A bigger Russian presence in North America?

[alexmilman]

I've been enjoying the discussion with alexmilman about the plausibility of profitable trading schemes centered around Russian America. It strikes me that it's not necessary that the triangular fur trade actually prove to be successful, merely that there's enough belief in its prospects to trigger a more serious effort to establish posts in North America.

With most of the furs coming from Siberia and Kamchatka, schema remains too convoluted and expensive to pick up on a broader base. It requires ships, new port facilities, new settlements and the people willing to settle (not too many in OTL), solutions of the supply issues, etc. while the Siberian fur trade requires just buying the furs from the local hunters and transporting them by land, which by that time was a routine. Furs from Kamchatka did require some sailing but the ports already had been there, and the distances shorter. The main fur remained squirrel and both sable and fox had been abundant in the Siberia. Besides, with all its inconveniences, the Kyakhta trade provided a growing market of the non-fur goods, in other words, it was diversified and less dependent upon the specific fur market.

So the “foundation” was rather shaky from the very beginning and at no time the whole schema started requiring the state subsidies.

Speaking of money, purchase of two ships for the first expedition based on “Canton schema” cost £17,000, with an additional expense of £5,000 for repairs to sail and more money along the route spent on the additional repairs and the whole thing did not turn too profitable. To quote wiki:

“Generally, the deal did not bring the expected profit. According to Korobitsyn, they managed to sell furs in the amount of 191 621½ Spanish piastres, for which tea was obtained for 80,000, silk fabrics for 20,000, porcelain for 14,000 and pearls for 3,000 piastres. In case they received 74 631½ piastres, however, from them they paid commission to British, taxes, measurement tax, supplies for ministers, as well as expenses of two captains, two clerks and their servants on the shore. Krusenstern settled in the Austrian trading post (costing 800 piastres), and Lisyansky in the Armenian one (600 piastres).Shemelin claimed that for the cargo they received only 176 605 piastres. The situation was extremely unfavourable, and it was decided to bring the best fur of sea otters, foxes, arctic foxes and bears back to St. Petersburg. For the most valuable beaver skins, Chinese side gave no more than 20 piastres (100 rubles), although in Moscow they could be sold for 200-300 rubles.”

So it took a multi-year expedition to bring to Canton the goods worthy of less than 1,000,000 rubles with the high expenses before and during the expedition and a need to bring the most expensive furs to St.Petersburg where the prices were higher.

For comparison, volume of Kyakhta trade in 1800 was 8,380,000 rubles and 16,000,000 in 1824 with a peak of 30,000,000 in between. It would be bigger if Manifest of 1801 did not limit trade to the merchants of the 1st Guild (which meant that the “balance” was traded unofficially). State was getting 20% in the export taxes. And even in the early XIX importance of the non-fur exports was quite significant and kept growing while the American schema was exclusively about the furs market of which already had been shrinking. So from the state perspective the whole thing was a very small and rather cost.y potato and from the commercial point of view it was anything but a good investment: high initial investment, a much longer time for ROI, high risk, low profit.

You keep insisting on the physical possibility (which you tend to overestimate ignoring general conditions of the Russian navy, financial aspect and demographics) while completely ignoring the motivations and the “boring details”.

Getting more land on the American coast to which purpose? Just for the fun of it? In the early XIX increasing Russian population of Siberia was of a higher priority and easier to do and even the southern areas of the European Russia were underpopulated. So, as a motivation resettlement is not a serious argument. As a financial schema it proved to be an expensive flop and kept proving this from year to year.

So how exactly this idea can be considered attractive by the broader merchant class and worthy of the serious support by the government?

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

Could Russia, with a POD after 1600, get a bigger slice of western North America than it did IOTL - one that stretches from, say, Alaska to northern California?

Not sure.

What I mean to say is, sure they could have landed in more places, but are you talking about them then keeping these lands after 1870, when the USA has a working transcendental railroad, a population in the 10,000,000's and a burning desire to complete it's manifest destiny, and 10's to 100's of thousands of Civil war Veterans laying about?

Seems to me a clear choice, by this time, that either they sell their claims, or loose them in war. At least if they sell, they get something for it, whereas attempting to hold them will cost them a great deal, and they'll be out all the wealth as well as the lives and territory.

US westward expansion I cannot see being stopped by any European Empire once the TCRR is up, and really much sooner than that would still be obvious what was going to happen. In order to hold the west coast of North America against the USA, I would expect someone else would need to have 1,000,000's of population, industry, infrastructure, and military fortifications w/troops to hold them, and they would have to be well on their way to this by the mid 1840's. Anything less than that just gets taken/purchased.

So yes, the Russian Empire can grab more territory in NA, but no, they won't be keeping it.

I realize the difficulties with this WI are considerable, given the country's vast territory and the fact Siberia is already much closer to home. Could a Treaty of Nerchinsk that is more favorable to the Russians, one that, for example, establishes the Amur river rather than the Stanovoy Range as the border between them and the Qing, help?

Not too sure on this one, as I don't know how this helps the Russians reach the Pacific easier, with more, and accelerates their infrastructure development.

