An Age of Miracles Continues: The Empire of Rhomania

[Evilprodigy]

It should also be quite clear that, well, we are in the age of aristocratic meritocracy. The Ottoman army fought in India, and the tens of thousands of soldiers there gathered experience. The ones who didn't shape up and become better, died, and those who didn't became more skilled for it. While officer positions will almost exclusively be stacked with land-owning aristocracy you don't get promotions without merit or education in the arts of war. The Ottomans weeded out their inefficient men in India, and what we have left facing Rome are the ones who became accomplished by passing the test that was India with flying colours. The highest positions, naturally, fall to the most decorated of the aristocratic military leaders through the likes of promotion by their superiors or even distinction enough to catch Ibrahim's eye.

If the Ottomans had not fought in India then their army would instead would have an officer corps lacking in the gauntlet of deadly real-world experiences that tends to make bad officers that coasted through the officer school die off. This is, effectively, what Rome currently has too to some extent as we are seeing in this update the importance of the retirees from previous conflicts as the current crop of officers is lacking such distinctions on the battlefield en masse. We have had sporadic conflict to test them of course but the army has been dramatically expanded and the update even said the officer staff is being strained due to this, so we reasonably speaking do not have a large crop of competent officers simply because Rome's officers lack the same massive wartime experience Ibrahim's gained while in India. Nineveh would be the best example of a recent conflict to train Roman officers but in that case the Ottomans learned as well. It was quite notable too on the Ottoman side because of the displays of incompetence from one of the units that ended up butchered as a result. I think it was Yaya or Azab soldiers? I forget honestly, but there was command and discipline issues before the battle and now so long afterwards those issues don't still seem to present as they were killed at Nineveh along with said incompetent soldiers and officers. Even those who lived would find getting promotions difficult because of it, while others who proved themselves would get said positions instead.

 

[jjstraub4]

How long before the Romans see the only good Arab Muslim as a dead Arab Muslim? The constant revolts are going to spill over to gebocide eventually (sounds like it’s already happening , but to what extent I’m wondering)

Will there be Arab Muslims left in the Roman Empire after this war ?

 

[Curtain Jerker]

Consistently facing off against unsettlingly good enemy commanders can have a benefit: you can study how your enemies exploited your errors, and IIRC we're approaching the period where the idea of studying past campaigns to plan future ones became really common (along with more professional army staffs in general).

True. Rome already has a OTL Prussian-style General Staff and has had one for a while now. Little good it has done them so far in this regard but the infrastructure is there which is half the battle (pun intended...)

 

[minifidel]

True. Rome already has a OTL Prussian-style General Staff and has had one for a while now. Little good it has done them so far in this regard but the infrastructure is there which is half the battle (pun intended...)

I think the good will start to show as the attrition in officers starts biting into Rome's enemies as well, but without the benefit of a professional structure to draw replacements from.

 

[Curtain Jerker]

I think the good will start to show as the attrition in officers starts biting into Rome's enemies as well, but without the benefit of a professional structure to draw replacements from.

I suppose we'll see. Given the terrible luck facing Roman officers (see: First Nineveh, where they died in droves, and Gaza, where one of them caught a musket ball in the throat right away) in battle combined with the lack of terrible luck facing non-Roman officers shown so far I'm not holding out much hope, but anything is possible.

 

[InMediasRes]

Perhaps the Roman military would benefit from more limited military interventions abroad, perhaps by rotating units in their colonial possessions and in and out of troubled frontiers to keep the rust from building up.

I'm fairly certain they regularly rotate units to the East already, in peace time at least. Though maybe the volume was not sufficient to gather experience across the board. Once the wartime expenses disappear and the higher income is still mostly available, maybe the Romans will be able to afford deploying higher numbers to the East. With the added bonus of possibly giving the Triunes and Spain-Portugal a much needed cutting down.

 

[Curtain Jerker]

Something I didn't pay enough attention to on the first read that I noticed on my re-read of this entry:

I'm assuming the slaves from Syria/Palestine sold to Arles/KotI/Aragon are eventually finding their way to the sugar plantations of the Caribbean? If so, ITTL the Caribbean will be a very interesting place from an ethnic and religious standpoint. We have sub-Saharan African slaves (like OTL) combined with these new slaves from the Levant combined with the Native Americans combined with the white Europeans/Creole descendants. Some of these people will be practicing Christians, some practicing Muslims, and some will practice the polytheistic religions of sub-Saharan Africa/the New World.

The Caribbean ITTL in say 1900 or so (or hell, even by 1700-1800) is going to be a very diverse place. I'm very curious as to what sort of distinct cultural/religious identities or traditions pop up from all the different people/faiths inhabiting those islands.

 

[minifidel]

I'm fairly certain they regularly rotate units to the East already, in peace time at least. Though maybe the volume was not sufficient to gather experience across the board. Once the wartime expenses disappear and the higher income is still mostly available, maybe the Romans will be able to afford deploying higher numbers to the East. With the added bonus of possibly giving the Triunes and Spain-Portugal a much needed cutting down.

