Answering the Call of Lafayette: America Intervenes in the Franco-Prussian War

[flaja]

No, the entire US military was brought to full mobilisation, and invasion of Spain was considered a possibility, as was defence against a Spanish Invasion Force. Only 1st, 5th and 8th Corps went overseas (being the ones with decent complements of regulars). The rest stayed in garrison at home.

You can document this?

The U.S. could not have gone to war with Spain without liberating Cuba since the entire war centered around Cuba. But if a U.S. invasion of Spain was considered, why did we send our forces to the Philippines and not Spain?

 

[MrP]

You can document this?

The U.S. could not have gone to war with Spain without liberating Cuba since the entire war centered around Cuba. But if a U.S. invasion of Spain was considered, why did we send our forces to the Philippines and not Spain?

I'd imagine that the key word is considered. Many things that do not and could not come to pass are still considered.

 

[Nicomacheus]

Flaja,

You do make good points about the history of Americans of German descent.

First, it seems to me that the USA's involvement in the Franco-Prussian War TTL is a result of Grant's looking for a war. From prior discussions with Robert about the state of TTL US politics in Reconstruction it's not too hard for me to believe that Grant's coalition -- whether he's a Republican or a Unionist -- is very prone to fragmentation. Furthermore, the nation is still putting its own identity to rights after the Civil War. Hence, Grant probably makes use of all the lovely rhetoric of "The Debt We Owe to Lafayette," but's it's not the reason for the war.

Second, it seems to me that the political reasons given above are going to trump ethnic sentiment, particularly in an America where "Northern" v. "Southern" and "Radical" v. "Copperhead" v. "Unionist" are going to be far more decisive political factors. Rather the evidence you supply suggests to me that Grant's efforts to fight the war as a political exercise may be complicated by ethinc sentiment. Even then, I have a hard time seeing the expression of such sentiment acheiving enough clout to prevent the war if Grant's determined on having one (protest the hell out of it, yes).

Third, ethnic sentiment is very hard to track in American politics. It tends to affect local politics a lot by determing neighborhoods and establishing basic us v. them sentiments. This is what I mean when I say I doubt your contention that the "Germanness" of the politicians you list will lead to a united political movement against the war, led by pro-German sentiment. Instead, it may turn the sentiments of groups within whatever coalitions currently animate national elections. I think a lot therefore depends on Grant's political party. If at the time of Grant's election in 1868, the Republican Party is still running as the Unionist party. Given my vague feeling that you'd be most likely to find the most recent German Americans in the Radical wing of the Republican party, due to their usual anti-slavery sentiments, such sentiment may play a role in leading to the fragmenting of that coalition into two blocs, Unionists and Radicals. And even then the primary divide is probably feelings about Reconstruction. This in turn may further influence the fighting and politics of the war by forcing Grant to turn to more moderate Northerners and even Southerners to support the war, the latter motivated by a desire to return to power after the rebellion and to forge a legacy to overcome the "Bloody Shirt" of the Radicals' call for massive social change as a part of Reconstruction.

Anyway, good points all round. Cheers.

 

[Nicomacheus]

You can document this?

The U.S. could not have gone to war with Spain without liberating Cuba since the entire war centered around Cuba. But if a U.S. invasion of Spain was considered, why did we send our forces to the Philippines and not Spain?

The force in the Philippines was mostly Commodore Dewey's Asiatic Squadron: he launched a very quick attact, less than 2 weeks after war had been declared. The US didn't really have ground troops in the Phillipines until after hostilities ended, thus provoking the Philipine - American war.

 

[flaja]

I'd imagine that the key word is considered. Many things that do not and could not come to pass are still considered.

But was it ever any kind of real possibility? The U.S. wanted Cuba; we had no need for Spain.

 

[flaja]

Flaja,

First, it seems to me that the USA's involvement in the Franco-Prussian War TTL is a result of Grant's looking for a war.

Were there any other Wars that the U.S. could have joined in 1870? What about an all-out war on the Indians of the western U.S.?

