The USN had excellent AAA for the period - Bofors, plus 5" DP, plus radars and analog computers is lethal. But the Standards aren't up to that level until after they are rebuilt. On 12/7/1941, the most valuable part of them are their crews. Now, the can probably beat the level bombers in open waters - but can they beat the torpedo bombers, if those bombers have an escort? If they can't - and it's likely that several of them don't - that's several thousand men right there. A potential surface fight at that stage of the war doesn't bear thinking about. Think Savo Island - with even less experience with the radar if contact occurs at night.
WI Pearl Harbor put on high alert?
- Thread starter Delvestius
- Start date
The USN had excellent AAA for the period - Bofors, plus 5" DP, plus radars and analog computers is lethal. But the Standards aren't up to that level until after they are rebuilt. On 12/7/1941, the most valuable part of them are their crews. Now, the can probably beat the level bombers in open waters - but can they beat the torpedo bombers, if those bombers have an escort? If they can't - and it's likely that several of them don't - that's several thousand men right there. A potential surface fight at that stage of the war doesn't bear thinking about. Think Savo Island - with even less experience with the radar if contact occurs at night.
usertron2020
Donor
I agree with you, but OTOH the Nagumo Force after leaving their tankers behind had an escort that was all of 2 converted battlecruisers, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and a half dozen destroyers. That's not much to throw against the entire Battleline, its cruisers and escorts, plus presumably later on 12/7 the Enterprise's cruisers and escorts. Yikes! So unless the USN AT SEA on the surface is left caught totally with their pants down... Oh, and Subpac's subs with their mighty vaunted spitballs.
The alert question is one of the more interesting ones presented regarding the attack. There are a number of threads here where it is discussed in considerable detail, but things generally devolve into the nature of the warning and the amount of notice.
A direct "the enemy is going to launch a main force strike" warning, which is sometimes posited was so unlikely as to require divine intervention. It would require the Kido Butai to be discovered at least a full day out to make any difference at all, any discovery prior to December 5th that was detected by the Japanese would have resulted in an automatic cancellation, per Nagumo's written orders. Discovery ON December 5th might have resulted in an abort, the decision was left to the discretion of the Attack Force commander. Only in the case of discovery on December 6th or 7th was the attack to proceed even if surprise was lost.
Had the IJN scouts that overflew the harbor ahead of the strike on the morning of the 7th found the harbor empty the written orders for Nagumo were specific. A 30 mile search centered on Oahu was to be conducted. If the fleet was not located the Kido Butai was to withdraw at high speed.
Nowhere in the ANY of the IJN plans or orders will you find specific mention of actions against fuel facilities or machine shops, in fact the actual orders do not even mention the existence of those facilities. The only ground targets mention were the various air fields and their hanger facilities. Even though the fuel farms have become the subject of much speculation in modern discussion on the attack, the Japanese simply didn't see them as being of any value. Japan wasn't expecting to have to fight the U.S. for two years, not even one year. They planned for a flash knockdown, acquiring the territory necessary to set up a defensive perimeter, and have a negotiated settlement.
Interestingly, the surviving IJN planning personnel stressed repeatedly to USSBS (Pacific) interrogators that the goal of the attack was to temporarily disable the Pacific Fleet (the Japanese believed that the USN had four or five carriers operating in Hawaiian waters, these were the primary targets, and were to be the SOLE target of the second wave, with other shipping only being subject to attack if insufficient carrier targets were available). It was only later, into the 1950s, that the "3rd Wave" suddenly because a missed opportunity as IJN survivors, especially Mitsuo Fushida, looked to burnish reputations that were somewhat shopworn.
The reaction of the U.S. forces at Pearl would also, assuming no sudden flash of insight telling Kimmel and Short exactly where the IJN forces were located, have more or less assured that no engagement occurred. Kimmel "knew" that any possible Japanese attack would originate from the Mandates. His fleet would have sailed away from the IJN attack force's actual location to the west/Southwest at best possible speed, assuming he chose to leave the harbor at all. The fleet was believed to safe in harbor, Pearl's defenses were quite substantial, but Kimmel was also known to be a very aggressive commander, it is hard to say if he would have waited or sortied even without his carriers (which had most of his cruisers with them).
