If the Russians had done better in ww1 to the extent that the february revolution was delayed by a dozen weeks, would Russia have won ww1?

I personally think so, considering it would still take Lenin the same amount of time to get to Russia from switzerland, so he wouldn't be in a position to carry out the october revolution until 1918, by then american soldiers had been pouring into ww1, which would cause the Russians to realize that the end of the war is near.
 
Had the Russians not done the Brusilov Offensive and just sat on the defensive in 1916 and 1917, I think there's a strong case to be made that they win the war and sit with the victors at Versailles. In which case, the Versailles negotiations would have been different in character by quite a bit.
 
Had the Russians not done the Brusilov Offensive and just sat on the defensive in 1916 and 1917, I think there's a strong case to be made that they win the war and sit with the victors at Versailles. In which case, the Versailles negotiations would have been different in character by quite a bit.
Could Italy been wrecked worse to any critical effect by the Austrians in consequence of no Brusilov offensive?

Or could the Germans have Ver-doomed the French more at Verdun in consequence of no Brusilov offensive?

Could any of the Russian resources not expended offensively on the the Brusilov offensive in Europe have reinforced the quite successful Yudenich offensives in Caucasus and Greater Armenia/eastern Anatolia of 1916, to which the Ottomans, unlike the Germans, seemed to have no effective reply?
 
So, what do you think would happen?
The revolution still happens...it had been brewing for a long time and the changes that were made to stall a complete change were simply not enough.Even if Russia does not collapse due to the war then the changes are even less likely to be made .
A victorious Russia sitting at Versailles wont change that much AFAIC. The Russian peasantry and workers wont get anything but minimal scraps.
The only thing which might make a difference is that Russia simply doesn't take part in WW1.The consequence of that would be far less people in Russia that are armed leading to a more one sided civil war.
In that scenario you either need intervention on the Red side from outside which is unlikely unless the revolutionary spark starts from Germany and then they arm the Bolsheviks
 
What does this mean?

So what I believe is that with the much reduced loss of lives we won't get the revolution twice. I still believe we'll get the Kerensky government, but we might be able to remove the fertile grounds the Bolshiviks found. Which saves millions and millions.
 
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Could Italy been wrecked worse to any critical effect by the Austrians in consequence of no Brusilov offensive?
Caporetto was already close to being boxcars for the Central Powers and snake eyes for Italy - as much as I like to wax poetic about the Piave as any other patriotic Italian, and there absolutely was some amazing willpower by the Italian soldiers even when everyone had taken them for goners (their allies, but also their commanders), a lot of what stopped the Austro-Germans was basically being at the far end of their logistical tether. Assuming the Italian army collapses outright, the Austrians still have to push beyond natural barrier after natural barrier, and they are already running on fumes by then, and when they reach the Franco-British lines (OTL placed laughably far back, but ITTL perhaps not) they will have the offensive power of a pool tube.
Most importantly, this means that Caporetto going better is not in Austro-German hands. It can, for sure, but if the PoD is utterly unrelated to the Italian army I can't see why stuff should overly change in there.
 
I personally think so, considering it would still take Lenin the same amount of time to get to Russia from switzerland, so he wouldn't be in a position to carry out the october revolution until 1918, by then american soldiers had been pouring into ww1, which would cause the Russians to realize that the end of the war is near.
Military situation was irrelevant for the February and October Revolution, Russians are still starving and the Tsar still doesn't realize the danger and continues to delay the Duma sessions; less military defeats don't solve Russia's problems.
And the scenario somewhat depends on how the February Revolution has been postponed.
Had the Russians not done the Brusilov Offensive and just sat on the defensive in 1916 and 1917, I think there's a strong case to be made that they win the war and sit with the victors at Versailles. In which case, the Versailles negotiations would have been different in character by quite a bit.
The Brusilov Offensive didn't made things worse for Russia, they would've attacked anyways just against the Germans (which IOTL was their plan, but Brusilov unexpectedly achieved success which scared the commander that was supposed to attack the Germans as he didn't want to tarnish his reputation).
And regardless of the situation on the military front, the reasons for the February Revolution were starvation, hate for the Tsar etc. which still are very present so don't expect massive delays. Once the Provisional Government takes over it will still face workers who constantly demand higher wages, collapse of discipline in the army etc. which will only be made worse when the Bolsheviks take over.
The only thing that it changes is that the Kerensky Offensive is now directed against Germany instead of AH so Kornilov never takes over command instead of Brusilov but it will only delay the Bolshevik coup, so little changes.
Could Italy been wrecked worse to any critical effect by the Austrians in consequence of no Brusilov offensive?
Somewhat better for the Austrians but doesn't massively change the war.
Or could the Germans have Ver-doomed the French more at Verdun in consequence of no Brusilov offensive?
I also doubt about that, while the Brusilov Offensive diverted resources from Verdun, the Russian offensive against the Germans (who was planned to be the main one) would now show less restraint than IOTL and Verdun was unlikely to be a success from the very beginning.
Could any of the Russian resources not expended offensively on the the Brusilov offensive in Europe have reinforced the quite successful Yudenich offensives in Caucasus and Greater Armenia/eastern Anatolia of 1916, to which the Ottomans, unlike the Germans, seemed to have no effective reply?
Anatolia was not a very important front for Russia, resources are better used against the Germans and Austro-Hungarians.
The only thing which might make a difference is that Russia simply doesn't take part in WW1.The consequence of that would be far less people in Russia that are armed leading to a more one sided civil war.
There would be no civil war at all in that case since Nicholas isn't deposed.
 