IIRC, veterans who'd already seen action in the Far East make up a significant number of veteran line infantry at the start of the war, and I think that generally speaking, Rome's losses haven't hit its veterans the hardest, they just happened to have fewer veterans than their enemies.

 

[Evilprodigy]

Something I didn't pay enough attention to on the first read that I noticed on my re-read of this entry:

I'm assuming the slaves from Syria/Palestine sold to Arles/KotI/Aragon are eventually finding their way to the sugar plantations of the Caribbean? If so, ITTL the Caribbean will be a very interesting place from an ethnic and religious standpoint. We have sub-Saharan African slaves (like OTL) combined with these new slaves from the Levant combined with the Native Americans combined with the white Europeans/Creole descendants. Some of these people will be practicing Christians, some practicing Muslims, and some will practice the polytheistic religions of sub-Saharan Africa/the New World.

The Caribbean ITTL in say 1900 or so (or hell, even by 1700-1800) is going to be a very diverse place. I'm very curious as to what sort of distinct cultural/religious identities or traditions pop up from all the different people/faiths inhabiting those islands.

It's a drop in the bucket really. There were around 4-5 million African slaves sent to the Caribbean, with 8-15 million spread across the Americas as a whole, and while many died there it doesn't change the scale of it. IOTL Jordan in 1900 had around 400,000 people and modern day Israel-Palestine had 500,000. Even assuming a complete depopulation of the entire region using post-industrial and far less wartorn demographics than ITTL the number is still quite small, but enough for a noticeable minority especially if all of them were sent to Caribbean rather than the more likely outcome of being dispersed among traditional slave-trading routes in the Atlantic Ocean. What's more likely is that the number could be as low as 10% of the figure I just gave, from being three hundred odd years earlier, the region having suffered much more ethnic conflict and war, and that only Muslims are being enslaved and removed while the Christian and Jewish populations are remaining. Even high-balling it at 25% average (though modern day Jordan would be much more effected proportionally of course) it's still only 225,000 people. Certainly enough for some influences on the dominant culture of enslaved West Africans and Congolese but I don't think it'd be enough to maintain cultural cohesion and a distinctive identity spread out across slave plantations from Virginia to Patagonia.

 

[Curtain Jerker]

--SNIP--

You aren't wrong, but that 225,000 people estimate (and your guess is as good as mine, I have no problem with the methodology you chose BTW) is significantly larger than the "near-zero if not actually zero" amount of Syrian/Palestinian/Jordanians who were sold into slavery in the Caribbean OTL during the 16th-18th Centuries. To make an analogy, even a little bit of Tabasco in a stew is noticeable.

Plus, with only Arles/KotI/Aragon buying those slaves doesn't it stand to figure that they would be concentrated in the New World colonies of those three nations as opposed to sent to Triune colonies like the ones in OTL Thirteen Colonies? That's a total guess on my part though. Maybe the slavers from the three countries Rome is selling to are just middlemen and sell the slaves everywhere.

I'm just saying the Caribbean culture will be different when you add in the slaves from the Levant. And it stands to figure that there's a decent chance these slaves would be concentrated in particular areas, making it that much more likely that some sort of Islamic Levant culture survives in the Caribbean.

I can see a ITTL Caribbean where a few of the Lesser Antilles in, say, 1900, have a small but noticeable Muslim minority due to the slaves keeping their faith alive. Or maybe some sort of syncretism occurs combining Christianity, Islam and the various indigenous faiths. Lots of options here. Stuff like this fascinates me.

 

[Stark]

Both of the Ottoman commanders mentioned in the update learned their ropes in India, and did so in an army that has essentially been on the march non-stop since the time of Ibrahim's father's campaigns. Roman armies tend to dedicate their efforts to defensive maneuvering -- and defending requires a lot less innovation and adaptability when you have stout fortresses and deep supply lines.

I also think that it's consistent with pre-Byzantine Roman history as well: as Rome ceased offensive operations and the sort of probing campaigns that really strain commanders' abilities, as their armies became garrisons with offensive capabilities essentially, the quality of its subordinates gravitated towards a stable baseline of "competent but corseted by tradition, inertia and risk aversion".

Notably, every time Rome is shocked out of this complacent security in its borders, as its commanders are forced to adapt or die as their supplies are cut-off or they're forced to pursue their enemies, new subordinates rise to the top as they demonstrate their abilities. Rome's commanders seem to go through a pretty consistent pattern of desperate adaptation, brilliant innovation, then prolonged stagnation.

EDIT: I think Demetrios, the Megas Domestikos and the two main Strategoi will look back on the army's performance, and may come across some previous reports documenting the very problem I mention above (the predictable cycle of stagnation precipitating a dramatic correction), and the Schools of War may be the next thing to be reformed by Demetrios III.

EDIT 2: And I also think we're beginning to see the first signs of that desperate adaptation in figures like d'Este and the commander of the Army of Mesopotamia, as Rome plays around with flying columns capable of deep raids with professional troops instead of mercenary raiders.

Very nice analysis.

