions in order to divide and conquer their opponents with great success. However, no mention of the Longist Progressives would be complete without the movement's disregard for political norms and tendency towards nepotism and authoritarianism - with President Long repeatedly breaking unwritten rules and bulldozing through opposition when he felt it necessary, which he did more often than not. As government messaging and priorities began to center on equality amongst races and religious minorities, with a particular emphasis on equal economic opportunity for all, and an emphasis on the need for greater social liberties in the face of restrictions imposed by moralistic hypocrites and outdated constitutional limitation, Progressivism grew ever more combative and dynamic as the end of the 1930s grew nearer (56).
Perhaps the most unique and surprising leftist reform party to come to prominence during the 1930s was the Social Reform Party of China which emerged in 1935 following the abandonment of Communism by the Shanghai Communist movement. Deeply influenced by the ideological developments of the German Social Democratic movement, the left wing of the Kuomintang and the early Chinese Communist movement, the Social Reform movement in China combined overt, often to a disconcerting level, Chinese nationalism with an ambitious push for social, political and economic reforms aimed at promoting equality, unity and fairness within the strictures of the Fengtian regime. In fact, the Social Reform Party was to have a surprising degree of impact on Fengtian policy-making, sponsoring major educational reforms and aiding in the inclusion of "Boards of Mediation" in many of the Central Plains cities as part of the industrialization programme under the influence of Liao Zhongkai, and serving as a key player in promoting the Hongzhi Emperor's social reforms following his ascension. The Social Reform movement would back the land reforms and social agrarian reforms in the Central Plains wholeheartedly as well with considerable success, Wang Jingwei playing a key role in securing legislative support for the effort. Perhaps the most important factor in fully splitting the reform movement from the revolutionary Jiaxing Communists was the shocking murder of a key founder of the movement, Li Dazhao, who had otherwise been one of the foremost figures in maintaining the movement's communist identity. By the 1930s the movement was shifting rapidly away from its Communist past and ever further towards support for a monarchical social democratic model, although its continued adherence to western values and sharp critiques of traditional Chinese society, most forcefully made by the former Communist Chen Duxiu, would cause repeated confrontations with more government-aligned social critics. In many ways the Social Reform Party came to represent the surviving remnants of the New Culture Movement, championing democracy, social liberalism, societal reform, modernism, scientific progress and a rejection of traditional, particularly Confucian, social values, while still working within the context of the Fengtian regime. Notably, the Social Reform movement abandoned any and all connections to Marxism, Socialism and Communism in rhetoric, ideology and ostensible values, seeking instead to sell their movement as more of an outgrowth of American Progressivism or European Social Liberalism - although few could doubt the immense influence and inspiration which the German SPD had served as for the Social Reform movement (56).
The Many-Headed Beast
The Great War unleashed not only apocalyptic advances in warfare, technology and human destruction, but also countless new ideas and ideologies which had been percolating and developing in every advanced economy and society across the globe. The most significant and wide-ranging of these new ideologies, which would sweep across the globe at an incredible pace following its early successes, was Communism. An outgrowth and evolution of the Marxist Socialism embraced by the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, Communism emerged as part of an ideological synthesis and admixture of a variety of Russian leftist ideologies, ranging from Agrarian Socialism through Marxists and Leninist strains of Socialism to Russian Syndicalist Anarchism, which spread swiftly as an inspiration for radical revolutionary leftists around the globe. While the ideological tenets of the Communist movement were complex and often contradictory during the first decade of its existence, with both Muscovite and Trotskyite strains of thought gradually coming together over time. One of the most significant early developments of the Communist movement was to be its reorientation away from Europe and towards Asia under the influence of Leon Trotsky, which, when coupled with the relatively diffuse ideological orthodoxy of the movement allowed Communist movements to rapidly localize and adapt the ideology to their respective circumstances. This weak ideological orthodoxy was to prove both a strength and weakness of the Communist movement, on one hand allowing the ideology to spread and localize incredibly well, but also set the stage for truly massive ideological controversies and disagreements which repeatedly spilled over into geopolitical and diplomatic matters. Notably early Communism was split in two distinct currents, Trotskyite and Muscovite, but as the political divides in Russia between the two movements came to an end this divide narrowed precipitously within Russia, although the distinction remained important internationally. This would all change with the climactic events of the Trotskyite Affair which not only saw the Russian Trotskyite movement suppressed and pushed into exile, with the death of Trotsky marking the end of one of the most significant Communist ideologues of the century, but also saw the rapid consolidation of political power behind the Governing Clique and its leading Triumvirate who soon set out to establish a clear ideological orthodoxy which was to prevail within Russian Communism in the years that followed (57).
The formulation of "The Five Fundamental Theories and Eight Core Principles of The Communist Party" in 1935 by Nikolai Bukharin was to prove amongst the most important foundational doctrinal papers in the new orthodoxy - outlining the importance of communal leadership, the role of the Communist Party as an anchor point and central organizing force of the state as well as the party's role as a mass political organization with truly astonishing membership numbers. With this document as its basis, alongside an increasingly lengthy orthodox cannon of works set out by the Politburo under Bukharin, debate on both how the state should and how it would be run came to dominate political discourse, with articles and editorials debating a variety of topics proliferating and engaging not only the political elite but the wider public as well. One of the most intensely debated subjects in Russian Communist political journals in the latter half of the 1930s was the question of democratic representation and the dictatorship of the proletariat - with sharp critique of the lack of democratic legitimacy and insufficient power of the Congress of Soviets a particularly prominent feature of the period. Ultimately, Bukharin would prove instrumental in outlining the "Transitional Theory of Socialist Humanism" which became Soviet Communist doctrine in the late 1930s, wherein he explained the current illiberal and undemocratic tendencies of the Communist state as part of a transitional phase in which the dictatorship of the proletariat sought to educate and undergird revolutionary society, uplifting its populace and preparing the "backwards" Russian population for a greater voice in politics - referencing the horrific failures of the Constituent Assembly during the Revolution as proof-positive of the Russian peoples' unpreparedness for greater legislative powers than they held at the moment - before eventually transitioning to a system of "Socialist Humanism", which he defined as democratic rule by an enlightened, socialized and proletarianized population which stood ready to receive the august burden of governmental power (57).
Perhaps the two most significant ideologues besides Bukharin was the Commissar for Communications, Ivan Smirnov, whose works focused heavily upon the importance of the village commune and neighborhood soviet, wielding propaganda, entertainment and cultural matrixes to promote the progress of Socialist Humanism - in many ways drawing inspiration from the Cultural Hegemony advocated in Italy by Antonio Gramsci. The other was one of Bukharin's closest associates in the Politburo, Yevgeni Preobrazhensky, whose work had previously focused on justifying the unorthodox mixed-market economics championed by Grigori Sokolnikov and the Ekonburo. Preobrazhensky's core contributions were to be the linking of economic and ideological incentives within the Soviet state, with a particular emphasis on the economic impetus which reliance upon fellow communist nations brought with it, part of a united international working in concert regardless of religious or racial divisions on an equal basis, as contrasted to the "exploitative" economics of imperialist nations such as Germany, where the Zollverein fueled the economic progress of the former. Particular scorn was focused upon the fact that the Germans had been allowed to establish a dangerous stranglehold on the Soviet food supply which he felt had to be addressed if Soviet Communism was to have any hope of revolutionary independence. One of the most forceful critics of the Soviet partnership and trade relationship with Germany, Preobrazhensky would stress the importance of Communist economic and ressource independence as well as the incredible dangers of relying upon imperialist powers - a position which was to seem prescient following the rise of the Conservative Bloc to power in Germany and the worsening diplomatic relationship that followed, with the idea that Germany might suddenly cut the Soviet Republic's food supply, leaving the Revolutionary Vanguard to starve to death, a clear and present fear in Soviet political and military circles (57).