If the Civil War in this scenario ends with slavery still in place, a war with Spain over Cuba would have been a real possibility since southern slave-owners had long coveted Cuba as potential slave states.

From prior discussions with Robert about the state of TTL

US politics in Reconstruction it's not too hard for me to believe that Grant's coalition -- whether he's a Republican or a Unionist -- is very prone to fragmentation. Furthermore, the nation is still putting its own identity to rights after the Civil War. Hence, Grant probably makes use of all the lovely rhetoric of "The Debt We Owe to Lafayette," but's it's not the reason for the war.

If the Civil War ended with slavery still in place none of the issues that lead to the Civil War would have been settled. This would make any kind of foreign war pretty much impossible.

Second, it seems to me that the political reasons given above are going to trump ethnic sentiment, particularly in an America where "Northern" v. "Southern" and "Radical" v. "Copperhead" v. "Unionist" are going to be far more decisive political factors.

Meaning that any foreign war scenario could not have happened because the country was far too divided.

But there is the possibility that an early end to the Civil War and re-union without reconstruction could have fostered another era of good feelings as far as politics were concerned. This could have allowed ethnic tensions to come to the fore. Remember that the U.S. had already had a history of ethnic tensions that were manifest in things like the Know Nothing Party.

Rather the evidence you supply suggests to me that Grant's efforts to fight the war as a political exercise may be complicated by ethinc sentiment. Even then, I have a hard time seeing the expression of such sentiment acheiving enough clout to prevent the war if Grant's determined on having one (protest the hell out of it, yes).

Suppose Siegel or Shurz were Speaker of the House when Grant called for a Declaration of War against Germany?

Third, ethnic sentiment is very hard to track in American politics. It tends to affect local politics a lot by determing neighborhoods and establishing basic us v. them sentiments.

If ethnic tension was always a local matter, explain how the Know Nothings became a national political party.

I think a lot therefore depends on Grant's political party. If at the time of Grant's election in 1868, the Republican Party is still running as the Unionist party.

If the Civil War ends in 1863, the National Union Party would never have existed since a Republican-War Democrat coalition would not have been needed.

Furthermore, Grant was a weak president. His administration was one of the most corrupt in history. I seriously doubt that Grant would have been politician enough to engineer our entry into a foreign war.

Given my vague feeling that you'd be most likely to find the most recent German Americans in the Radical wing of the Republican party, due to their usual anti-slavery sentiments, such sentiment may play a role in leading to the fragmenting of that coalition into two blocs, Unionists and Radicals.

The German immigrants post-48 would likely have been outnumbered by the German immigrants who came from the 1680s to 1848 and their descendants- many of whom owned slaves and were not radicals.

And even then the primary divide is probably feelings about Reconstruction.

If the Civil War ended in 1863, what reconstruction would have been needed much less one as radical as the one that actually happened?

 

[flaja]

The force in the Philippines was mostly Commodore Dewey's Asiatic Squadron: he launched a very quick attact, less than 2 weeks after war had been declared. The US didn't really have ground troops in the Phillipines until after hostilities ended, thus provoking the Philipine - American war.

If the U.S. had any real ideas about invading Spain, would Dewey’s fleet have been needed for the invasion? Wouldn’t he have been told ahead of time to quietly make his way to the Atlantic or at least not engage in hostilities in case he were needed to deal with unforeseen events as the war progressed?

 

[MrP]

But was it ever any kind of real possibility? The U.S. wanted Cuba; we had no need for Spain.

Beats me, old man. I've certainly heard it stated on this board before 67th did above. But the SAW really isn't my period, so I haven't got any sources either way.

 

[Nicomacheus]

If the U.S. had any real ideas about invading Spain, would Dewey’s fleet have been needed for the invasion? Wouldn’t he have been told ahead of time to quietly make his way to the Atlantic or at least not engage in hostilities in case he were needed to deal with unforeseen events as the war progressed?

