A Better Show in 1940

[sitalkes]

The book on Epro 210 does mention aircraft being destroyed on the ground as well as fighters not taking off until the very last second and only not being hit because the bombers approached from the wrong direction. It also says that on August 30 there was a power cut that affected 80 miles of coastline and shut down the radar stations in that area. That seems to indicate that the radar stations didn't have a backup power supply and hitting the power supplies at the stations and elsewhere would have been a valid tactic. It also means that dropping Seilbomben might have had some effect (it's otherwise hard to think of a militarily significant effect of cutting the power supply to an invasion area used to the blackout).

Anyway, there was no need to destroy the radar stations. Radar could have been jammed electronically or using Window, both of which methods were known to the Germans in 1940.

 

[Michele]

The consensus was that they were, but they ran out of fuel before becoming the size of the Hamburg or Dresden ones.

The consensus of wikipedia, I suppose.

British structures used less wood so they had less to burn, plus, I've been told, the streets were wider so it was harder to carry the flames over from street to street, especially without the numbers of aircraft that the RAF BC could muster from 1943 on. The London fire wore itself out once the city center burned, because the surrounding sections had wider streets and a lot less wood than the section burned on the 29th.

In fact, as I mentioned for a real firestorm it takes a suitable target.

In any case, to put things in perspective, I'd suggest looking up the casualty figures for the "second fire of London", the worst raid on Coventry, and comparing them with the casualty figures for Hamburg, Dresden, and, to have a smaller city in the sample, Pforzheim - true firestorms, these.

 

[Michele]

I will address several minor points one by one later, if I have the time.

I would now just make a general consideration. It seems that I have to point out what is the clearly stated objective of this ATL.

Yes, the Germans can do better, way better than they did historically; there is nothing wildly implausible in the improvements I made.

No, that is not going ot be enough to make Seelöwe a success.

Yes, maybe I was too niggard with the Germans; maybe one specific tactics, say low-level strafing/bombing attacks by Bf 110s, might bag them some slighly larger, but still marginal success.

No, that additional improvement is not going to change the final outcome. It may well make the Germans more confident in Seelöwe; that is not the same as actually succeeding at it.

Think about it. Let's say I was too prudent (several well-read posters here said that I was too generous with the Germans, but let's assume they are wrong). So let's say the Germans destroy, what, 50 more British fighters by means of an unexpectedly successful Bf 110 campaign, while losing only 10 of those, before the time comes to launch Seelöwe.

Fine. Figher Command is 50 fighters short. Bomber Command is still the same, the Army and the Home Guard too. The Royal Navy is either still the same, or stronger - if the situation is perceived as dire by the British, they only have to postpone the French affair. That gives them two battleships, two aircraft carriers, three cruisers and a dozen destroyers more.

Is 50 less fighters going to make a real difference here? My opinion is that they are not. Maybe the Germans advance one kilometer more. Maybe they have some other local success. That is only going to prolong the agony of the beachheads.

That all is assuming the Bf 110s do bag that score. I doubt they would, for the reasons already provided. But if I'm wrong, it's not as if they will win Seelöwe with that.

If you think this is a lose-lose situation for the Germans, yes, you are right. It's not as if real war had to be fair.

 

[Michele]

The book on Epro 210 does mention aircraft being destroyed on the ground as well as fighters not taking off until the very last second and only not being hit because the bombers approached from the wrong direction. It also says that on August 30 there was a power cut that affected 80 miles of coastline and shut down the radar stations in that area. That seems to indicate that the radar stations didn't have a backup power supply and hitting the power supplies at the stations and elsewhere would have been a valid tactic. It also means that dropping Seilbomben might have had some effect (it's otherwise hard to think of a militarily significant effect of cutting the power supply to an invasion area used to the blackout).

it's time you broaden your readings. "That seems to indicate" won't cut, when we know perfectly well what the real situation was. Read, for instance, The Most Dangerous Enemy, by Bungay.