An ideal scenario from the U.S. perspective would be a change to the war warning, including specific wording regarding the possibility of air attack, being issued on November 27th instead of the far less specific warning IOTL. That alone might have been enough to alter operation plans, including having aircraft dispersed and a number of fighters being armed, including a "dawn patrol", and AAA batteries having ready ammunition stored and being at least 1/3 manned. A base at that level of readiness would have been able to react much more decisively to the Condors's notification of 03:57, it may have even had a standing watch on the Opana Point SCR-270 radar installation. Even a full alert at the time of Ward's sinking of Kō-hyōteki No. 20 would have allowed a base that was on notice of a possible main force attack to make very strong preparations before the arrival of the IJN strike force roughly an hour later.
A direct "the enemy is going to launch a main force strike" warning, which is sometimes posited was so unlikely as to require divine intervention. It would require the Kido Butai to be discovered at least a full day out to make any difference at all, any discovery prior to December 5th that was detected by the Japanese would have resulted in an automatic cancellation, per Nagumo's written orders. Discovery ON December 5th might have resulted in an abort, the decision was left to the discretion of the Attack Force commander. Only in the case of discovery on December 6th or 7th was the attack to proceed even if surprise was lost.
Had the IJN scouts that overflew the harbor ahead of the strike on the morning of the 7th found the harbor empty the written orders for Nagumo were specific. A 30 mile search centered on Oahu was to be conducted. If the fleet was not located the Kido Butai was to withdraw at high speed.
Nowhere in the ANY of the IJN plans or orders will you find specific mention of actions against fuel facilities or machine shops, in fact the actual orders do not even mention the existence of those facilities. The only ground targets mention were the various air fields and their hanger facilities. Even though the fuel farms have become the subject of much speculation in modern discussion on the attack, the Japanese simply didn't see them as being of any value. Japan wasn't expecting to have to fight the U.S. for two years, not even one year. They planned for a flash knockdown, acquiring the territory necessary to set up a defensive perimeter, and have a negotiated settlement.
Interestingly, the surviving IJN planning personnel stressed repeatedly to USSBS (Pacific) interrogators that the goal of the attack was to temporarily disable the Pacific Fleet (the Japanese believed that the USN had four or five carriers operating in Hawaiian waters, these were the primary targets, and were to be the SOLE target of the second wave, with other shipping only being subject to attack if insufficient carrier targets were available). It was only later, into the 1950s, that the "3rd Wave" suddenly because a missed opportunity as IJN survivors, especially Mitsuo Fushida, looked to burnish reputations that were somewhat shopworn.
The reaction of the U.S. forces at Pearl would also, assuming no sudden flash of insight telling Kimmel and Short exactly where the IJN forces were located, have more or less assured that no engagement occurred. Kimmel "knew" that any possible Japanese attack would originate from the Mandates. His fleet would have sailed away from the IJN attack force's actual location to the west/Southwest at best possible speed, assuming he chose to leave the harbor at all. The fleet was believed to safe in harbor, Pearl's defenses were quite substantial, but Kimmel was also known to be a very aggressive commander, it is hard to say if he would have waited or sortied even without his carriers (which had most of his cruisers with them).
An ideal scenario from the U.S. perspective would be a change to the war warning, including specific wording regarding the possibility of air attack, being issued on November 27th instead of the far less specific warning IOTL. That alone might have been enough to alter operation plans, including having aircraft dispersed and a number of fighters being armed, including a "dawn patrol", and AAA batteries having ready ammunition stored and being at least 1/3 manned. A base at that level of readiness would have been able to react much more decisively to the Condors's notification of 03:57, it may have even had a standing watch on the Opana Point SCR-270 radar installation. Even a full alert at the time of Ward's sinking of Kō-hyōteki No. 20 would have allowed a base that was on notice of a possible main force attack to make very strong preparations before the arrival of the IJN strike force roughly an hour later.
