Operation Unthinkable in Mid-April 1945 - Germany/US/UK coming together

All,

Please don’t condemn this one to the ABS section – although it might be slightly ‘left field’.

Hitler and his close entourage in the last days hoped for a fall-out between US/UK and USSR, saving nazi-Germany.

In the light of reality, it was far-fetched and not aligned with much military consideration.

Eisenhower was not interested in advancing beyond the boundaries already set for the occupation zones. As supreme commander, that was the ‘law’ laid down.

Without getting into a deep discussion whether US/UK could have gotten to Berlin first, we can safely assume that it could have been possible.

The question or scenario here is a link-up with German forces to drive Russia back out of Germany (and presumable Poland as well).

The possibility will need a political decision more than any military decision. In essence: Eisenhower would have to over-ruled (or removed?).

When did Churchill et. al. start to consider ‘Unthinkable’? The sneak attack on Russia was supposed to go in by 1 July 1945 and had an element of 200,000 German POWs to be enrolled in this adventure.

Could Churchill have convinced Truman that mid-April would be a good time for linking up with Germany and hitting Russia? This would.be Unthinkable brought forward with only 2-3 months.

How much convincing would Truman require? Truman and Churchill would know that the nuclear bomb was by and large ready and if it all went ‘pear shaped’ there would be a trump card waiting.

Some German generals and the Hitler inner core might have envisaged they would be treated as equal partners in this Barbarossa v2.0, but that would be stretching it – perhaps?

Maybe not equal partners, but Steiner, Busse, Wenck, Heinrici, etc etc all had some experience in fighting the Russians that US/UK military leaders could use?

Combine Unthinkable (which in reality was a dead horse) with the desire that formed the creation of NATO and the re-arming of Germany it might not be far out that some (Churchill – that vile old fox) and others could have looked at the possibility of starting the attack on Russia in Mid-April (or late April together with nazi-Germany.

The premise might have been that Hitler would have to go and a purely military (if there were any purely military generals around) semi-government would be the counter-part to the US/UK forces.

It raises an interesting question in terms who US/UK would accept as representing a ‘new’ Germany. Doenitz in Flensburg might have been a candidate.

It also leaves one thing: would Waffen SS have been seen as ‘convenient’ in fighting the Russians? Unthinkable calculated with 200,000 Germn soldiers signing up again. It did not mention anything about Waffen SS, maybe because it was ‘embarrassing’ to mention that there would be SS units employed?

Comments?

Could it even have happened?
 
No, by 1945 the WAllies knew what the Nazi regime was truly like and Communism was rightly considered a much lesser evil. Thinking that either Truman or Churchill would deal with Hitler in 1945 is ASB.

The only way for this to happen is by accident. Possibly meeting engagements between Russian and WAlly forces go disastrously wrong with escalation instead of mediation being the result. Only works with a full blown Cold War level of mutual paranoia. Although this scenario is highly unlikely.
 
Not chances. Allies were already decided that nazis must defeat and there was already ultimatum for unconditional surrend. Allies too knew perfectly how horrible nazis were and even if they didn't like Soviets they hated nazis more. Furthermore Chruchill and Truman knew already very well that Hitler can't be trusted and he was going to lost war anyway.
 
All,

Please don’t condemn this one to the ABS section – although it might be slightly ‘left field’.

Hitler and his close entourage in the last days hoped for a fall-out between US/UK and USSR, saving nazi-Germany.

In the light of reality, it was far-fetched and not aligned with much military consideration.

Eisenhower was not interested in advancing beyond the boundaries already set for the occupation zones. As supreme commander, that was the ‘law’ laid down.

Without getting into a deep discussion whether US/UK could have gotten to Berlin first, we can safely assume that it could have been possible.

The question or scenario here is a link-up with German forces to drive Russia back out of Germany (and presumable Poland as well).

The possibility will need a political decision more than any military decision. In essence: Eisenhower would have to over-ruled (or removed?).

When did Churchill et. al. start to consider ‘Unthinkable’? The sneak attack on Russia was supposed to go in by 1 July 1945 and had an element of 200,000 German POWs to be enrolled in this adventure.

Could Churchill have convinced Truman that mid-April would be a good time for linking up with Germany and hitting Russia? This would.be Unthinkable brought forward with only 2-3 months.

How much convincing would Truman require? Truman and Churchill would know that the nuclear bomb was by and large ready and if it all went ‘pear shaped’ there would be a trump card waiting.

Some German generals and the Hitler inner core might have envisaged they would be treated as equal partners in this Barbarossa v2.0, but that would be stretching it – perhaps?