Anyway, there was no need to destroy the radar stations. Radar could have been jammed electronically or using Window, both of which methods were known to the Germans in 1940.

I have already repeated this several times, both here and in other threads. So this is the last time I provide you with this obvious piece of information.

Suppose the British have no radar network at all. What will happen then? How many decisive air battles involving hundreds of fighters will take place - the kind of air battles the Germans needed to do away with the British fighter arm?
How many French fighters survived the battle of France, where there was no radar network - in spite of the fact that the Germans were pulling the rug from under their feet with the Heer, not with the Luftwaffe? Heck, how many Polish aircraft withdrew to Romania, notwithstanding the supposedly lethal blow the Luftwaffe inflicted on them, and notwithstanding the fact that there, too, air bases were being overrun by panzer?

 

[Michele]

No, I think it's a bit silly to describe them all as firestorms. They're not comparable in scale nor effects, and hence not in physics.

Thank you for this and for the previous post. You are right.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

I will address several minor points one by one later, if I have the time.

I would now just make a general consideration. It seems that I have to point out what is the clearly stated objective of this ATL.

Yes, the Germans can do better, way better than they did historically; there is nothing wildly implausible in the improvements I made.

No, that is not going ot be enough to make Seelöwe a success.

Yes, maybe I was too niggard with the Germans; maybe one specific tactics, say low-level strafing/bombing attacks by Bf 110s, might bag them some slighly larger, but still marginal success.

No, that additional improvement is not going to change the final outcome. It may well make the Germans more confident in Seelöwe; that is not the same as actually succeeding at it.

Think about it. Let's say I was too prudent (several well-read posters here said that I was too generous with the Germans, but let's assume they are wrong). So let's say the Germans destroy, what, 50 more British fighters by means of an unexpectedly successful Bf 110 campaign, while losing only 10 of those, before the time comes to launch Seelöwe.

Fine. Figher Command is 50 fighters short. Bomber Command is still the same, the Army and the Home Guard too. The Royal Navy is either still the same, or stronger - if the situation is perceived as dire by the British, they only have to postpone the French affair. That gives them two battleships, two aircraft carriers, three cruisers and a dozen destroyers more.

Is 50 less fighters going to make a real difference here? My opinion is that they are not. Maybe the Germans advance one kilometer more. Maybe they have some other local success. That is only going to prolong the agony of the beachheads.

That all is assuming the Bf 110s do bag that score. I doubt they would, for the reasons already provided. But if I'm wrong, it's not as if they will win Seelöwe with that.

If you think this is a lose-lose situation for the Germans, yes, you are right. It's not as if real war had to be fair.

I think the highlighted text is what I have slight issues with ... this is a fixed timeline rather than a developing one. You have deternined a start point and a definitive end point, they are fixed in your mind from the start. Wever lives, a few changes are made, Sealion fails anyway. You might as well have saved yourself the bother of writing the rest because it follows a predetermined path used to prove your end theory. I'm not saying this isn't a good read, well researched and interesting and obviously a good writing exercise but it doesn't have scope to change course as and when new items of information are presented to you, or after additional research. I know this may seem like a criticism but its just my own personal way of viewing a timeline, I like to have clear start point and let things run their own course ending with a conclusion that has developed as part of the journey. This, and many other timelines, has a clear unwavouring end point and a journey that MUST meet your goals.

Possibly that is why I didn't like Stephen Bungays book, it feels much the same ... the book is written to provide evidence for his own theory and through the use of cleverly selected information he is able to give the proof he needs.

 

[Michele]

Except the experience of Erprobungsgruppe 210 demonstrated that groups of 3-4 were not spotted by CH at all.

Really? Did they know for a sure thing they were not spotted? Or maybe they were spotted and not reacted against? A fast-moving (i.e., possibly a fighter-only flight), minor signature, possibly moving in while a major raid was approaching too? Have you considered the possibility that an interception was attempted and failed?

