WI: Napoleon Wins at Waterloo

[Matteo]

So we agree on the fact that they took very much.

There were not good guys on on side and bad guys on the other side.

There is no possible comparison between what the US and the UK did during world war II and what Britain, Austria, Russian or Prussia did during the revolutionary and napoleonic wars.

 

[Saphroneth]

When did it occur and who took the initiative of war ?

The question is for the form since I have already reminded how events took place.

I am not giving excuses to Napoleon. But real responsibilities can not be ignored.

Vae victis for sure. But we needn't make him the scapegoat since responsibilities are shared and since France in fact was on the defensive until 1807 included.

Define "initiative of war".

The revolution has to be seen in the context of the time, as to why it was seen so adversely - basically, as far as anyone was concerned, the revolutionaries in France were killing anyone they could get their hands on. There were a lot of revolts against them which were bloodily put down in the early days, for instance.
Everyone was a lot more happy with the American Revolutionaries.

 

[Matteo]

Oh no. I am very critic about the french revolution but as someone previously reminded on this forum, although it drove to an awful and bloody civil war, it still was less bloody than the british repression in Ireland.

And England had its own civil war and its Cromwell too.

Initiative of war ? Who engages hostilities. You won't find Napoleon engaging hostilities in Europe untill 1807.

 

[Saphroneth]

Oh no. I am very critic about the french revolution but as someone previously reminded on this forum, although it drove to an awful and bloody civil war, it still was less bloody than the british repression in Ireland.

And England had its own civil war and its Cromwell too.

Initiative of war ? Who engages hostilities. You won't find Napoleon engaging hostilities in Europe untill 1807.

Well, no, he didn't engage hostilities until after he was in power...
The French Revolutionaries certainly engaged hostilities - 20 April 1792, declaration of war on Austria.

 

[Matteo]

First it was Austria. And before this, there was the Pillnitz declaration.

Second, we were talking about Napoleon, the terrible corsican ogre that could not help making war and conquering Europe.

There was peace several Times with Austria. Austria broke it alone.
There was peace with Prussia. Idem in 1806.
There was peace with Russia. Idem in 1804.

I am the first to blame Napoleon for what he unlawfully did in Spain.

But the other european powers, mainly Britain, Austria and Russia, were the war-mongers for 10 to 15 years (depending if you count from 1792 on which is debatable or from 1798 on).

 

[Saphroneth]

First it was Austria. And before this, there was the Pillnitz declaration.

Second, we were talking about Napoleon, the terrible corsican ogre that could not help making war and conquering Europe.

There was peace several Times with Austria. Austria broke it alone.
There was peace with Prussia. Idem in 1806.
There was peace with Russia. Idem in 1804.

I am the first to blame Napoleon for what he unlawfully did in Spain.

But the other european powers, mainly Britain, Austria and Russia, were the war-mongers for 10 to 15 years (depending if you count from 1792 on which is debatable or from 1798 on).

Britain was declared war on by Revolutionary France first...

 

[funnyhat]

Except the Dutch East Indies, Guadalupe, Martinique, Reunion and Mauritius, all of which it handed back at the Congress of Vienna.

Mauritius was not handed back. It remained under British rule until its independence in the 20th century.

The Dutch East Indies were returned, but then, the British had not been at war with the Dutch themselves but their French conquerors - and still, the British helped themselves to Ceylon, the Cape Colony, and Guyana anyway. Malta and the Ionian Islands likewise ended up permanently under British control despite the fact that their pre-French governments had not been at war with Britain.

The British seemed somewhat more willing to restore France's colonies (although they kept a few, like Mauritius, Tobago and St. Lucia) than anyone else's. I'm assuming it was because they didn't want to undermine Louis XVIII's position as a restored monarch. Otherwise they were inclined to keep what they'd taken during the war.

 

[robcraufurd]

So we agree on the fact that they took very much.