 

[Evilprodigy]

You aren't wrong, but that 225,000 people estimate (and your guess is as good as mine, I have no problem with the methodology you chose BTW) is significantly larger than the "near-zero if not actually zero" amount of Syrian/Palestinian/Jordanians who were sold into slavery in the Caribbean OTL during the 16th-18th Centuries. To make an analogy, even a little bit of Tabasco in a stew is noticeable.

Plus, with only Arles/KotI/Aragon buying those slaves doesn't it stand to figure that they would be concentrated in the New World colonies of those three nations as opposed to sent to Triune colonies like the ones in OTL Thirteen Colonies? That's a total guess on my part though. Maybe the slavers from the three countries Rome is selling to are just middlemen and sell the slaves everywhere.

I'm just saying the Caribbean culture will be different when you add in the slaves from the Levant. And it stands to figure that there's a decent chance these slaves would be concentrated in particular areas, making it that much more likely that some sort of Islamic Levant culture survives in the Caribbean.

I can see a ITTL Caribbean where a few of the Lesser Antilles in, say, 1900, have a small but noticeable Muslim minority due to the slaves keeping their faith alive. Or maybe some sort of syncretism occurs combining Christianity, Islam and the various indigenous faiths. Lots of options here. Stuff like this fascinates me.

I did consider your analogy about influence, they'd almost certainly influence the other enslaved peoples in some manner and to a varying degree island by island, state by state. While it would be reasonable to assume that the Levantine slaves would end up concentrated among certain colonial powers I do not think they will be statistically significant from a cultural standpoint. As per the update Aragon sells to the Spanish market, the Kingdom of the Isles doesn't have any colonies as far as I know, and Arles's colonial possessions are limited ever since Mexico became independent. The new world is the domain of the Spanish and the Trinues, with a smattering of Arles and the independent Mexico. So these states almost exclusively will end up selling their slaves to third parties. Furthermore, keep in mind the international nature of the slave trade. While it is certainly easier for a merchant in Arles to sell a slave to a contact in an Arletian colony they likely do not solely have that contact. Arletian ships could very likely take these slaves anywhere, as could the Aragonese and Islanders who are even more likely than the Arletians to sell to the slaveowners or slave merchants of American colonial powers.

Potential influences upon the dominant post-colonial culture though would likely be influences upon various creole languages in vocabulary and pronunciation. Religiously I am certain how well Islamic teachings would survive given the zealotry the Spanish OTL and ITTL enforce Catholic faith upon their subjects. The Triunes might see minority groups survive but I am uncertain about how intense their people are on the subject of religion to minorities within their state. Those who remain Muslims, somehow, would have to contend with at least another two centuries of slavery and suppression, then another century of continued cultural pressure, and only then would religious freedom become relatively entrenched as an idea. In modern day the indigenous religions of the African Diaspora survive in statistically insignificant numbers on a national level, with Christians and non-religious people forming 90% or more of post-colonial populations. Non-christian religious groups are almost elusively of East Indian and Asian heritage, brought to the Caribbean as Coolies in the 19th and 20th centuries, such as the large groups of Hindus and Muslims in Trinidad and Tobago (18% and 5% respectively). The British brought Indians, the French Vietnamese, the Dutch Indonesians, the Spanish Philippine, and all of them brought Chinese who accounted for 10-15% of the population of Cuba in 1875. Many returned to their countries of origin, but many more stayed so if you ever look at religious statistics of modern Caribbean nations very few of the non-Christians are of enslaved African heritage. It's more likely, as you say, that religious syncretism would occur. Cultural practices of Levantine Arab Muslims could well survive in a Christian context, as the various forms of Vodoo/Vodou do from Cuba to Brazil in various forms, sizes, and intensities that influences the local expressions of Christianity in the same way that, for example, Mexican Catholic and Spiritual Baptist Churches are informed by the pre-Christian cultures of the people and their unique experiences following Christianization.

 

[Komnenos002]

I do get where the frustrations regarding commanders come from at this point. The Romans are meant to be the power with a more technical and professional approach to warfare - I mean, no one else has a School of War.

But instead, it does feel like every enemy has - for centuries - rolled a 6 on Generalship compared to the 2 the Romans did. Except if the dice was to be weighted in any direction, the narrative would have suggested towards the Romans.

I know that when I was reading this update and it went "Here is the Ottoman General, he captured 34 cities. His Roman opponent is an idiotic retiree," I could only sigh. I've read this update before.

 

[Wolttaire]

I do get where the frustrations regarding commanders come from at this point. The Romans are meant to be the power with a more technical and professional approach to warfare - I mean, no one else has a School of War.

But instead, it does feel like every enemy has - for centuries - rolled a 6 on Generalship compared to the 2 the Romans did. Except if the dice was to be weighted in any direction, the narrative would have suggested towards the Romans.

I know that when I was reading this update and it went "Here is the Ottoman General, he captured 34 cities. His Roman opponent is an idiotic retiree," I could only sigh. I've read this update before.

Me too, for example, they appoint a commander to a city who which city is then under siege that with near perfect accuracy hit the Romans cannons

 

[JSC]

So I re-read the whole timeline and all the comments (Thank you new job in front of internet connected computer) over the last couple weeks and I have a few thoughts.

