WI: Joseph Johnston wasn't replaced in July 1864?

[Nytram01]

Note, what follows is for the sake of discussion, as the odds of Nytram changing my mind or vice-versa is poor -but I think between our positions the original poster can get some excellent ideas on what was going on.

And unleashing Forrest had been repeatedly shot down by Davis. Meanwhile, striking at Sherman's columns effectively would require him demonstrating something he failed at Cassville - pressing an attack in the face of difficulties.

I would not be surprised on Wheeler, but Johnston probably could have done better here. At least, he could have spent the time he spent trying to get Forrest's men to replace Wheeler, which would probably have been acceptable if Johnston presented it right (Wheeler being pro-Bragg and vice-versa, but not mattering to Davis, if I'm not mistaken).

Thing was that Wheeler was useful close by. He was skilled at flank guard and picketting duties. He just wasn't a good administrator, tactician, strategist and he hated to scout. And he was, essentially, the Southern version of Custer, believed himself a great cavalryman and sought fame and glory.

On the issue of replacing Wheeler. Johnston had asked for Chase Whiting or Mansfield Lovell to command Breckenridge's old Corps. Davis refused and gave him Hood.

And then there is the story regarding Alexander Stewart's division after Johnston took over. One of Stewart's brigade commanders had been killed or wounded - I'm not sure which - and Johnston recieved a telegram from Richmond asking who should command the brigade now. Johnston rode to Stewart's HQ personally and asked a staff officer - Colonel J.C. Thompson - who Stewart wanted to command this Brigade. He was told that Stewart's choice was Colonel James T. Holtzclaw and he forwarded the message to Richmond. Several days later a Colonel Baker arrived to take command of the brigade. Davis had decided that the man Johnston picked wasn't good enough.

Given Davis's refusal to allow Johnston to choose his own subordinates would there really have been a point in trying to get Wheeler replaced? Davis would have said no just to spite Johnston. He was in that kind of mind with Bragg in his ear and Hood and Wheeler writing to him behind Johnston's back.

Mississippi, aka the department he's assigned to and responsible for?

Being assigned to Mississippi didn't stop Forrest raiding into Tennessee. There is no reason to suggest he couldn't have raided into Georgia during this time either.

"Only"? That aside, yes, Wheeler has to go for a successful campaign here. Johnston had enough cavalry, but not anyone capable of commanding it.

That came out a bit wrong on my part. It was intended to read "Beauregard only got Hampton because Davis wanted Hampton out of South Carolina".

The silly thing is that when Johnston took command there was a more capable man in the AoT than Wheeler who could have led the AoT's cavalry with greater competance in John A. Wharton but Wharton resigned soon after Johnston took over after quarrelling with Wheeler and was sent out to rot in the Trans-Mississippi.

I would have to dispute that, but I don't know anyone I'd genuinely advocate here. There are not enough good generals to go around.

So you'd dispute it in principal but cannot name a better candidate? Maybe Richard Taylor? He's the only Confederate Army Commander who had any real success in 1864 but his "army" was little more than a division so he had no more experiance than Hood did at commanding a force the size of the AoT.

Snipped the for concision - I think this would be a good idea. Or if not Breckinridge, someone without Bragg's bitterness. Even someone not fond of Johnston but willing to work with him would have sufficed, as long as they could also work with Davis.

But a note: Johnston got all the reinforcements Davis could send him OTL. This has to be noted, whether he was satisfied or no, doing more is in the category of stripping the Carolinias in '63 to aid Lee - as in, what about the problems threatening those area? Forrest leaving Mississippi renders it possible for the Federals to negate Brice's Crossroads, for instance.

But Brice's Crossroads was pointless in the long run anyway. It was one great tactical victory for Forrest that left the road to Georgia, Tennessee or Mississippi open to him. Pretty much a month later Forrest was beaten by A.J. Smith. Moving back into Mississippi after winning at Brice's Crossroads did nothing to aid the Confederate cause, had he moved into Georgia he could have damaged Sherman's supply lines and slowed the Federal advance rather than just threaten them and scare the Federals like some boogeyman.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Johnston fights a battle akin to Peachtree Creek and then after getting walloped by Thomas retreats from Atlanta and gets sacked and replaced by Hood. The Army of Tennessee was annihilated IOTL at Nashville, so I can't see how Johnston would do worse than Hood, but given that Hood failed to even get a Kennesaw Mountain that says nothing very much about Johnston.