While Russian Communism was the most prominent Communist branch, it was far from the only one. Nearly as old, and most forcefully combative towards the Russians, were the Italian Communists whose ideological developments diverged significantly from that of the Russians. While initially formed as an alliance between Socialist and Anarchist forces during the Italian Civil War, it was very much the Socialist half of the party which rose to dominate the movement, eventually pushing the Anarchists out entirely, wherefrom they would fracture into a couple major factions and lose much of their political relevance in the decade that followed. For the rest of the movement it would be the highly esteemed Antonio Gramsci who emerged as the premier ideologue, his wide network of friends and allies both within his New Order clique and beyond the confines of the Communist Party, proving immensely influential not just in Italy but across the globe. Communism in Italy was pluralistic and cosmopolitan, well aware of its precarious dependence upon the German-led Zollverein and its highly exposed coastal borders, with an eye towards not only building up a new communist culture in Italy but also ensuring the spiritual welfare of its populace through sponsorship of the Revolutionary Catholic Church. Surprisingly integrated into the wider European Communist movement, the Italians would come to be seen by many as something of a laboratory of the revolution - a place in which new ideas and revolutionary concepts were ever welcomed, and a place in which education, culture and science were held to be of great importance. Nevertheless, one of the most significant ideological contributions to Communist and Socialist thought to emerge from the peninsula would have nothing to do with these factors, and instead related to the transition from theory to practice of large-scale public enterprise as the foundational stone of a Communist economy. Under Amadeo Bordiga the immense amount of theoretical work done into how exactly a communist state might run the economy was put into practice - large scale multi-year planning, massive publicly-owned conglomerates and rationalized pricing schemes all saw implementation and constant tweaking, with the Italians' numerous failures and successes soon serving as fodder for the leftist political journals of Europe. Ever in a contentious relationship with the Russian Soviets, the Italians would find more of a support system amongst their European counterparts, particularly in Germany and France, although as intra-Communist relations began to warm following the Trotskyite Affair translations of ideological works from either country began to proliferate as well, introducing new and exciting ideas to both Russia and Italy, although differences of opinion were numerous and loudly stated by both sides (58).
Communism in the rest of Europe drew upon three distinct influences: most importantly the internal debate amongst particularly German and French Communists, influence from the Soviet ideological developments and the development of Italian Communism. Over the course of the 1930s particularly the influence of the Soviets upon European Communist ideology would become a contentious topic, with the Trotskyite Affair marking a sharp break within the Communist movement as Trotskyite refugees fled into exile and brought an overt hostility towards the Soviet Communist structure with them. At the same time, Soviet involvement in the Communist parties of Europe became ever more of a contentious issue as internal disputes and growing ideological orthodoxy were implemented with Soviet backing, in the process disempowering those who viewed the Soviets with hostility. Notably, many of the Soviet-aligned Communist factions would prove surprisingly moderate, willing to cooperate and participate in the political dialogue, ever eager to form a united front in order to ensure left-wing political dominance where possible, or to form a united opposition where possible. However, while the Soviet-inspired Communist movements predominated in the first half of the 1930s, over the course of the latter half it would be an array of radical and revolutionary anti-Soviet factions which rose to the fore, from the KPO in Germany and the Treint-aligned radicals of the SFIO in France to the Communist Party in Britain, all came to view Soviet infiltration as a danger and threat to not only their ideological purity but their political viability following the dramatic revelations of the Krivitsky Case in Germany. This demonstration of the covert activities of the Soviet intelligence edifice was to highlight the claims of the Trotskyites and cause immense disconcerted worry about the various parties' potential exposure. Treint was soon to be joined by two other young and forceful voices who sought to tear French Communism away from the grips of the Soviets, namely Jacques Doriot and Louis Sellier. These three would come to form a forceful voice of opposition to both the mainstream reformists of the SFIO but also to the more Soviet-aligned communists within the party, ultimately coming to dominate the radical wing of the party with a forceful emphasis on economic planning, state control of enterprise and a strong political center - drawing inspiration not only from the emergent ideological current of neo-socialism, which sought to further socialist thought beyond Marxism and drew inspiration from the Integralist movement, but was also inspired by the successful economic model demonstrated by Amadeo Bordiga in Italy. In Germany it would be the KPO which held sway amongst the communists in the aftermath of the Krivitsky Case while the KPD found its role as a stooge of the Soviets a major problem, experiencing a precipitous collapse in support to the KPO. Here it was Walther Ulbricht who emerged as the most prominent ideological figure on a platform mixing Trotskyite, National Socialist and New Order Italian Communist concepts with surprising adeptness (58).
While Europe was to continue to see ideological developments in the Communist sphere, it would be in Japan that a truly revolutionary new form of Communism was to emerge under the influence first and foremost of the infamous Kita Ikki. In contrast to both European and Soviet varieties of Communism, the Japanese Communism of Kita Ikki was to prove itself deeply rooted in the socio-cultural context of Japan, embracing often ancient Japanese institutions and historical precedents while crossing them with modern, Communist, concepts and thought. Perhaps the most obvious example of this was to be the retention of the Japanese monarchy and embrace of State Shintoist elements into the ideological admixture of Nippon Kyosanto and the People's Shogunate. While drawing inspiration and learnings from both the Soviet and Trotskyite models of Communism, Japan was to prove amongst the most willing to adapt the ideology to local circumstances, and embraced a variety of ideas which were viewed as near-anathema by their counterparts. Kita Ikki was instrumental in promoting the adoption of these ideas, bringing an intense populist, traditionalist and nationalist tendency to Japanese Communism which was to produce a surprisingly adaptive and localized ideology which secured wide adherence and was viewed as "naturally" Japanese - as contrasted with many of the westernized ideologies which had otherwise proliferated in Japanese political society without ever really penetrating the lower classes of Japanese society. Had the Japanese Communists been more close-minded in their outlook and less understanding of the vast socio-cultural contexts which existed both between and within Asian states, their ideological movement might have struggled to secure international adherents, but the combination of a laisse-faire attitude towards local synchroneities and a Pan-Asian outlook were to combine to facilitate the movement's wide spread into South-East and South Asia, with Japanese inspired movements in Laos, Siam, Indonesia, Burma and India all making an impact on their national politics. Importantly, however, the Japanese would find themselves rejected by their Chinese counterparts in the Jiaxing Communist movement which had transitioned south into Indochina and played such an important role in the War of Independence in that country. Viewing the Japanese as arrogant interlopers who had embraced heretical nationalist tendencies, the Jiaxing Communists were fiercely agrarian, internationalist and republican in outlook, viewing the adoption of monarchism as a deeply troubling development which threatened to undermine the very core precepts of the Communist movement. While the ICP, their Vietnamese counterparts, were significantly more open towards the Japanese and greeted their intervention with pleasure, the Jiaxing Communists were to remain fiercely independent of the Japanese Communists - far more willing to adopt precepts promulgated by Moscow by contrast (59).
While the Soviet, Italian and Japanese Communist movements were the foremost currents within the wider Communist movement, they were far from a position of supremacy. In the Middle East, India and Indonesia, independent efforts at adapting Communist principles to Islam saw the gradual emergence of Islamic Communism as a force while in Chile an explicitly autocratic and state-based ideological model of Communism became prevalent, more inspired by the ideological works of fellow Latin American leftists, Trotskyites and European Communists than either the dominant Soviet or Japanese models. In Mexico Trotskyites once again made their presence known, although it was to be a far more native Mexican version of Communism which was to prevail, focused on a strong centralized state, acceptance of the Revolutionary Catholic Church and state-controlled businesses and unions. The United States would not be free of Communist movements either, although these were to be far more democratically and anarchistic in outlook than any of the major models - the focus being upon trade unionism, social liberty and a state which enabled the freedom of all. Nevertheless, the American Communists were not to find a significant base of support, with most of their potential base supporters having found themselves absorbed by the colossal Progressive Party tent. Brazil would prove home to one of the most protracted active communist insurgencies in the form of the Siquerian Communists whose adoption of various marginalized and persecuted groups soon began to form a syncretic admixture of Communist millenarism with distinctly religious overtones - Antonio de Siqueria Campos finding himself in something at the head of what looked increasingly like a quasi-religious and violently revolutionary cult which held Siqueria Campos up as a messenger from god, sent to earth to spread the Communist Gospel in preparation for the End of Days. Ultimately Communism came in many guises, shapes and forms, with only a very basic level of common features across the breadth of the movement, but nevertheless its influence upon the era was all-encompassing (59).
