How "should" WWII in 1940 have gone?

Opinions on the fall of France in 1940 are greatly divided. The two main camps, as far as I can see, are as follows:

Camp 1 holds that the fall of France was a pure fluke. Manstein's plan even being implemented and the Ardennes offensive happening at all were rather unlikely, and it was only Hitler overriding the general staff that it happened. The French discovering Germany's previous plan and it confirming their thoughts was lucky for Germany, as was France's slow response times. Had Manstein's plan not gone through, which seems more likely than OTL, the Germans would have lost in 1940 and been ground down by the Entente. Same with a bluntet sickle.

Camp 2 holds that the fall of France was mostly inevitable without a pre-war PoD. The German use of radios in their tanks gave them a huge advantage in communications, and their concentration of armor formations, as opposed to the allies mixing their armor in with the infantry, along with German use of air power to a greater degree than the allies, made victory much more likely than defeat. It might take longer, but it would probably happen.

My question is, how "should" WW2 in 1940 have gone? From a timeline writing perspective, OTL's fall of France would be laughed at as ASB in pretty much any timeline. Would it be more probable for Manstein's plan for an Ardennes offensive to be rejected? Would the allies have ground down Germany by 1942, given that Germany, even before the annexation of Czechia, had a higher population and produced more steel and electricity than either Britain or France?
I think it's been suggested in other threads that the brain of one of the original timeline senior French generals may well have been in the process of being rotted by syphilis or something like that in 1940 - which if true seems to me to stack events in favour of Germany unless he makes the correct decisions completely by accident.
 
The rot on the French side was right at the top of the military command ...change that by retiring and replacing the key players mid thirties and you get a much more dynamic French military. In turn , the decision making during the German offensive will be much faster and effective.They might still have to fall back but perhaps only as far as the German logistics last so more like 1870.
Politically this means that the whole Vichy episode is not going to happen and France's honor is preserved.It also means that Barberossa might not be possible either , that Italy might not enter the war either.
 
Thats not how The Netherlands and Belgium wanted to play it though.
Absolutely correct. The way the wanted to play it was the way they did play it in the OTL. The premise of this thread is to explore what "should" have been done differently.
If they do grant military access and go in a military alliance, which is months/years earlier, you can bet your ass Germany will respond in kind.
Again absolutely correct. But how could a German response be any worse than what actually happened after 10 May 1940?
I am also willing to bet my ass against any non-pornographic body part of anyone else that both Belgium and the Netherlands would have been better off in an alliance with Great Britain and France.
 
Absolutely correct. The way the wanted to play it was the way they did play it in the OTL. The premise of this thread is to explore what "should" have been done differently.

Again absolutely correct. But how could a German response be any worse than what actually happened after 10 May 1940?
I am also willing to bet my ass against any non-pornographic body part of anyone else that both Belgium and the Netherlands would have been better off in an alliance with Great Britain and France.

well there is a reason they didn't want to play it that way, i can understand that reason. its mostly got to do with not wanting your country destroyed and your people homeless and hungry.

Might be a good thing for France and England to have a military alliance with The Dutch and Belgium, but not for those 2 parties. Because the fighting is going to take place there. And they all feared another trench war. And oh yeah, air power was way way more sophisticated. So burning cities is pretty much a guarantee. For Germany both countries were just a stepping stone into France. They didn't want revenge, they didn't want the resources, they didn't want the prestige.

Getting overrun like that was at the moment a blessing for both countries, unlike Poland. Except Rotterdam, that was unfortunate.

Most important thing was that the governments, royal families and gold all managed to get out(plus a lot of troops, military equipment and even some POWs). Plus the population wasn't overtly punished for the resistance.

I'm not saying being occupied by Nazis is better than trying your best to keep them out, its the opposite. But i highly doubt they will be able to keep both countries from being occupied. Plus they didn't know of course what an occupation by the Nazis meant yet, we do. Better have it with the least bloodshed and destruction. imho. I'd say OTL was the best outcome for both, considering they were going for neutrality from the getgo. Although maybe more for The Netherlands than Belgium. Then again Belgium was the theatre of WWI trench warfare.

France is a different matter though. France was a goal, not an obstacle. They wanted that prize. Let them work for it, a lot bigger country too so you have room to fight. Much better chances. Bgger army, bigger airforce. It'll cost them dearly.
 
well there is a reason they didn't want to play it that way, i can understand that reason. its mostly got to do with not wanting your country destroyed and your people homeless and hungry.

Might be a good thing for France and England to have a military alliance with The Dutch and Belgium, but not for those 2 parties. Because the fighting is going to take place there. And they all feared another trench war. And oh yeah, air power was way way more sophisticated. So burning cities is pretty much a guarantee. For Germany both countries were just a stepping stone into France. They didn't want revenge, they didn't want the resources, they didn't want the prestige.

Getting overrun like that was at the moment a blessing for both countries, unlike Poland. Except Rotterdam, that was unfortunate.

Most important thing was that the governments, royal families and gold all managed to get out(plus a lot of troops, military equipment and even some POWs). Plus the population wasn't overtly punished for the resistance.