I agree with you up to a point, in that I think Johnston would have sortied to launch an attack as Thomas was crossing Peachtree Creek (even Hood said that the plan was originally Johnston's). But why do you think he'd automatically abandon Atlanta if he were repulsed?

 

[Elfwine]

Thing was that Wheeler was useful close by. He was skilled at flank guard and picketting duties. He just wasn't a good administrator, tactician, strategist and he hated to scout. And he was, essentially, the Southern version of Custer, believed himself a great cavalryman and sought fame and glory.

On the issue of replacing Wheeler. Johnston had asked for Chase Whiting or Mansfield Lovell to command Breckenridge's old Corps. Davis refused and gave him Hood.

At least Custer could fight. Wheeler - and this rests on Bragg's shoulders, though Johnston is the one who got him a major general's commission - should never have advanced past brigade command.

Also, Johnston - by intent or ignorance - picked two officers Davis disliked. And almost certainly, wrote his usual terse and tactless letter. With something like that, is it really like Davis is going to approve regardless of any instinctive bias against Johnston requests?

And then there is the story regarding Alexander Stewart's division after Johnston took over. One of Stewart's brigade commanders had been killed or wounded - I'm not sure which - and Johnston recieved a telegram from Richmond asking who should command the brigade now. Johnston rode to Stewart's HQ personally and asked a staff officer - Colonel J.C. Thompson - who Stewart wanted to command this Brigade. He was told that Stewart's choice was Colonel James T. Holtzclaw and he forwarded the message to Richmond. Several days later a Colonel Baker arrived to take command of the brigade. Davis had decided that the man Johnston picked wasn't good enough.

And therefore, there's no use even trying to work with Davis on such things? I know you think Davis was a pig (for want of a better insult), and I'm not saying you're all wrong, but this is no way for Johnston to get what he wants.

Given Davis's refusal to allow Johnston to choose his own subordinates would there really have been a point in trying to get Wheeler replaced? Davis would have said no just to spite Johnston. He was in that kind of mind with Bragg in his ear and Hood and Wheeler writing to him behind Johnston's back.

This is grossly unfair to Davis.

Being assigned to Mississippi didn't stop Forrest raiding into Tennessee. There is no reason to suggest he couldn't have raided into Georgia during this time either.

Except that raiding into Tennessee still leaves him able to fall back to protect the department in question. Georgia would require leaving it bare of at least a few divisions.

Western Tennessee is much closer than northern Georgia.

That came out a bit wrong on my part. It was intended to read "Beauregard only got Hampton because Davis wanted Hampton out of South Carolina".

Ah, okay.

The silly thing is that when Johnston took command there was a more capable man in the AoT than Wheeler who could have led the AoT's cavalry with greater competance in John A. Wharton but Wharton resigned soon after Johnston took over after quarrelling with Wheeler and was sent out to rot in the Trans-Mississippi.

Too bad for all parties, IMO. What little I know of Wharton supports the view that he was quite good - and generally good with his superiors, at least (given how he died, maybe not always with subordinates).

So you'd dispute it in principal but cannot name a better candidate? Maybe Richard Taylor? He's the only Confederate Army Commander who had any real success in 1864 but his "army" was little more than a division so he had no more experiance than Hood did at commanding a force the size of the AoT.

I cannot name any candidate I'm confident in. Longstreet or Hardee would be my preferences, but I can't really see anyone available - and sending Lee just means finding someone for the ANV, it doesn't change the lack of qualifeid generals - who is good enough. Johnston is one of the better choices, or would be if he was a better communicator.

But Brice's Crossroads was pointless in the long run anyway. It was one great tactical victory for Forrest that left the road to Georgia, Tennessee or Mississippi open to him. Pretty much a month later Forrest was beaten by A.J. Smith. Moving back into Mississippi after winning at Brice's Crossroads did nothing to aid the Confederate cause, had he moved into Georgia he could have damaged Sherman's supply lines and slowed the Federal advance rather than just threaten them and scare the Federals like some boogeyman.

Except that threatening them and scaring them like some boogeyman played to his strengths, and his command attempting to break Sherman's railroad would not have - there's a good essay on this in Richard McMurry's book on the Atlanta campaign.

Sufficient to say, the railroad is well defended.