No, we don't. Firstly, because that's not what you said:

Britain took every foreign colony It could snatch from other countries.

And secondly, because it isn't true. I would class "very much" as half your opponent's pre-war territories (Treaty of Tilsit), your opponent's holdings in Italy, the Balkans and southern and central Germany (Peace of Pressburg) or 400,000 of your opponent's subjects (Treaty of Schoenbrunn). At Vienna Prussia takes very much; Britain takes very little.

Let's remember the complaint that you were trying to set right:

This is just caricatural propagande

There was peace several Times with Austria. Austria broke it alone.
There was peace with Prussia. Idem in 1806.
There was peace with Russia. Idem in 1804.

"I find it inexplicable that good historians can simply assert what is technically true, that Prussia started the war of 1806 or Austria that of 1809, and not ask themselves what could have induced so timorous a king as Frederick William III, eager only to enjoy further peace and neutrality, to gamble everything on war against the French? Or what could make so narrow-minded and fearful a sovereign as Emperor Francis, whose highest ambition was to hang onto his hereditary estates in peace and who had been so thoroughly beaten by France in three great wars throw the iron dice again alone and unsupported in 1809?"

"Between 1800 and 1812 almost every government in Europe, and most statesmen in Europe, went much further in trying to appease Napoleon than Chamberlain did with Hitler... The experience of Napoleon's power was enough to make every European power try some form or other of accommodation- joining him if possible to get a share of the imperial spoils, buying him off, or making an arrangement to stay out of his way. Some states like Bavaria did this fairly eagerly and trustingly, others like Austria only with reservations or in desperation. Only Britain, which Napoleon could not destroy, continued to fight doggedly, and this only because it concluded in 1803 that an actual peace with Napoleon was humiliating and intolerable and in 1806-7 that any peace was impossible.

What demands explanation is not Europe's repeated recourse to appeasement, but its consistent failure. The only satisfactory answer is the simple and obvious one: Napoleon could not be appeased. Each war was the outcome of the uniform experience of one European state after another that it was impossible to do business with Napoleon, that peace with him on his terms was more dangerous and humiliating than war. It is most striking of all that the appeasers themselves, the very men who had advocated accommodation and coexistence with France, regularly abandon their own policies, admitting, even though they still dread war and fear defeat, that accommodation will not restrain Napoleon. This was true of Austria's Count Coblenzl and Archduke Carl in 1805, of Emperor Francis and Carl again by 1809, of Prussia's Counts Lombard and Hauwitz, the Duke of Brunswick, and King Frederick William III by 1806, of Prussia's Baron vom Stein in 1807, of Prince Hardenberg in 1808-12, of Count Rumiantsev and Tsar Alexander by 1812, of Count Metternicht in 1813..."
(Paul W. Schroeder, "Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise", Journal of Military History vol. 54 no. 2 (Apr. 1990), pp.147-162.)

The quote is lengthy, but it neatly sums up the case. This is what the European states believed at the time: you may choose to dispute whether it was true in hindsight, but you can't handwave away the fact that, both at Chaumont and Vienna, they're determined to present a united front to put Napoleon down. That's the point that BlackFox5 was making.

Mauritius was not handed back.

My mistake, I retract it.

the British helped themselves to Ceylon, the Cape Colony, and Guyana anyway

Though the Dutch receive Belgium in return, which hardly means they lose out on the deal.

Malta and the Ionian Islands likewise ended up permanently under British control despite the fact that their pre-French governments had not been at war with Britain.

Probably something to do with the fact that the Maltese petitioned the British for annexation. The Ionian Islands were a protectorate, by definition not permanently under British control, and were in fact handed to Greece in 1862.

Otherwise they were inclined to keep what they'd taken during the war.

As the single most obdurate foe of Napoleon, which had spent almost twenty years propping up its allies with subsidies to fight France, you can't blame them for wanting at least some tangible reward for having done so. However, as the examples which you yourself cite show, they were prepared to hand back territories in the interest of retaining goodwill among its allies: by definition, not the act of a country which

took every foreign colony It could snatch from other countries.