I don't recall if anyone's brought it up yet, but the "special" torpedoes that were produced/brought with the fleet Probably wouldn't be of much use in the Open Waters, again, if there was enough warning for them to make it out of Pearl. Weren't most of the sinkings done by the Torpedo Bombers 
Aside from the Arizona naturally.
But, I guess in a pinch they could remove the wooden fins and make them normal. Other thing is, the PH Raid as it was, was an intricately woven plan that, more or less, assumed everything would happen the way the IJN planned it would--a failing which would be exposed ever more greatly over the course of the Pacific War--Coral Sea & Midway if you want to get precise, though in my view Midway is a classic study of colossal underestimation of the enemy, and again, the mindset of "nothing could possibly at all, ever, go wrong with this plan"
Sorry for the tangent But yeah if we propose the BB's actually get out of Pearl proper, what happens when Fuchida and co. arrive over/in range of Pearl and find a near-empty harbour? I guess they can't just turn back, maybe they attack the dry docks, maintainence for the fleet or even some of the subs that might still be in the harbour? Submarines would be a good target since it was the Silent Service that caused a *lot* of trouble for shipping. Though with the US industry once in kicks into gear it may not matter. Anyways...theres my contribution
Edit: didn't see Calbears post, but again running with my "empty harbor" option, and the need to attack "something" maybe Fuchida takes initative and takes out other secondary/tertiary targets mised in the 1st or 2nd wave OTL
2nd edit: Again, I need to learn to read, derp, once again, seems as Calbear said if presented with an empty harbour the KB was to boot it out of there..hrmph. Dangit.
Aside from the Arizona naturally. But, I guess in a pinch they could remove the wooden fins and make them normal. Other thing is, the PH Raid as it was, was an intricately woven plan that, more or less, assumed everything would happen the way the IJN planned it would--a failing which would be exposed ever more greatly over the course of the Pacific War--Coral Sea & Midway if you want to get precise, though in my view Midway is a classic study of colossal underestimation of the enemy, and again, the mindset of "nothing could possibly at all, ever, go wrong with this plan"
Sorry for the tangent
But yeah if we propose the BB's actually get out of Pearl proper, what happens when Fuchida and co. arrive over/in range of Pearl and find a near-empty harbour? I guess they can't just turn back, maybe they attack the dry docks, maintainence for the fleet or even some of the subs that might still be in the harbour? Submarines would be a good target since it was the Silent Service that caused a *lot* of trouble for shipping. Though with the US industry once in kicks into gear it may not matter. Anyways...theres my contributionEdit: didn't see Calbears post, but again running with my "empty harbor" option, and the need to attack "something" maybe Fuchida takes initative and takes out other secondary/tertiary targets mised in the 1st or 2nd wave OTL
2nd edit: Again, I need to learn to read, derp, once again, seems as Calbear said if presented with an empty harbour the KB was to boot it out of there..hrmph. Dangit.
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I don't recall if anyone's brought it up yet, but the "special" torpedoes that were produced/brought with the fleet Probably wouldn't be of much use in the Open Waters, again, if there was enough warning for them to make it out of Pearl. Weren't most of the sinkings done by the Torpedo Bombers
But, I guess in a pinch they could remove the wooden fins and make them normal. Other thing is, the PH Raid as it was, was an intricately woven plan that, more or less, assumed everything would happen the way the IJN planned it would--a failing which would be exposed ever more greatly over the course of the Pacific War--Coral Sea & Midway if you want to get precise, though in my view Midway is a classic study of colossal underestimation of the enemy, and again, the mindset of "nothing could possibly at all, ever, go wrong with this plan"
Sorry for the tangent
Edit: didn't see Calbears post, but again running with my "empty harbor" option, and the need to attack "something" maybe Fuchida takes initative and takes out other secondary/tertiary targets mised in the 1st or 2nd wave OTL
The additional fins wouldn't really be a problem, all they did was prevent the torpedo from diving deeper than normal. At useful attack range the change in accuracy would have been minimal.