I'm not saying being occupied by Nazis is better than trying your best to keep them out, its the opposite. But i highly doubt they will be able to keep both countries from being occupied. Plus they didn't know of course what an occupation by the Nazis meant yet, we do. Better have it with the least bloodshed and destruction. imho. I'd say OTL was the best outcome for both, considering they were going for neutrality from the getgo. Although maybe more for The Netherlands than Belgium. Then again Belgium was the theatre of WWI trench warfare.

France is a different matter though. France was a goal, not an obstacle. They wanted that prize. Let them work for it, a lot bigger country too so you have room to fight. Much better chances. Bgger army, bigger airforce. It'll cost them dearly.
I think that Belgium could have played up the armed neutrality stance by making a show of building defences against both Germany and France. They already had a big army so could argue that no matter who came, they were determined to make them pay.
Albert Canal balanced by defences on the French border, a central antitank defence line across the Hannut/Gembloux area adaptable to either direction (France has lots of tanks). They can't really get away with accidentally building them all vs Germany first, but there must be some scope for doing the bulk of the works so they can be used either way, leaving relatively minor work to place final barriers ( eg Cointet fences) once you know who's a real danger.
Also, if they're doing earthworks, it keeps the troops busy.
That and sending Gamelin to Martinique or Djibouti (so he can't spring the Breda plan at the last minute) should make the German army advance slower and losses higher in the north, reducing panic (a bit) when the southern breakthrough comes in.
That adds a few more days to weeks, more allied equipment destroyed in combat, sabotaged or evacuated and higher German losses. Now, they are two or three panzer divisions short vs OTL, their allies and occupation troops have worse equipment, they are many 10s of thousands of vehicles down vs OTL and Britain is in less of an invasion panic due to more equipment, closer to autumn weather etc. Italy may not join in.
Then you have to ask what happens to North Africa if Italy isn't involved? Does France have time to sign the joint sovereignty agreement with Britain? Maybe N Africa is British administered. Either way, Italy's navy is not available to the axis and the Med is more of less closed to Germany.
How does Barbarossa go with a vulnerable southern flank, no Italians and fewer vehicles and tanks?
 
Belgium's sin was ambiguity. Had they picked a side or neutrality the French could plan for it. Is Maginot even practical to build if you need to defend the northern border? How does the defensive thinking change? How does it change if you know you need to support the Belgian frontiers? Make a solid decision and you can plan for it.
 
The Belgians must have known that the French planned to fight their next war with Germany almost entirely on Belgian territory. The Belgians would have compared the human and economic toll of another German occupation with the cost of seeing Brussels destroyed in a Stalingrad- or Verdun-style siege lasting months or even years. I wonder how much that impacted the Franco-Belgian relationship during the interwar years and what it meant for Belgian neutrality in the first months of WWII. If the Belgians had abandoned neutrality in late 1939, British and French forces would have moved in and the Germans would be unable to respond, but it would guarantee significant fighting on Belgian territory when the German offensive happened. Waiting gave the Belgians the opportunity to offer what was effectively token resistance to appease British political interests while avoiding the casualties and destruction associated with fighting a protracted positional war on their territory. The lack of French response to the remilitarization of the Rhineland has been cited as a reason why the Belgians adopted strict neutrality compared to what was effectively an alliance with the French after 1920.
 
Might be a good thing for France and England to have a military alliance with The Dutch and Belgium, but not for those 2 parties.
This is the crux of the question put quite succinctly. I respectfully disagree. I believe the alliance would be good for all four nations, and may save Belgian and Dutch territory from being a battleground by robbing the Germans of the strategic and operational initiative.
 
If you simplify warfare into a dice game, I would say that the otl 1940 invasion of France was Germany consistently rolling a 4 or 5 on average. They didn't rely entirely on luck to win due to the obvious inherent advantages they had, however the campaign could have went significantly worse with the tiniest of pods.

I would say in a world where Germany, France, and Great Britain are all rolling 3s and 4s and luck is split 50/50, I think Germany still manages to grind it's way to Paris after 2-3 months and force France to submit, but the peace deal is much more conditional and the British/Free French forces come out of the campaign much more intact and the German military is much more heavily damaged, to the point where Barbarossa needs to be permanently postponed and Hitler embraces a larger Mediterranean strategy as his only move forward.
 
Whenever there's a discussion like this there are those who will have a rigid perspective that what occurred was all, more or less, inevitable. They'll regale us with all that they have learned about the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Germans versus France, Britain and co (which the rest of us are just as well versed on).

What I think often goes missing is that the French made some appalling decisions, and I don't simply mean with the benefit of hindsight. It had long been a maxim of warfare, for example, that you should hold strong reserves. As Frederick the Great said: "He who defends everything defends nothing." Politics played a part in this, particularly with regard to the Breda extension of the Dyle Plan. But it can be seen elsewhere. The warning, meanwhile, against preparing to fight the last war is not a new concept. And there absolutely were thinkers on the French/British side advancing concepts such as the Germans took hold of. The difference being they failed to fully implement new ideas in time.