 

[usertron2020]

Not just because of that. All the invading probably helped. (Yes, Revolutionary France shot first.) And the pogroms helped. And the bombastic way Napoleon started handing out huge chunks of Europe to his friends and relatives didn't hurt, either.

Is this a reference to Revolutionary France's Reign of Terror? I can't imagine their bloodily putting down anti-revolutionary revolts being condemned (by us at least) considering what the elites had been doing to revolting peasantry since the start of the Dark Ages 1300 years previously. The revolutionaries of France knew full well what awaited them and the peasantry and the working classes of their country had the aristocracy ever regained control on their own during this critical period (as opposed to their being restored by the force of foreign arms in 1815).

As to the use of the word "pogrom", isn't that a word normally used for anti-semitic purges? AIUI, Napoleon was no enemy of Europe's Jews.

 

[robcraufurd]

The revolutionaries of France knew full well what awaited them and the peasantry and the working classes of their country had the aristocracy ever regained control on their own

I've been looking back through French peasant rebellions in the 17th century- the Croquants, the Nu-pieds, the Torrebens- and I can't see any where the number of those tried and executed after the event was more than a few hundred. This is relatively small in comparison with the numbers involved- for instance, La Mothe La Forest (who led the Croquants in Perigord in 1637) fielded an army of between four and eight thousand rebels. The Terror, on the other hand, involved the extrajudicial execution of over 40,000 people. A substantial proportion of those executed, if we can term being beaten to death by a mob "executed", were peasants or workers accused of disloyalty to the state. Disloyalty to the state, of course, was no longer fermenting rebellion or being caught in arms as it had been under the ancien regime, but now encompassed anything down to and including hoarding.

When you actually put the Terror in context, the reason the rest of Europe was worried about revolutionary France makes much more sense.

As to the use of the word "pogrom", isn't that a word normally used for anti-semitic purges?

Not according to the OED: even in the Russian context (first citation 1891) it was not linked exclusively to anti-Semitic violence, and its generalised secondary meaning (first citation 1906) is an officially tolerated attack on any community or group.

 

[SirCliveWolfe]

There is no possible comparison between what the US and the UK did during world war II and what Britain, Austria, Russian or Prussia did during the revolutionary and napoleonic wars.

Firstly I have got to say that I am as proud as any man from the former British Empire on what we did in WWII to defeat the Nazi's and everything they stood for. However, I am not convinced that our intentions, at least at the start, were any different to the age old British policy of wanting a divided Europe*. We knew the Germans wanted to dominate Europe and we could not allow it and acted in much the same way as we did against Napoleon and the Central Powers for much the same reasons.

*As Sir Humphrey so eloquently put it:

Minister, Britain has had the same foreign policy objective for at least the last five hundred years: to create a disunited Europe. In that cause we have fought with the Dutch against the Spanish, with the Germans against the French, with the French and Italians against the Germans, and with the French against the Germans and Italians. Divide and rule, you see. Why should we change now, when it's worked so well?

"Only Britain, which Napoleon could not destroy, continued to fight doggedly, and this only because it concluded in 1803 that an actual peace with Napoleon was humiliating and intolerable and in 1806-7 that any peace was impossible. "

This is what interests me in this thread, some people has written that if Wellington is defeated then the government in London would fall and peace overtures would be made. This surprises me, because of this quote, why would Britain suddenly stop what it's been doing for so long?

Please note that this is not to say that it would not happen, I am not well versed enough to argue this point, but I am very interested in why people think this would have happened?

 

[Matteo]

Britain was declared war on by Revolutionary France first...

Oh sure. Britain had just previously fired the french ambassador.