The Faith, State and Me
The Ideology of Integralism emerged across much of Latin Europe during the 19th century as a movement that sought to assert Catholic underpinnings to all social and political actions while minimizing or eliminating any competing ideological actors, most forcefully defined in a Liberal or Humanist guise. As the threat towards Catholicism from temporal powers and growing secularism became an ever greater, a series of popes began to work towards formulating an intellectual counterpoint to the ascendent powers of liberalism, with the first political parties established on integralist lines emerging in Spain around 1890. The following decades would see similar tendencies emerge in France, Italy, Portugal and Romania, although ever struggling to find a footing in the face of constant liberal progress, pushed to the political margins. The gradual emergence of socialist and anarchist movements during this time was to set in motion a secondary front in the Integralists' culture war, joining their Liberal foes in threatening traditionalist Catholic values. The true turning point was to come with the devastation of the Great War, as societal tensions rose to a boil and both the liberal and conservative superstructures which had been suppressing Integralism crumbled under the pressure, not only unleashing integralism but socialism and anarchism as well. The first state to fall under Integralist rule can be viewed with considerable surprise in hindsight, for it was not one of the major combatants of the Great War who fell first, but rather the minor belligerent of Portugal which saw Sidónio Pais maneuver his way to power by virtue of a coup against a weak and divided liberal government, subsequently engaging in a series of precarious struggles for power which only came to a successful end in the early 1920s. Sidónio Pais brought with him a number of important developments - establishing a strong central presidency, instituted a new constitution, and most importantly, entered into a partnership with the Catholic Church which was to make Lusitanian Integralism a most appealing ideology for him to embrace - in the process beginning the process of transitioning Integralism from a theoretical concept to a practical governing ideology. Around this time a similar, yet divergent, ideology known as Fascism rose to prominence in Italy and set about contesting for power with both the weakened pre-existing Liberal establishment and the emergent Socialist and Anarchist forces of northern Italy. While initially an outgrowth of Socialist Revisionism and Futurism, the Fascist movement would share many features with the Integralist movements of Iberia and eventually found itself subordinated and influenced by that ideology grouping on a large scale. In Spain, the rise of Integralism was to coincide with King Alfonso XIII's abandonment of the Liberal Restoration, which his family had otherwise relied upon for power, and his subsequent absorption of Carlist, Traditionalist and Integralist movements behind his rule. In truth it was this mix of ideologies which the wider world would come to recognize as the quintessential Integralist ideological admixture due to the exceedingly strong grip of the Catholic Church on society and incredibly close ties between the Santiago de Compostela Papacy and the Spanish Crown (60).
Thus, by the middle of the 1920s Integralism had come to be seen as an emphasis on a strong central state built around a strong central figure, be it the President, King, Emperor or Prime Minister, with a heavy emphasis on religious social reforms and the involvement of religious authorities in all spheres of life, public and private. It was marked by an emphasis upon class cooperation and unity through the use of syndicalist-inspired associations and an economy geared and directed by the state to achieve its purposes, while a high degree of importance was placed upon history, morality and tradition. As time went on, the ideological structures of Integralism gradually solidified and diverged, each nation following similar, but different, social and ideological models. Perhaps one of the most surprising and notable features of Integralist thought was to be its emphasis upon inward improvement and cooperation with like-minded nations - viewing other integralist nations not as enemies or rivals, but as potential partners and fellow combatants in the unending war against liberalism, socialism and modernism. In Portugal a stark divide emerged between those who wished to snuff out party politics entirely in the name of technocratic state rule, effectively seeking to replace the instability and uncertainty of politics with the certainty and stability of bureaucratic and technocratic rule, while their opponents forcefully argued the importance of continued political engagement and an expansion of integralist ideals along lines reminiscent of those undertaken in Spain. Regardless, Sidonio Pais would never feel entirely comfortable with his Integralist partners, and often sought to limit their political influence in whatever way he could, while still keeping them on his side. By contrast, Spain was dominated by the larger-than-life figure of King Alfonso whose grip and manipulation of the Militarist, Carlist and Traditionalist movements first saw them turned towards the destruction of his most feared enemies on the left before gradually allowing for their internal ideological differences of his supporters to weaken the movement's cohesion such that no one else could amass a following sufficient to threatening the power and authority of the monarch. In the process, he nevertheless embraced the ideals promulgated by all three subsidiary ideologies and blended them in such a way as to always benefit his own position while balancing the various forces supporting his regime. Throughout this period the French Integralist movement remained an important ideological and political force, churning out some of the most compelling political theory crafting and ideological ground work for integralism in the integralist world in their constant struggle with the left and center of French politics. As the Union de la Droite grew to ever greater prominence and subsumed ever more of the French far-right, it drew in numerous new ideological currents and began to develop a synthesis under the influence of radical ideologues like Charles Maurras - had the UD continued on with Maurras and his compatriots at the head, it is easy to imagine the road to revolution and civil war in France. However, it was to be the sudden and stunning rise to power of the enigmatic Jacques Arthuys which derailed this development and paved a path for the UD to gain sufficient following across the French populace to eventually secure power and bring about the all-important January Restoration. Notably, Arthuys was not much of a public ideologue or a radical thinker, instead proving himself a peerless adapter and networkers, capable of taking the ideas set forth by far more radical minds and integrating them into the French political situation in such a way as to avoid public outrage (60).
The Integralist movement was to inspire many around the world, from South America where the ideological foundations developed in Iberia were grasped with open arms by various authoritarian and autocratic rulers as a way of justifying and strengthening their regimes, to Eastern Europe where numerous reactionary figures and groups found it a foundation from which to develop their ideology in an Integralist direction. Here the partnership with religious counterparts, in this case often Orthodox Churches, and resultant societal control which these partnerships unlocked proved amongst the most attractive features of the movement while the rallying power of integralist principles in opposition to German power and influence proved an equally significant draw. Particularly Romania would be deeply influenced by Integralist thought, becoming the leading opposition ideology to the German-aligned governments which dominated political power throughout the 1920s and 30s. Even further afield would Integralism prove an inspiration, most significantly for Japanese Emperor Genka who sought to wield Integralist principles as a path towards securing popular support for the establishment of a far more autocratic state capable of guiding Japan to prominence in place of the "weak and decadent" liberalism which had come to hold sway over Japan under Prime Minister-Admiral Yamamoto Gonbee. While this effort eventually failed electorally it paved the way for the bloody and vicious coup attempt which set in motion the Japanese Civil War in a gambit to achieve by might what had failed to be accomplished at the ballot boxes. Ultimately many of the integralist trappings of the subsequent Chosun regime would fall by the wayside, at least for the time being, with the government far more similar to a monarchical military dictatorship - only gradually and piecemeal restoring the political freedoms enjoyed by the Japanese people under Emperor Taisho which made integralism a viable political ideological model. Nevertheless, it was here that a more properly Japanese current of integralism was to be formed, worked atop the ashes of the old Kokumin Domei - adopting State Shintoist elements alongside a strong central government, although the state bureaucracy only gradually began to reassert control over the entirety of the Korean Peninsula and saw itself forced to rely heavily upon Korean underlings for most of its lower ranks, and extending the state's influence into the private lives of its citizenry. While not directly inspired or based upon integralist theories, many scholars would consider the state structures established by the Fengtian Dynasty to hold many similarities to the Integralist movement: from its control and direction of private enterprise, involvement in the conduct of the citizenry's public and private lives, emphasis on religious and traditional authority to its strong central government based around a ruling Emperor. However, the Fengtian Dynasty would repeatedly refute such claims, condemning Integralism as a foreign ideology with no place in Chinese society and stressing the innately Chinese nature of their regime, pointing to the ancient institutions, philosophies and ideologies on which they had based their rule. Nevertheless, the Fengtian Dynasty would often find itself lumped in with the integralists in European papers and studies of integralism, and this was the perspective through which the ideological foundations of the Fengtian dynasty were to be studied for years to come (60).