Shturmoviks aren't exactly the best example here, they were heavily armored so they pressed home their attacks suicidally

So let me get this straight: one of the reasons because the Shturmovik suffered a high loss rate is that they were one of the best protected aircraft in the war.
Who knows how many less losses they would have suffered if they had been as unprotected as the standard Japanese aircraft in 1941!
Is this the reasoning?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Really? Did they know for a sure thing they were not spotted? Or maybe they were spotted and not reacted against? A fast-moving (i.e., possibly a fighter-only flight), minor signature, possibly moving in while a major raid was approaching too? Have you considered the possibility that an interception was attempted and failed?

Don't know, do you have evidence to demonstrate that was the case?

So let me get this straight: one of the reasons because the Shturmovik suffered a high loss rate is that they were one of the best protected aircraft in the war.
Who knows how many less losses they would have suffered if they had been as unprotected as the standard Japanese aircraft in 1941!
Is this the reasoning?

Turns out heavy armor wasn't the best protection as the Germans found out themselves with the Hs129 and Ju87. Fighter-bombers were the safest due to their speed making them harder to shoot down, which is why the Allies went for them in the West and the Germans shifted to those by the end of 1943; the Soviets opted for just an upgraded IL-2, the IL-10, which suffered the same heavy losses.

 

[thevaliant]

I think the highlighted text is what I have slight issues with ... this is a fixed timeline rather than a developing one. You have deternined a start point and a definitive end point, they are fixed in your mind from the start. Wever lives, a few changes are made, Sealion fails anyway.

I disagree - I don't think the timeline was ever fixed.

If you read it over on SHWI (which is were it was originally posted), you will see a number of modifications are made over time, most noticeably the entire part with HMS Revenge was originally ordered back and followed those orders. It was only when virtually everyone on SHWI shouted 'foul' and cited that the Admiral would simply do a Nelson that Michele rewrote that entire part.

Additionally, the invasion itself felt slightly forced. I think (and perhaps Michele could state) that he never intended Sealion to go ahead but simply ran with it because people on SHWI asked him to do so. Again, there is a discussion over there about whether it would or would not go ahead.

Maybe Michele can confirm, but a predetermined timeline? I don't think so. It's five years old, but still good and was subject to the extremely rigorous critic that is (was?) SHWI at the time.

 

[Michele]

Don't know, do you have evidence to demonstrate that was the case?

No. It should be the one claiming that the radar network did not spot such small raids that provides the evidence that the reason why the small raids weren't engaged was a failure in radar spotting, and not something else.

And by the way, this should be obvious. It's a matter of historiographic principle. The burden of the proof.

Turns out heavy armor wasn't the best protection

Sure. I hope you are able to distinguish between "not being the best protection" and "actually being one of the reasons for extremely heavy losses", i.e. a net negative.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

No. It should be the one claiming that the radar network did not spot such small raids that provides the evidence that the reason why the small raids weren't engaged was a failure in radar spotting, and not something else.

And by the way, this should be obvious. It's a matter of historiographic principle. The burden of the proof.



Sure. I hope you are able to distinguish between "not being the best protection" and "actually being one of the reasons for extremely heavy losses", i.e. a net negative.

Getting a bit snippy huh?
For the first I cited Vasco.
Plus this:
http://www.amazon.com/The-Luftwaffe...F8&qid=1403704210&sr=8-15&keywords=chris+goss
If you have some counter evidence, which is what I was asking for, then please provide some. I appreciate your perspective on other issues, but as far as the books I've cited go they don't indicate that was the case.

For the latter the heavy losses I mentioned were partly a factor of the heavy weight of the IL-2 and the tactics it used as a result of the thinking it was protected against ground fire well enough.

 

[Michele]

Getting a bit snippy huh?
For the first I cited Vasco.

It's not a matter of authority. It's a matter of evidence.

If the book says "the radar network did not spot small raids" and it bases that on evidence coming from the British side, it's one thing. It is the British who can testify "we saw nothing and that's the reason why we didn't engage", not the Germans.