"I find it inexplicable that good historians can simply assert what is technically true, that Prussia started the war of 1806 or Austria that of 1809, and not ask themselves what could have induced so timorous a king as Frederick William III, eager only to enjoy further peace and neutrality, to gamble everything on war against the French? Or what could make so narrow-minded and fearful a sovereign as Emperor Francis, whose highest ambition was to hang onto his hereditary estates in peace and who had been so thoroughly beaten by France in three great wars throw the iron dice again alone and unsupported in 1809?"

"Between 1800 and 1812 almost every government in Europe, and most statesmen in Europe, went much further in trying to appease Napoleon than Chamberlain did with Hitler... The experience of Napoleon's power was enough to make every European power try some form or other of accommodation- joining him if possible to get a share of the imperial spoils, buying him off, or making an arrangement to stay out of his way. Some states like Bavaria did this fairly eagerly and trustingly, others like Austria only with reservations or in desperation. Only Britain, which Napoleon could not destroy, continued to fight doggedly, and this only because it concluded in 1803 that an actual peace with Napoleon was humiliating and intolerable and in 1806-7 that any peace was impossible.

What demands explanation is not Europe's repeated recourse to appeasement, but its consistent failure. The only satisfactory answer is the simple and obvious one: Napoleon could not be appeased. Each war was the outcome of the uniform experience of one European state after another that it was impossible to do business with Napoleon, that peace with him on his terms was more dangerous and humiliating than war. It is most striking of all that the appeasers themselves, the very men who had advocated accommodation and coexistence with France, regularly abandon their own policies, admitting, even though they still dread war and fear defeat, that accommodation will not restrain Napoleon. This was true of Austria's Count Coblenzl and Archduke Carl in 1805, of Emperor Francis and Carl again by 1809, of Prussia's Counts Lombard and Hauwitz, the Duke of Brunswick, and King Frederick William III by 1806, of Prussia's Baron vom Stein in 1807, of Prince Hardenberg in 1808-12, of Count Rumiantsev and Tsar Alexander by 1812, of Count Metternicht in 1813..."
(Paul W. Schroeder, "Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise", Journal of Military History vol. 54 no. 2 (Apr. 1990), pp.147-162.)

The quote is lengthy, but it neatly sums up the case. This is what the European states believed at the time: you may choose to dispute whether it was true in hindsight, but you can't handwave away the fact that, both at Chaumont and Vienna, they're determined to present a united front to put Napoleon down. That's the point that BlackFox5 was making.

Your quotation from Paul Schroeder is not History. It's just a moralizing pamphlet. The british (Ireland, India, ...etc), austrian (Poland, Italy), russian (Poland, asian conquests), and prussian (Poland) rulers were no less criminals than Napoleon if you want to go on this moralizing field.

I don't thiink it's an interesting way because dubbing the other a criminal just kills any possibility of a serious discussion.

Now if we try to consider facts globally.

The other great european powers feared that the french turmoil spread to their countries. And the ruling elite of these countries feared to lose their power, their properties and even their lives if the same thing happened in their country. This is a legitimage feeling, but not a specially noble feeling. It was all about defending their interests, though people offend tend to mix up their interests with their conception of morals.

When war broke-up between France and Austria (on a proposal of Louis XVI himself), the french conquered the austrian Netherlands, which Britain considered unacceptable from 1688 on.

Prussia, Russia and Austria profited from the french mess to break-up Poland. That's a funny conception of respecting established thrones. They were all imperialist expansionnist powers. No less than Britain or France.
Past 1794, it was a matter of realpolitics and strategy. Any moral argument is a pretext and a lie.

As soon as the french revolution calmed down (that is after the extremists were executed or exiled), France tried to make peace. It did it between 1795 and 1797 with all other countries except Britain.

Then Britain set up new coalitions against France.

The problem is that since France won crushing victories against coalition members, it came out each time more powerful than it was before the war.

Why did France snatch territories from its enemies ? Because France considered it could not trust those countries since they started a new war a few years after the peace treaty they had signed. So it considered it needed a tangible guarantee.