 

[Anaxagoras]

I think it's fair to say that the Davis-Johnston feud was equally the fault of Davis and Johnston.

 

[Elfwine]

I think it's fair to say that the Davis-Johnston feud was equally the fault of Davis and Johnston.

They both certainly seemed to have a knack for hitting the other's buttons, whether maliciously or even intentionally or not.

 

[Snake Featherston]

I agree with you up to a point, in that I think Johnston would have sortied to launch an attack as Thomas was crossing Peachtree Creek (even Hood said that the plan was originally Johnston's). But why do you think he'd automatically abandon Atlanta if he were repulsed?

Because he'dve fought for Atlanta and viewed himself as losing. His whole MO was to retreat in that campaign, and it was his usual pattern: fight a battle, be outflanked, retreat.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Because he'dve fought for Atlanta and viewed himself as losing. His whole MO was to retreat in that campaign, and it was his usual pattern: fight a battle, be outflanked, retreat.

Be fair. When Sherman moved to outflank Johnston's position at Allatoona, Johnston skillfully intercepted him at New Hope Church. He then proceeded to pin Sherman down for weeks, during which he repulsed Union attacks at both New Hope Church itself and at Pickett's Mill, inflicting heavier casualties then he himself sustained and slowing the Union advance to a crawl.

 

[Johnrankins]

Be fair. When Sherman moved to outflank Johnston's position at Allatoona, Johnston skillfully intercepted him at New Hope Church. He then proceeded to pin Sherman down for weeks, during which he repulsed Union attacks at both New Hope Church itself and at Pickett's Mill, inflicting heavier casualties then he himself sustained and slowing the Union advance to a crawl.

Sherman himself said he was frustrated by Johnston and was happy when Hood took over.

 

[Elfwine]

Be fair. When Sherman moved to outflank Johnston's position at Allatoona, Johnston skillfully intercepted him at New Hope Church. He then proceeded to pin Sherman down for weeks, during which he repulsed Union attacks at both New Hope Church itself and at Pickett's Mill, inflicting heavier casualties then he himself sustained and slowing the Union advance to a crawl.

And then got flanked and the process repeated itself.

Johnston never, ever did anything to force Sherman into a fight on his terms when it came to setting who lead the dance.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Johnston never, ever did anything to force Sherman into a fight on his terms when it came to setting who lead the dance.

He did at the Battle of New Hope Church, the Battle of Pickett's Mill, and the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain.

In any case, to get back to the OP...

I think if Johnston had not been replaced, the Battle of Peachtree Creek would still have been fought at the same time and place as it was IOTL, since it was Johnston's plan. While I think the odds of success would have been considerably greater with Johnston in command, I do not think it likely that the AoT would have succeeded in its efforts to drive the AotC into the river. The best outcome for the Confederates would have been to give Thomas something of a bloody nose and slow the Union advance to the city.

What then?

Well, obviously Johnston would have fallen back into the extensive defenses of Atlanta itself, and Sherman would have responded in much the same way as he responded to Hood IOTL - by detaching significant forces to cut the Confederate railroad supply lines. The AoT would certainly have been stronger than it was IOTL by this point, since it would have avoided the bloodletting inflicted upon it by Hood on July 22 and July 28. But Johnston would likely have been more willing to abandon Atlanta than was Hood, since he always saw the preservation of his army as his most important goal.

Sherman would have been able to cut the railroad to Augusta without too much trouble; I doubt Johnston would have made much of an effort to prevent it as he would have seen any such move as too risky. But cutting the railroad to Macon was a much more difficult proposition, and Johnston likely would have done everything he could to maintain that critical supply route. Had Sherman done what he did IOTL (move almost his entire force against the railroad, leaving only a few divisions to hold a bridgehead over the Chattahoochee), I think it very likely that Johnston would have finally been willing to roll the dice and commit to a serious and bloody battle.

Alternatively, Johnston might have not been willing to take such a risk and could have withdrawn from the city. This, I believe, would have immediately resulted in his being removed from command. But no matter what, it would have meant that the Confederates would have had a far stronger AoT sitting outside a Union-occupied Atlanta than was the case at the same time IOTL.

IOTL, the AoT was about 40,000 strong when it evacuated Atlanta. ITTL, it could have been much stronger. And having avoided battlefields defeats such as those of July 22 and July 28, its morale would likely have been much stronger.

