The Germans build carriers, instead of battleships, prior to WW2

The German Navy of WW2 was never able to match the British in sheer tonnage. Their largest battleships might have been very modern and good (debatable) but they simply didn't have the numbers to compete. There were just too many demands on the German economy for 'Plan Z' to be anything more than a pipedream. In theory, the Germans could deploy a fleet-in-being that could threaten the UK's shipping lanes and keep UK ships pinned down; in practice, the concept was never as workable as the Germans hoped.

What if they'd put the resources that went into Bismarck and Tirpitz into carriers instead? The aircraft carrier concept was proven by that time. The Japanese could have offered technical support, if the Germans had asked. It would be chancy, but unless the Germans got very lucky their surface fleet was never going to be decisive. But a handful of semi-modern carriers might be more effective ...

What do you think?

RC
 
The German Navy of WW2 was never able to match the British in sheer tonnage. Their largest battleships might have been very modern and good (debatable) but they simply didn't have the numbers to compete. There were just too many demands on the German economy for 'Plan Z' to be anything more than a pipedream. In theory, the Germans could deploy a fleet-in-being that could threaten the UK's shipping lanes and keep UK ships pinned down; in practice, the concept was never as workable as the Germans hoped.

What if they'd put the resources that went into Bismarck and Tirpitz into carriers instead? The aircraft carrier concept was proven by that time. The Japanese could have offered technical support, if the Germans had asked. It would be chancy, but unless the Germans got very lucky their surface fleet was never going to be decisive. But a handful of semi-modern carriers might be more effective ...

What do you think?

RC
It’s been discussed before, with the general view of it not really ending up being anything better for the Reich and arguably worse even with large amounts of hindsight. You are still going to need sufficient heavy escorts to protect the carriers particularly in the North Sea (HMS Glorious for example), you need the supply ships (more than just surface ships need), the demands for airplane production, the timings of the Treaty allowing the German expansion…

Its highly doubtful that they would have enough in service by 1939 to make a huge difference and the RN could always respond.
 
And bluntly, they had no idea what they were doing. The arrestor system they put on Graf Zeppelin straight-up didn’t work.
Even assuming a far greater level of Japanese-German interaction and support, going from effectively no navy to an effective Carrier based navy in the years after Hitler came to power but before 1939 would almost be ASB.
 
For this to have a remote chance the PoD needs to be back around 1921. The Navy needs to float a experimental ship early on, like the US did with the Langley about that same time. To figure out the worst mistakes and dodge them before the real carriers are built and commissioned. They also need the equivalent of Adm Bull Reeves who kicked the carrier aviation program into high gear, turning the Langley into a real test bed and not just a showboat for visiting Congress critters.

So circa 1921 the Kriegsmarine starts planning on how they will circumvent and Versialles restrictions. A non navy search and rescue ship? ...a seaplane tender with a flight deck? Operate it from a secret naval base in the USSR as the Luftwaffe did with its clandestine experimental air wing? As that produces data they can build some commercial fast merchant ships with air service off the big flat top deck? Or maybe it will be easier than that... Point is when Hitler abrogates the ToV in 1934 the navy already has its Saratogn and Lexington equivalents designed, planned, and under construction. Its Langley equivalent long operating. Not a perfect solution but much better than starting from zero in 1934.
 
For this to have a remote chance the PoD needs to be back around 1921. The Navy needs to float a experimental ship early on, like the US did with the Langley about that same time. To figure out the worst mistakes and dodge them before the real carriers are built and commissioned. They also need the equivalent of Adm Bull Reeves who kicked the carrier aviation program into high gear, turning the Langley into a real test bed and not just a showboat for visiting Congress critters.