The fact is nonetheless that Napoleon conquered too much. But he did so because he had no acceptable way to settle the conflict with Britain. Unable to settle the conflict on the seas, he had to fight an asymetric war against Britain which worsened the problems on the european continent.

And from 1808 on, he messed-up everything. But you can't start from 1800 on.

Consider the relationship between Napoleon and Talleyrand, who was a much better diplomat and geopolitician than Napoleon.

Talleyrand had a rather good perception of what was acceptable for others and what no longer was acceptable. He advice de Napoleon, after the Austerlitz victory, not to be too harsh with the defeated because there was a golden opportunity to stabilise the situation on the continent. What changed everything was the crushing victory on Prussia and the rebirth of a small Poland which was an incurable casus belli with Russia.

 

[robcraufurd]

why would Britain suddenly stop what it's been doing for so long?

Why would any of the countries back out of the coalition? If they stay in the war, they have perhaps a year of conflict shared with allies and then everything is over. If they don't stay in the war, they risk Napoleon deciding he likes their territority or he doesn't like their foreign policy and having to face him alone a few years down the line, when France has recovered and reorganised.

Oh sure. Britain had just previously fired the french ambassador.

Your history of causation only ever seems to go so far as it takes to paint another European power as the bad guy. For instance, the US were the ones who recalled their ambassador from London, breaking off diplomatic relations in the same way that Britain did to France, yet you blame both wars on the actions of Britain. When Britain dismisses the French ambassador in 1793, the French have annexed Belgium, violated an agreement to keep the Scheldt neutral, and are on the verge of invading Holland. Pitt doesn't wake up one day and decide he's going to war with France. I've noticed you doing this elsewhere. Take this quote:

There was peace several Times with Austria. Austria broke it alone.
There was peace with Prussia. Idem in 1806.
There was peace with Russia. Idem in 1804.

One might better describe this as follows:
There was peace with Russia; Russia broke this in 1804 after Napoleon sent troops into Baden to kidnap a refugee and executed him on trumped up charges.
There was peace with Austria; Austria broke this in 1805 after Napoleon crowned himself king of a state on their southern border.
There was peace with Prussia; Prussia broke this in 1806 after Napoleon demanded they cede him land, then tried to bribe the British into neutrality using more Prussian territory.

When you say:

France considered it could not trust those countries since they started a new war a few years after the peace treaty they had signed. So it considered it needed a tangible guarantee.

This ignores the fact France annexed vast amounts of territory in the war of the First Coalition, meaning their desire for territory was not the result of the perfidity of the rest of Europe in breaching peace treaties. In fact, as shown above, and detailed in the quotation from Schroeder which you dismissed, the countries which declare war have frequently suffered serious provocations before they do so.

Your quotation from Paul Schroeder is not History. It's just a moralizing pamphlet...I don't thiink it's an interesting way because dubbing the other a criminal just kills any possibility of a serious discussion.

You didn't bother to read it, then:

"I realise that in advancing this thesis I open myself to the charge, dreaded by historians, of being a moralizer, a prosecuting attorney... For every historian who distorts the record by moralizing, ten do so by excessive coyness, calling things by any other name- mistakes, errors, blunders, miscalculations, aberrations, irrationality, stupidity, sickness- so as to avoid the word 'crime'. Not to see the criminal side of Napoleon, to deny his demonic dimension, is to deny something quintessential to him personally and vital to our historic understanding, to make him less great and less interesting than he was... We do him more historic justice by recognising in him the soul of a corsair, a condottiere, a capo Mafioso, but arguably the greatest corsair, condottiere and capo Mafioso in history. Besides, as I have argued, this verdict is not a moral judgment on Napoleon, though certainly it implies one. It is instead the key, the prerequisite, to an understanding of his policy and its impact upon European international politics."