Fuchida wouldn't have had any option to change the strike targets. The plan, which was largely his work, was both specific and quite rigid. If the harbor was empty the mission changed to a search extending out no more than 30 miles from Oahu (the Lahani anchorage was checked by the same sea plane recon mission) in any direction. If Kimmel had sortied by 05:00, meaning a fleet-wide alert by 01:00 at the latest, on December 7th, the chances are very high that his force is never located and that the attack never takes place.
Unlike the WAllies, or even KM forces, the IJN was extremely rigid in its command philosophy. A junior commander simply didn't violate orders, not if he wanted to ever become a senior officer. Nagumo was also, even for an IJN flag officer, remarkably cautious. He was a good officer in that he gave 100% to whatever his orders might be, but given the option he tended away from aggression. He had two tasks at Pearl, knock the U.S. fleet out temporarily, and preserve the striking force of the IJN. He couldn't allow the entire carrier force to be lost, it had several tasking that were vital to the overall success of the Japanese strategy. As I noted above, the Japanese believed that the Americans had four or five carriers in Hawaiian waters, not finding them meant there was a force of near equal size to his own (keep in mind that USN carriers generally operated more aircraft per deck than the IJN) that he could not account for , a force that might appear at any moment.
That might not have made Halsey blink, or even Nimitz or Yamamoto, but Nagumo wasn't a gambler nor was he reckless.
Huh... from my reading, the IJA seems to have something of the opposite problem: junior commanders had far too much leeway to the point where they could basically drive national policy from below (as the entire Marco Polo Bridge incident neatly demonstrates) but that extended to the military sphere as well: a whole lotta of banzai charges occurred because some Japanese lieutenant thought it would be a great idea to interpret his orders to defend a position as "drive the enemy away from your position with your sword and your men's bayonets". Basically, it seems that they tolerated a colossal amount of outright insubordination from certain officers - so long as it was insubordination that could be couched as aggressive patriotism anyway. Insubordination in the service of reasonable doubts, not so much.
Was the relationship between IJN officers so rigid as a reaction to the Army's relative anarchy in such affairs (given how much the two sides hated each other) or was it just something that developed in parallel?
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that was more typically an Army problem than a Navy one. "Soldiers of the Sun" goes into excellent detail as to why.
usertron2020
Donor
Like how if a senior officer tried to enforce command discipline on his junior officers (No, you may NOT charge your men off a cliff!), they risked being fragged? If you want the antithesis of the IJA, IMO it would be the army of the USSR.
IIRC from already mentioned book by Zimm, the torpedo bomber attack would have been a complete fiasco even given minimal warning. About the only thingvthat would have worked in that case would be the level bombing while Val's would uselessly expand their bombs on undamaged BBs of the outer row. And the fighter sweeps. However the loss of majority of Kates would probably cripple the Kido Butai?
usertron2020
Donor
I remember an interview given to an elderly survivor of the Kido Butai first wave torpedo planes. He told of lessons hard learned by the Japanese air crews even during the first minutes of Pearl. First and foremost was:
Never make successive air attacks with flights coming in from one direction in two waves. IOW, one wave of planes, followed with only a bare minimum of space the second wave. This old veteran described what happened with that tactic. As the planes closed in, the enemy was desperately trying to train their weapons towards the torpedo bombers. When the AA guns opened up, most of the fire missed. But as they did so, they almost couldn't miss the torpedo planes coming up directly behind the first flight. Like having multiple targets coming at you from the same point in a video game. You are going to hit something.
The old timer sorrowfully ruminated about how the men came back to their carriers, cheerful over how light their losses were. "But if you were a crewman from a Kaga torpedo plane, you didn't feel the losses were light at all".
Eight pilots got off during the attack. Even if they're the only ones who manage it, that's eight more aircraft aloft to deal with the Japanese.For those quartered near their planes...
