Knock Britain out of the conflict somehow and the rest of Europe would have to grudgingly bow down to Napoleon.
AHC/WI: Napoleonic peace
- Thread starter Tredecimus
- Start date
unprincipled peter
Donor
Matteo,
true enough. I did overstate Austria vs Poland. the point remains that Nap preferred domination politics over any other. Alliance was not a word in his vocabulary, at least not as any one else understood the definition.
true enough. I did overstate Austria vs Poland. the point remains that Nap preferred domination politics over any other. Alliance was not a word in his vocabulary, at least not as any one else understood the definition.
I was thinking a British civil war would do the trick. More powerful Luddites vs government?
And the instant Napoleon makes an independent Poland, he's going to make a permanent enemy of Russia and annoy all the other major powers. Napoleon couldn't dismantle Austria without having to fortify the Kingdoms he broke them into and strengthening Russia in the Balkans by denying them a greater rival in the region. He'd actively weaken himself and strengthen Russia if he did something that stupid.
And the Tsar couldn't be everywhere at once? Neither can Napoleon and he has a much wider scope to deal with. He couldn't even deal with Spain when it was over the border and he had little else to distract himself with. The Tsar doesn't have to do anything, Napoleon's fate depended on attacking Russia before forces could gather against him. The Russians were willing to pull back and sacrifice Moscow itself without surrendering so why would they give in when Napoleon has proven to be far too scared to even cross the border?
And, as I said, those states will need occupying to strengthen them against nationalist revolt or Russia, further weakening Napoleon.
Neither side is blameless, but Napoleon's personality makes peace so much harder because he wouldn't have it unless everyone bowed the knee despite the fact that international relations, especially in the Great Powers of Europe, don't work like that. That's why he needs to die for a true peace, because Napoleon was his own worst enemy.
No this is too biased an argument.
From 1799 to 1807, it's the coalitions that forced wars on France. The paradox is that as France each time came out victorious and stronger, the other powers, and first of all Britain, pushed for another war.
In this context, it is quite understandable and rather logical for France, with or without Nappy at its head, to take guarantees in search for peace. There was a mutual lack of trust.
Now the paradox' ai problem is that Nappy's crushing success made things more difficult.
From 1799 to 1807, it's the coalitions that forced wars on France. The paradox is that as France each time came out victorious and stronger, the other powers, and first of all Britain, pushed for another war.
In this context, it is quite understandable and rather logical for France, with or without Nappy at its head, to take guarantees in search for peace. There was a mutual lack of trust.
Now the paradox' ai problem is that Nappy's crushing success made things more difficult.
No one capitalizing on ways Britain could be forced out of the Napoleonic conflict? Because a civil war is the only way that could make Britain jump ship.
scholar
Banned
In the colonies, when most of the New World was still enslaved. In Europe, Napoleon emancipated slaves and ended the practice, notably in Malta, but everywhere else on the continent that still practiced it domestically.
It's
Banned
... And no major war in Europe since 1945. Thanks Adolf- a man who achieved far greater conquests and much less egocentric (but a lot more monstrous nonetheless).
First- yes, Napoleon will annoy everyone around by making Poland strong. That's why he should dismantle Prussia and Austria, feed Poland with their lands and create client states- divided they're smaller threat than united and if Russia wants to do something about it (in 1807 it's gonna be hard), than Tzar must come to Napoleon, not Napoleon to Tzar. Usually it ended bad for Tzar.
Second- Yes, Russia will be permanent enemy. So what? Wasn't it exactly the same IOTL? It's still better for Napoleon to have about 25 million strong Poland (pre 1772 borders, if Poland gets everything east of Oder from Prussia, than it'll be more) against 30 million strong Russia (40 millions from OTL minus 10 millions living in former Commonwealth territories) than to try take whole Russia at once.
You sound like "Napoleon barely could deal with anyone". Jesus- this guy conquered whole Europe. Whatever You may think of him- he was capable.
And Spain was completely different case than Poland- French were trying to directly occupy Spain (more or less), which resulted in huge guerrilla movement- what's the reason to believe it'll be the same in Poland and former Polish lands? OTL plenty of people from Russian part of Commonwealth joined him (and no- peasants weren't rising to kill nobles- they came along) on his way east. Now, I'm not saying that there will be massive uprising on these lands, restoring them to Polish rule. But there won't be significant guerrilla, there won't be massacres of Polish nobles. Reluctantly- but still- these people will become part of "Greater Poland".
What do You actually mean that these states will need occupying? Worst case scenario, Napoleon can sever Austrian government ties to these lands and leave them be (aside from Bohemia as it should be easy to establish control there), so Austrian rule no longer exists. Prussia can be dismantled without constant occupation.
