No French intervention in American Revolutionary War, how long could Rebels Hold?

[FelixMansbridge]

The most interesting result of something like this would probably be the Rebels resisting just hard enough to force a settlement without being quite strong enough to declare independence. Maybe something along the lines of the later dominions (which would pretty much give the Americans what they wanted).

Honestly, ''Look to the West'' covers this outcome quite well though, so I tend to think detailing such a scenario would involve re-treading old ground.

 

[euromellows]

In my view we will see the 13 American colonies win their independence through exhaustion, but without a decisive victory they are unlikely to get anything west of the proclamation line. America likely to be nicknamed as the Maritime Republic of the West.

 

[HunterX]

In my view we will see the 13 American colonies win their independence through exhaustion, but without a decisive victory they are unlikely to get anything west of the proclamation line. America likely to be nicknamed as the Maritime Republic of the West.

The proclamation line isn't a feasible international border. It was completely enforceable even as an internal border. Without the coast, Britain isn't going to be able to control that interior.

 

[unprincipled peter]

TFSmith,
I disagree with your assertion that the Patiots kept the Brits running hither and yon in the south. I picture the south being the blueprint for what would happen all over without French alliance: the Brits taking the cities, but being subjected to militia/guerilla harassment. With diminishment of the continental army, Britain is in better position to minimize the harassment. the Brits, for the most part were in control of the south, but couldn't control the hinterland. Sans French involvement, Britain does not lose at Yorktown, and are unimpeded in transferring their troops wherever needed. The only real question, IMO, is whether Britain had the fortitude to outlast the harassment. Sans massive French involvement, Britain controls the regular fighting. Saratoga was an outlier, aided by major malfeasance on the part of Britain.

 

[TFSmith121]

The OP is "as much" which is pretty vague

They never needed to, they simply expanded the size of their existing forces (and recruited controversially from German allies) rather than transferred them around the Empire. At the beginning of the Revolutionary War both the Army and the Navy were considerably smaller.

It turns out that the garrisons elsewhere in the Empire were sufficient to hold out until reinforced. You have yet to offer evidence that it would be different in this scenario in which France at the very least is missing from the attack.

The OP is "as much" which is pretty vague, but it is rather unlikely the French et al are going to avoid taking advantage of their great rival's circumstances; to do so is at odds with the history of the previous few centuries of European power politics (pre- and post-Westphalia) and so it is really a matter a degree. The other point is that a 'Cold War" is never cheap for either side; there will be, as always, pressures to "do something" which usually leads to overt hostilities.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Saratoga was an outlier?

TFSmith,
I disagree with your assertion that the Patiots kept the Brits running hither and yon in the south. I picture the south being the blueprint for what would happen all over without French alliance: the Brits taking the cities, but being subjected to militia/guerilla harassment. With diminishment of the continental army, Britain is in better position to minimize the harassment. the Brits, for the most part were in control of the south, but couldn't control the hinterland. Sans French involvement, Britain does not lose at Yorktown, and are unimpeded in transferring their troops wherever needed. The only real question, IMO, is whether Britain had the fortitude to outlast the harassment. Sans massive French involvement, Britain controls the regular fighting. Saratoga was an outlier, aided by major malfeasance on the part of Britain.

Saratoga was an outlier? Burgoyne got his orders from the highest level in London, but the exact same patterns of flawed strategic thinking and operational decision-making were demonstrated at Buenos Aires, Plattsburgh, Baltimore, and New Orleans.

Suggests something structural in the equation, does it not?

Best,

 

[Mike]

Mike,
I believe it was France's idea to invade Britain.

No, it was one of Spain's conditions to join the war on France's side. Spain, like France, wanted a short war and felt an invasion of Britain was doable and would end the war quickly. Since France needed the Spanish navy, they reluctantly had to accept Spain's conditions.

http://books.google.ca/books?id=W86...=france spain gibraltar jonathan dull&f=false

http://www.xenophongroup.com/mcjoynt/dulltlk.htm

When France switched from limited assistance to full blown support, they recognized US independence and signed an alliance treaty guaranteeing full support. Their land grabs were not independent of the support of the US. From the moment they agreed to full support, they were in it to the max. they were not sucked into additional unending support to keep the americans from dropping out. the patriots were given several chances to drop out, but said 'hell no, we've got France on our side, it's independence or bust '.