Also, the warning times seem arbitrary, times before the attack, rather than events that might give the game away. One option I've always thought was plausible was delaying the B-17 flight due that morning for one reason or another, which means that even though the Opana point radar station isn't yet in operation, it picks up the attack (the crew was actually just putting in extra practice while waiting for the breakfast truck to turn up), and possibly manages to disseminate it. Now how quickly this goes through the command system will have an effect on what can be done They might only get 5 minutes to play around with, which means that maybe a couple dozen fighters are brought out of line, some of the guns are brought on line more quickly, and some of the ships have some of their watertight doors closed. Alternatively they might get 15-20 minutes warning, which could see most of the aircraft out of line, and some under concealment, plus maybe even a half-dozen more up (and those that are up know to be ready for a fight), most or all of the guns manned and armed, and most of the ships have their watertight doors shut.
usertron2020
Donor
The phone at Opana Point was a direct link to a communications center. It couldn't just start burning up the phone lines all over Oahu. The commo officer on duty was stuck with the job. (1) A green second lieutenant who still had the original shine on his bars, and had zilch training in radar or communications.
1) 2400 to 0800, Sunday morning on a base that "can't" be attacked. So not the brightest light under the bush. Though in his defense I can say it was a good thing he wasn't employed as a scapegoat. The goat should have been the off-duty senior communications officer who refused to act at his on-duty junior officer's insistence to issue an island-wide alert based on the report from the USS Ward of their sinking that midget sub.
Well the IJN did seem to know how hard taking on the US would be. The "sleeping giant" quote may be fictional but the estimates of being able to run riot for six months were actually said. They were also accurate Midway was about six months after Pearl. However the IJN had experiance with the western Navys, especially the senior officers who would have been Captains and commanders in WWI and worked with the Allies. Also the IJN spent most of its time worrying about the western navys in any case (the chinese fleet being a joke) and this combined meant they knew what they were getting into. The IJA in contrast was used to (relatively) eaey fights in China and expected more of the same. For a while they got it but since the Navy was unable to hold a perimeter, those victorys didn't ammount to much in the end and once allied industral might came on line they started pushing back hard.
If Pearl gets a little bit of warning then they may be able to hurt the incoming planes. The Americans will still be pissed but with a more intact battleline they won't be quite as scared as they were in OTL. It will be less "the Jap's sunk our fleet, panic!" and more "Right you'll pay for this!"
Incidently if the Japanese balls it up will Hitler still declare war? War with Germany is inevitable (and has been going on at a low level for months) but if the Japanese foul up will Hitler still take a chance if he's less certain he has an ally able to take the heat off. Is it likely he would realise the US is gonna crush them with two fingers of one hand? And would he guess what the US is gonna do with the other eight fingers?
Exactly right. This is one of those 20/20 hindsight options: we know where Nagumo is, but Kimmel didn't.CalBear said:
Either one of these things really requires divine intervention, because nobody, but nobody, in DC or anywhere outside IJN, thought it could even happen. It's why Hawai'i was so unprepared for itCalBear said:
And this one is the biggest, most glaring mistake made IMO. Detecting a submarine was widely taken to indicate the presence of a task force, yet nobody made the connection. (Of course, by appearances, Kimmel was never even told, since the DO was asleep...CalBear said:
{"Confirmation! I want confirmation!"})
Well, somebody did, because it was looked at in Fleet Problem XIX (April-May 1938) and XXI (April 1940).
And by somebody, I mean... Ernest King, who had Saratoga strike Hickam and Wheeler Fields and Pearl Harbor NAS. From the northwest.
It's certainly not unthinkable that a Taranto-style raid be attempted -two carriers (Akagi and Kaga have the greatest range, IIRC) putting in a dawn torpedo strike, say - even if the Pearl Harbor hydrography means it will fail (from air-dropped torpedoes hitting the seabed).
Having said that, the performance of the FEAF in the Phillipines later in the day showed glaring deficiencies in the management of interception by the USAAF. There, the pursuit squadrons were airborne and the radar detected the Japanese bombers - but the ground controllers did not manage to bring the two together, with the result that much of the B-17 strength of the FEAF was destroyed on the ground.