Anatolia was not a very important front for Russia, resources are better used against the Germans and Austro-Hungarians.
It was a *very* important front for Ottoman Turkey. Additional pressure encroaching on their Anatolian heartland means the Ottomans barely have a chance to recover from fending off the Allied Gallipoli invaders (who only evacuated in spring 1916), adds to the pressure of the Arab revolt that broke out in 1916, and could accelerate the British early 1917 offensive in Mesopotamia that took Baghdad, and the progress of the 1917 southern Palestine campaign. That kind of pressure might make the Ottomans peace out and open the straits. Also, pushing on in eastern Anatolia gives more access to ethnic Armenians and Assyrians who can be enrolled under the Russian Army banner to keep the campaign somewhat self-supporting, and the Turks just don't have the firepower or tactical proficiency to rough up Russian formations like the German Army does, which had such a demoralizing effect on Russian soldiers.

Theoretically (in a Clausewitzian sense) attacking the enemy center of strength in the German Army and the Austrian Army is the best contribution of the Russians, or any ally, to the common cause. In practice, given the Russians' lower proficiency, attacking the weaker CP's forces', those of the Ottomans or Bulgarians, wherever they could be fought without nearby German back-up, was likely to be more profitable for the Russians and sustainable for them.
 
Caporetto was already close to being boxcars for the Central Powers and snake eyes for Italy - as much as I like to wax poetic about the Piave as any other patriotic Italian, and there absolutely was some amazing willpower by the Italian soldiers even when everyone had taken them for goners (their allies, but also their commanders), a lot of what stopped the Austro-Germans was basically being at the far end of their logistical tether. Assuming the Italian army collapses outright, the Austrians still have to push beyond natural barrier after natural barrier, and they are already running on fumes by then, and when they reach the Franco-British lines (OTL placed laughably far back, but ITTL perhaps not) they will have the offensive power of a pool tube.
Most importantly, this means that Caporetto going better is not in Austro-German hands. It can, for sure, but if the PoD is utterly unrelated to the Italian army I can't see why stuff should overly change in there.
Not that it invalidates your points about natural obstacles, availability of western support for rescue purposes, and Italian ability to rally, but I was not talking specifically about a non-Brusilov offensive (August 1916) crushing Italy through an improved Caporetto (Oct-Nov 1917), but through it leaving the Austrians of 1916 undisturbed and their offensive against of 1916 against Italy uninterrupted.

The effect of the Brusilov offensive in OTL was to gut *both* the Austro-Hungarian Army and the Russian Army to a great extent, although the Russians made better tactical gains. Without the offensive, both armies are better off and can probably inflict more damage other ways, and have enough stamina that alternate and additional means would be required to wear them down.
 
Not that it invalidates your points about natural obstacles, availability of western support for rescue purposes, and Italian ability to rally, but I was not talking specifically about a non-Brusilov offensive (August 1916) crushing Italy through an improved Caporetto (Oct-Nov 1917), but through it leaving the Austrians of 1916 undisturbed and their offensive against of 1916 against Italy uninterrupted.

The effect of the Brusilov offensive in OTL was to gut *both* the Austro-Hungarian Army and the Russian Army to a great extent, although the Russians made better tactical gains. Without the offensive, both armies are better off and can probably inflict more damage other ways, and have enough stamina that alternate and additional means would be required to wear them down.
I see what you mean, but honestly Austria is more likely to work itself to a nub not unlike what Italy did, because the tactics on the two sides weren't really that dissimilar. In fact, I would say that if A-H feels like they can go full on the offensive on the Italian front, this is a net loss for them compared to just doing nothing, as Italy stops them more or less with the same ease as the opposite, more or less for the exact same reasons, and when Russia comes back into the fray (better and stronger, or so the premise goes) Austria will be in an even worse position on both fronts.
 