1) It was only mentioned once in a single comment around page 500 or thereabouts in the original thread but I think we are looking at the beginning of "The Sundering" in the Levant. The Romans are done with the once a generation revolts and by the end of this the Levant is going to be seriously depopulated but majority Christian

2) I don't think overall the Romans have bad officers; from reading the timeline for the last 45years in story what they have had has been a stupidly bad run of luck at inopportune moments. Let write it out a bit
a) In the Idawite uprising as the Romans are going to siege and crush Cairo a Idawite force appears behind their lines and destroys their entire siege train. This ruins the chances of ending the uprising that campaign season
b) At Nineveh as the Romans are completing a maneuver with a small window of vulnerability the wind blows exposing the attempt and allowing Iskander to isolate and trap a chunk of the Roman army including the Kaisar; greatly strengthening the Ottoman hand
c) At Belgrade a fortress that should hold up for an entire campaign season or more instead has a powder explosion and is severely weakened. Forces the Romans to attack before they ready since the anvil will break before the hammer strikes.
d) At the first major battle not only is there a snafu that leads to a lack of ammunition for a part of the defense line but that part of the line is commanded by the one person who isn't a professional officer who compounds the error by a doomed charge
e) Instead of sending the Georgians a reasonable offer for the throne the foreign minister sends a BS offer and is able to hide it because D3 is concentrating on the war. Not only does this deny Rome 40000 Georgian troops but it means Rome also has to commit a force to deal with a theatre that by now should be closed
f) Just before the fortress of Arra is about to capitulate the Ottomans are able to get enough powder inside via a doomed charge to have it hold out another couple months. It forced the Roman Army to stay in place for another couple months while the Ottomans rampaged through Palestine.

Each of these have occurred in just the last 40 years and each changed the strategic direction of a war. Take away the bad luck and the Idawites are 75KM south and weaker, Iskander is paying for Mosul rather than getting border forts, Germany is hit far harder in the first campaign season, there are an extra 45 000 soldiers in Northern Iraq, and the Ottoman Army is stuck around Damascus with the door firmly shut behind them.

3) Despite all this the Romans clearly have a better trained army overall. Yes the Germans and the Ottomans might have better generals but the army from top to bottom is decidedly inferior.
a) Ive said it before but Blucher, Vauban, and Bone-breaker haven't gained a single strategic victory despite outnumbering the Roman army in every battle for the first 2 and a half campaign seasons. They grinded their way into Bulgaria before losing it all in just a couple months. In EU4 terms they took Vidin, Sofia, and Tarnovo before losing nearly all of it in a couple months and for that they broke their army while nearly bankrupting the realm. Why this army keeps getting held up as some invincible god like creation I truly don't understand.
b) With the Ottomans let's be clear; at the absolute height of their power with their absolute best leader before or since with calm borders and a battle hardened army facing a Rome that was distracted by multiple other commitments with average leadership the Ottomans were able to squeak out a win by a mix of bluffing and corruption on the part of the Romans.

4) In the current war the Ottomans attacked a Rome that was in a life or death struggle in Europe already; the Ottomans had a battle hardened but not exhausted army; the Ottomans had cleared out all other commitments, and the Ottomans achieved 100% complete strategic surprise. Despite having literally the best possible hand in two campaign seasons the Ottomans are stuck in Palestine at the end of long insecure supply line that will barely be enough to keep their army fed through the winter let alone get it enough war supplies to fight battles. While this is going on pre-war Ottoman territory in Northern Iraq is once again being plundered and taken. All of this is being done by a Rome that has decided that this is a SECONDARY theatre.

All in all the Romans are getting what they need. Average to good officers from General down to corporal. They lose out on the brilliant warlords that their enemies get but the robustness and depth of the Roman officer corp diminishes the effectiveness. Compare the battles of Andreas versus anyone and Iskander/Blucher/Bone-breaker versus Roman armies. The Romans bleed and are roughed up but there has been no equivalent of Cannae, or Sicily, or the Iron Gates, or the Mameluke campaign with Rome as the losers. They remain strong in the field with new officers training new soldiers and come back for more. They lose tactically but with the exception of Iskander are winning strategically and even with Iskander the losses amounted to a whole 3 border forts..not even a single city lost.

 

[Stark]

So I re-read the whole timeline and all the comments (Thank you new job in front of internet connected computer) over the last couple weeks and I have a few thoughts.