No, the Rebels and the American population hated France because they were "Papists". The Rebels feared that France joining the Rebel side would cause the population to switch from ambivalence to support for the British. Some Rebels were even willing to defect to the British if France actively joined. To calm down the Rebels, France had to promise not to take back Canada, not to land an army in America and to provide only naval support. That was a warning bell to France (among many others) that the Rebels were not committed enough to fight to the end for independence. But France took that risk because they thought that it would be a short war. They were wrong; the ragtag Rebels were incompetent and not committed enough and Britain with its navy was still a tough nut to crack.

you paint a portrait of France envisioning the 13 colonies as a side show, while they carved up the British empire. They certainly thought they were going to get some empire spoils, but they had the colonies as one of the main theatres, and committed troops/supplies/money from the beginning. They misjudged the depth of the pool, but France jumped in with gusto into the deep end.

France's original plan as formulated by Foreign Minister Choiseul was that. Choiseul didn't care for American independence. He hated Britain and wanted revenge for losing Canada and India. He was open to allowing Britain to keep America but had to lose everything else. He rebuilt the French navy as much as he could to prepare the day when the rebellion (which he correctly predicted would happen in 1760) would occur and France could attack and strip Britain of the lucrative Carribean and Indian colonies. That was the original plan. However, by 1770 Choiseul was sacked because France wanted better relations with Britain because they feared Austrian and Russian dynastic claims and wanted Britain's help. So, Choiseul was replaced by Vergennes who was an anglophile. Britain, despite also being concerned with Austria and Russia, was still too francophobic and thereby rebuffed France's offer of reconciliation. So when the rebellion started, Vergenees changed the plans and made American independence as France's main war aim and expected only a short war would be enough to achieve that aim. He was forced to expand France's war aims as the war continued and became more expensive.

 

[Mike]

Where did you hear this from? Are you just talking about the "one-third Patriot, one-third Loyalist, one-third neutral" quotation? That only referred to the state of affairs in 1775. After July 1776 there was no turning back.

Most of the American population was ambivalent. They would go with whoever won the war. Both the British and Rebels had trouble recruiting American soldiers to their respective sides.

The Continental Congress had no legitimacy in that the American population didn't get to vote it into being or vote for independence. The fact that the Congress had trouble not only in raising armies, but paying and supplying them proved that American population was ambivalent about independence. So, July 1776 means nothing. It was only when the Rebels won the war that the Americans were willing to legitimize the Continental Congress.

 

[Mike]

Saratoga was an outlier? Burgoyne got his orders from the highest level in London, but the exact same patterns of flawed strategic thinking and operational decision-making were demonstrated at Buenos Aires, Plattsburgh, Baltimore, and New Oreleans.

Suggests something structural in the equation, does it not?

Best,

Maybe you should consider the different variables in the equation. The War of 1812 and the Revolutionary War are as common as apples and oranges. For starters, the USA was more united and had an industrial base by 1812 not to mention that Britain was exhausted after 20 years of constant war. That cannot be compared to the Revolutionary War. Washington and the other Rebels initially didn't want a French army in America but when the Rebels kept on losing, Washington had to throw caution to the wind and ask for a French army to come over. That speaks volumes about the desperate Rebel position that they had to ask the hated Catholics to help out directly. The French army still had to take caution though, in calming down the American population by keeping up appearances that the Rebels were still running the show which was not true. After all, it was Rochambeau that suggested attacking Yorktown.

 

[Sabot Cat]

France provided 90% of American arms and almost all of its gunpowder by 1776-7 [*]. The Americans would also be short 1.3 billion livres, which is the equivalent of $13 billion dollars today [*], and without any allies they'd have tens of thousands less soldiers and 73% fewer ships. The Revolutionaries would not have the supplies to continue the war, and the entire thing would fizzle out.

 

[TFSmith121]

You may want to reconsider the "hated Catholics" meme

Maybe you should consider the different variables in the equation. The War of 1812 and the Revolutionary War are as common as apples and oranges. For starters, the USA was more united and had an industrial base by 1812 not to mention that Britain was exhausted after 20 years of constant war. That cannot be compared to the Revolutionary War. Washington and the other Rebels initially didn't want a French army in America but when the Rebels kept on losing, Washington had to throw caution to the wind and ask for a French army to come over. That speaks volumes about the desperate Rebel position that they had to ask the hated Catholics to help out directly. The French army still had to take caution though, in calming down the American population by keeping up appearances that the Rebels were still running the show which was not true. After all, it was Rochambeau that suggested attacking Yorktown.

You may need to reconsider the "hated Catholics" meme considering the examples of Charles Carroll, Daniel Carroll, and Thomas Fitzsimmons.