If the book says "the radar network did not spot small raids because the veterans of ErProGr 210 noticed that they weren't engaged", then it's the other sort of thing - the thing without evidence. And it should be evident. I hope it now is clear.

If you have some counter evidence, which is what I was asking for, then please provide some.

I have no evidence. Do you have it?

 

[Ian Hathaway]

It's not a matter of authority. It's a matter of evidence.

If the book says "the radar network did not spot small raids" and it bases that on evidence coming from the British side, it's one thing. It is the British who can testify "we saw nothing and that's the reason why we didn't engage", not the Germans.

If the book says "the radar network did not spot small raids because the veterans of ErProGr 210 noticed that they weren't engaged", then it's the other sort of thing - the thing without evidence. And it should be evident. I hope it now is clear.

I have no evidence. Do you have it?

Evidence ... not for Epro 210 but for the Do17s of 9th Staffel of III/KG76 attacking Kenley on 18th August. From 'The Most Dangerous Enemy' p.225. "Though they passed under the Radar screen,". From 'Battle of Britain Airfields' p.60 "a small force of nine Do17s crossed the coast at low level by Beachy Head, avoiding radar detection." I could go on but I won't mainly because there are so many examples it would take forever.

 

[Michele]

I disagree - I don't think the timeline was ever fixed.

If you read it over on SHWI (which is were it was originally posted), you will see a number of modifications are made over time, most noticeably the entire part with HMS Revenge was originally ordered back and followed those orders. It was only when virtually everyone on SHWI shouted 'foul' and cited that the Admiral would simply do a Nelson that Michele rewrote that entire part.

Additionally, the invasion itself felt slightly forced. I think (and perhaps Michele could state) that he never intended Sealion to go ahead but simply ran with it because people on SHWI asked him to do so. Again, there is a discussion over there about whether it would or would not go ahead.

Maybe Michele can confirm, but a predetermined timeline? I don't think so. It's five years old, but still good and was subject to the extremely rigorous critic that is (was?) SHWI at the time.

Thank you, Valiant Sir, for this very kind message. You are basically right, but not entirely. Ian's opinion is not without merit. Yes, I did take into account the input of a lot of knowledgeable posters; and yes, when I started I had not already decided everything; and yes, I wasn't sure the invasion would really be launched; and I considered myself reasonably open to various possibilities.

But, Ian, you are right; when I began, I did not believe that realistic, reasonable improvements in the Luftwaffe - even if they touched upon many diverse aspects - could really eventually deliver a militarily successful Seelöwe. I admit that.

It should be said that when I started working on the timeline, I couldn't have everything already bolted down because I thought I knew enough about the situation - but I actually learned a lotta things more while writing the timeline.
And nothing of what I learned convinced me that my initial impression, albeit not terribly well defined back then, was basically wrong. Rather the contrary.

Please let us all remember that there are reputable historians who think that the whole of Seelöwe was nothing than a bluff. Bringing it forward to a real attempt of carrying it out already is a leap of faith.

Note, wrt this, how I have stessed "militarily", above. Is there a possibility that some hypothetical British government, once the ATL reaches the situation of my scenario on S+2, panics and asks for an armistice? Yes. Churchill? I doubt that.

I hope this is frank enough.

 

[Michele]

Evidence ... not for Epro 210 but for the Do17s of 9th Staffel of III/KG76 attacking Kenley on 18th August. From 'The Most Dangerous Enemy' p.225. "Though they passed under the Radar screen,". From 'Battle of Britain Airfields' p.60 "a small force of nine Do17s crossed the coast at low level by Beachy Head, avoiding radar detection." I could go on but I won't mainly because there are so many examples it would take forever.

We're not talking about hypothetical ErProgr 210 raids at 60 feet of height here. We're talking about the real raids - and they normally did not travel at 60 feet.

The example you mention, by the way, is not exactly a shining light for the Germans. Out of 9 Dorniers, 6 lost, 2 damaged.

 

[Michele]

The example you mention, by the way, is not exactly a shining light for the Germans. Out of 9 Dorniers, 6 lost, 2 damaged.