1) It was only mentioned once in a single comment around page 500 or thereabouts in the original thread but I think we are looking at the beginning of "The Sundering" in the Levant. The Romans are done with the once a generation revolts and by the end of this the Levant is going to be seriously depopulated but majority Christian

2) I don't think overall the Romans have bad officers; from reading the timeline for the last 45years in story what they have had has been a stupidly bad run of luck at inopportune moments. Let write it out a bit
a) In the Idawite uprising as the Romans are going to siege and crush Cairo a Idawite force appears behind their lines and destroys their entire siege train. This ruins the chances of ending the uprising that campaign season
b) At Nineveh as the Romans are completing a maneuver with a small window of vulnerability the wind blows exposing the attempt and allowing Iskander to isolate and trap a chunk of the Roman army including the Kaisar; greatly strengthening the Ottoman hand
c) At Belgrade a fortress that should hold up for an entire campaign season or more instead has a powder explosion and is severely weakened. Forces the Romans to attack before they ready since the anvil will break before the hammer strikes.
d) At the first major battle not only is there a snafu that leads to a lack of ammunition for a part of the defense line but that part of the line is commanded by the one person who isn't a professional officer who compounds the error by a doomed charge
e) Instead of sending the Georgians a reasonable offer for the throne the foreign minister sends a BS offer and is able to hide it because D3 is concentrating on the war. Not only does this deny Rome 40000 Georgian troops but it means Rome also has to commit a force to deal with a theatre that by now should be closed
f) Just before the fortress of Arra is about to capitulate the Ottomans are able to get enough powder inside via a doomed charge to have it hold out another couple months. It forced the Roman Army to stay in place for another couple months while the Ottomans rampaged through Palestine.

Each of these have occurred in just the last 40 years and each changed the strategic direction of a war. Take away the bad luck and the Idawites are 75KM south and weaker, Iskander is paying for Mosul rather than getting border forts, Germany is hit far harder in the first campaign season, there are an extra 45 000 soldiers in Northern Iraq, and the Ottoman Army is stuck around Damascus with the door firmly shut behind them.

3) Despite all this the Romans clearly have a better trained army overall. Yes the Germans and the Ottomans might have better generals but the army from top to bottom is decidedly inferior.
a) Ive said it before but Blucher, Vauban, and Bone-breaker haven't gained a single strategic victory despite outnumbering the Roman army in every battle for the first 2 and a half campaign seasons. They grinded their way into Bulgaria before losing it all in just a couple months. In EU4 terms they took Vidin, Sofia, and Tarnovo before losing nearly all of it in a couple months and for that they broke their army while nearly bankrupting the realm. Why this army keeps getting held up as some invincible god like creation I truly don't understand.
b) With the Ottomans let's be clear; at the absolute height of their power with their absolute best leader before or since with calm borders and a battle hardened army facing a Rome that was distracted by multiple other commitments with average leadership the Ottomans were able to squeak out a win by a mix of bluffing and corruption on the part of the Romans.

4) In the current war the Ottomans attacked a Rome that was in a life or death struggle in Europe already; the Ottomans had a battle hardened but not exhausted army; the Ottomans had cleared out all other commitments, and the Ottomans achieved 100% complete strategic surprise. Despite having literally the best possible hand in two campaign seasons the Ottomans are stuck in Palestine at the end of long insecure supply line that will barely be enough to keep their army fed through the winter let alone get it enough war supplies to fight battles. While this is going on pre-war Ottoman territory in Northern Iraq is once again being plundered and taken. All of this is being done by a Rome that has decided that this is a SECONDARY theatre.

All in all the Romans are getting what they need. Average to good officers from General down to corporal. They lose out on the brilliant warlords that their enemies get but the robustness and depth of the Roman officer corp diminishes the effectiveness. Compare the battles of Andreas versus anyone and Iskander/Blucher/Bone-breaker versus Roman armies. The Romans bleed and are roughed up but there has been no equivalent of Cannae, or Sicily, or the Iron Gates, or the Mameluke campaign with Rome as the losers. They remain strong in the field with new officers training new soldiers and come back for more. They lose tactically but with the exception of Iskander are winning strategically and even with Iskander the losses amounted to a whole 3 border forts..not even a single city lost.

This reminds me to WW2 pilot and tank crew training... Germans and Japanese have famous aces who fight until they die and compile impressive kill list, UK and US send them to train new recruits and have much better overall fighting force.

The disparity in AoM is not due to different training practices but the results seem similar - one side has cream on the top (which is mostly luck and experience based), the other much more robust and numerous officer core. Minifidel explained it in a similar way.

Once luck changes (and Romans are getting the experience right now), the Empire could go on a short term rampage.

 

[Curtain Jerker]

I do get where the frustrations regarding commanders come from at this point. The Romans are meant to be the power with a more technical and professional approach to warfare - I mean, no one else has a School of War.

But instead, it does feel like every enemy has - for centuries - rolled a 6 on Generalship compared to the 2 the Romans did. Except if the dice was to be weighted in any direction, the narrative would have suggested towards the Romans.

I know that when I was reading this update and it went "Here is the Ottoman General, he captured 34 cities. His Roman opponent is an idiotic retiree," I could only sigh. I've read this update before.

I've been saying this for months. It is almost beyond parody at this point. If I didn't know any better I'd say our author was trolling us or something. I will give B444 credit - he/she does find new and creative ways to make sure Rome gets the short stick when it comes to leadership because a cowardly retiree is something we haven't seen before.