Dewey's fleet was hardly the lion-share of the USN. Also, we're sort of getting off - topic.

 

[robertp6165]

As far as national origin goes, the U.S. has never had a majority. But ethnic Germans and their descendants for at least several generations, as the largest minority, would have a great deal of say in setting U.S. foreign policy as it relates to any conflict between Britain and Germany/Prussia....yada yada yada ad infinitum...

Let's put this tired old horse to rest, shall we? Even if I grant everything you say about the numbers of German Americans, you have not shown that they would have supported Germany or tried to inhibit the U.S. war effort in 1870. Since you are the one making those assertions, it is up to you to prove them, not to me to disprove them. The only thing you have put forth remotely resembling an attempt to provide support for your contention is your statement that the "loyalty of German Americans was strongly suspect on the eve of World War I." However, that does not prove that German Americans weren't loyal to the U.S....it proves that non-German Americans were paranoid about what German Americans might do in the event of war with Germany. In fact, German Americans were loyal to America during World War I, and in World War II. There is no sound reason to suspect that it would have been different in 1870.

You are welcome to believe otherwise, of course. But I am afraid that we are going to have to simply "agree to disagree" on this issue.

 

[robertp6165]

No, the field armies were about 200,000 in total, the other 100,000 were in garrisons etc..

Well, I don't know where you get your figures, but something does not compute. Totaling up the men who were in the field with the OTL Union Army of the Potomac, the Union Army of the Tennessee, the Union Army of the Cumberland, and the Union Army of the West in the Spring of 1862, by themselves (not including other Union field armies of smaller size, of which there were several in the field at that time), there were about 220,000 men in just those armies alone. As stated elsewhere, there were other Union field armies which were not included in that total (such as the one operating under Ben Butler against New Orleans and southern Louisiana; the one which was operating under John Pope against Island Number 10; another operating in coastal North Carolina; several armies totalling over 50,000 men operating in the Shenandoah Valley against Stonewall Jackson, and others). If you add these men into the total, the strength of the Union FIELD ARMIES is over 300,000. And again, this does not count garrisons in the North, troops manning the defenses of Washington and Union coastal fortifications, troops holding down the Western Territories, etc.

This does not count the Confederates in, either. Even you admit later that...

In this case, we have the 1861 and 1862 intakes (the 1863 intakes were miniscule BTW), about 500,000 trained soldiers for the Union, and about 300,000 for the Confederacy.

If that is the case, that means a minimum pool of 700,000 to 800,000 trained men to draw upon. These would be the men who would fill up the first units, and also provide the experienced officers, non-coms and veteran enlisted men who will enable the training of the new volunteers to proceed much faster.

So I think I have ample basis for assuming that an A.E.F. of 500,000 could be raised by the U.S. in 1870. You are, of course, free to disagree. But, as with the German-American issue, this is another horse I think we have beaten to death, and it might be time to just "agree to disagree."

 

[Zyzzyva]

<snip>
So I think I have ample basis for assuming that an A.E.F. of 500,000 could be raised by the U.S. in 1870. You are, of course, free to disagree. But, as with the German-American issue, this is another horse I think we have beaten to death, and it might be time to just "agree to disagree."

At the risk of laying into the poor dead beast, I think the idea is not so much that the States doesn't have that many veterans as that not all of them are going to be willing to fight overseas for France.

 

[robertp6165]

At the risk of laying into the poor dead beast, I think the idea is not so much that the States doesn't have that many veterans as that not all of them are going to be willing to fight overseas for France.

I can see that. However, there's always the draft, or the threat of it, to motivate volunteerism.

 

[67th Tigers]

Were there any other Wars that the U.S. could have joined in 1870? What about an all-out war on the Indians of the western U.S.?

OTL The US and Spain came close in 1873, but the US backed down when it was clear Spain, or rather the Spanish local forces completely outclassed her. This led to a major reform of the militia system, in an effort to create a force of 100,000 mobilisable at a few months notice. As it was, the only State Militia capable of supplying fighting men was New York, 32,000 on paper, maybe 10-15,000 in reality.