Since we're at it, let's see this example in greater detail.

This attack took place on August 18, 1940, also known as "the Hardest Day" of the Battle. To put things in perspective, this was a typical day as to large-scale engagements, as I have pointed out in this thread and recently in another one: on the days where the Germans put up a amaximum effort and obtained the large air battles they needed if they were to sweep Fighter Command from the sky - they were soundly defeated, and with high losses. The kill ratio for the RAF on this day was 2:1, and we're not talking small numbers, the actual tally being 69:34.

The best thing that can be said about the unlucky 9/76's attack was that it barely managed to reach and attack its target without being intercepted (it actually was attacked by enemy fighters just as it was engaging Kenley, but unsuccessfully and the British fighters withdrew to avoid friendly fire). That's not because they were flying low: they had not been spotted by radar, but they were very accurately tracked by ground observation. It is, rather, that the British radar did spot the rest of the attack waves coming up at roughly the same hour. Their estimation was a 350+ raid. It was an exaggeration, but anyway the Germans had airborne about 110 bombers and 150 fighters at that time. No wonder that the 9 flying at 60 feet weren't engaged before.

Now on to the attack. The supposedly weak British AA defenses of Kenley immediately hit at least four out of 9 bombers (according to dr. Price; other sources state that nearly all of the bomber were at least damaged straight away by ground fire). Even the PAC line, a last-ditch, desperation-borne improvisation, damaged the wing of one Dornier and brought down another (the latter, admittedly, had already been damaged by conventional AA, so it might be that if it had been untouched, the pilot could have managed to dodge the cable). Two of the Dorniers crashed right there and then thanks to the British AA defenses.

Sure, the attack was a success in terms of destroying most of Kenley's infrastructures, and much more importantly in destroying four Hurricanes that were on the ground, under repairs and therefore unable to take off and avoid the bombing. They also destroyed one Blenheim and damaged a couple more fighters in the air.
Kenley resumed limited operations in two hours, and was fully operational on the day after that. Naturally maintenance times would be not as fast now, with just one hangar standing. Work could also be done outdoors, which however would be more of a problem in another season.

To achieve this, the Germans expended 6 Dorniers, had two more heavily damaged (the last one wasn't untouched; it only suffered minor damage), and lost 45% of the aircrew between KIA, WIA and POW.

---

That's the actual history.
Now, let's suppose this attack is done by 9 Bf 110s.
The damage to the ground targets would be much less significant, due to the difference in payload. Usually, a smaller tonnage can do more damage than a bigger one, as was the case with many ErProGr 210's attacks, if delivered more accurately. In this case, the Dorniers were extremely accurate, so the Bf 110s would achieve less against Kenley. Let's say they destroy just two fighters on the ground.

Now, the Bf 110s would be more survivable than the Dorniers - though not exceedingly so, and especially not in this situation. Let's say they are more difficult targets for the AA and entirely escape the PAC line. When engaged by enemy fighters, however, they are in a dire situation, between a rock (the fighters) and a hard place (the ground) just like the Dorniers.
So let's say the loss rate is halved; just three Bf 110s are lost, one to the AA; one more is heavily damaged.

Is it worth it?

Apparently, we have halved everything, so the ratio remains the same. But looking at the whole picture, it's a loss for the Germans. That's because in this ATL, at the end of June the Germans had operational 1180 level bombers, but just 219 Bf 110s.
6 out of 1180 is a 0.5% loss rate.
3 out of 219 is a 1.3% loss rate.

Also note that come Seelöwe, the number of level bombers isn't crucial. That's because the bottleneck is in the number of Bf 109s that can escort them; the Germans, for all the time in actual history and for all the time in this ATL, do not have enough Bf 109s for the number of bombers they have.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

Thank you, Valiant Sir, for this very kind message. You are basically right, but not entirely. Ian's opinion is not without merit. Yes, I did take into account the input of a lot of knowledgeable posters; and yes, when I started I had not already decided everything; and yes, I wasn't sure the invasion would really be launched; and I considered myself reasonably open to various possibilities.