--SNIP--

This is a great, thoughtful post. There's a few problems here however that I want to address. In no particular order:

I wrote a lot about First Nineveh. Yes, Iskander was very lucky, but the reason the battle was such a disaster for the Romans was because Gabras, the Roman general in charge...well, I'll let our author explain it:

At the same time an Ottoman battery scores a lucky hit and explodes a Roman powder magazine behind the Roman right, sowing chaos in the area and seriously hampering the buildup to the planned attack. Reminded by his staff that the Kaisar is amongst the troops on Mount Alfaf (it is strongly believed by historians that he had honestly forgotten the Kaisar’s position when ordering the Akoimetoi to remain on the mountain) and with the planned reinforcements from the left still on his left, Alexios changes his plans. Perhaps he can cut off the Ottoman salient instead.

(Emphasis is mine)

That mistake wasn't luck but bad leadership. It was bad leadership when Gabras used only "a screen of cavalry" to link the men on Mount Alfaf with the rest of his army instead of some line infantry or something more sturdy than a cavalry screen.

Rome was unlucky at First Nineveh but that luck was compounded by a lack of good leadership on their side and a brilliant, flawless general on the Ottoman side.

Our author has admitted he "messed up with him" so I don't need to beat the dead horse that is Iskander again, but Gabras' leadership is why a battle that should have been at worst a draw turned into such a strategic defeat.

It was also bad leadership when Petros Cheilas was more interested in lining his own pockets as Protospatharios of the Office of Barbarians than actually doing his job and letting the Roman delegation at Mashhadshar know about the Ottoman defeats at Depalpur. Cheilas is either stupid or corrupt - either way, more Roman bad leadership.

That doesn't take into account the bad leadership in foreign affairs from Demetrios II and his mother in the first place.

As far as the rest of your examples under 2): You are right about the bad luck at Cairo, Belgrade, and Arra but I'd argue that point d) isn't luck, but more bad leadership on the part of the Romans. It wasn't bad luck that led to Rome having a lack of ammo at a citadel but negligence on the part of the Roman leadership. It would be one thing if the ammo was there and it blew up (like Belgrade) but the ammo was never there in the first place. That's not bad luck, that's poor planning - which boils down again to poor leadership.

(I'm not even going to get into Crown Prince Lazar and how terrible at everything he was before, during, and after order Leo and his men to their death at Sopot. The only good thing about him is that he seems to have vanished from the story. Good riddance I say).

2e) also has nothing to do with luck at all. The foreign minister screwing up is bad leadership. It is epidemic on the Roman side and has been for decades.

I don't grant the premise that the Romans have the better trained army. First Ruse was a setback for two reasons - 1) the Archbishop caught Michael Laskaris napping and 2) the majority of the men under attack in the battle itself were fresh conscripts who broke and caused a rout. The battle was as bad as it was precisely because of the lack of training in the Roman army.

Rome has two main advantages in this war. The first is that their economy is far better organized and efficient than either the Allies or the Ottomans. Being able to expand the military on the fly without bankrupting the country is a testament to Demetrios III and his leadership. The second advantage is that (so far) the main fighting in Thrace and Syria/Palestine has been on Roman lands. It is very tough for any army, no matter how well-led, in the early 17th Century to stay supplied when campaigning on enemy territory. If Rome were to take the offensive and attack Mesopotamia proper or Bohemia (or even Hungary) I imagine they would face the same exact supply issues that Blucher and Ibrahim are facing right now. That's just the nature of the beast.

However, I'm not going to give Rome a ton of credit for playing defense in this war. They didn't choose to play defense, it was forced on them by the Allies and Ottomans all attacking at once. I would also remind that the reason half of Roman Europe is a smoldering crater is because Blucher ran circles around Nikolaois Mouzalon at Drenovac and was able to quickly take half the Danube fortresses as a result. Mouzalon was shown to be a bad field commander in 1632 - again, bad leadership on the part of the Romans.

(I will give Mouzalon credit for being a far better overall commander of the entire war effort than he was in the field vs Blucher. The fact that the army was able to quickly expand without mass conscription - which would have been an economic disaster - is a feather in his hat.)

As far as the Ottomans, I think you are short-changing Ibrahim. He's not his dad but he played geopolitics perfectly by securing vital tribal support, encouraging the Syria/Palestine rebels to revolt and arming them once they did (although that's playing out badly for them now, it bought him a year+ of chaos), he secured the fortresses and interior highways of Roman Syria, didn't attack Anatolia (which would have been a disaster) and got Theodoros Laskaris to fall for the oldest trick in the book when Ibrahim left his camp fires burning overnight and started marching south without Theodoros realizing it til the next day. That subterfuge is how he was able to maul an Egyptian army in the first place at Aabdeh before Theodoros caught up to him a day later. I don't want to call Ibrahim a genius like his father but he's a very good leader at both the tactical and strategic levels.

What's screwed him is the supply issue which again, isn't really his fault, just how things worked in general back then.

In closing, I think it is fair to say that Rome has better strategic leaders in this war (Demetrios III blows Theodor/Cesare out of the water) and worse tactical commanders, especially at the non-theater levels. There's no Roman analogues to von Mackensen or Vauban or Casimir or the Archbishop or Turgut Reis or Sinan Pasha.

Rome hasn't had a kickass general since Andreas Niketas died in 1517. In the ensuring 116 years, Rome's enemies have multiple great generals while Rome certainly has not.