Last but not least- otl Russians moved east of Moscow, coming back just when Napoleon tried to withdraw. What stops Napoleon from reaching Smolensk, proclaiming Greater Poland and fortify his positions? Russian army isn't pillaging Ukraine or Duchy of Warsaw at this point. Instead they stay out of Napoleon's reach. But at the same time they can't reach territories occupied by him...
No offense, but it's really not an adequate comparison...
They can certainly send cavalry forces (cossacks, etc) to do nasty things to his supply lines (such as those were): For how long can he actually maintain his army on that new border?
Sure, but that's not enough to take fortresses from him. I think that he can keep this up for long enough to let Poles establish some degree of administration there (btw- I'm still talking about 1772 borders, so Smolensk itself doesn't have to be included) and start conscription. Otl it took about half a year before Russians forced him out. If Napoleon won't move against Moscow and won't overstretch his supply lines- I give him about a year. He can always withdraw a bit, leaving fortified Smolensk for Russians to deal with.
BTW- this: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/07/Patriotic_War_of_1812_ENG_map1.svg
Indeed implicates that Napoleon was going to capture stronghold after stronghold initially. And up to Mogilev he should have some degree of support from locals (especially if he turns these territories to Polish state).
I mostly imagine it like this- after Prussia is dismantled and their eastern territories are given to Poland (Galicia too- but dismantling of Austria doesn't have to follow it. It maybe some deal instead), Napoleon moves against Russia slowly conquering strongholds, while Polish army shadows him, securing supply lines (with both Galicia and Prussian lands, Poland should be easily able to field about 300k soldiers- Duchy of Warsaw fielded 100k) and establishing Polish administration. Then- depending on Grand Army's state- Napoleon decides whether he sieges Moscow or simply fortifies his positions. He doesn't have to hurry- either way, taking 1/4 Russia's population will be seen as tremendous success in Europe (so I don't think we'll see popular uprising against him). He can continue his campaign later.
That said- attrition and scorched earth will still take its toll. But without disastrous march on Moscow and taking defensive positions, rather than withdraw and fight- he can not only "make it", but also significantly weaken Russia, establishing strong buffer state. And good base for future campaigns that won't be scorched next year and later.
unprincipled peter
Donor
the early years are the years in question.
the French revolution broke out, destroying (in combination with an earlier American revolution) the notion of a divine right of kings. the second, on top of the first, wanted to export such a notion.
kings all over the place were rightfully appalled. they didn't need to be rightfully in power. they were in power, and France represented a threat.
Say what you want, France wanted to export revolution, and they wanted a war. Foreign powers wanted to take advantage of such a war. Both sides wanted a war. Both sides.
everything that happened from there on out was one maneuver after another to gain advantage over the other.
that is the basic situation.
both sides tried to take advantage of the other. France wanted to take advantage. Britain and the coalition powers wanted to take advantage. the entire question is how to maintain balance of power. Nap, from the beginning, sought to maintain it from a position of dominance. He wanted to control Italy. sure, if Britain agreed to this, there would be peace. but Nap wanted from the begininning, to be the predominant power. the only way there was going to be peace is if Britain agreed to this. why should Britain agree to it? Nap demanded to be the top dog in Europe. this is a direct threat to Britain.
Britain, on the other hand, knew it could never control any given power. they depended on a system of alliances. that system depended on a balance of power. Nap's idea of a balance of power is that he was in charge. end of story. Name one incident where he was willing to compromise. there is none. He won, or he regrouped to win. everything was his way, or the highway. there was never a point, ever, where Nap was willing to settle for what France ended up with in the end.
the French revolution broke out, destroying (in combination with an earlier American revolution) the notion of a divine right of kings. the second, on top of the first, wanted to export such a notion.
kings all over the place were rightfully appalled. they didn't need to be rightfully in power. they were in power, and France represented a threat.
Say what you want, France wanted to export revolution, and they wanted a war. Foreign powers wanted to take advantage of such a war. Both sides wanted a war. Both sides.
everything that happened from there on out was one maneuver after another to gain advantage over the other.
that is the basic situation.
both sides tried to take advantage of the other. France wanted to take advantage. Britain and the coalition powers wanted to take advantage. the entire question is how to maintain balance of power. Nap, from the beginning, sought to maintain it from a position of dominance. He wanted to control Italy. sure, if Britain agreed to this, there would be peace. but Nap wanted from the begininning, to be the predominant power. the only way there was going to be peace is if Britain agreed to this. why should Britain agree to it? Nap demanded to be the top dog in Europe. this is a direct threat to Britain.