And there's a place called "Maryland" you may have heard of...

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Yes, just like the revolutions in Mexico, the West Indies,

France provided 90% of American arms and almost all of its gunpowder by 1776-7 [*]. The Americans would also be short 1.3 billion livres, which is the equivalent of $13 billion dollars today [*], and without any allies they'd have tens of thousands less soldiers and 73% fewer ships. The Revolutionaries would not have the supplies to continue the war, and the entire thing would fizzle out.

Yes, just like the revolutions in Mexico, the West Indies, Central America, and South America fizzled out...

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

The continental congresses were formed by delegates

Most of the American population was ambivalent. They would go with whoever won the war. Both the British and Rebels had trouble recruiting American soldiers to their respective sides.

The Continental Congress had no legitimacy in that the American population didn't get to vote it into being or vote for independence. The fact that the Congress had trouble not only in raising armies, but paying and supplying them proved that American population was ambivalent about independence. So, July 1776 means nothing. It was only when the Rebels won the war that the Americans were willing to legitimize the Continental Congress.

The continental congresses were formed by delegates elected or appointed by the various colonial/state legislatures, so they were as legitimate as those bodies, which were elected by population which a larger percentage of those enfranchised in Britain and Ireland at the same time, so they were as legitimate (or not) as the Commons and certainly more so than the House of Lords.

Best,

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Saratoga was an outlier? Burgoyne got his orders from the highest level in London, but the exact same patterns of flawed strategic thinking and operational decision-making were demonstrated at Buenos Aires, Plattsburgh, Baltimore, and New Orleans.

Suggests something structural in the equation, does it not?

Best,

Not really. Every British attempt to defend Canada worked brilliantly, they engineered a string of defeats against the rebels which prolonged the war, and the rebellion struggled to produce another Saratoga for years.

Plattsburgh was barely a battle, the British lost on the Lake so Prevost withdrew, despite the fact he had been gaining ground on land. Hardly stunning incompetence or a bloody repulse, more like a well reasoned strategic decision.

Baltimore didn't see Britain marred by incompetent command (Ross's death was a huge factor though) and better prepared American defences repulsed the British rather than any amazing strategic maneuvers on the part of the US commanders.

New Orleans was hardly stunning incompetence. Pakenham's major mistake was not attacking earlier, then during the battle the senior British commanders were killed or incapacitated leaving the British forces leaderless for crucial hours, which then led to an orderly withdrawal and an army that still would have been capable of offensive operations had they not learned the war was over. It was a nice morale booster but hardly the decisive victory people like to paint it as, since it had no effect on the war.

Beunos Aires was definitely the fault of local commanders though.

You may need to reconsider the "hated Catholics" meme considering the examples of Charles Carroll, Daniel Carroll, and Thomas Fitzsimmons.

And there's a place called "Maryland" you may have heard off...

Best,

When men are printing "Damn the Pope" on cannons there's some anti-Catholic bias going on. There's a difference between tolerating them as fellow rebels and liking them, as most of the politics in the post-revolutionary period show.

Unless of course you'd like to tell me that didn't exist.

Yes, just like the revolutions in Mexico, the West Indies, Central America, and South America fizzled out...

Best,

Considering Spain was fighting across the breadth and width of South and Central America at pretty much the same time there's a bit of a difference between the two. The people in the West Indies also had both British help, and useful things like diseases on their side, which tended to wipe out European armies, just like in South America.

Something the Colonials noticeably lack.

The Americans were still willing to compromise at various periods, and didn't exactly coat themselves in glory throughout much of 1775-1780, otherwise history wouldn't exactly consider Valley Forge an important triumph and we wouldn't have gotten the Battle of Rhode Island or the Penobscot Expedition.

There's no reason to believe the rebels could have held off the British Empire on their own absent the massive French support offered. Rolling ones eyes and referring to revolutionary wars with massively different circumstances does not a point prove.

 

[TFSmith121]

The British tried to invade the US in force three times

The British tried to invade the US in force three times in 1812-15, twice from the sea and once overland/lacustrine and were defeated all three times, largely because they could never deploy and sustain combat power worth the name.

They tried the same thing twice in the Rio de la Plata and were stymied and defeated twice in 1806-07, and for the same reasons.

They tried it by sea in Boston in 1775 and were forced to withdraw or face destruction, tried it overland from BNA at Saratoga and Oriskany in 1777 and were defeated in both; given the realities of the Saratoga campaign, the British actually lost three battles in the field (Bennington, Freeman's Farm, and Bemis Heights), so their track record in the interior is even worse, actually.