 

[Elfwine]

He did at the Battle of New Hope Church, the Battle of Pickett's Mill, and the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain.

"Sherman attacked" is not the same as being forced to do what Johnston wanted. When do we see Sherman losing the initiative to Johnston?

In any case, to get back to the OP...
. . .
IOTL, the AoT was about 40,000 strong when it evacuated Atlanta. ITTL, it could have been much stronger. And having avoided battlefields defeats such as those of July 22 and July 28, its morale would likely have been much stronger.

On the other hand, having been doing very little of significance except retreating and heavy skirmishing, it would not be feeling too good.

Commenting on this part as ultimately, unless Johnston is able and willing to hold the city as Lee held Richmond-Petersburg, the AoT is retreating from Atlanta sooner or latter anyway.

So the thorny question is, if it hasn't held Atlanta, what does it do?

There's no chance in hell that Johnston is going to invade Tennessee like Hood did, and only a marginly higher one that Hardee would.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Be fair. When Sherman moved to outflank Johnston's position at Allatoona, Johnston skillfully intercepted him at New Hope Church. He then proceeded to pin Sherman down for weeks, during which he repulsed Union attacks at both New Hope Church itself and at Pickett's Mill, inflicting heavier casualties then he himself sustained and slowing the Union advance to a crawl.

In all these cases Sherman attacked Johnston, Johnston did nothing to force him into doing this. Sherman's advance was laborious to a degree regardless of what Johnston did due to logistical factors. 100,000 troops supplied by one railway line requiring a continual supply of food and ammunition aren't going to be an army group of Speedys Gonzalez.

He did at the Battle of New Hope Church, the Battle of Pickett's Mill, and the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain.

In any case, to get back to the OP...

I think if Johnston had not been replaced, the Battle of Peachtree Creek would still have been fought at the same time and place as it was IOTL, since it was Johnston's plan. While I think the odds of success would have been considerably greater with Johnston in command, I do not think it likely that the AoT would have succeeded in its efforts to drive the AotC into the river. The best outcome for the Confederates would have been to give Thomas something of a bloody nose and slow the Union advance to the city.

What then?

Well, obviously Johnston would have fallen back into the extensive defenses of Atlanta itself, and Sherman would have responded in much the same way as he responded to Hood IOTL - by detaching significant forces to cut the Confederate railroad supply lines. The AoT would certainly have been stronger than it was IOTL by this point, since it would have avoided the bloodletting inflicted upon it by Hood on July 22 and July 28. But Johnston would likely have been more willing to abandon Atlanta than was Hood, since he always saw the preservation of his army as his most important goal.

Sherman would have been able to cut the railroad to Augusta without too much trouble; I doubt Johnston would have made much of an effort to prevent it as he would have seen any such move as too risky. But cutting the railroad to Macon was a much more difficult proposition, and Johnston likely would have done everything he could to maintain that critical supply route. Had Sherman done what he did IOTL (move almost his entire force against the railroad, leaving only a few divisions to hold a bridgehead over the Chattahoochee), I think it very likely that Johnston would have finally been willing to roll the dice and commit to a serious and bloody battle.

Alternatively, Johnston might have not been willing to take such a risk and could have withdrawn from the city. This, I believe, would have immediately resulted in his being removed from command. But no matter what, it would have meant that the Confederates would have had a far stronger AoT sitting outside a Union-occupied Atlanta than was the case at the same time IOTL.

IOTL, the AoT was about 40,000 strong when it evacuated Atlanta. ITTL, it could have been much stronger. And having avoided battlefields defeats such as those of July 22 and July 28, its morale would likely have been much stronger.

Peachtree Creek was doomed for factors having nothing to do with Hood.

 

[Elfwine]

I
Peachtree Creek was doomed for factors having nothing to do with Hood.

How many of them are problems long before the Atlanta campaign even starts?

Either within the AoT, or amongst its external enemy.

Asking for discussion's sake, as I have my own opinion.

 

[Snake Featherston]

How many of them are problems long before the Atlanta campaign even starts?

Either within the AoT, or amongst its external enemy.

Asking for discussion's sake, as I have my own opinion.

More than are generally given credit for. James Longstreet arguably killed any attempt that ever existed to get it to be more than feuding overmighty generals. The really big problem that neither Bragg nor Sidney Johnston ever solved was Polk, who never got over losing command of the army, and that factor was far past control by 1864.