Less soldiers (who are husbands, fathers, brothers, sons) dying in war, more blockades against russia failing.
If people are starving the revolution still happens, less soldiers dying does not solve Russia's problems.
It was a *very* important front for Ottoman Turkey. Additional pressure encroaching on their Anatolian heartland means the Ottomans barely have a chance to recover from fending off the Allied Gallipoli invaders (who only evacuated in spring 1916), adds to the pressure of the Arab revolt that broke out in 1916, and could accelerate the British early 1917 offensive in Mesopotamia that took Baghdad, and the progress of the 1917 southern Palestine campaign. That kind of pressure might make the Ottomans peace out and open the straits. Also, pushing on in eastern Anatolia gives more access to ethnic Armenians and Assyrians who can be enrolled under the Russian Army banner to keep the campaign somewhat self-supporting, and the Turks just don't have the firepower or tactical proficiency to rough up Russian formations like the German Army does, which had such a demoralizing effect on Russian soldiers.

Theoretically (in a Clausewitzian sense) attacking the enemy center of strength in the German Army and the Austrian Army is the best contribution of the Russians, or any ally, to the common cause. In practice, given the Russians' lower proficiency, attacking the weaker CP's forces', those of the Ottomans or Bulgarians, wherever they could be fought without nearby German back-up, was likely to be more profitable for the Russians and sustainable for them.
This is absolutely correct however Russia sort of has to attack AH or Germany because at this point their war effort was dependent on the rest of the Entente so they had to make offensives against them. Even without any offensive on the Eastern Front (which is politically unfeasible), the Russians will still be more worried about the CP offensives there than about continuing offensives in the Caucasus.
Not that it invalidates your points about natural obstacles, availability of western support for rescue purposes, and Italian ability to rally, but I was not talking specifically about a non-Brusilov offensive (August 1916) crushing Italy through an improved Caporetto (Oct-Nov 1917), but through it leaving the Austrians of 1916 undisturbed and their offensive against of 1916 against Italy uninterrupted.
AFAIK the Italians had already succeeded in fending off the Austrian Offensive when the Brusilov one started.
 
If the Russians are doing better in WW1, it also means that the Central powers are coming closer to defeat.
Losing less soldiers and winning on the front lines are two very different things, IOTL Russia had absolutely no chance to contest Germany militarily, had Nicholas II managed the war effort better (and therefore improved the internal conditions in Russia) Russia could've sat at the table of winners after WW1 but just losing less soldiers in battle doesn't solve Russia's problems.
 
This is absolutely correct however Russia sort of has to attack AH or Germany because at this point their war effort was dependent on the rest of the Entente so they had to make offensives against them. Even without any offensive on the Eastern Front (which is politically unfeasible), the Russians will still be more worried about the CP offensives there than about continuing offensives in the Caucasus.
Nope - Russia can hang back and do the defensive and dodging strategy, the Fabian strategy, the rope-a-dope, in Europe in 1917.

The French checked out of offensives for 1917 after the Nivelle Offensive disaster.....it didn't lose the war for the coalition. The Russians didn't have to be any more heroic than the French. The French still ended up sitting at the winner's table, even though they took the rope-a-dope in 1917 with more of their vital organs under the German boot than Russia had.
 
Had the Russians not done the Brusilov Offensive and just sat on the defensive in 1916 and 1917, I think there's a strong case to be made that they win the war and sit with the victors at Versailles. In which case, the Versailles negotiations would have been different in character by quite a bit.
Its very interesting to think what those alternatve Versailles terms would look like.
This POD might have the US entering the war earlier because Germany panics earlier.
 
It was a *very* important front for Ottoman Turkey. Additional pressure encroaching on their Anatolian heartland means the Ottomans barely have a chance to recover from fending off the Allied Gallipoli invaders (who only evacuated in spring 1916), adds to the pressure of the Arab revolt that broke out in 1916, and could accelerate the British early 1917 offensive in Mesopotamia that took Baghdad, and the progress of the 1917 southern Palestine campaign. That kind of pressure might make the Ottomans peace out and open the straits. Also, pushing on in eastern Anatolia gives more access to ethnic Armenians and Assyrians who can be enrolled under the Russian Army banner to keep the campaign somewhat self-supporting, and the Turks just don't have the firepower or tactical proficiency to rough up Russian formations like the German Army does, which had such a demoralizing effect on Russian soldiers.

Theoretically (in a Clausewitzian sense) attacking the enemy center of strength in the German Army and the Austrian Army is the best contribution of the Russians, or any ally, to the common cause. In practice, given the Russians' lower proficiency, attacking the weaker CP's forces', those of the Ottomans or Bulgarians, wherever they could be fought without nearby German back-up, was likely to be more profitable for the Russians and sustainable for them.
And the Ottomans peacing out means the Russians can export and import throught the Black Sea again, which will make a huge though patchy difference to their logistics and popular discontent.
 
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