Maybe not equal partners, but Steiner, Busse, Wenck, Heinrici, etc etc all had some experience in fighting the Russians that US/UK military leaders could use?

Combine Unthinkable (which in reality was a dead horse) with the desire that formed the creation of NATO and the re-arming of Germany it might not be far out that some (Churchill – that vile old fox) and others could have looked at the possibility of starting the attack on Russia in Mid-April (or late April together with nazi-Germany.

The premise might have been that Hitler would have to go and a purely military (if there were any purely military generals around) semi-government would be the counter-part to the US/UK forces.

It raises an interesting question in terms who US/UK would accept as representing a ‘new’ Germany. Doenitz in Flensburg might have been a candidate.

It also leaves one thing: would Waffen SS have been seen as ‘convenient’ in fighting the Russians? Unthinkable calculated with 200,000 Germn soldiers signing up again. It did not mention anything about Waffen SS, maybe because it was ‘embarrassing’ to mention that there would be SS units employed?

Comments?

Could it even have happened?
Why all the Churchill hate recently?

Given that USSR had originally sided with the Nazis to invade Poland and was now sitting on half of Europe wouldn't it be entirely sensibly for the "vile old fox" as you put it to have contingency plans. I mean lets be honest - if you are developing a plan for a meaningful strategic option you don't call it Operation Unthinkable. And you certainly don't junk the original version and use the same name for a defensive strategy less than a month later.

Rather you would take your time and come up with a plan like Operation Pincher https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Policy/Policy_V001.pdf with your main ally .

Of course the Soviets were also making plans
 
LOL - no, i don't 'hate' Churchill. He was probably one of the most ruthless leaders but rather realistic.

It was not his idea with 'unconditional surrender' and there were rumblings (Bennet's book on Canaris) that Churchill could be moved on that account.

No, Hitler would have to go. Anything else would exactly be ABS.

However, it is worth a thought that Unthinkable was dependent on an additional 200,000 Germans to be part of the attacking force.
Also, that NATO would be unrealistic without a re-armed and strong Germany. NATO was formed in 1949 and Germany joined in 1955. This was only 10 years after the conclusion of WWII.

There must have been serious considerations prior to having Germany to join. In essence: German re-armament must have been discussed within the US/UK alliance probably from 1949 and onwards.

It is in this llight the posts must be read
 
LOL - no, i don't 'hate' Churchill. He was probably one of the most ruthless leaders but rather realistic.

It was not his idea with 'unconditional surrender' and there were rumblings (Bennet's book on Canaris) that Churchill could be moved on that account.

No, Hitler would have to go. Anything else would exactly be ABS.

However, it is worth a thought that Unthinkable was dependent on an additional 200,000 Germans to be part of the attacking force.
Also, that NATO would be unrealistic without a re-armed and strong Germany. NATO was formed in 1949 and Germany joined in 1955. This was only 10 years after the conclusion of WWII.

There must have been serious considerations prior to having Germany to join. In essence: German re-armament must have been discussed within the US/UK alliance probably from 1949 and onwards.

It is in this llight the posts must be read
Not considered in US war planning prior to Korean War. You can check out the plans here https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:gf917dt8506/vol_2.pdf
 
Why all the Churchill hate recently?

Given that USSR had originally sided with the Nazis to invade Poland and was now sitting on half of Europe wouldn't it be entirely sensibly for the "vile old fox" as you put it to have contingency plans. I mean lets be honest - if you are developing a plan for a meaningful strategic option you don't call it Operation Unthinkable.
Churchill was a politician and could see the criticism coming "we went to war for Poland, and now it's still occupied, although by a different dictator".

Operation Unthinkable analysis shows "even if we went to war with the Soviet Union, we'd end up with a stalemate in Poland".
 
You would need a much earlier POD. Maaaaayyyyyybe a successful July 20 plot followed by the immediate liquidation of Hitler's surviving inner circle and an immediate pullback to prewar borders. Even then, you're going to have a devil of a time getting the Wallies to trust the Tom Cruise looking dude who took control.
 
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Not convinced with an earlier time line.

1944 still saw US/UK being 'good friends' with USSR (Stalin).

April 1945 was different. USSR had installed its puppet government in Poland (the 'reason' for going to war) and shown its hand in settling Eastern Europe. Tension was indeed building.

Could it even have come to blows if US/UK forces had met along a longer front in 1945? And if so, what could have happened? The Berlin blockade (1948) did have a few 'blows' but that got swept under the carpet. It could have gone much worse I think.

Unthinkable was scheduled for July 1945 which was just around the corner.