The Colonial Problem
While colonialism had reached its peak in the immediate pre-Great War era, colonialist movements and efforts would continue to play out around the globe even as opposition to colonial practices rose to prominence and the imperialist edifice of European Colonialism began to fracture. There were four major settler colonization programmes during this period worth addressing - the Jewish settlements in Palestine fueled by the rise of Zionist ideology, the Japanese settlement of Chosun and Taiwan, the German settlements in German East Africa and Kamerun as well as the Latin Pact settlements in North Africa. The simplest of these developments was the Latin Pact settlement of North Africa and the German-African colonies, with the patterns largely following more traditional settler colonization models as German settlers largely secured command of major economic resources such as plantations, mines and transportation infrastructure. German settlement practices were an outgrowth of the Lebensraum thought complex which sought to address the growing German population by providing productive outlets in both Eastern Europe, where numerous German expatriate communities soon developed, and in Africa. Particularly in East Africa would the settlers find access to a large subordinate populace in the form of refugees from the Kenyan Famine, who fled across the border and soon found themselves drawn into work on German farms, mines and plantations on a grand scale as day laborers - the economic development of the colony growing explosively as ever more money and settlers arrived in the colonies in hopes of striking it rich. In North Africa, the painful lessons learned by the French in Algeria, where they had dispossessed and left destitute nearly sixty percent of the native peasant population, would see both the French and Spanish colonizers in Morocco adopt far more industrial methods of production, pushing Moroccan farmers into the booming coastal cities which soon saw explosive industrial development harness the rising urban population growth, with particularly food in the form of canneries, sugar refining, brewing and flourmills proliferating as the industrial agricultural development of the colony was harnessed for export - with ownership largely composed of truly massive state-owned corporations. In Chosun and Taiwan, Japanese settlements grew precipitously throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, before the outbreak of the Japanese Civil War fundamentally overturned the situation and resulted in a massive wave of refugee migration to Chosun. In the aftermath of the Civil War, Taiwan soon grew into a favored location for resettlement amongst the population of the Shogunate, with major population transfers occurring as early as during the Red Terror when many of those fearful of persecution sought safety in colonial obscurity where they soon found themselves part of a complex cultural melting pot resulting from the abolition of racial distinctions in the koseki household registers which brought an end to the ethnic divisions emphasized by past Japanese colonial rule. In Chosun itself, the wave of Japanese refugees would displace many Korean natives and stoked intense communitarian hatreds which would persist for years to come - the trauma becoming a steady feature in all Korean independence movements. The Japanese colonization of Chosun would be accompanied by an explicit effort at cultural subjugation and assimilation into the Japanese population, although the relationship between Korean and Japanese would remain deeply inequal regardless of any Korean efforts at assimilation (61).
Zionism emerged in the late 19th century in response to rising antisemitism in Europe and Russia with the aim of creating a Jewish nation state beyond the reaches of their European oppressors. Around the turn of the century the focus eventually turned towards the settlement of Jews in the Ottoman Levant, with Palestine a particular focus of investment - funded predominantly by Jewish bankers of varying origin during the initial decades of settlement before gaining overt British backing during the Great War and a promise of Jewish self-determination in Palestine under the auspices of the Balfour Declaration. Following the Great War, Palestine would find itself engulfed in a series of conflicts and crises as the Jewish settlers clashed with the native Arab population, the Arabs increasingly backed by the Hashemite Monarchy while the British continued to support Jewish settlement. Ultimately, this would culminate in the formation of the independent Kingdom of Palestine under the rule of King Faisal I al-Hashemi with an explicit power-sharing agreement between the Jewish and Arab populations. Nevertheless, Jewish settlements would continue to expand gradually and confrontations with the Arab population was near constant as harassment on both sides escalated and regularly spilled over into violence. While Faisal would try to keep a lid on things, neither side particularly trusted the monarch, the Zionists viewing him as an Arab stooge and the Arabs as a foreign occupier, and both thus continued to act independently - the Palestine parliament more a verbal battleground than an effective legislature, with both Arabs and Jews establishing ruling bodies which performed de facto executive, judicial and legislative duties. The weak royal military and gendarmerie would find itself largely made obsolete by Jewish and Arab militia forces who performed both policing and protection duties for their respective communities and regularly came into confrontation with each other - the state ever on the verge of civil war. While the Arabs would rely primarily on a council of religious authorities and tribal clans headed by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, the Jewish population would prove surprisingly divided, spanning the entire political spectrum and only really kept from tearing at each other by fear of the resultant divisions allowing their Arab neighbors to displace them. During the 1930s the Syrian-Arab Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam would begin explicitly advocating the violent expulsion of the Jewish settlers in Palestine, rallying support publicly and seeking to pressure the Hashemite monarchy into action against the Jews with gradual success, particularly during the latter half of the 1930s as the Jewish population girded itself for war and British attentions waned. It is important to note here the gradual decline in Jewish migration which Palestine received in the post-Great War years, as the rapid improvement of Jewish opportunities and social status in not just Germany but across the Zollverein and in the Soviet Republic made the push-factors for Zionist migration increasingly unattractive, even as the violence and seeming futility of the Zionist cause in Palestine itself reduced the pull-factors drawing Jewish migrants to the region (61).
The modern native anti-colonial movements within many European colonies would draw their origins to the early twentieth century, emerging first as intellectual movements seeking to reclaim their own culture, history and traditions, before gradually pressing for greater autonomy and eventually seeking independence. The Great War had played a key role in invigorating anticolonial movements around the globe as the colonial populations were asked to sacrifice ever more for their colonial lords in return for very little, only to be thrown into chaos and calamity of both human and economic nature as colonial economies around the world shook during the immediate post-war period and the Great Flu reaped horrific carnage across colony after colony. India was to prove amongst the earliest and most well organized of the independence and anti-colonial movements, wielding political and moral power as well as the backing of the massed might of their populace to pressure their colonial lords into granting political and economic concessions. In some cases this was done without violence, but these efforts would repeatedly see violent flareups to the frustration of their leaders. Indian thinkers were to formulate a vast and complicated literature of anticolonialism and Indian pride, spanning the political spectrum from far-left to far-right, all united in the sole goal of bringing an end to their colonial subjugation. A bit further eastward, these same beliefs were to end in violent revolution and an extended war of liberation amongst the Indochinese people which fundamentally reshaped what was seen as possible for colonial populations. Prior to the Indochinese Revolt, it had come to be seen as near-gospel that no colonial nation could go toe-to-toe with its oppressor - a presupposed fact which had been repeatedly hammered into the heads of particularly the Indian independence movement following the Indian Rebellion of 1857. However, with the Indochinese Revolt's relative success and longevity, the proof had now come that colonial populations could combat their oppressors with hope of victory, and rebellion gradually came to be seen not so much as an expression of horrified frustration, but rather as a real opportunity for independence. During this same period, the Asian independence movements were to find themselves further influenced by the spread of various strains of Communism which many found appealed greatly to the lower classes of many colonial nations, as a successful future economic model and a justification for revolutionary action against their oppressors - both foreign and domestic (62).