 

[Stark]

I've been saying this for months. It is almost beyond parody at this point. If I didn't know any better I'd say our author was trolling us or something. I will give B444 credit - he/she does find new and creative ways to make sure Rome gets the short stick when it comes to leadership because a cowardly retiree is something we haven't seen before.



This is a great, thoughtful post. There's a few problems here however that I want to address. In no particular order:

I wrote a lot about First Nineveh. Yes, Iskander was very lucky, but the reason the battle was such a disaster for the Romans was because Gabras, the Roman general in charge...well, I'll let our author explain it:



(Emphasis is mine)

That mistake wasn't luck but bad leadership. It was bad leadership when Gabras used only "a screen of cavalry" to link the men on Mount Alfaf with the rest of his army instead of some line infantry or something more sturdy than a cavalry screen.

Rome was unlucky at First Nineveh but that luck was compounded by a lack of good leadership on their side and a brilliant, flawless general on the Ottoman side.

Our author has admitted he "messed up with him" so I don't need to beat the dead horse that is Iskander again, but Gabras' leadership is why a battle that should have been at worst a draw turned into such a strategic defeat.

It was also bad leadership when Petros Cheilas was more interested in lining his own pockets as Protospatharios of the Office of Barbarians than actually doing his job and letting the Roman delegation at Mashhadshar know about the Ottoman defeats at Depalpur. Cheilas is either stupid or corrupt - either way, more Roman bad leadership.

That doesn't take into account the bad leadership in foreign affairs from Demetrios II and his mother in the first place.

As far as the rest of your examples under 2): You are right about the bad luck at Cairo, Belgrade, and Arra but I'd argue that point d) isn't luck, but more bad leadership on the part of the Romans. It wasn't bad luck that led to Rome having a lack of ammo at a citadel but negligence on the part of the Roman leadership. It would be one thing if the ammo was there and it blew up (like Belgrade) but the ammo was never there in the first place. That's not bad luck, that's poor planning - which boils down again to poor leadership.

(I'm not even going to get into Crown Prince Lazar and how terrible at everything he was before, during, and after order Leo and his men to their death at Sopot. The only good thing about him is that he seems to have vanished from the story. Good riddance I say).

2e) also has nothing to do with luck at all. The foreign minister screwing up is bad leadership. It is epidemic on the Roman side and has been for decades.

I don't grant the premise that the Romans have the better trained army. First Ruse was a setback for two reasons - 1) the Archbishop caught Michael Laskaris napping and 2) the majority of the men under attack in the battle itself were fresh conscripts who broke and caused a rout. The battle was as bad as it was precisely because of the lack of training in the Roman army.

Rome has two main advantages in this war. The first is that their economy is far better organized and efficient than either the Allies or the Ottomans. Being able to expand the military on the fly without bankrupting the country is a testament to Demetrios III and his leadership. The second advantage is that (so far) the main fighting in Thrace and Syria/Palestine has been on Roman lands. It is very tough for any army, no matter how well-led, in the early 17th Century to stay supplied when campaigning on enemy territory. If Rome were to take the offensive and attack Mesopotamia proper or Bohemia (or even Hungary) I imagine they would face the same exact supply issues that Blucher and Ibrahim are facing right now. That's just the nature of the beast.

However, I'm not going to give Rome a ton of credit for playing defense in this war. They didn't choose to play defense, it was forced on them by the Allies and Ottomans all attacking at once. I would also remind that the reason half of Roman Europe is a smoldering crater is because Blucher ran circles around Nikolaois Mouzalon at Drenovac and was able to quickly take half the Danube fortresses as a result. Mouzalon was shown to be a bad field commander in 1632 - again, bad leadership on the part of the Romans.

(I will give Mouzalon credit for being a far better overall commander of the entire war effort than he was in the field vs Blucher. The fact that the army was able to quickly expand without mass conscription - which would have been an economic disaster - is a feather in his hat.)

As far as the Ottomans, I think you are short-changing Ibrahim. He's not his dad but he played geopolitics perfectly by securing vital tribal support, encouraging the Syria/Palestine rebels to revolt and arming them once they did (although that's playing out badly for them now, it bought him a year+ of chaos), he secured the fortresses and interior highways of Roman Syria, didn't attack Anatolia (which would have been a disaster) and got Theodoros Laskaris to fall for the oldest trick in the book when Ibrahim left his camp fires burning overnight and started marching south without Theodoros realizing it til the next day. That subterfuge is how he was able to maul an Egyptian army in the first place at Aabdeh before Theodoros caught up to him a day later. I don't want to call Ibrahim a genius like his father but he's a very good leader at both the tactical and strategic levels.

What's screwed him is the supply issue which again, isn't really his fault, just how things worked in general back then.

In closing, I think it is fair to say that Rome has better strategic leaders in this war (Demetrios III blows Theodor/Cesare out of the water) and worse tactical commanders, especially at the non-theater levels. There's no Roman analogues to von Mackensen or Vauban or Casimir or the Archbishop or Turgut Reis or Sinan Pasha.