It leaves the question:
IF US/UK had come to blows in April 1945, where would it leave Germany?
On the sidelines?
a participant?

... and that is really the big question.

and yes, i agree: Hitler had to go. But somebody else could have stepped in.
 

Pangur

Donor
AApril 1945
Not convinced with an earlier time line.

1944 still saw US/UK being 'good friends' with USSR (Stalin).

April 1945 was different. USSR had installed its puppet government in Poland (the 'reason' for going to war) and shown its hand in settling Eastern Europe. Tension was indeed building.

Could it even have come to blows if US/UK forces had met along a longer front in 1945? And if so, what could have happened? The Berlin blockade (1948) did have a few 'blows' but that got swept under the carpet. It could have gone much worse I think.

Unthinkable was scheduled for July 1945 which was just around the corner.

It leaves the question:
IF US/UK had come to blows in April 1945, where would it leave Germany?
On the sidelines?
a participant?

... and that is really the big question.

and yes, i agree: Hitler had to go. But somebody else could have stepped in.
April 1945 yes it was obvious Stalin was a bad bastard, true however Hitler was a bigger bastard
 
Could it even have happened?
Not without changing the war in a very fundamental way. Ironically, of course, this is what the German high command was (feebly) hoping for by this stage of the war. That the Allies would fall apart and something of 'their' Germany would be salvaged as a weapon against the Russians. It's not going to happen.

Let's be clear here. There is zero stomach for war with the USSR here. The USA and UK just fought the largest war in history (still ARE fighting it in Asia), with unimageable destruction. No one wants round 2 for.....whatever reason. Not to mention, Churchill did (as governments do) commission a study to look at war with the USSR in the near-term. It was quickly realized it was virtually impossible due to the strength of the Red Army.

There is no place to start here, Unthinkable has a very accurate name for a war plan.
 
Interesting comments. It is all about timing.

1945: a new war going in, this time against a former ally - USSR - would not be very popular.
UK was not in a good shape. rations and universal misery really.
US did have plenty of resources

1948: Berlin blockade:
Maybe one of the instances where war could have broken out.
Confrontations aplenty. and the appetite for war was there I believe, at least within the US military.

That was only 3 years after WWII ended.

Was the sentiment there in 1945 in US circles? that now might be a good time to fight USSR - once and for all?
Could it have tipped the scale if Hitler was dead in Mid- April? Or even after Hitler's suicide on 30 April?

I for one, do not fully understand the US sentiments on this one. Could they have worked with say Doenitz?
After all, they immediately employed some rather dubious characters whose actions were directed at USSR (Gehlen, etc).
So, US was fully prepared to work with even former SS officers if it could advance their 'crusade' against communism.

This is a crucial question: could they consider signing up with a 'new' Germany (sans Hitler) to fight USSR?

It brings it back to Unthinkable. Brooke declared that from a military perspective it was a dead duck. He did (of course) not dabble in the political aspect of this.

What is amazing is that Stalin knew about Unthinkable.
 
Was the sentiment there in 1945 in US circles? that now might be a good time to fight USSR - once and for all?
Could it have tipped the scale if Hitler was dead in Mid- April? Or even after Hitler's suicide on 30 April?
From the JCS history I linked earlier. The JIC prepared a report on Soviets intentions in January 1945. Which in hindsight was pretty much bang on.

In carrying out its national security policies,” the JIC report forecast, “the Soviet Union will rely heavily upon the development of its own influence upon other nations. In peripheral areas, such as Eastern Europe, the USSR will insist upon control or predominant influence. In Central Europe, China, and perhaps Japan,” the report continued, “it will insist upon an influence at least equal to that of the Western powers. In Western Europe and the Mediterranean, it will attempt to make British influence less than Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.” And in more distant regions, the Soviets would “probably be content to wield a merely negative power such as will prevent anti-Soviet orientation of the countries involved. In carrying out these policies, the USSR will use the local communist parties and other means at its disposal.”

To achieve its maximum economic recovery, the Soviet Union would need to avoid a conflict with Great Britain or the United States and the tensions that might lead to an arms race. To this end it would probably adopt a peaceful policy unless it conceives its vital interests relating to national security are threatened.
 
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The thing about Unthinkable is that not even Churchill was seriously invested in it, even before he received the plan which laid out just how unfeasible it was. David Reynolds places Operation Unthinkable in context of Churchill's (and Britain's) diplomatic history and points out that for all the attention it gets, it was an anomaly even in Churchill's (let alone British) thinking at the time and that Churchill's main strategy at the time was and remained, effectively, more summits like Yalta and Potsdam.