Africa was to prove slower in embracing anticolonial and independence movements than their Asian counterparts, the many ethnic and religious differences which cut across individual colonies contributing to significant organizational difficulties amongst the often small and educated elite who commonly lead the African independence movements such as they existed. The British African Famines were to prove a key turning point in the development of African anti-colonial sentiments as it splintered traditional societal bonds in Kenya, united ethnic groups in South Africa and highlighted the dangers of dependence upon colonial good will in West Africa - with particularly the Kenyan population experiencing an intense degree of anti-British sentiment which served as a uniting force amongst the shattered remnants of Kenyan society as they sought to rebuild their communities following the British suppression of the region's unrest. In South Africa, racial tensions served as a uniting force amongst the African population, particularly the Xhosa and Zulu peoples who felt themselves threatened beyond measure by the recent activities of the Afrikaners and the South African government. One of the most surprising sources of African nationalism and colonial critique would actually come from the schools run by the League of Nations in many African colonies, with the education and opportunities provided through the League allowing for the emergence of African intellectuals versed in European ideas of nationalism, socialism and liberalism - all of which they soon began to propagate amongst their varied peoples. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1930s this process was still in its early stages, and the African independence movements remained relatively small organizations who drew their leadership and membership from a small number of European-educated elites. These movements sought to imagine a world in which African liberty from the white man could be assured with opportunity and plenty for all of Africa's peoples, although at the same time it is worth noting the often stark divides amongst these movements on topics ranging from the future relationships between African nations and their colonizers, and the specific societal models that they felt should be adopted in place of the colonial regimes - many proposing and supporting distinctly western models of society, while others sought to determine what a truly "African" state should look like (62).
Whereas many African and Asian nations were forced to contend with active colonial lords interfering and controlling their states, in Latin America it was a more subtle form of foreign influence with which they had to contend. Through the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the United States had gradually extended its influence over much of the rest of the Americas both economically and politically, even turning to more outright colonial conquests of the former Spanish colonial empire and military interventions in independent Latin American nations around the Caribbean. However, following the Great War and particularly the rise of Isolationism under President McAdoo in the latter half of the 1920s, this trend began to turn rapidly as American economic and political control over its sphere of influence began to crumble. In Mexico anti-American political factions rose to the fore, nationalizing foreign-owned, primarily American, resource extraction industries before a far more intensely anti-American political movement emerged in Central America in the form of the Sandinistas - marrying agrarian and socialist policies with a religious revolutionary ethos in what amounted to a crusade against American economic and political interests and their native representatives. Further south, Integralist tendencies spread like wildfire and the Latin Pact soon began to infringe upon the interests of American Big Business. While business interests in the United States tried with all their power to return a more pro-business political movement to power in Washington, which was partially accomplished with the Curtis Presidency, the political partnership between Republican and Progressive parties was to undermine these lobbying efforts on the part of Big Business interests. These forces all represented a break and "revolt" against the pervasive influence of American business interests in the politics, economics and society of large parts of Latin America - with the reassertion of national sovereignty by these nations being greeted with great acclaim in many of the nations which had been so dependent upon the Americans previously. While American business interests would shift its focus further southward, the political establishments in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile all proved themselves a great deal more resilient to these endeavors than their northern counterparts had been - partly due to the greater political legitimacy and economic prosperity enjoyed by these countries, but also due to the pre-existing influence of European nations such as Great Britain, Germany and France. Ultimately, the 1930s would be remembered as a period in which many Latin American nations sought to assert their economic and political independence, striving to reclaim a voice in their domestic and foreign affairs and fend off the predatory economic grasp of European and North American corporations and nation states (62).
Footnotes:
(55) This section works to outline two major developments which have taken place over the course of the timeline - the first being the gradual synthesis of conservative and liberal ideological structures to form a baseline upon which other ideologies build, and the second being the struggles of both traditional ideologies to adjust to the rise of mass politics and greater involvement of the entire society in political decision-making, particularly electorally. Perhaps the most weird development is probably the rise of monarchism in a multitude of guises, and the monarchical structures' gradual decoupling from conservatism. Regarding the specific thinkers mentioned here, Karl Popper remains in Germany ITTL without the Nazis to chase him away, and as such is not traumatized by his dislocation - his thoughts focusing far more on direct liberal ideological development alongside his wider philosophical endeavors. Rathenau, having survived without his OTL assassination, is able to continue developing his Mechanistic ideas under a liberal model - it is honestly a bit fascinating how he felt that technological progress and data treatment rings so prescient of the OTL Information Revolution, although he seems more in line with the early utopian thinkers of the information revolution than the more modern cynics. In general Rathenau had some interesting ideas generally - for example stressing the importance of "social wisdom", i.e. knowing what works and doesn't in society, as well as his belief that competition could give way to cooperation through "love" - in effect marrying artistic ideals with rational economics. He was this incredibly intelligent and talented scholar with a romantic and unmaterialistic outlook alongside his hardboiled identity as a politician and industrialist.
(56) I know that the social reform frame of reference is a bit unwieldy, but considering I am lumping American Progressivism, Chinese Social Reform, European Social Democracy and Anglo-Labour together into a single collection of ideological movements, I hope that this can be forgiven. Most of this is a restatement of prior developments, and I have refrained from going into detail with theoreticians, but it is important to note that whereas most of these ideological movements have been largely theoretical in nature prior to the Great War, they are now having to tackle holding actual administrative and governmental power with varying degrees of success. One thing that I hope people will find particularly interesting is the way in which debate erupts within the social democratic movements of Europe in the aftermath of their fall from grace. Notably this period has seen the French radicals and reformers split into two distinct factions - with only the reformers relevant here - and the Labour Party fracture into a bunch of feuding factions including radicals who wouldn't be as relevant to this section. The German SPD are really the most significant of the European parties though, and they remain firmly unified even after falling from power, with all three of these currents present and seeking to make an impact.
(57) The Communists in the Soviet Republic are very aware of the problems of democratic legitimacy at the top of their political structure, and are actually pretty determined to seek a way of resolving it. The theory of transitioning from the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to "socialist humanism" is actually an OTL Bukharin theory and he is one of the Communist writers who was pretty invested in securing democratic rule, however there was a pretty broad perception that the Russian populace was not yet ready for democracy in the 1930s amongst those who actually were interested in democratic reform (Stalin's goon squad weren't really all that interested), and that there would need to be a prolonged period of indoctrination, education and scientific uplifting of the Russian population before they would be ready. That belief is still very much a part of Bukharin's thinking, and is how he legitimizes the current undemocratic system - although in contrast to OTL this is the government position and is held quite widely with the communications, education, culture and politics governmental institutions actively seeking to prepare the populace for a say in the state's politics. We also see here that ideas from Italy, such as the Theory of Cultural Hegemony, are starting to make an impact and influence the ideological thinking of the Politburo with Ivan Smirnov and finally Yevgeni Preobrazhensky whose works end up becoming foundational for the hawkish figures in the Soviet state and military apparatus.
(58) Sorry about not getting into greater detail with the European communist movements - had considered addressing Iberia and Eastern Europe, but Communism really isn't a major political force in either regions at this point, so I refrained. What I hope people find interesting in this section is the way in which Communist movements across Europe are starting to distance themselves from the Soviets, and the rather significant role that the Trotskyites have actually had in turning people against the Soviets. I know I didn't dig into it a great deal previously, but the Trotskyites are immensely important in this regard, as their warnings end up being undergirded by the revelations of the Krivitsky Case. At the same time I am hopefully successful in conveying the way in which the Italian Communists end up having a rather surprising degree of influence on the rest of European Communism - not as threatening a force as the Soviets and yet more explorative and more adapted to a European context.