 

[Anaxagoras]

"Sherman attacked" is not the same as being forced to do what Johnston wanted. When do we see Sherman losing the initiative to Johnston?

Well, Johnston did come close to smashing the Union left flank at the Battle of Resaca, and he attempted to seize the initiative at both Cassville and New Hope Church, and (as already pointed out) the plan to attack the AotC at Peachtree Creek was his. It's true that none of these movements were ultimately successful, but the picture of Johnston being entirely passive throughout the campaign is mostly a fiction created by his post-war detractors for partisan reasons.

There's no chance in hell that Johnston is going to invade Tennessee like Hood did, and only a marginly higher one that Hardee would.

I quite agree. Lee suspected that Johnston would fall back on Augusta to protect the Carolinas in the event that Atlanta was abandoned. Of course, it would be equally likely that Sherman would have moved against Alabama or (as IOTL) through the heart of Georgia towards Savannah. Johnston would probably have wanted to take a position where he could either contest Sherman's anticipated advance or move to retake Atlanta if Sherman had decided to operate in a different direction, thereby forcing Sherman to confront him directly and hope that he would be able to catch Sherman at a disadvantage.

Of course, there is no reason to think that Johnston would be any more successful with this strategy after the fall of Atlanta than he had been before its fall, but it would have forced Sherman to keep his focus on Johnston and the AoT rather than embarking upon the March to the Sea.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Peachtree Creek was doomed for factors having nothing to do with Hood.

I would hesitate to use the word "doomed", because nothing in history is foreordained. But I do believe that its chances of success were very small. The argument I am making is that its small chances of success would have been somewhat higher with Johnston in command than they were with Hood in command.

 

[Snake Featherston]

I would hesitate to use the word "doomed", because nothing in history is foreordained. But I do believe that its chances of success were very small. The argument I am making is that its small chances of success would have been somewhat higher with Johnston in command than they were with Hood in command.

I think that some battles offer obvious AH potential, I think that other battles in terms of how they work offer really not very much of any. Cassville is one of the major AH potential fights, as is Spring Hill and for that matter McLemore's Cove....

 

[Elfwine]

Well, Johnston did come close to smashing the Union left flank at the Battle of Resaca, and he attempted to seize the initiative at both Cassville and New Hope Church, and (as already pointed out) the plan to attack the AotC at Peachtree Creek was his. It's true that none of these movements were ultimately successful, but the picture of Johnston being entirely passive throughout the campaign is mostly a fiction created by his post-war detractors for partisan reasons.

Close only counts in horse shoes and hand grenades, I believe the saying is.

And Cassville is a splendid example of Johnston having the offensive spirit usually reserved for defeatists and cowards (as Nytram will point out in exhaustive detail if I don't save him the trouble, Johnston was certainly not the latter).

Johnston's strategy was one of trying to get in a situation where Sherman would oblige him as Burnside obliged Lee. This is pretty damn passive or at least reactionary instead of trying to grab the initiative and hang anyone who gets in the way.

I quite agree. Lee suspected that Johnston would fall back on Augusta to protect the Carolinas in the event that Atlanta was abandoned. Of course, it would be equally likely that Sherman would have moved against Alabama or (as IOTL) through the heart of Georgia towards Savannah. Johnston would probably have wanted to take a position where he could either contest Sherman's anticipated advance or move to retake Atlanta if Sherman had decided to operate in a different direction, thereby forcing Sherman to confront him directly and hope that he would be able to catch Sherman at a disadvantage.

Of course, there is no reason to think that Johnston would be any more successful with this strategy after the fall of Atlanta than he had been before its fall, but it would have forced Sherman to keep his focus on Johnston and the AoT rather than embarking upon the March to the Sea.

Or at least, before doing so.

 

[Anaxagoras]

I think that some battles offer obvious AH potential, I think that other battles in terms of how they work offer really not very much of any. Cassville is one of the major AH potential fights, as is Spring Hill and for that matter McLemore's Cove....

I agree with you, but I think I would rank Peachtree Creek higher than you in AH potential (a lovely term, by the way. We must use it more often).