Looking at this from a transport infrastructure perspective, would RR be the deciding factors?

The USA historically reaches and annexes Texas is 1845, Oregon territory in 1846, most of the rest of the southwest in 1848, and the Transcontinental RR is opened in May, 1869. In contrast, the Trans-Siberian RR is started in 1891, and opens in June, 1904, which is just about in time for the Russo-Japanese war. If Russia had a TSRR open in 1804, then I could buy them being in a position to at least try a bigger RAC landgrab. Anyone got another idea for when they would need to have had a RR to the far east coast?

 

[TrickyApe]

With most of the furs coming from Siberia and Kamchatka, schema remains too convoluted and expensive to pick up on a broader base. It requires ships, new port facilities, new settlements and the people willing to settle (not too many in OTL), solutions of the supply issues, etc. while the Siberian fur trade requires just buying the furs from the local hunters and transporting them by land, which by that time was a routine. Furs from Kamchatka did require some sailing but the ports already had been there, and the distances shorter. The main fur remained squirrel and both sable and fox had been abundant in the Siberia. Besides, with all its inconveniences, the Kyakhta trade provided a growing market of the non-fur goods, in other words, it was diversified and less dependent upon the specific fur market.

I don't think the Canton trade would be particularly in competition with the Kyakhta trade. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe a substantial amount of the Kyakhta furs still came from parts of Siberia other than the Pacific coast. These furs, combined with the steadily-growing trade in other goods, would keep Kyakhta going. Keep in mind though that by the 1850's Kyakhta caravans had become so uneconomic that the Russian government had to give them substantial tax advantages over tea shipped in European merchant vessels.

So the “foundation” was rather shaky from the very beginning and at no time the whole schema started requiring the state subsidies.

Possibly, but my point is that even an ultimately marginal or unsuccessful enterprise can still find backing. The Canton triangle trade idea came from contemporary RAC personnel - it's not something I came up with myself. One can imagine a POD where the RAC sells this idea to a Tsar or someone else important.

There was enough dynamism to establish Sitka and the trade in Alaska at the beginning of the period we're discussing, and enough dynamism left even by the 1840's to move the Siberian base from Okhotsk to Ayan, so establishing a few more posts in spots like Vancouver Island and points south doesn't seem like so much of a stretch.

You keep insisting on the physical possibility (which you tend to overestimate ignoring general conditions of the Russian navy, financial aspect and demographics) while completely ignoring the motivations and the “boring details”.

Just from a quick look at Wiki, for lack of handy better sources, I count 37 ships of the line launched for the Baltic Fleet between 1800 and 1815. I'm well aware that not all of these were in commission, or even good condition, at any given time but I still find your assertion that the Russian Navy couldn't find a few frigates and corvettes for remote duty puzzling.

 

[alexmilman]

Possibly, but my point is that even an ultimately marginal or unsuccessful enterprise can still find backing.

RAC was getting state backing for the decades and it did not develop into something greater over more than half of a century. Even attempt to buy serfs and settle them in CA failed. Out of couple hundreds settlers in Fort Ross much less than a half were the Russian employees of RAC. Similarly, the Russian population of Alaska was minuscule and had not been growing.

Then, again, you are avoiding answering to the question “why?”. What would be economic or political reason for that e exercise?

The Canton triangle trade idea came from contemporary RAC personnel - it's not something I came up with myself.

Yes, Krusenstern got quite enthusiastic about this idea based upon his experience in the RN. But Russia was not Britain and his implementation of the schema was, scientific and prestigious aspects aside, a flop. The same can be said about the diplomatic aspect of the schema: could not be implemented without risking the status quo, which the Russian government was trying to preserve.

One can imagine a POD where the RAC sells this idea to a Tsar or someone else important.

See above. The idea was “sold”, Russian Minister of Commerce, Count N.P.Rumyantsev, got enthusiastic and ever imagined an ambitious three-prong schema of the Russian expansion into the Far East which got the imperial approval. In case you missed it, both Krusenstern and
Lysiansky continued to be the officers of the Russian Navy and both their ships and later “Juno” and “Abos” had been permitted to sail under the Russian naval flag, not as the commercial ships, which required the imperial approval.

Just from a quick look at Wiki, for lack of handy better sources, I count 37 ships of the line launched for the Baltic Fleet between 1800 and 1815. I'm well aware that not all of these were in commission, or even good condition, at any given time but I still find your assertion that the Russian Navy couldn't find a few frigates and corvettes for remote duty puzzling.

Most of the ships of the Baltic fleet never left the Gulf of Finland or at least the coastal waters of the Baltic provinces. Number of the officers serving in the RN on a practice program was, AFAIK, in the single digits. It seems that you are under impression that it is enough to build a ship and it will sail to wherever is necessary regardless its quality and experience of its crew. How about making a closer look and to find out where the OTL ships operating on the Far East came from?