So circa 1921 the Kriegsmarine starts planning on how they will circumvent and Versialles restrictions. A non navy search and rescue ship? ...a seaplane tender with a flight deck? Operate it from a secret naval base in the USSR as the Luftwaffe did with its clandestine experimental air wing? As that produces data they can build some commercial fast merchant ships with air service off the big flat top deck? Or maybe it will be easier than that... Point is when Hitler abrogates the ToV in 1934 the navy already has its Saratogn and Lexington equivalents designed, planned, and under construction. Its Langley equivalent long operating. Not a perfect solution but much better than starting from zero in 1934.
Those were Treaty changed Battlecruisers, its much more likely to be something smaller and Treaty compliant even assuming they were to start in the 20's and get away with it, otherwise even after Hitler, they are breaking the Naval Treaties and the UK isn't likely to sign up to the Anglo-German Treaty, among other butterflies of course. Not too mention the question of whether extremely large Fleet Carriers is the way to go for Germany and it's position.
 
Those were Treaty changed Battlecruisers, its much more likely to be something smaller and Treaty compliant even assuming they were to start in the 20's and get away with it, otherwise even after Hitler, they are breaking the Naval Treaties and the UK isn't likely to sign up to the Anglo-German Treaty, among other butterflies of course.


Yep. It requires a bit of subterfuge. Thats why the clandestine Bolshivik naval base is useful.

A fast flat topped transatlantic liner with 'mail planes' coming and going constantly.

Not too mention the question of whether extremely large Fleet Carriers is the way to go for Germany and it's position.

A entirely separate & very important discussion. Big decks are more efficient tactically and operationally. But there are those other unpleasant factors. If strategy just covers dominating the North Sea to the Arctic to the Baltic then smaller decks are the thing. three or those for the cost of two big carriers? But, those are less useful and survivable in longer ranged 'Atlantik' operations.
 
Yep. It requires a bit of subterfuge. Thats why the clandestine Bolshivik naval base is useful.

A fast flat topped transatlantic liner with 'mail planes' coming and going constantly.



A entirely separate & very important discussion. Big decks are more efficient tactically and operationally. But there are those other unpleasant factors. If strategy just covers dominating the North Sea to the Arctic to the Baltic then smaller decks are the thing. three or those for the cost of two big carriers? But, those are less useful and survivable in longer ranged 'Atlantik' operations.
I’m not saying subterfuge for trying to create some sort of carrier capability, I’m just saying that building anything the size of Alex and Saratoga are going to stand out a mile as breaching the Treaties in 1934. Will all the other parties ignore that?
 
I’m not saying subterfuge for trying to create some sort of carrier capability, I’m just saying that building anything the size of Alex and Saratoga are going to stand out a mile as breaching the Treaties in 1934. Will all the other parties ignore that?

Nope, they certainly won't. Its one of those political/military strategy decisions. jThe one thing the Germans have going for them in this is how slow the Brits and French were in getting off the dime when rearmament became apparent 1935-36.
 
At least he have a example of how well or poorly that worked in naval matters. Taking that idea to several levels up, what if the nazi regime only builds a balanced dense force and puts priority on economic domination of Europe? Would that work?
That's not going to fool anyone, particularly the British who looked at the same idea.

But.. but.. there's no guns anywhere. See, come aboard and look :(
 
The thing to remember too is that the carrier itself is only half the weapon. The aircraft to fly off it are the other half. Post Versailles, Germany is banned an Airforce, though they are to work covertly to subvert these provisions. The thing is even when this is successful, what aircraft that become available will be largely under the sway of Goering. He will not allow for any plans that will compete with the expansion of his beloved Luftwaffe. Getting the hulls is just part of the struggle. . As Astrodragon portrayed in his WHW trilogy, the RN struggled with the RAF control of aviation and IRL didn't get back its FAA until 1938. Compound that bun fight with the factionalism and internal power struggles of the interwar Germany, to imagine how hard it is for such an endeavor to be successful. It's a fascinating conundrum and I've done my own take of this, MFK - Hitlers FAA but it's an issue requiring both aircraft and hulls. IMHO the deck is stacked against a powerful force being developed for that reason, and you'll notice that even with my thread, most of the MFK is largely land based aircraft for that reason. Enjoy and I'd be interested in your thoughts if you can come up with anything. T (PS. Her's my Rheinubung thread on the German carriers use if you want a look. Operation Rheinubung. )
 

thaddeus

Donor
...a seaplane tender with a flight deck?