Britain, on the other hand, knew it could never control any given power. they depended on a system of alliances. that system depended on a balance of power. Nap's idea of a balance of power is that he was in charge. end of story. Name one incident where he was willing to compromise. there is none. He won, or he regrouped to win. everything was his way, or the highway. there was never a point, ever, where Nap was willing to settle for what France ended up with in the end.
Napoleon walked into wars that he wanted. He acted in ways that were guaranteed to threaten the other nations of Europe and provoke them into war. Tilsit was really just the extreme conclusion of this, he made it so that Prussia would always want revenge and that he'd have enemies. His success wasn't the problem, it's the fact that his very personality made him think a generous peace was beneath him and the arrogance that he felt that he could dictate to nations like they were soldiers in his army. He could have had peace multiple times, but cocked it up each and every time.
The Tsar doesn't have to do anything. It's Napoleon who has to move as Russia can trade with Britain, openly defy Napoleon and show Europe that his power isn't that great while thumbing his nose at him. Napoleon would have to respond as it was him who had to invade in OTL. The Tsar could have waited, maybe make a probing attack or two while Napoleon was weakened in Spain and made to look like a weak fool, something he couldn't be able to stand, as well as having to deal with being harried by partisans as IOTL. And the Tsar did pretty well in going to Napoleon from 1813 onwards lest we forget.
It would have been different OTL if Napoleon had the sense to listen to Talleyrand and not annoy everyone in Europe. If he had done the sensible thing, Prussia and Austria could have been used as bulwarks against Russian influence but, Napoleon being Napoleon, ballsed it up. Also, the population was deemed to have been closer to 11 million before the partitions.
I was referring to the fact that he didn't do anything to help the Spanish situation despite the fact that he had every opportunity to do something about it before the invasion of Russia. Whatever activity he did in fact tended to make things no better, or slightly worse, for his Marshalls in fact. I was also talking about that fact that Spain was still a bleeding sore at this time with French forces very hard pressed. If Napoleon has to occupy a healthy chunk of Eastern Europe to prevent Russia from making a move for even longer than OTL, then the French forces on the Peninsular are going to have an even rougher time of it then they did originally. As for joining Greater Poland, it'll depend on how long it lasts and how long French troops are stationed there for, Spain wasn't the only place that resented having to feed Napoleon's forces and it wasn't the only place that had guerrilla activity against the occupiers either.
And once Napoleon gets bogged down in Russia, what's to stop Austria from reclaiming these territories as their own? He's just created states that are always going to be hostile to him and now have even less to lose than OTL so really, there's every reason to oppose him all the more. He's also dramatically increased Russian influence in the Balkans by doing this, easier to get to Romania from Moscow that it is Paris at this point and the Monarchies of Europe are going to be even more against him since he's just reminded everyone of why they were wary of the Revolution in the first place. It's a counter-productive move however you slice it.
As for Smolensk, simply put, Napoleon's supply situation was too bad to even try that. The Grand Armee was dying in droves before the winter even settled in and the supplies were a large part of it. Eastern Europe at that time simply couldn't cope with the demands Napoleon' s armies required of it and this inability to adapt doomed the Russian campaign just as much as anything else. Plus, in this scenario, what's to stop Cossacks going around the main force and raiding what attempts to gather supplies Napoleon made? If he stays in one spot, his forces are going to weaken due to starvation, badly damaged due to the cold (The cavalry forces take their fair share of blame for not being ready for the winter themselves) and disease which is basically going to be inevitable if you camp at the sight of a disastrous battlefield. A good chunk of the bodies hadn't even been cleared by the time the Grand Armee made their way back through Smolensk in OTL, just to give you an idea of how bad it was.
He overstretched his supply lines long before even stepping into Russia, it really was that bad. Food was short in Eastern Germany and got so much worse as time went on. This is going to be the killer, if he stays in one place, as things are, Napoleon simply can't supply a force as big as he did IOTL, especially with the system of supply the Grand Armee relied upon. Things will need to change greatly if that strategy even has a hope of survival.
unprincipled peter
Donor
nap has two things going for him:
his code, which is doubtfully his to claim, but his being in power, made it so.
his military prowess. which left him about halfway through: 07-8 ish.after that, he blundered his way to defeat. if he had maintained his military prowess, all of history would be different.
his code, which is doubtfully his to claim, but his being in power, made it so.
his military prowess. which left him about halfway through: 07-8 ish.after that, he blundered his way to defeat. if he had maintained his military prowess, all of history would be different.
Who needs to take fortresses? In a country Russia's size they can always be bypassed, and then it's just a matter of laying waste the surrounding country and leaving the garrisons to starve.
If the Army stays together in one place it runs out of food unless it keeps moving - and maybe still does even then. It also controls only whatever patch of ground it is actually standing on. If it splits up to control more ground, it exposes itself to defeat in detail, since Napoleon can't be everywhere at once. It's a no-win situation.
