No, they don't. They lost in 1940 because they didn't grasp the concept of a strategic reserve (here's a hint- don't commit all your forces in the first couple of days) and in the armistice agreed to turn over ANYONE THE NAZIS WANTED TO TORTURE AND KILL to them.
They understood the concept of a strategic reserve very well (I'd say they invented it during WWI) and they had a big one prior to May 1940, but their command, control and communication (CCC) system was repeatedly shortcut by swift German action. That was especially bad for an army like the French, which based on experience from WWI, was focused on grand schemes and plans executed like a clockwork and with all levels being tought to not think for themselves but just do what they were told.
If allowed time to unfold the French army could be a devastaing steamroller, but the German "Auftragstaktik" never allowed that and instead left frustrated French commanders and soliders waiting for new orders instead of those hopelessly behind the situation. Not even the best motivated, equipped and trained army can stand that for very long time.
But it started with the French commander Gamelin planning for the Germans to follow the French plans - ie. main German trust through Belgium. Most of his strategic reserve was so committed in a plan that was outdated from the start as the German main trust was in the Ardennes and thus cut of the best part of the allied forces. The problem wasn't their concept of strategic reserves but extremely bad intelligence work.
After that the battle was lost but the French acutally fought very well where they had the chance and German losses rose dramatically. In a few weeks they thus went from old fashioned cohesive frontlines to company or platoon positions in chequerboard formation that could survive being overrun by panzers but keep the follow up infanty back. That tactic proved the way to stop blitzkrieg but took years for the allies to learn and by June 1940 too little of the French Army was left to stop the Germans.
But back to WWI the Germans certainly did well in the sense that they kept a much stronger enemy at bay for four years and still had a plausible chance of winning. The very agile doctrines (auftragstaktik) that in WWII was so succesful at the tactical and operational levels had not emerged out of blue air in the interwar years but went back to the Prussian army of the 19th century. We often today imagine WWI Germans as goose walking militarists with shiny boots and Pickelhauben - they were that too - but also a much more flexible and egalitarian system than the French or British.
In 1870-71 that had worked well and I guess they hoped it would do so in 1914 too. The problem was that the French had learned a lot and implemented it in their 1911 army reforms. The German problem was a very critical strategic situation with a Russian Empire accelerating in strength on one side and a hot headed revanchist France on the other - in that context alienating the British Empire by taking on the cost of building a high seas fleet does not appear very wise. Especially as tyhey never really got close to defending their (anyway worthless) colonies. Imagine the resources spent on the High Seas Fleet put into the German and Austrian armies instead and the seapowers (UK and USA) neutral!
Regards
Redbeard