A fast flat topped transatlantic liner with 'mail planes' coming and going constantly.

A entirely separate & very important discussion. Big decks are more efficient tactically and operationally. But there are those other unpleasant factors. If strategy just covers dominating the North Sea to the Arctic to the Baltic then smaller decks are the thing. three or those for the cost of two big carriers? But, those are less useful and survivable in longer ranged 'Atlantik' operations.

a realistic assessment shows the KM would have to fight a u-boat war and how can it best be supported? my speculation would be for a fleet of oil tankers, as Germany is both importing oil and chronically short of currency reserves, they could barter transportation for oil.

they could add seaplane handling capacity, develop the small helicopters, neither would require rebuilding the vessels for wartime use?
the same capacity in a more limited extent added to the clandestine raiders and their warships.

of course the OP is calling for replacing the largest BBs with "proper" carriers and my prospective fleet would not do that. it seems better (to me) to operate a handful of aircraft from three or four dozen converted ships than large numbers of aircraft from three or four carriers.

edit. meaning operate a handful of aircraft from each converted tanker. also not speculating the battleships are cancelled to build a fleet of tankers.
 
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The German Navy of WW2 was never able to match the British in sheer tonnage. Their largest battleships might have been very modern and good (debatable) but they simply didn't have the numbers to compete. There were just too many demands on the German economy for 'Plan Z' to be anything more than a pipedream. In theory, the Germans could deploy a fleet-in-being that could threaten the UK's shipping lanes and keep UK ships pinned down; in practice, the concept was never as workable as the Germans hoped.

What if they'd put the resources that went into Bismarck and Tirpitz into carriers instead? The aircraft carrier concept was proven by that time. The Japanese could have offered technical support, if the Germans had asked. It would be chancy, but unless the Germans got very lucky their surface fleet was never going to be decisive. But a handful of semi-modern carriers might be more effective ...

What do you think?

RC
In 1928 the authorization of funds by the Reichstag for the Panzerschiff Deutschland
was an important development for the navy and allowed it to begin conceiving a longterm
building programme. The new commander-in-chief, Admiral Erich Raeder, made
the first reference to a carrier in a memorandum drafted in January 1929 for the defence
minister, General Wilhelm Groener, on the ideal composition of the fleet once it was
freed from Versailles treaty constraints.23 Raeder argued for at least one carrier along
with a sizeable naval air arm, but, owing to political considerations, references to a carrier
were omitted from the Schiffbauersatzplan approved by the Reichstag in the spring
of 1931. Internally the carrier, referred to as a 10,000 t Flugdeckkreuzer, remained part of
future planning, and in 1931 maritime aviation was integrated into fleet manoeuvres.24

The Kriegsmarine and the
Aircraft Carrier: The Design
and Operational Purpose of the
Graf Zeppelin, 1933–1940
Marcus Faulkner

War in History
19(4) 492–
516
© The Author(s) 2012
 
Yep. It requires a bit of subterfuge. Thats why the clandestine Bolshivik naval base is useful.

A fast flat topped transatlantic liner with 'mail planes' coming and going constantly.



A entirely separate & very important discussion. Big decks are more efficient tactically and operationally. But there are those other unpleasant factors. If strategy just covers dominating the North Sea to the Arctic to the Baltic then smaller decks are the thing. three or those for the cost of two big carriers? But, those are less useful and survivable in longer ranged 'Atlantik' operations.
The shift from a battle line to raiding groups required more smaller carriers rather than one or two large ones.
To operate with the Panzerschiffe they needed to have considerable endurance (12,000 nm
at 20 kt) and be capable of sustained high speed for air operations. They also needed the
equivalent armament and protection to ward off destroyer attacks.33