"The panic [surrounding Operation Unthinkable], it must be stressed, was temporary and did not betoken all-out hostility towards the Soviet Union. Churchill's comments about veils and curtains were mostly directed to the situation in Poland, where the Soviets were dragging their feet in the spring of 1945 on the reconstruction of the existing communist government, agreed in outline at Yalta, while non-communists in Poland were being quietly eliminated. Once that process was complete, at the end of June, Stalin was happy to welcome Truman's emissary, Harry Hopkins, and include a few token non-communists in a new Polish government. After the Americans had agreed, Churchill had no choice but to acquiesce. At the same time he had to accept the American decision to pull back their troops to the occupation zones previously agreed between the Allies. Churchill had wanted them to remain, at least for the moment, in the heart of defeated Germany, including Magdeburg and Leipzig, right up to the middle Elbe. Although that might have provided a platform for an offensive, as in Operation Unthinkable, Churchill's main reason was diplomatic rather than military. He wanted to retain the most eastwardly positions possible as bargaining counters for a new summit. As he told Truman in his 'iron curtain' telegram of May 12: 'Surely it is vital now to come to an understanding with Russia, or to see where we are with her before we weaken our armies mortally or retire to the zones of occupation.' Even though the Americans decided to withdraw, this remained Churchill's strategy: a new summit with the Russians at which, he hoped, the outstanding differences could be resolved or at least reduced. The summit eventually convened at Potsdam on 17 July, considerably later than Churchill wanted, and he spent only a week there before being evicted from office by the British electorate." -From World War To Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s, Page 251-252

In fact, Reynolds would go on to note that even after Potsdam, after the breakdown of relations, and the start of the Cold War, Churchill would continue to retain a remarkable degree of faith in Stalin and continued to express a belief that more "summit diplomacy", wherein he would sit down a negotiate in conferences with Stalin, would still remain Churchill's preferred method of dealing with the Soviets

"I have suggested that Churchill went to Fulton to hit the headlines with a clarion call about the special relationship but that the reaction to his speech, particularly from Moscow, made him seem more of a Cold Warrior than he had intended. Support for this argument may be found in Churchill's attitude to Stalin: despite the explosive rejoinder from the Kremlin, Churchill seems to have retained a remarkable faith in the Soviet dictator.

His public praise of Stalin on 7 November 1945 was not an isolated incident. Churchill continued his wartime habit of sending Stalin birthday greetings. A telegram in December 1945 wishing 'Many happy returns of the day' received a belated but cordial acknowledgement. Nor did Churchill allow the Fulton furore to interrupt his pattern. On 21 December 1946 he asked the Soviet Ambassador in London to transmit a brief message to Stalin: 'All personal good wishes on your birthday, my wartime comrade.' Three days later came the reply: 'My warm thanks for your good wishes on my birthday.' With Moscow's consent, Churchill duly published his message to Stalin, which was printed in several British papers, often featuring the phrase 'My wartime comrade.'"-Page 262

Reynolds goes on to deal with more fawning from Churchill towards Stalin in private messages (including fully quoting a especially fawning three-paragraph long one) as well as Churchill doing so further in his personal memoirs before returning to how Churchill obssessively kept trying to pursue summit diplomacy some 2-3 pages later.

"The 1945 documents [exchanged between him and Stalin] were live in his [Churchill] mind from working on the memoirs and his 4 November 1951 message to Stalin [after regaining Prime Ministership] was almost saying: 'Let us resume from where we were so rudely interrupted six years ago.' Back in February 1950, Churchill had called for another 'parley at the summit'-coining a further slogan for the diplomatic lexicon to complement 'iron curtain' and 'special relationship'. Summitry was the overriding passion of his second term and on several occasions during 1952 Churchill spoke privately of his desire for a joint Anglo-American approach to Stalin, leading perhaps to a modern Congress of Vienna at which the Potsdam Conference would be reopened and concluded. He also observed that in June 1952 that 'while Stalin was alive we were safer from attack than if he died and his lieutenants started scrambling fo the succession'. Reminiscing with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromkyo in February 1953 about wartime summits, he said his 'percentages' meeting with Stalin in Moscow in October 1944 was the 'the highest level we ever reached'."-Page 265

Basically, Churchill's attitude towards the Soviets by the end of the war had been heavily (though by no means entirely) altered by continual contact with Stalin such that his preferred methodology had come to be - and would remain - Summit Diplomacy. Summit Diplomacy from a position of strength preferably, but Summit Diplomacy in general if not. Which with hindsight, given the actual history of these Summits, does represent another Churchillian mistake... if of a completely different kind than Operation Unthinkable.
 
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