And he's absolutely right: by refusing to acknowledge that there may be a criminal element to Napoleon's foreign policy, that it's outside the norm of diplomacy at the time, you've rendered yourself completely unable to understand the motivations and actions of the other European powers in reacting to him.

And from 1808 on, he messed-up everything. But you can't start from 1800 on.

Why not? This is the most immediate experience which the other European powers will have, and the most important in determining whether they would stay in the war against him in 1815. Napoleon has been waging aggressive war against the rest of Europe for at least six years, if we take your low estimate: why would the coalition give him the chance to keep doing so? Napoleon was offered France's pre-war borders in 1814 but refused, expecting that more conflict and more lost lives would give him a better position: why would the coalition expect him to be happy with whatever borders come out of a peace deal in 1815 for more than a few months?

 

[Mike]

I've been looking back through French peasant rebellions in the 17th century- the Croquants, the Nu-pieds, the Torrebens- and I can't see any where the number of those tried and executed after the event was more than a few hundred. This is relatively small in comparison with the numbers involved- for instance, La Mothe La Forest (who led the Croquants in Perigord in 1637) fielded an army of between four and eight thousand rebels. The Terror, on the other hand, involved the extrajudicial execution of over 40,000 people. A substantial proportion of those executed, if we can term being beaten to death by a mob "executed", were peasants or workers accused of disloyalty to the state. Disloyalty to the state, of course, was no longer fermenting rebellion or being caught in arms as it had been under the ancien regime, but now encompassed anything down to and including hoarding.

When you actually put the Terror in context, the reason the rest of Europe was worried about revolutionary France makes much more sense.

The Terror happened AFTER the rest of Europe already went to war against Republican France. The rest of Europe going to war helped CAUSE the Terror, not the other way around. Furthermore, the Terror was STARTED by the Royalists and counter-revolutionaries in order to support the invading European armies into France.

Hence, Republican France was under threat from within (Royalists, counter-revolutionaries) and without (rest of Europe) with its overthrow almost a certainty, like what happened to previous attempts to start republics in Europe. They took extreme measures to defend themselves and the Republic. Only after the battle of Fleurus, when it was clear that the Republicans were going to win the war, did the Terror end and those responsible brought to justice.

The onus of the Terror is on the rest of Europe and to the French counter-revolutionaries and Royalists, not to the republicans.

 

[Mike]

I am the first to blame Napoleon for what he unlawfully did in Spain.

Godoy Spain was going to attack France while France was at war with Prussia. However, Prussia was defeated so quickly before Spain could intervene. Napoleon then decided he couldn't trust Spain and seized an opportunity to overthrow Godoy, all for security reasons. However, the way he did it was amateur. He should have picked a Spaniard that was a francophile rather than one of his own.

 

[Mike]

When Britain dismisses the French ambassador in 1793, the French have annexed Belgium, violated an agreement to keep the Scheldt neutral, and are on the verge of invading Holland. Pitt doesn't wake up one day and decide he's going to war with France. I've noticed you doing this elsewhere. Take this quote:

Britain was already agitating and supporting the upcoming coalition against France. Britain had a history of attacking or supporting a side before a DoW.

One might better describe this as follows:
There was peace with Russia; Russia broke this in 1804 after Napoleon sent troops into Baden to kidnap a refugee and executed him on trumped up charges.
There was peace with Austria; Austria broke this in 1805 after Napoleon crowned himself king of a state on their southern border.
There was peace with Prussia; Prussia broke this in 1806 after Napoleon demanded they cede him land, then tried to bribe the British into neutrality using more Prussian territory.

Weak provocations for war. The real reason they all went to war against France countless times was, besides restoring the French monarchy, for dynastic aims in Poland, and Italy. In other words, they wanted to expand their territories and spheres of influence that you accuse Republican France and Napoleon of doing. The difference is that Republican France and Napoleon expanded their territories as a result of defensive actions, while Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Britain did them for pure aggression. Which is morally superior?