And note that all of the above predate the extension of significant French aid, much less overt action.

Again, one can try and qualify it all one may wish, but the historical record is pretty clear - none of the European powers were able to deploy and sustain enough combat power on either American continent of any significance to force a political settlement against the wishes of those who lived there.

Best,

 

[Sabot Cat]

[snip]

So what would the Americans do to cope with the gun powder shortage and lack of arms?

The British tried to invade the US in force three times in 1812-15, twice from the sea and once overland/lacustrine and were defeated all three times, largely because they could never deploy and sustain combat power worth the name.

They tried the same thing twice in the Rio de la Plata and were stymied and defeated twice in 1806-07, and for the same reasons.

Apples and oranges, not to mention that the Napoleonic Wars were going on.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

The British tried to invade the US in force three times in 1812-15, twice from the sea and once overland/lacustrine and were defeated all three times, largely because they could never deploy and sustain combat power worth the name.

That's untrue. Maine was occupied successfully throughout the entire war, and the British controlled the Midwest (portions of Michigan, Illinois and the whole of modern Wisconsin). They also successfully controlled the Chesapeake, occupied Washington, and withdrew largely on their own initiative versus being driven out by the Americans That and the failure at Baltimore made any continued campaign pointless since they had already accomplished their war aims.

They also unequivocally crushed every American attempt at invading/occupying British territory. To say the couldn't deploy combat power worth the name in light of the victories they did accomplish is simply untrue.

This is of course not mentioning that they could land troops wherever they wished unopposed along the American coast.

They tried it by sea in Boston in 1775 and were forced to withdraw or face destruction, tried it overland from BNA at Saratoga and Oriskany in 1777 and were defeated in both; given the realities of the Saratoga campaign, the British actually lost three battles in the field (Bennington, Freeman's Farm, and Bemis Heights), so their track record in the interior is even worse, actually.

And note that all of the above predate the extension of significant French aid, much less overt action.

Except none of this decisively defeated the British or completely weakened their hold on the coasts and portions of New England or the South. Boston was only won by the Americans capturing heavy guns, absent that they're basically out of luck.

Without the extension of significant French aid after it would have been the high water mark of the revolution.

Again, one can try and qualify it all one may wish, but the historical record is pretty clear - none of the European powers were able to deploy and sustain enough combat power on either American continent of any significance to force a political settlement against the wishes of those who lived there.

Except this is still untrue. In quantifying the American Revolutionary War when one exams the ramshackle nature of the Continental Army and its uninspiring performance throughout many portions of the war and the deprivations it suffered; its easy to conclude that, absent foreign intervention, they were doomed.

In 1812 its also pretty easy to note that the United States would never have even considered risking war had Britain not been distracted by Napoleon, so when considering the potential combat power to be deployed that's another nail in the coffin that European powers couldn't sustain victories in the Western hemisphere. Also note the British possessions in the Western hemisphere alongside Spain's' and Spain managing to make a fight of it for over a decade despite the astronomical distance and geographic impediments placed on them.

The previously noted environmental factors from disease are also overwhelmingly present when one looks at Haiti and South America. (Yet were flouted in Cuba)

So by examining each case in the Western hemisphere it becomes overwhelmingly clear that its not quite so clear cut as you would make it out to be.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

So what would the Americans do to cope with the gun powder shortage and lack of arms?

Patriotism? Though that would be pretty hard to fire out of cannon, or to eat. As the Continental Army found out at Valley Forge.

 

[Sabot Cat]

Patriotism? Though that would be pretty hard to fire out of cannon, or to eat. As the Continental Army found out at Valley Forge.

They're sort of like the Confederates in the Civil War; their only chance for independence was through winning an impressive enough victory against their superior foe to convince foreign powers to intervene on their side.

 

[TFSmith121]

Make themselves, capture, and import

So what would the Americans do to cope with the gun powder shortage and lack of arms? Apples and oranges, not to mention that the Napoleonic Wars were going on.

The same thing the Haitians, Mexicans, Santo Domingoans, Central Americans, Colombians, Peruvians, Chileanes, Rio Platinenses, and Brazilians (eventually) did - Make it themselves, capture it, and import it themselves.

There's a reason all of the above gained their independence from Europe in the roughly five decades between 1775-1825, and although being able to play one European power off against another was helpful, it was not crucial ... the Atlantic, the home field advantage, and all the Europeans waiting to take advantage of any potential weakness close to home were more than enough.

Best,