Consider the two corps making the attacks, and how they fared. On the right we have Hardee, who fought one of his worst battles of the war. While we will never know for sure, I think it's very likely that he was both distracted by all the administrative chaos caused by Johnston's departure and resentful at Hood (his junior in every conceivable way) having been appointed over him. Had his mind not been befuddled by Hood's sudden elevation, it seems entirely possible that he would have conducted the battle far more carefully.

Bate, on the far right, did not conduct proper reconnaissance and ended up playing little role in the battle. However, he was in a prime position to sweep around the Union left flank and take them from the rear. Had he been even a bit more meticulous (and Bate was generally quite a good commander), the whole result on that part of the battlefield might have been different. So, there's considerable potential there. It's worth pointing out that Bate had the Orphan Brigade under his command, which (Granbury's Texans aside) was the best brigade in the entire AoT.

Then look at Cheatham's Tennessee division, which was under the command of General Maney because Cheatham had been promoted to command Hood's corps when Hood took command of the whole army. Next to Cleburne's, this division was the best in the army and under the command of Cheatham had proven itself to be a fearsome force. However, at Peachtree Creek the division did little more than some skirmishing with the Yankees to its front. It never even mounted a major attack. I don't think anyone can doubt that Cheatham would have behaved very differently, and he still would have been in command of the division had Hood not been in command of the AoT.

Looking over at the other side of the battlefield, we can see that Stewart's corps actually had a reasonable amount of success, pushing the Union forces back and taking considerable numbers of prisoners and cannon. If the attack on Hardee's side of the battlefield had been more successful (i.e. if Bate had done better or if Cheatham had still been in command of his division), the temporary success Stewart achieved might have been emulated across the battlefield.

Now, I do not say that any of this is likely, but it certainly was possible. And it certainly would have been more likely with Johnston in command of the AoT than it was with Hood.

 

[Snake Featherston]

I agree with you, but I think I would rank Peachtree Creek higher than you in AH potential (a lovely term, by the way. We must use it more often).

Consider the two corps making the attacks, and how they fared. On the right we have Hardee, who fought one of his worst battles of the war. While we will never know for sure, I think it's very likely that he was both distracted by all the administrative chaos caused by Johnston's departure and resentful at Hood (his junior in every conceivable way) having been appointed over him. Had his mind not been befuddled by Hood's sudden elevation, it seems entirely possible that he would have conducted the battle far more carefully.

Bate, on the far right, did not conduct proper reconnaissance and ended up playing little role in the battle. However, he was in a prime position to sweep around the Union left flank and take them from the rear. Had he been even a bit more meticulous (and Bate was generally quite a good commander), the whole result on that part of the battlefield might have been different. So, there's considerable potential there. It's worth pointing out that Bate had the Orphan Brigade under his command, which (Granbury's Texans aside) was the best brigade in the entire AoT.

Then look at Cheatham's Tennessee division, which was under the command of General Maney because Cheatham had been promoted to command Hood's corps when Hood took command of the whole army. Next to Cleburne's, this division was the best in the army and under the command of Cheatham had proven itself to be a fearsome force. However, at Peachtree Creek the division did little more than some skirmishing with the Yankees to its front. It never even mounted a major attack. I don't think anyone can doubt that Cheatham would have behaved very differently, and he still would have been in command of the division had Hood not been in command of the AoT.

Looking over at the other side of the battlefield, we can see that Stewart's corps actually had a reasonable amount of success, pushing the Union forces back and taking considerable numbers of prisoners and cannon. If the attack on Hardee's side of the battlefield had been more successful (i.e. if Bate had done better or if Cheatham had still been in command of his division), the temporary success Stewart achieved might have been emulated across the battlefield.

Now, I do not say that any of this is likely, but it certainly was possible. And it certainly would have been more likely with Johnston in command of the AoT than it was with Hood.

On the other hand it's near impossible to achieve the *strategic* aim of the battle which was to hit Thomas when he was straddling the river. That factor doesn't change, and it's that which is the biggest problem for the AoT as the AotC was definitely a dangerous enemy in a strong defensive position. The CSA could easily do better tactically but it can't meet the strategic issue, which is where the problem comes in.

By contrast McLemore's Cove is one of those real strategic AH potential moments that had the chance to really ruin the Army of the Cumberland, and that was all Leonidas Polk's fault. If he'd decided to screw Bragg by showing Bragg what an idiot he was by attacking, the CSA might have actually had a very happy equivalent to the Chickamauga campaign. But he didn't even do that much.