(59) One of the things I want people to note is the fact that the Jiaxing Communists and ICP are quite divided in their attitudes towards the Japanese Communist Movement - although it should be mentioned that the ICP is more influenced by the French Communist Movement than anything else early on, with the Soviets second and the Japanese a rather distant third - although the Japanese ideas are finding ever greater adherence amongst Indochinese Communists. For the final section we have a vast range of countries and movements covered with the most interesting probably being the Siquerians, who continue to be something of a bizarre oddity - although the mixture of millenarian religious movements with Communism is a pretty common occurrence, particularly in regions where there is room for heterodox ideological developments like is the case here. Siquerian Communism ends up becoming something of a go-to ideology for uprisings in central South America - honestly drawing some inspiration from Shining Path for the Siquerians if you are looking for an OTL counterpart to explore.
(60) Integralism is a complicated ideological complex with numerous different adaptations which span a spectrum of ideologies which IOTL are viewed as Fascistic or Quasi-Fascistic. However, I think it is very important to stress how different Integralism actually is from its OTL Fascist counterpart and the fact that the movement is actually quite old - stretching back into the second half of the Nineteenth Century, and potentially even before that as a more generally Conservative tendency. Integralism is nowhere near as radical or revolutionary as Fascism was and is, lacking the revolutionary ethos which Fascism and Nazism borrowed from Socialism, and is instead a very firmly reactionary and traditionalist movement instead - it is more conservative than nationalist in a lot of ways. This in turn is important because it allows for partnerships and cooperation amongst Integralist nations to a completely different degree than was possible amongst the Axis powers of OTL. There is a real trust and belief that everyone is working in the same direction amongst the Latin Pact nations, and it is this focus on traditionalism, unity and social conservatism which makes the movement so appealing even beyond the boundaries of Catholicism. I know it is a very brief mention, but I do want to stress the fact that there is a growing Orthodox Integralist movement amongst the countries of the Balkans - although national hatreds remain powerful and the influence of the Zollverein and its allies predominant. One thing I want to stress here is that while the Fengtian regime shares a lot of elements with the integralists, they do not view themselves as part of the movement - which is a very important factor in how they interact with integralists diplomatically and geopolitically. The Fengtian Dynasty holds its ideological position to be entire based upon Chinese traditions and thoughts, modified to take into account the modern context that they find themselves in, and find the comparisons to Integralism to be both demeaning and threatening due to the significant anti-western bias held by much of Chinese society by this point in time.
(61) So I thought it would be a good idea to show some of the various colonial efforts which continue even post-Great War and a bit about the ideological foundations behind them. Notably, the Integralist colonies are not really treated all that different from other North African colonial states even though state investments into them continue on pace. The Germans are really one of the big colonial settlers in this period, primarily because this is really the only major opportunity they have had for exercising that outlet. IOTL the whole Nazi obsession with Lebensraum originated with the loss of Germany's colonies, although the concept had already been introduced in the early 1900s, so ITTL there is that same sort of pressure for new lands to settle but with control of large African colonies those migrants end up turning towards this outlet or serving as expats in the various Zollverein nations predominantly - I should also mention that a good deal of Eastern Europeans also end up following the Germans into the colonies, using their Zollverein ties to gain settlement rights in either Kamerun or German East Africa. Notably, German migration to the United States falls off quite significantly in the Post-Great War period, particularly compared to OTL, with many more people remaining in Germany or seeking economic opportunities within the German sphere of influence. As for the Zionists, I have noted the general reduction in antisemitism across Europe before, and in the Soviet Republic the top ranks of the government end up packed with Russian Jews, so the factors which led to the Zionists being able to continually expand and recruit new members are significantly weakened ITTL. When this is coupled to a much less friendly government than the OTL Mandate of Palestine and the constant low-grade communitarian violence, the whole Zionist experiment ends up looking a whole lot less attractive. What the fate of the Palestinian Jews will be in the long run I am not sure just yet, but they are highly reliant upon British backers, and it isn't like the British Empire has nothing else going on at the moment.
(62) So I know that this is a very broad and general overview of the anticolonial movements, but as you should all know by now the moment I start digging into these movements it is like something of a pandora's box, unleashing a bunch of new characters and ideological variations which need to be accounted for. Particularly given the relatively broad political spectrum I have encompassed with many of my independence movements, it is hard to get very detailed about it without getting bogged down in socialist, nationalist, conservative and integralist factions. Instead I tried to point out the way in which anticolonial developments and movements are in various stages across the world, from the post-independence Latin American nations fending off neocolonial pressures, through the active and explosive Asian struggle for independence further enflamed by the spread of Communism and Nationalism to Africa where the struggle against colonial rule is only just beginning to find a cohesive starting point beyond the confines of religion or ethnicity.
End Note:
Finally, god damn finally, I really struggled to figure out quite how to approach this ideological section, and in the end I am not completely happy with the end result, but it should do its work relatively well. Cut it very close getting it out on schedule. I have cut out the summary box since I feel it has lost all meaning with the later structural changes, but at some point I will go back through and edit the TL throughout.
Going into this section I really wanted to drag in a bunch of different thinkers and schools of thought, explore the ideological tendencies within the various movements, but I ran into the problem of many of these thinkers being rather actively involved in the development of government policy. I know that there is a bit too much restatement of prior developments within the TL, but my hope is that the reframing and different perspective on these developments can give an added understanding to the general tendencies of the world of ADiJ.
Either way, I look forward to seeing what everyone thinks about it.
I do feel the need to state that I am going to be pausing the timeline at this point as I try to regroup and catch my breath. I have now been writing non-stop on the timeline since March of last year and I have been putting out an update every Sunday for nearly a year - I think I posted something like nearly half a million words in that period, and frankly I have gotten a bit burned out on the timeline at the moment. I need some time to recharge and to map out how the next period of the timeline should play out. We have now basically gotten to a place where I feel relatively comfortable leaving the timeline for now while I figure out how I want to proceed with it.
That said, I welcome anyone who has any interest in providing any sort of interlude, feature or other addition to the timeline (although do run it by me in a PM before posting so that I can make sure it fits into cannon and I can threadmark it in time) and I always keep an eye on the timeline, so as long as the discussion is ongoing I will be participating in it even during this hiatus. Beyond that I am always more than happy to engage in any discussion of alternate history in PM, both if people want feedback on TL ideas or to discuss something from the timeline. If you have any questions about the TL itself, do make sure to ask them and I will see if I can find an answer for you.
Beyond that, I am hopeful that I can get some contributors and maybe make a couple shorter interludes during the hiatus to keep people tided over for the time being. Anyway, I really do hope you have enjoyed the timeline up to this point, and I hope to get back to the timeline when I have things a bit more put together.
So just to make it easier to organize my thoughts, I'll link my general impressions to the footnotes up above:
55) I loved reading this section, I think the German Conservative Bloc has so far best represented my favourite ideal of conservatism, in many ways it's similar to One-Nation Toryism (though obviously more inclined towards teutonic autocracy)
56) *laughs mischievously at the misfortune of European social democrats*
57) This is surprisingly quite in line with Classical Marxism (or was it Orthodox Marxism?), in the sense that they're aware that Russia isn't ready for full Communism just yet, it hasn't reached that critical level of industrialization that America, Britain, France or Germany has. Now it's true thanks to Lenin they've gone and jumped the gun anyways, I mean they had the momentum and a golden opportunity, so why not? However they've decided to adapt, so instead of allowing a bourgeois capitalist republic to take shape, which is traditionally in Marxist thought what the next stage should have been, they've decided to gradually institute "some" bourgeois market and democratic policies themselves to get Russia up to the industrial standard to achieve full Communism. And hey, it's even better this way! They've gotten all that revolutionary blood-letting out of the way early and the market and social reforms will be guided by good Communists, really Marx should have thought of this himself, clearly our comrades in the Government Clique are proving more insightful than that old goat
*sound of round being racked into pistol chamber*58) Ooooh how interesting! You've reversed roles, IOTL it was the reformist Socialists/Communists in the European Left being infiltrated by orthodox hardliners from Moscow. ITTL it's the orthodox hardliners of the European Left being infiltrated by the reformists in Moscow
59) It's nice to see some things never change, even ITTL the Chinese of all stripes hate the Japanese
60) Integralism has become my second favourite ideology ITTL, again it has many ingredients that I like. If Canada ends up severed from the Empire/Commonwealth, then I would like to see an Integralist Canada emerge (a political alliance between RB Bennet and King Edward VIII? It. Just. Might. Work... though we would probably need a Communist takeover of Britain first, and I can see the nationalistic Aussies taking to Integralism... oh dear, did I just copy Kaiserreich? Oh well, a man can dream...)