Then goes the “frigates and corvettes” part. What exactly the frigates would be doing on the Far East? Chasing the poachers? Rather inefficient task. Carrying the cargo? The small OTL ships had been quite adequate for the task and, judging by USS “Constitution”, the early-XIX frigate did not have too much space for the cargo being overcrowded with the guns and military supplies. Then goes the obvious question about the service: who and how would be supporting a prolonged service of the bigger ships in Okhotsk? There would be a need for a bigger wharf, much more supplies of everything, more skilled workers, more naval cadres, etc.. An idea that RAC would be able to “accommodate” the bigger ships on the American side is not even funny.

 

[TrickyApe]

Then, again, you are avoiding answering to the question “why?”. What would be economic or political reason for that e exercise?

I'm not sure why my message isn't getting across here. The reason to expand beyond Alaska is the same reason to do business in Alaska in the first place - to make profit trading furs with China, and ideally making further profit trading Chinese goods bought with the proceeds of the fur. We know the furs and the market were both there; British and American traders made considerable fortunes doing precisely this, and without any bases or infrastructure in the region. The British (as well as, abortively, the Americans at Astoria) made further profits by establishing infrastructure in the Columbia River area and collecting furs inland. The business was there for the taking.

The RAC did a mediocre job of capturing this trade. That doesn't mean they were doomed to inevitably do a mediocre job, or that backers would automatically assume they would always do a mediocre job.

There's nothing magic about the 54 40 line, where business for Russia made sense to the North but not to the South.

Most of the ships of the Baltic fleet never left the Gulf of Finland or at least the coastal waters of the Baltic provinces. Number of the officers serving in the RN on a practice program was, AFAIK, in the single digits. It seems that you are under impression that it is enough to build a ship and it will sail to wherever is necessary regardless its quality and experience of its crew. How about making a closer look and to find out where the OTL ships operating on the Far East came from?

Nonetheless, when Russian seafarers began navigating the Pacific in the early 19th century, they actually performed quite well. Glynn Barratt for one has written a number of works in English on the topic, including a four volume study of Russia and the South Pacific. The expeditions cycled through regularly, with competent seamanship and navigation, and played a not inconsiderable role in adding to Europe's knowledge of the Pacific.

Then goes the “frigates and corvettes” part. What exactly the frigates would be doing on the Far East? Chasing the poachers? Rather inefficient task. Carrying the cargo? The small OTL ships had been quite adequate for the task and, judging by USS “Constitution”, the early-XIX frigate did not have too much space for the cargo being overcrowded with the guns and military supplies. Then goes the obvious question about the service: who and how would be supporting a prolonged service of the bigger ships in Okhotsk? There would be a need for a bigger wharf, much more supplies of everything, more skilled workers, more naval cadres, etc.. An idea that RAC would be able to “accommodate” the bigger ships on the American side is not even funny.

Agreed, the smaller the vessels the better for policing functions, as well as to further reduce the cost and drain on naval forces at home. You seriously think a navy that can build more than 2 battleships a year on average can't support a couple corvettes, sloops, or even frigates on a distant station?

A naval presence to maintain monopoly over the trade along whatever segment of the coast was claimed by Russia was essential. OTL this wasn't done properly even for the territories eventually recognized as Alaska, with the result of considerable loss of trade for the RAC. Larger vessels might be useful to overawe the Native Americans, while rotating in and out, but naval warfare isn't my forte so I won't try to define the proper mix of ships.

 

[alexmilman]

I'm not sure why my message isn't getting across here.

Because you keep ignoring the facts and realities of life and keep bringing the examples that do not apply.

The reason to expand beyond Alaska is the same reason to do business in Alaska in the first place - to make profit trading furs with China, and ideally making further profit trading Chinese goods bought with the proceeds of the fur.

For the Russian this specific business proved to be not profitable by the early XIX and RAC was getting the state subsidies. OTOH, the land trade through Kyakhta was profitable. So there was no reason for either state or for private capital to get committed to the u profitable model.

We know the furs and the market were both there; British and American traders made considerable fortunes doing precisely this, and without any bases or infrastructure in the region. The British (as well as, abortively, the Americans at Astoria) made further profits by establishing infrastructure in the Columbia River area and collecting furs inland. The business was there for the taking.

I already explained it at least once. The British and American models do not apply because the reality was that the Chinese government did not want to allow extension of the Russian trade to Canton and for the Russian government the most important thing in that framework was not to spoil relations with China. Which meant that after China said “no”, the issue of the Canton trade was closed.

The RAC did a mediocre job of capturing this trade.

See above. The whole thing was not an issue after China refused.

That doesn't mean they were doomed to inevitably do a mediocre job, or that backers would automatically assume they would always do a mediocre job.

Behavior of the “backers” (Russian government) was clear: the whole thing was a subject to the Chinese agreement and nobody was going to endanger relations over this issue.

There's nothing magic about the 54 40 line, where business for Russia made sense to the North but not to the South.

RAC business was not making too much sense to the North or to the South of the magic line and the fact that Alexander signed some decree in 1821 meant very little. Of course, there has to be some defined border so it was declared with no meaningful consequences. Alexander’s main interest were the European affairs, the Holy Alliance and the crazy domestic projects like the military settlements and insane drill of the army. Plus “mysticism”.