But, Ian, you are right; when I began, I did not believe that realistic, reasonable improvements in the Luftwaffe - even if they touched upon many diverse aspects - could really eventually deliver a militarily successful Seelöwe. I admit that.

It should be said that when I started working on the timeline, I couldn't have everything already bolted down because I thought I knew enough about the situation - but I actually learned a lotta things more while writing the timeline.
And nothing of what I learned convinced me that my initial impression, albeit not terribly well defined back then, was basically wrong. Rather the contrary.

Please let us all remember that there are reputable historians who think that the whole of Seelöwe was nothing than a bluff. Bringing it forward to a real attempt of carrying it out already is a leap of faith.

Note, wrt this, how I have stessed "militarily", above. Is there a possibility that some hypothetical British government, once the ATL reaches the situation of my scenario on S+2, panics and asks for an armistice? Yes. Churchill? I doubt that.

I hope this is frank enough.

Thanks Michele, as I said this is no criticism of the timeline, which is well written and researched ... its just not my kind of timeline which I know puts me in a very tiny minority. Its also probably why when I start a timeline people drop on me like a ton of bricks because they think I already have a clear end point which I never do ... one of these days I'll get it right lol

 

[sharlin]

People are wary of your TL's Ian because lets be honest, you do have a big tendancy to have the Germans either do a hell of a lot better or split hairs in a HUGE way, arguing the smallest thing again in favour of the Germans. Folks roll their eyes and go 'great another Nazi's could have won if X Y and Z...'

You research stuff superbly and and always articulate your points well. But its ALWAYS in favour of the Nazi's militarily. And most folks are always put out a bit by folks cheering the Nazi's armed forces along because a military victory for them in WW2 means the death of probably billions in Europe.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

Since we're at it, let's see this example in greater detail.

This attack took place on August 18, 1940, also known as "the Hardest Day" of the Battle. To put things in perspective, this was a typical day as to large-scale engagements, as I have pointed out in this thread and recently in another one: on the days where the Germans put up a amaximum effort and obtained the large air battles they needed if they were to sweep Fighter Command from the sky - they were soundly defeated, and with high losses. The kill ratio for the RAF on this day was 2:1, and we're not talking small numbers, the actual tally being 69:34.

The best thing that can be said about the unlucky 9/76's attack was that it barely managed to reach and attack its target without being intercepted (it actually was attacked by enemy fighters just as it was engaging Kenley, but unsuccessfully and the British fighters withdrew to avoid friendly fire). That's not because they were flying low: they had not been spotted by radar, but they were very accurately tracked by ground observation. It is, rather, that the British radar did spot the rest of the attack waves coming up at roughly the same hour. Their estimation was a 350+ raid. It was an exaggeration, but anyway the Germans had airborne about 110 bombers and 150 fighters at that time. No wonder that the 9 flying at 60 feet weren't engaged before.

Now on to the attack. The supposedly weak British AA defenses of Kenley immediately hit at least four out of 9 bombers (according to dr. Price; other sources state that nearly all of the bomber were at least damaged straight away by ground fire). Even the PAC line, a last-ditch, desperation-borne improvisation, damaged the wing of one Dornier and brought down another (the latter, admittedly, had already been damaged by conventional AA, so it might be that if it had been untouched, the pilot could have managed to dodge the cable). Two of the Dorniers crashed right there and then thanks to the British AA defenses.

Sure, the attack was a success in terms of destroying most of Kenley's infrastructures, and much more importantly in destroying four Hurricanes that were on the ground, under repairs and therefore unable to take off and avoid the bombing. They also destroyed one Blenheim and damaged a couple more fighters in the air.
Kenley resumed limited operations in two hours, and was fully operational on the day after that. Naturally maintenance times would be not as fast now, with just one hangar standing. Work could also be done outdoors, which however would be more of a problem in another season.