When you say:

This ignores the fact France annexed vast amounts of territory in the war of the First Coalition, meaning their desire for territory was not the result of the perfidity of the rest of Europe in breaching peace treaties. In fact, as shown above, and detailed in the quotation from Schroeder which you dismissed, the countries which declare war have frequently suffered serious provocations before they do so.


You didn't bother to read it, then:

"I realise that in advancing this thesis I open myself to the charge, dreaded by historians, of being a moralizer, a prosecuting attorney... For every historian who distorts the record by moralizing, ten do so by excessive coyness, calling things by any other name- mistakes, errors, blunders, miscalculations, aberrations, irrationality, stupidity, sickness- so as to avoid the word 'crime'. Not to see the criminal side of Napoleon, to deny his demonic dimension, is to deny something quintessential to him personally and vital to our historic understanding, to make him less great and less interesting than he was... We do him more historic justice by recognising in him the soul of a corsair, a condottiere, a capo Mafioso, but arguably the greatest corsair, condottiere and capo Mafioso in history. Besides, as I have argued, this verdict is not a moral judgment on Napoleon, though certainly it implies one. It is instead the key, the prerequisite, to an understanding of his policy and its impact upon European international politics."

His opinion. He admits that he is going against the prevailing historians opinion about this conflict. He is nothing more than a contrary historian like those that like to label the massacres at the Vendée as genocide. However, those historians actually provide arguments and facts to support their charges, flawed in my opinion, unlike Schroeder who doesn't provide any arguments to support his discourse and makes only sweeping statements.

 

[robcraufurd]

the Terror was STARTED by the Royalists and counter-revolutionaries in order to support the invading European armies into France.

Please don't be an apologist for what happened. The Royalists made a threat of harsh punishment; in response, the revolutionaries executed tens of thousands of people, in many cases for little more than having more food than someone else.

its overthrow almost a certainty, like what happened to previous attempts to start republics in Europe.

To cite the first two examples that come to mind of attempts to start republics in Europe, the Republic of Venice lasted a thousand years before Bonaparte toppled it in 1797 and the British Commonwealth was allied with Louis XIV's France within six years of the republic being declared, its first foreign war being one it started against the Dutch Republic and its ultimate fall coming through internal factors. As such, your claims of certitude seem to be overstated.

They took extreme measures to defend themselves and the Republic.

Which was the point I was making: the other European monarchies are rightfully suspicious of a country where such a thing will happen. This is like arguing that the world should have treated Pol Pot's Cambodia or Idi Amin's Uganda as if everything was completely normal.

Britain was already agitating and supporting the upcoming coalition against France.

"We shall do nothing... All my ambition is that I may at some time hereafter... have the inexpressible satisfaction of being able... to tell myself that I have contributed to keep my own country at least a little longer from sharing in all the evils of every sort that surround us. I am more and more convinced that this can only be done by keeping wholly and entirely aloof." (Lord Grenville, foreign secretary, November 1792)
"Perhaps some opening may arise which may enable us to contribute to the termination of the war between different powers in Europe, leaving France (which I believe is the best way) to arrange its own internal affairs as it can." (Pitt, November 1792).

His opinion. He admits that he is going against the prevailing historians opinion about this conflict.

So you haven't read it either.
"what I am saying is not new, but old and conventional. Most historians have not to my knowledge called Napoleon a criminal in so many words (though contemporaries did, and worse); but they have said the same thing in more subtle ways."

Schroeder who doesn't provide any arguments to support his discourse and makes only sweeping statements.

Except the examples given and the case study of Napoleon's dealings with the Pope on p.149, the analysis of attempts to appease Napoleon on p.152-3, the case study of the war of 1812 on p.154-5, the examination of Napoleon's correspondence on Austria on p.157, and the comparison of Talleyrand and Napoleon's views on p.157. Again, this shows you haven't bothered reading the article. I don't know why I bother citing information: I may as well just make it up like anybody else on here.