"Two modern vessels of war would have done us up in thirty minutes."
-Admiral Robeley D. Evans, USN, on the prospect of war with Spain in 1873

The US military is incredibly weak for most of the 19th century, indeed, the largest branch of the US Army and Militia in the late 1800's is the coast defence artillery.

 

[67th Tigers]

Well, I don't know where you get your figures, but something does not compute. Totaling up the men who were in the field with the OTL Union Army of the Potomac, the Union Army of the Tennessee, the Union Army of the Cumberland, and the Union Army of the West in the Spring of 1862, by themselves (not including other Union field armies of smaller size, of which there were several in the field at that time), there were about 220,000 men in just those armies alone. As stated elsewhere, there were other Union field armies which were not included in that total (such as the one operating under Ben Butler against New Orleans and southern Louisiana; the one which was operating under John Pope against Island Number 10; another operating in coastal North Carolina; several armies totalling over 50,000 men operating in the Shenandoah Valley against Stonewall Jackson, and others). If you add these men into the total, the strength of the Union FIELD ARMIES is over 300,000. And again, this does not count garrisons in the North, troops manning the defenses of Washington and Union coastal fortifications, troops holding down the Western Territories, etc.

Spring 1862 aye? Before a disk crash I had the complete Union Orbat (1 Apr 62) down to regiment and detachments.

Spring 1862 is interesting. Although you mention the Army of the Cumberland, it doesn't exist yet, it's still the Army of the Ohio. The Armies of Western Tennessee, Ohio and Mississippi, and then detachment that was the Army of the West (i.e. Halleck's Western Army Group) come to a bit less than 100,000 men.

In the Eastern theatre, McClellan reports 200,000 men and change. However, a quarter of those are absentees, and about half of the rest are either in the Valley, the Washington Defences, the Ft Monroe garrison, the Baltimore occupation force.

So that's 250,000 men. The remainder (50,000) are accounted for by the various detachments such as the SC expeditionary force etc.

If that is the case, that means a minimum pool of 700,000 to 800,000 trained men to draw upon. These would be the men who would fill up the first units, and also provide the experienced officers, non-coms and veteran enlisted men who will enable the training of the new volunteers to proceed much faster.

Military training doesn't last. Within 5 years of leaving the Colours a long service regular soldier is no longer suitable for front line duty.

The US will simply be building a new army from scratch.

 

[flaja]

Dewey's fleet was hardly the lion-share of the USN. Also, we're sort of getting off - topic.

Would a U.S. invasion of Spain have lead to a general European war?

 

[flaja]

Let's put this tired old horse to rest, shall we? Even if I grant everything you say about the numbers of German Americans, you have not shown that they would have supported

Germany or tried to inhibit the U.S. war effort in 1870.

Considering subsequent real history pertaining to World War I and World War II, German American opposition to a U.S. war with Germany in 1870 would have been a real possibility.

 

[flaja]

At the risk of laying into the poor dead beast, I think the idea is not so much that the States doesn't have that many veterans as that not all of them are going to be willing to fight overseas for France.

Precisely my point. France and Germany have a long history of being natural enemies. France and Britain have an even longer history of being enemies. Since most Americans in 1870 (as they do today) have a British, a German, or a British-German heritage, most Americans wouldn’t be willing to fight a war on behalf of France.

 

[flaja]

I can see that. However, there's always the draft, or the threat of it, to motivate volunteerism.

And there is always draft riots or the threat of them as well.

 

[flaja]

So that's 250,000 men. The remainder (50,000) are accounted for by the various detachments such as the SC expeditionary force etc.

And I’ve already shown that with just the operational Union and Confederate armies at Gettysburg and Vicksburg in July 1863 an army of 275,000 men could be deployed.

Military training doesn't last. Within 5 years of leaving the Colours a long service regular soldier is no longer suitable for front line duty.

Then why have we sent men who have not been in the army for a decade or more to front line duty in Iraq?