To achieve this, the Germans expended 6 Dorniers, had two more heavily damaged (the last one wasn't untouched; it only suffered minor damage), and lost 45% of the aircrew between KIA, WIA and POW.

---

That's the actual history.
Now, let's suppose this attack is done by 9 Bf 110s.
The damage to the ground targets would be much less significant, due to the difference in payload. Usually, a smaller tonnage can do more damage than a bigger one, as was the case with many ErProGr 210's attacks, if delivered more accurately. In this case, the Dorniers were extremely accurate, so the Bf 110s would achieve less against Kenley. Let's say they destroy just two fighters on the ground.

Now, the Bf 110s would be more survivable than the Dorniers - though not exceedingly so, and especially not in this situation. Let's say they are more difficult targets for the AA and entirely escape the PAC line. When engaged by enemy fighters, however, they are in a dire situation, between a rock (the fighters) and a hard place (the ground) just like the Dorniers.
So let's say the loss rate is halved; just three Bf 110s are lost, one to the AA; one more is heavily damaged.

Is it worth it?

Apparently, we have halved everything, so the ratio remains the same. But looking at the whole picture, it's a loss for the Germans. That's because in this ATL, at the end of June the Germans had operational 1180 level bombers, but just 219 Bf 110s.
6 out of 1180 is a 0.5% loss rate.
3 out of 219 is a 1.3% loss rate.

Also note that come Seelöwe, the number of level bombers isn't crucial. That's because the bottleneck is in the number of Bf 109s that can escort them; the Germans, for all the time in actual history and for all the time in this ATL, do not have enough Bf 109s for the number of bombers they have.

That is why I chose this as an example because it gave evidence that the fast, low approach (even though these were Do17s so not as fast as the Bf110) didn't always work. This was an operational error by the Luftwaffe as the plan was for the medium and high level bombers to attack as normal draw up the fighters which it was hoped would then be on the ground rearming and refuelling by the time the low level attack was delivered. Unfortunately the Do17s got there first and the base and the fighters were on full alert awaiting the arrival of the other formations. That is not to say the low level attack wasn't tracked by the Observer Corps as evidenced by the fact that the British fighters were initially scrambled to 20,000ft then 5,000ft, then 3,000ft as the Dorniers approached. So whilst they avoided radar by travelling at low level across the sea, their altitude of 50ft across country could not go unnoticed.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

People are wary of your TL's Ian because lets be honest, you do have a big tendancy to have the Germans either do a hell of a lot better or split hairs in a HUGE way, arguing the smallest thing again in favour of the Germans. Folks roll their eyes and go 'great another Nazi's could have won if X Y and Z...'

You research stuff superbly and and always articulate your points well. But its ALWAYS in favour of the Nazi's militarily. And most folks are always put out a bit by folks cheering the Nazi's armed forces along because a military victory for them in WW2 means the death of probably billions in Europe.

To be honest you have me all wrong, as I keep trying to explain time and time again, if I see an error in someones assumptions about an event I provide information that I hope will clarify things ... unfortunately, in general those errors are usually about Britains mighty Navy and the falability of the entire German military. If it were the other way around then I would be doing exactly the same but in reverse. If people think I "split hairs" by providing evidence based information to correct misconceptions then that is fair enough but that is not a reason to label me as a Nazi sympathiser as you have done often enough.

Unfortunately or fortunately, whichever way you want to look at it, this is in my nature. I have been an engineer, researcher and scientist for the past 25+ years. I draw my conclusions from the evidence I find and I have to provide as much detail as possible as some of the reports I produce are used to guide both national and international policies and therefore come under quite close scrutiny. When I start a timeline I have no clear ending as I never believe I have all the information at the start of the process to enable me to draw conclusions from the very beginning, in much the same way as the scientific investigations I conduct have no clear outcome until the very end after every avenue has been explored. I need to make it a lot clearer the next time I start a timeline that I don't just want but NEED constructive input throughout the entire timeline as I feel they are organic in their development with no clear pathway and no final conclusion.