Let's come back to the quote that started all this:

Napoleon was like the world's first real supervillain. He was "The Monster." He was considered far too dangerous to be left in charge of France. Napoleon had spent 20 years winning, and rather than let the world live in peace he kept invading everyone.
Nobody could take the risk Napoleon wouldn't begin the cycle again in 5, 10, or 20 years later even if truly wanted to be left alone in 1815.
Having finally defeated the man once, the Allies weren't going to let him leave in peace.

From this point on, I'll no longer respond to people who want to argue whether or not these statements are true, because this isn't what the thread's about. Despite my attempts the Napoleon fanboys seem determined not to realise this, so the only appropriate response is silence. If anybody wants to dispute that the statement made by Blackfox5 is what the European powers thought about Napoleon, and that this belief would mean the seventh coalition would hold together beyond any initial defeats that Napoleon could hand out, then make your case and we'll discuss it.

 

[usertron2020]

I've been looking back through French peasant rebellions in the 17th century- the Croquants, the Nu-pieds, the Torrebens- and I can't see any where the number of those tried and executed after the event was more than a few hundred. This is relatively small in comparison with the numbers involved- for instance, La Mothe La Forest (who led the Croquants in Perigord in 1637) fielded an army of between four and eight thousand rebels. The Terror, on the other hand, involved the extrajudicial execution of over 40,000 people. A substantial proportion of those executed, if we can term being beaten to death by a mob "executed", were peasants or workers accused of disloyalty to the state. Disloyalty to the state, of course, was no longer fermenting rebellion or being caught in arms as it had been under the ancien regime, but now encompassed anything down to and including hoarding.

When you actually put the Terror in context, the reason the rest of Europe was worried about revolutionary France makes much more sense.

Others have answered this better than I since, so I'll only throw in that I was pointing out the history of crushed peasant revolts going back to the start of the Dark Ages, a considerably longer period of time, and I admit that I should have considered the history of crushed revolts in the rest of aristocratically ruled Europe.

 

[Redhand]

Didn't we have this exact same discussion a while ago?

Anyway, the only result is that Napoleon prolongs the inevitable. That is all.

EDIT: Also good point on the horses, Simreeve. Losing so many in Russia was the real killer for Napoleon - in addition to losing the Grande Armée, of course.

It could be argued that 1813 in Germany, which saw some of Napoleon's best tactical work, could have turned out a lot differently if he had the cavalry to crush some of the Allied armies that he was able to defeat but not decisively so. Maybe a decisive win or two keeps the Germans from screwing him at Leipzig.

 

[Redhand]

Not really

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minor_campaigns_of_1815#Army_of_the_Upper_Rhine_.28Austo-German_Army.29

On 19th June the Austrians were just commencing crossing the Rhine with 270,000 men, with another 37k Swiss and 50k in Northern Italy. The French had about 30k in total. So more than 10 to 1. They are not stopping until made to, which will require the Army du Nord to march down from Belgium, and even then the French are going to be outnumbered at least 2 to 1 without the Russians. Schwarzenburg was cautious and methodical, but that also means he tended to not make mistakes, and with numbers on his side it will be a repeat of 1814.

You are ignoring the massive attritional problems the Austrian and Russian armies were having at this point. The troops being sent were deserting much more than usual due to the pace of march and the pell-mell nature of the preparations. The morale problems of the Austrians were notoriously problematic as they approached the Rhine. That 270K number also included the sick who were being dragged along, a number made worse because of the spring of 1815 being particularly ripe for camp diseases after the winter was so harsh.

The Austrians were having issues maintaining basic discipline on the march and the troops were comprised of a lot of Landwehr units that had no desire to be there, with the professional units being dispersed to hell around the empire at the time.

I am not sure that meeting Napoleon with a 2 to 1 advantage on French soil that the Austrians might not blunder into a massive defeat.

The Russians did not have many of these issues, but the pace of their march was hard on the troops and they too took attritional losses coming from the east.