After 1807 or so, most of the continental enemies of France had begun major reforms of their armies. The French Army during the Austerlitz campaign was, in terms of organization, flexibility, and command, vastly superior to the Coalition forces, and it showed. The ease with which Mack was encircled at Ulm should speak to that.
The gap in later years narrowed, but that is one factor to consider in the decisiveness of early French successes.
Additionally, while the expansion of Poland, at the expense of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, is a possible solution, you're essentially antagonizing three of the Great Powers you hope to make peace with eventually (or already have). It is a possibility, however, and by this stage you may as well given a need to curtail Russia. The Poles are completely dependent on your support to survive and would be staunch allies. But if you're trying to reach a rapprochement with at least one of those powers, the plan is somewhat suspect as you'd be essentially making permanent enemies with all of the three, and committing France to fight on behalf of another state far out of the areas of French national interest.
A peace could be maintained with the dismantlement of one (Prussia, though it's harder to get harsher than what it was already whittled down to, with Austria refusing Silesia), and hoping to establish a permanent alliance with another (either Austria). As was Napoleon's attempt as he sought to maintain the a favorable balance of power in Europe. His goals, and indeed French national goals, at this point was largely aimed at maintaining their buffer states in Italy and Germany and forcing Prussia and Austria to accept those borders and new statelings. Poland, in this frame of mind, is both too far away and out of immediate concern, and needlessly antagonizing in achieving the primary and why it was not pursued vigorously in French foreign policy at the time.
Can a Napoleonic peace be made? Well, yes, but only if you remove Britain from the equation. That's the real rub, and there's very little that France can do about it after Trafalgar in the short-term. It's the only way any of France's continental enemies were able to come back against France, round after round despite crippling losses. You'd need economic unrest/collapse or a civil war to bring down Britain in a reasonable timeframe.
Alternate PDs involving Spain and Russia could mix things up, but really, the crux of the barrier for a French-dominated Europe is Britain, and if that's the outcome you're looking for, look to neutralize Britain through some PoD.
The gap in later years narrowed, but that is one factor to consider in the decisiveness of early French successes.
Additionally, while the expansion of Poland, at the expense of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, is a possible solution, you're essentially antagonizing three of the Great Powers you hope to make peace with eventually (or already have). It is a possibility, however, and by this stage you may as well given a need to curtail Russia. The Poles are completely dependent on your support to survive and would be staunch allies. But if you're trying to reach a rapprochement with at least one of those powers, the plan is somewhat suspect as you'd be essentially making permanent enemies with all of the three, and committing France to fight on behalf of another state far out of the areas of French national interest.
A peace could be maintained with the dismantlement of one (Prussia, though it's harder to get harsher than what it was already whittled down to, with Austria refusing Silesia), and hoping to establish a permanent alliance with another (either Austria). As was Napoleon's attempt as he sought to maintain the a favorable balance of power in Europe. His goals, and indeed French national goals, at this point was largely aimed at maintaining their buffer states in Italy and Germany and forcing Prussia and Austria to accept those borders and new statelings. Poland, in this frame of mind, is both too far away and out of immediate concern, and needlessly antagonizing in achieving the primary and why it was not pursued vigorously in French foreign policy at the time.
Can a Napoleonic peace be made? Well, yes, but only if you remove Britain from the equation. That's the real rub, and there's very little that France can do about it after Trafalgar in the short-term. It's the only way any of France's continental enemies were able to come back against France, round after round despite crippling losses. You'd need economic unrest/collapse or a civil war to bring down Britain in a reasonable timeframe.
Alternate PDs involving Spain and Russia could mix things up, but really, the crux of the barrier for a French-dominated Europe is Britain, and if that's the outcome you're looking for, look to neutralize Britain through some PoD.
Napoleon did not need to defeat Britain in its homeland to have a favourable peace with Britain.
If his russian campaign had ended successfully (which he had a strong chance to succeed if he had not messed it up), he would have had enough control in continental Europe to have Britain accept the new situation was going to last long and want an agreement with Napoleon remaining the dominant power in continental Europe.
If his russian campaign had ended successfully (which he had a strong chance to succeed if he had not messed it up), he would have had enough control in continental Europe to have Britain accept the new situation was going to last long and want an agreement with Napoleon remaining the dominant power in continental Europe.
There was that feeling in post-1807 and Britain had been able to strike at Napoleon through Spain, something that they'd been doing quite successfully while they'd also been expanding their markets elsewhere in the world along with exploiting smuggling opportunities in Europe. While Napoleon was strong, his position in that period wasn't invulnerable.