In March 1934 a new Schiffbauersatzplan was drafted that, alongside a core of
eight Panzerschiffe, included three 15,000 t carriers, two for active service and one in
reserve.34 The shift from small- to medium-sized carriers, transforming the vessels
from escorts into capital ships, had numerous causes. First consultations with the
Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM), had established that a longer flight deck was
needed to operate future aircraft.35 The perceived weakness of carriers, with some
officers referring to them as ‘petrol boxes’, also caused considerable concern.36 The
Washington Treaty stipulated that aircraft carriers, vessels of over 10,000 t designed
specifically and exclusively for the purpose of carrying aircraft, were permitted to
carry 15 cm guns, and made an extra provision allowing the two American battlecruiser
conversions to mount four twin 20.3 cm turrets.37
 
And bluntly, they had no idea what they were doing. The arrestor system they put on Graf Zeppelin straight-up didn’t work.
However, the time frame for a fully worked-up carrier and air group had been considerably
underestimated. The theoretical aspects of the project were mastered remarkably
well in a short time, and the design demonstrates a reasonably good degree of
understanding of contemporary carrier development. While war games and plans
alone are insufficient evidence, they too show a reasonably good understanding of the
operational value of naval aviation. The practical side is more problematic. While the
vessel might have been completed in a similar time frame to the Bismarck or Tirpitz,
it would, like all the large combatants, have suffered propulsion problems.167 The
navy did well in developing carrier-specific equipment. For example, the arrester
system functioned very well, with few accidents in the thousands of landings conducted
at shore establishments.168
 
Even assuming a far greater level of Japanese-German interaction and support, going from effectively no navy to an effective Carrier based navy in the years after Hitler came to power but before 1939 would almost be ASB.
Small carriers would have been sufficient and could have been developed quicker, as the
British themselves knew. The navy’s problem was that it had over-thought and overengineered
the issue by seeking, in its first attempt, to produce a perfect fleet carrier,
rather than one suited to its operational requirements.
 
The German Navy of WW2 was never able to match the British in sheer tonnage. Their largest battleships might have been very modern and good (debatable) but they simply didn't have the numbers to compete. There were just too many demands on the German economy for 'Plan Z' to be anything more than a pipedream. In theory, the Germans could deploy a fleet-in-being that could threaten the UK's shipping lanes and keep UK ships pinned down; in practice, the concept was never as workable as the Germans hoped.

What if they'd put the resources that went into Bismarck and Tirpitz into carriers instead? The aircraft carrier concept was proven by that time. The Japanese could have offered technical support, if the Germans had asked. It would be chancy, but unless the Germans got very lucky their surface fleet was never going to be decisive. But a handful of semi-modern carriers might be more effective ...

What do you think?

RC


The KM was always the red haired step child of the German armed forces and always will be, Germany is a continental power that is surrounded by enemies and potential enemies. The finest navy in the world will do them 0 good if the France army beats them on land (and in the 30's the French army was seen as the most powerful on the continent).

It's not as simple as seeing an aircraft carrier and then instantly deciding lets to do that. Bismarck and Tirpitz were laid in down in 1936, that means the decision to start them was made prior to that. There is no great moment in that time frame that will signal the death of the battleship and supremacy of the carriers.

Hitler didn't even like big battle ships but at least battleships were part of long established naval orthodoxy at this point, no way is he going to suddenly sign off on the KM flipping to Carriers in the first half of the 1930's.

Carriers by themselves are vulnerable they need all the rest, especially if they are swanning about the Atlantic in between the world's first and second largest navies

Carriers require a fleet air arm, and the LW at this point is seen as airborne artillery for the Army. No one in Germany is spending serious resources on this (and remember it's not just the planes, an effective carrier air force requires years of developing the tactics and training).

Goring is not going to be happy about a navy air force so he will want it to be a LW thing, the KM will not want that in turn.

Germany is not planning on fighting the battle of the Atlantic, this is why they go into 1940 with something 30 operational U-boats.

The axis were notoriously bad at helping each other out, and besides that even the earliest pact between Germany and Japan is 1936 (the anti-commitern pact)

As others have mention GB will notice this, and will be pissed off (there is only one target for German Carriers). Japan will also know this and will not help because they are fighting a war in China and don't want to piss people off.
 
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