61) So it looks like Germany and the Latin Pact will be the big winners when the Empire collapses in Africa, looks like Israel is getting butterflied too, bummer.
62) Yeah it's understandable, with TL's as expansive as this one, the butterflies tend to get frisky and breed quite prodigiously. It gets quite difficult to track them all I imagine.
Well actually the LPC did absorb the Progressives IOTL, when that party collapsed Henry Crerar, Robert Forke and the lion's share of party went over to the LPC, the CPC didn't really get anything except the name. What few Progressives did end up joining came about from the CPC absorbing the Socreds when they collapsed (funny enough actually, it was more like the Socreds and their successors that absorbed the CPC when Reform/Alliance merged with the PC's in 2003). Also the "radical progressives" were a faction in the Progressive Party that would not have remotely been interested in joining the LPC. The Ginger Group as they were called, which also included UFP and Labour MP's, held the traditional structure of political parties in contempt (they considered it too autocratic and elitist in tendency). It was Crerar's attempts to bring party structure to the Progressives, in addition to what was seen as abandonment of traditional Progressive policies, that led to the party splitting apart.
Canadian Social Credit is actually a right-wing movement, thanks in large part to the fact that the Canadian Socred movement was founded by Albertans (those crazy, crazy Albertans), particularly William Abehart who was a Baptist preacher. He basically took the original Social Credit monetarist theory and threw in Evangelical Christian ideals, making Social Credit a strongly socially conservative ideology in Canada. I can't see the Progressives or Mackenzie Moderates even wanting Socred to touch the LPC.
Now granted this is IOTL and without the Great Depression there would be definite changes, but even without the GD it's hard to see how the radical wing of the Progressives end up with the LPC. It's hard to see as well how Socred mixes in there too...
Granted, but still not sure how that would diminish their reputation. IIRC and I could be wrong, the CEF was destroyed fighting a desperate rearguard as the entire BEF was being pushed back and routed under the intense pressure of the German offensive, the Canadian Corps was not the only Corps-level formation practically wiped out. If anything wouldn't the British (and especially the Canadians) try to lionize and romanticize the loss? The brave Canadians fighting their last stand to cover the retreat of their Tommy cousins, granted it wasn't like they fought to the last man and many were captured as POW's, but then again they just lost their most elite formation in the most intense German offensive of the war, which sounds better for propaganda purposes? Yeah it's going to hurt, but I'd imagine the British estimation and admiration of the Canadians' fighting qualities would have diminished very little, after all none of the BEF came out looking good after GEORG and Whitehall would properly even know back then that the Canadians (and Aussies! I imagine the AIF suffered severely too) would need to be sold something to help ease the loss somewhat.
So just to make it easier to organize my thoughts, I'll link my general impressions to the footnotes up above:
55) I loved reading this section, I think the German Conservative Bloc has so far best represented my favourite ideal of conservatism, in many ways it's similar to One-Nation Toryism (though obviously more inclined towards teutonic autocracy)
56) *laughs mischievously at the misfortune of European social democrats*
57) This is surprisingly quite in line with Classical Marxism (or was it Orthodox Marxism?), in the sense that they're aware that Russia isn't ready for full Communism just yet, it hasn't reached that critical level of industrialization that America, Britain, France or Germany has. Now it's true thanks to Lenin they've gone and jumped the gun anyways, I mean they had the momentum and a golden opportunity, so why not? However they've decided to adapt, so instead of allowing a bourgeois capitalist republic to take shape, which is traditionally in Marxist thought what the next stage should have been, they've decided to gradually institute "some" bourgeois market and democratic policies themselves to get Russia up to the industrial standard to achieve full Communism. And hey, it's even better this way! They've gotten all that revolutionary blood-letting out of the way early and the market and social reforms will be guided by good Communists, really Marx should have thought of this himself, clearly our comrades in the Government Clique are proving more insightful than that old goat
58) Ooooh how interesting! You've reversed roles, IOTL it was the reformist Socialists/Communists in the European Left being infiltrated by orthodox hardliners from Moscow. ITTL it's the orthodox hardliners of the European Left being infiltrated by the reformists in Moscow
59) It's nice to see some things never change, even ITTL the Chinese of all stripes hate the Japanese
60) Integralism has become my second favourite ideology ITTL, again it has many ingredients that I like. If Canada ends up severed from the Empire/Commonwealth, then I would like to see an Integralist Canada emerge (a political alliance between RB Bennet and King Edward VIII? It. Just. Might. Work... though we would probably need a Communist takeover of Britain first, and I can see the nationalistic Aussies taking to Integralism... oh dear, did I just copy Kaiserreich? Oh well, a man can dream...)
61) So it looks like Germany and the Latin Pact will be the big winners when the Empire collapses in Africa, looks like Israel is getting butterflied too, bummer.
62) Yeah it's understandable, with TL's as expansive as this one, the butterflies tend to get frisky and breed quite prodigiously. It gets quite difficult to track them all I imagine.
Well actually the LPC did absorb the Progressives IOTL, when that party collapsed Henry Crerar, Robert Forke and the lion's share of party went over to the LPC, the CPC didn't really get anything except the name. What few Progressives did end up joining came about from the CPC absorbing the Socreds when they collapsed (funny enough actually, it was more like the Socreds and their successors that absorbed the CPC when Reform/Alliance merged with the PC's in 2003). Also the "radical progressives" were a faction in the Progressive Party that would not have remotely been interested in joining the LPC. The Ginger Group as they were called, which also included UFP and Labour MP's, held the traditional structure of political parties in contempt (they considered it too autocratic and elitist in tendency). It was Crerar's attempts to bring party structure to the Progressives, in addition to what was seen as abandonment of traditional Progressive policies, that led to the party splitting apart.
Canadian Social Credit is actually a right-wing movement, thanks in large part to the fact that the Canadian Socred movement was founded by Albertans (those crazy, crazy Albertans), particularly William Abehart who was a Baptist preacher. He basically took the original Social Credit monetarist theory and threw in Evangelical Christian ideals, making Social Credit a strongly socially conservative ideology in Canada. I can't see the Progressives or Mackenzie Moderates even wanting Socred to touch the LPC.
Now granted this is IOTL and without the Great Depression there would be definite changes, but even without the GD it's hard to see how the radical wing of the Progressives end up with the LPC. It's hard to see as well how Socred mixes in there too...
Granted, but still not sure how that would diminish their reputation. IIRC and I could be wrong, the CEF was destroyed fighting a desperate rearguard as the entire BEF was being pushed back and routed under the intense pressure of the German offensive, the Canadian Corps was not the only Corps-level formation practically wiped out. If anything wouldn't the British (and especially the Canadians) try to lionize and romanticize the loss? The brave Canadians fighting their last stand to cover the retreat of their Tommy cousins, granted it wasn't like they fought to the last man and many were captured as POW's, but then again they just lost their most elite formation in the most intense German offensive of the war, which sounds better for propaganda purposes? Yeah it's going to hurt, but I'd imagine the British estimation and admiration of the Canadians' fighting qualities would have diminished very little, after all none of the BEF came out looking good after GEORG and Whitehall would properly even know back then that the Canadians (and Aussies! I imagine the AIF suffered severely too) would need to be sold something to help ease the loss somewhat.