I'd question whether it was possible for the HAF to manage to do much better than put a CAP over their fields and engage the elements sent there.
usertron2020
Donor
My most often memory when this comes to mind is what I first read in Costello's Pacific War about the first day and night of the Solomons campaign for the 1st Marine Division. 16,000 marines digging in and defending an assault by an IJA force sent to deal with them. 900 men
One of the few IJA survivors said: "It was like a housefly attacking a tortoise. The odds were all against it." First time the IJA attacking an enemy fully trained, dug in, fed, healthy, and coming into the war fresh. If you don't count the pounding the IJA took attacking the USSR in the late 30s.The IJA simply didn't know how to win a stand-up head on fight against an un-weakened enemy. Banzai charges were not the way to go.
*sigh* OK, here we go again...
Nazi Germany will DoW the USA. They. Have. To. Otherwise the USA is free, as an Associate Power in WWII is free to send L-L in unlimited largesse to its British, Dominion, and Dutch Allies against the perfidious Japanese. Including sending it to the UK direct. All the way to Liverpool, in US-flagged ships, under heavy USN escort. Where the British, as a Sovereign Nation, is fully free to use the L-L as they see fit. Including slapping the L-L into crates saying "Made In Britain" and shipping the materiel to THEIR ally, the Soviet Union.
It won't be FDR's fault if the British suddenly decide that they can't win the war against Japan without at least 7000 P-39s and uncounted numbers of Studebaker locomotives...
True, the US can't protect the Murmansk convoys, but most of that was done by the RN OTL as it was. And the convoys had to be terminated in the summer months anyway. And the lack of a Second Happy Time more than makes up for that.If Hitler doesn't like it, he can always declare war.
Bingo!And this one is the biggest, most glaring mistake made IMO. Detecting a submarine was widely taken to indicate the presence of a task force, yet nobody made the connection. (Of course, by appearances, Kimmel was never even told, since the DO was asleep...
And the guy he said that to? *Arizona blows up* "There's your CON-FIR-MATION!"
I would hope the DO wound up guarding a PoW camp in North Dakota, but knowing the Annapolis Mutual Protection Society, he probably retired as CNO.
They most assuredly did not, or they would never have attacked the U.S. to begin with.JamesHunter said:
IJN SOs did not understand the difference between local sea war & a truly blue water war, or the difference in fighting a truly blue water navy. The Sino- & Russo-Japanese Wars were both very constrained by geography & the weakness of the respective governments. The Pac War would be by neither. Japan did not understand this.It seems improbable he wouldn't, since the distracted U.S. (& with U.S. force going to PTO, however much it is, that's true) is a lesser threat now than later--& Hitler always planned to fight the U.S.JamesHunter said:
OTOH, if he delays, there's half a chance U-boat attacks on convoys will prod Congress into DoW...
It's a quite different thing to expect it on that morning.GarethC said:
See, everybody thought Japan was only capable of executing a single major operation at once, & a task force had been detected sailing south. Ergo, Hawai'i is immune.That's lovely. Now perhaps you'd like to explain why Kimmel would expect an attack from the northwest when Japan's main fleet base outside Japan was the opposite direction?GarethC said:
There's rather a big difference between "unthinkable" & "unexpected".GarethC; said:
That wasn't solely due to an inability to find the inbound mission. It was also because Sutherland wouldn't let Brereton talk to MacArthur (who was, it seems, busy reading his Bible
or praying it was a nightmare), so Brereton couldn't get permission to attack Formosa. Meanwhile, his bombers were flying around burning gas & had to refuel--because the Japanese had been delayed & didn't attack right away...The Japanese had all the luck going their way in the early days of the war, it seems. It turned...well, Midway
p).Guarding a prison camp was too good for him.usertron2020 said:And the guy he said that to? *Arizona blows up* "There's your CON-FIR-MATION!"
I would hope the DO wound up guarding a PoW camp in North Dakota, but knowing the Annapolis Mutual Protection Society, he probably retired as CNO.
As for CNO, I don't think so. (I notice none of the sources I've seen names him, tho...)
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The oxygen will cure a hangover pretty damn quick - just set the mixture to "Rich", take off, and by the time you're at 3000ft your head's pretty clear. The combats would have been fairly low-level, so masks not needed the rest of the time.