Rome hasn't had a kickass general since Andreas Niketas died in 1517. In the ensuring 116 years, Rome's enemies have multiple great generals while Rome certainly has not.

Just on the last point, Andreas Drakos and Giorgios Laskaris would like to disagree.

Regarding the rest, you're constantly repeating yourself. You've stated your complaints, there's no need to repeat them after every post.

 

[Curtain Jerker]

Regarding the rest, you're constantly repeating yourself. You've stated your complaints, there's no need to repeat them after every post.

Ummmm, I was replying to someone else who brought up the same issues I did and I was addressing another poster who brought up those same issues. Why are others allowed to "constantly" repeat themselves but I'm not, especially in a reply?

I've been effusive in my praise for this timeline when warranted and critical when I feel that's warranted too. I've said over and over that the timeline rocks otherwise I would have stopped reading/commenting a long time ago. The issue of Roman leadership is one other posters have brought up, why aren't I allowed to reply?

 

[JSC]

As far as the Ottomans, I think you are short-changing Ibrahim. He's not his dad but he played geopolitics perfectly by securing vital tribal support, encouraging the Syria/Palestine rebels to revolt and arming them once they did (although that's playing out badly for them now, it bought him a year+ of chaos), he secured the fortresses and interior highways of Roman Syria, didn't attack Anatolia (which would have been a disaster) and got Theodoros Laskaris to fall for the oldest trick in the book when Ibrahim left his camp fires burning overnight and started marching south without Theodoros realizing it til the next day. That subterfuge is how he was able to maul an Egyptian army in the first place at Aabdeh before Theodoros caught up to him a day later. I don't want to call Ibrahim a genius like his father but he's a very good leader at both the tactical and strategic levels.

What's screwed him is the supply issue which again, isn't really his fault, just how things worked in general back then.

In closing, I think it is fair to say that Rome has better strategic leaders in this war (Demetrios III blows Theodor/Cesare out of the water) and worse tactical commanders, especially at the non-theater levels. There's no Roman analogues to von Mackensen or Vauban or Casimir or the Archbishop or Turgut Reis or Sinan Pasha.

Rome hasn't had a kickass general since Andreas Niketas died in 1517. In the ensuring 116 years, Rome's enemies have multiple great generals while Rome certainly has not.

I agree that Ibrahim played his hand perfectly. I even pointed out that his invasion was the absolute best conditions the Ottomans could hope for. Also there's a reason campfires at night are the oldest trick in the book; because in an age before night vision or radio intercepts when the only way to "see" an army is to literally SEE them campfires at night while the army marches is an amazingly effective trick. Its not idiotic to fall for it. Its unfortunate but not idiotic.

Regarding the lack of supplies. It seems odd that you would blame Laskaris for falling for campfires but would give Ibrahim a pass while the Romans spent an entire campaign season systematically seizing the fortresses his supply line depended on and Ibrahims solution was to stay right where he was and watch it happen while sending a flying column to Egypt and try to disrupt Roman supplies. For all the "brilliance" of Ibrahim and his commanders his entire army is now entirely reliant on a single desert road that will be hard pressed to get enough food to him let alone any other supplies.

I don't get this focus on 1st Ruse. Even in story its shown as a small skirmish that only gets a name because it was the first engagement in an area that had a lot of them. How was it a "setback"? Roman plans were not delayed or changed. Roman power was not appreciably diminished. The biggest knock-on effect of 1st Ruse was Rome deciding to give a bit more training to their recruits before sending them to the front. This "battle" could be summed up as "in the march to Ruse there are skirmishes with the Germans getting the better of a Roman column though not enough to slow down the Roman advance more than a day or two". And marching to a battlefield in columns was also common at this time period for large armies...since the logistical capacity of roads made it a necessity. It would be impossible to supply the entire army along a single road, so they are split up. The price of the army not starving is that sections of it can be vulnerable to flying columns..as happened here.

Finally; war is all about the strategic; the Romans have shown that they know that, Blucher and Theodore and Ibrahim have shown that they do not. The Romans spent 1633 doing nothing but destroying their two main enemies supply lines. To diminish that to "its always hard to supply armies in foreign territory in this time period" is a serious misread of the story as written. The German supply lines were fine until the Romans shattered them at 4th Ruse. Ibrahims supply lines were adequate until Rome went and took all the fortresses they relied on. The Romans had a plan for 1633 and it has worked brilliantly. Blucher, Casimir, Mackensen, the Archbishop, and Vauban are all sitting at Vidin having had their armies offensive power broken. Ibrahim and Sinan Pasha are sitting in a marginally supplied pocket where the best option at this point seems to be either try to fight there way out and abandon everything or march out the desert road and hope their army doesn't disintegrate. Turgut Reis is sitting in an estate in Anatolia as a prisoner. The Romans are winning despite terrible odds against them because they remembered the central rule of warfare...its all about the logistics. For this reason and only this reason the Roman army is superior to any of their foes. Blucher and Ibrahim are theatre commanders; for them to allow their logistical tail to be shattered in the way that it has is a serious defect. They are not good generals because they could not do arguably the most important part of their job; make sure their armies were supplied.