I am happy to hear you enjoyed the ideological developments, and the fact that various people can see the appeal of most of the ideologies I have outlined is something I take immense pleasure in - provides a great indicator that they are plausible largescale TTL ideologies. Regarding the Transition Theory from the Soviets, you could frame it as you have here, but it would rile both Marxists and TTL Communists if you did so. That said, it was a pretty broadly held view that the Russian populace were "unready" for democratic responsibilities, which is in large part why I ended up using that as a framework for this particular Soviet theory - IOTL it was partly used to justify the Stalinist regime and various OTL autocratic Communist states, but ITTL it is seen as less of a pretext for autocracy and more as an actual central belief of the government. Whether that belief holds long-term, and when exactly the Russian people will be "ready" for Socialist Humanism is very much a question of interpretation.
As in so many other instances, I have been fucking around with where many of these new ideologies fall on the political spectrum, and SoCred is one of those ideologies which have ended up on the left, rather than on the right (this is related to the impact of the Fall of Rome, RCC and general religious discombobulation of the period, including in Protestant ranks) - bear in mind that ITTL National Socialism is a leftist ideology as well. I haven't dug into it in detail yet, but basically the plan is to have Socred monetarist policies, progressive social policies and liberal christian theology form the basis of the ideology, which then sweeps through the progressive wing of the Liberals. As for Progressive revolt, that is part of the early butterflies - think it is in update 21, where I worked that out.
The CEF do end up lionized and romanticized to an extent by the British, but it ends up seeming like a series of rather hollow effort in Canadian eyes. If the British government had enjoyed more time to take stock of the situation, they might have been able to address the situation and lessened the anger of the dominions, but they were preoccupied by the Irish catastrophe, India on the verge of revolt as well as countless other foreign and intense crises. Dominion dissatisfaction ended up getting relegated to the back burner, since it was less of a crisis than everything else going on at the time. Beyond that, the British did make a series of concessions to their dominions, such as the Imperial Council, Dominion Fleet and various other power-sharing initiatives, but those efforts were repeatedly undermined by events like the King-Byng Affair, Battle of East China Sea, treatment of Ireland, etc.
Oh I know that interpretation would rile feathers, I actually based it off the OTL Chinese Communist justification late/post-Mao for the PRC adopting market capitalism (so that's why they tolerate so many billionaires, it's all a temporary measure while they catch up of course).
Okay I am very much looking forward to seeing how you pull that off, SoCred moving to the left? What have you done to Alberta!?
I also quickly checked over Update 21, must have missed the brief overview of Canadian politics due to my eyes bleeding, however while I do see you mentioning a Liberal-Progressive government in 1921, I don't see how that was pulled off. One butterfly I noticed was the Progressives actually getting six seats less than OTL, where did those six seats go to instead? Update 21 also didn't address how the ex-Liberals convinced the Gingers into joining with the LPC, an issue that broke the party OTL. I imagine the slightly worse election results might have something to do with it? Or are these details going to be revealed later alongside the leftist SoCred abomination? Ahhhh, okay that ends up making more sense. Forgot the British were overwhelmed by your undying hat-- I mean by the multiple crisis that would keep them from more effectively soothing relations.
Oh I know that interpretation would rile feathers, I actually based it off the OTL Chinese Communist justification late/post-Mao for the PRC adopting market capitalism (so that's why they tolerate so many billionaires, it's all a temporary measure while they catch up of course).
Okay I am very much looking forward to seeing how you pull that off, SoCred moving to the left? What have you done to Alberta!?
Ahhhh, okay that ends up making more sense. Forgot the British were overwhelmed by your undying hat-- I mean by the multiple crisis that would keep them from more effectively soothing relations.
It is an interpretation rife in OTL Communist contexts from what I have seen - if the situation requires something which would otherwise be anathema ideologically then the response is "Oh, that is a temporary measure, it will be gone in a jiffy, don't get you panties in a twist". Fifty years later: "Oh that? Totally temporary. Whats that? When will the temporary measures end? How the hell would I know - it was my grandfather's grandfather who said it would be, I am just repeating what I was told."
Urrgghhhh. Is Handwavium an acceptable answer?
I mean, I can go back, read into it and figure out some sort of workaround to make it fit and if I remember it for the next time Canada comes up I will see if I can write it in, but at the moment the details of how I got those changes are escaping me. Its been three years since I posted it, so the details are rather foggy on how exactly I got to the numbers. I didn't consider the Gingers at the time, but it shouldn't be too difficult to figure out a workaround if I spend some time reading up on them and the party's internal politics. Honestly, with the Albertans I was mostly viewing them as being under similar pressures and developments as the Americans across the border - with a similar focus on agrarian, progressive policies. As for SoCred, it is more a matter of it being more liberal versions of protestantism rather than fundamentalist versions proliferating on the Canadian Plains - hell, IOTL William Aberhart only shifted towards a more fundamentalist religious outlook later in life.Hey, had they refrained from bombarding Copenhagen, none of this would be happening - they only have themselves to blame.
😂It is an interpretation rife in OTL Communist contexts from what I have seen - if the situation requires something which would otherwise be anathema ideologically then the response is "Oh, that is a temporary measure, it will be gone in a jiffy, don't get you panties in a twist". Fifty years later: "Oh that? Totally temporary. Whats that? When will the temporary measures end? How the hell would I know - it was my grandfather's grandfather who said it would be, I am just repeating what I was told."
Urrgghhhh. Is Handwavium an acceptable answer?
Hey, had they refrained from bombarding Copenhagen, none of this would be happening - they only have themselves to blame.
This is what you have wrought, you've forced me to actually work and do my own research. In time I will probably be a nightmare at pestering you 😛😂 Don't overly sweat it, I know you'll come up with something plausible eventually but for now you should enjoy your break from the TL. I look forward to seeing how you transmorgrify Canadian Prairie culture (though you are correct that Alberta/Saskatchewan are closely linked to American Midwest culture, including the early prevalence of left-wing Farmer parties). Hm, didn't know he only got that way later in life, so basically you're hinting at a RCC like shakeup for North American protestantism. Still it makes me wonder if SoCred would be more left or just more centrist...
I KNEW IT 😂
Heeresgruppe A
Banned
Just wanted to ask you a question, but after the end of the Great War, why did neither Max Hoffmann nor Erich Ludendorff end up getting ennobled as Lords/Herrs(i.e. allowed to add a 'von' after their surname) for the vital part that they played in the Great War? After all, even relatively insignificant figures at the time such as Thoma, Schobert, Leeb, Hauenschild ,Greim and Epp were made lifelong nobles(knights/Ritters) for the part that they played during the war.
Furthemore, given that von Seeckt, von Hindenburg and von Hutier were already hereditary nobles even before the war began, why was it not considered to elevate them up the ranks, e.g. make them, say, Reichsfreiherr, Graf, Furst etc. after it ended? After all, after the end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870/1871, von Moltke was made a hereditary 'Graf' and von Bismarck himself was even given the honour of receiving the 3 hereditary titles of Furst, Graf and Herzog. Is the case different this time?
Furthemore, given that von Seeckt, von Hindenburg and von Hutier were already hereditary nobles even before the war began, why was it not considered to elevate them up the ranks, e.g. make them, say, Reichsfreiherr, Graf, Furst etc. after it ended? After all, after the end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870/1871, von Moltke was made a hereditary 'Graf' and von Bismarck himself was even given the honour of receiving the 3 hereditary titles of Furst, Graf and Herzog. Is the case different this time?
They probably were rewarded with ennoblement and titles.
Honestly the whole mess of decorations, promotions and titles is something I refrained from getting into because it would be an absolute mess to keep track of on my end of things, and considering the ridiculous number of other factors I have had to keep track of simultaneously, this seemed like one of the points where refraining from digging into the topic wouldn’t perceptively change the course of events in the timeline. In general I didn’t really dig into the course of specific people’s lives unless they were a unique or significant part of the events I was trying to cover, so there are a lot of these sorts of things that I just haven’t addressed.