I pretty much agree with everything you've written, but IMHO the "risk theory" is and was horseshit.
Risk means a threat and a threat will illicit a response. Barring a complete British capitulation - which was never going to happen - Britain was always going to respond somehow. That may have been to finance a continental proxy to challenge the threat, build an Alliance to balance the Alliance of the aggressor, ramp up their own military capacity or utilise the Empire to divert the threat's attention around the globe.
As it was, Britain chose all the routes available to them.
Maybe Germany with a moderate size navy gets to be part of a "continental proxy" against some threat, and gets stuff for that, with no navy to help, Britain is disinterested.
(something like a super power 1924 no WW1 Russia time line, where Germany+Russia navy could be a threat, so Britain agrees to split the Portuguese colonies to keep Germany friendly, doesn't cost Britain much, a cheap const to build an alliance system against a super power Russia, but makes Britain consider Germany more)
OR
A no Spanish american war + No world war 1 time line. Sometime about 1920 Japan wants to take the Northern Philippines. Seeks German help with an offer of Mindanao. The thought of a combined German+Japan Pacific naval threat is enough to make the USA back down.
Even if its a bit of fantasy. I think Tirpitz really believed that these kind of thing could happen.
(OR perhaps the German army is enough of an alliance "helper" in such situations, and that is all she needs for such diplomatic power plays, probably would be in any "Russia situation)