A few changes here and there that are far from ASB and that the Germans would not have been able to counter to make irrelevant could absolutely have changed the outcome. May 1940 need not have the month of the greatest significance in the last century or millennia even. And believing that is how history had to play out - one way or another - is to advance a really shallow perspective.
 
Last edited:
Its also worth mentioning that the Worlds Greatest Navy ®️™️ was based within a days brisk steaming of this entire debacle and at the time of kickoff was not only busy aggressively violating Norwegian neutrality but even had an amphibious force in the starting blocks ready to pre-emptively invade Norway for their own protection*.
Why did they do that again?

Was it because the Norwegians on several occasions having boarded the Altmark had somehow not found - more accurately chosen not to find or indeed hear them as they were all shouting etc at the time the 300 odd POWs being illegally transported through their waters?

Having chosen not to exercise their neutrality by freeing the POWs the British acted for them.

Now I fully understand that the Norwegian authorities found themselves in the unenviable position of having to chose to piss of the Germans by defending their Neutrality and freeing the POWs or piss off the British by not doing so and proving that they were incapable of defending their Neutrality.

An unfortunate position to be in for sure but Norway was only one of a number of nations invaded by Germany in WW2 and the plans for this invasion started in late 1939 well before the Altmark incident.

Granted their was a British plan as well but that was more to do with providing a link to Finland and denying the Swedish Iron Ore 'winter' route to Germany and largely involved acting in collusion with the Norwegians and Swedes.

Both Germany and the UK are going to conduct themselves according to their needs at that point in WW2 and unfortunately poor Norway was stuck in the middle not only Geographically but also with regards to the vital supply of Iron Ore to Germany.

In the end the Germans gained Norway and the Iron ore and Britain gained the worlds 3 largest Merchant fleet.
 
Its also worth mentioning that the Worlds Greatest Navy ®️™️ was based within a days brisk steaming of this entire debacle and at the time of kickoff was not only busy aggressively violating Norwegian neutrality but even had an amphibious force in the starting blocks ready to pre-emptively invade Norway for their own protection*.

Yet just like the French command and the Norwegian government, at every opportunity to demonstrate a degree of competence the RN instead chose to shit in their hands then applaud. To a frankly unrealistic degree.
So. Many. Cockups.

*This whole “even our best friends are champing at the bit to invade us” vibe probably didn’t help the Norwegian decision making very much when deciding whether to declare mobilisation, which would signal both Germany and the UK they have to invade right now or miss their chance.

It's dramatically easier to know what "should" have been done in 2024 than it was to know it in 1940.

There is just the tiniest possibility that actually running a major operation at the start of the war is harder than you seem to think. Yes, Norway didn't go off perfectly - for anyone on either side (or all three sides, if you count the Norwegians). The Heer and KM also made major errors. Either everyone in charge of just about every service in every country engaged was a complete moron, or everyone was struggling under handicaps that made cockup-free operations impossible.

What was particularly easy or unsuccessful about the attack on the Konigsberg or the Battles of Narvik, for example? Why was the sinking of the Rio De Janiero a "cockup"? Should it have been cheered on to its destination instead? Why was Renown's action in taking and damaging two German battleships such a stuff-up? Do you mean she should have run away? Why did the sub Truant shit in her hand by being so stupid and inefficient as to sink the light cruiser Karlsruhe? What do you want Truant to have done, sent her captain a congratulatory telegram and wish him good luck? What was so bad about Spearfish severely damaging Lutzow?

By what standards do you criticise the RN in every way while apparently claiming that the German attack on Oslo (which cost a heavy cruiser sunk, a light cruiser damaged and delays that allowed the Norwegian royals and national treasury to get away) was a grand success?

The Germans lost one modern heavy cruiser, two modern light cruisers, ten of their destroyers, 10% of their merchant vessels, six of their approximately 36 U-Boats, and had a long list of damaged ships including two battlecruisers. The British lost a carrier (due to stupidity, yes), two old cruisers, and five destroyers.
 
Last edited:
The warning, meanwhile, against preparing to fight the last war is not a new concept.

But on the other hand, it's arguable that those who said "don't fight the last war" were at least as wrong as the guys who did prepare to re-fight the last war.

The "last war" had many aspects that were echoed in WW2, but that people who said "don't fight the last war" had said would not happen again. The "this war is different" crowd were wrong when they said that bombers could not be stopped (they could be, just as did were in the last war); when they said that U-Boats would not be a major problem because of treaties and Asdic (they were, just as in the last war); that the infantry of the last war would be replaced almost entirely by armour (as Liddell Hart and/or Fuller said); when they said that the civilian populace could not last against bombing (it did, just as it did in the last war); when they said that battleships were obsolete (they were in the Pacific but not in the ETO) and I think when they said that artillery was largely obsolete.

You can make a pretty good case that if the Allies had followed the "don't fight the last war" concept and had prepared for a new war along the lines outlined by Douhet, Trenchard and the bomber barons, Liddell-Hart, Fuller, etc then the Brits and French would have lost. The guys who hung onto the lessons of the last war may often have been in the right.
 
But on the other hand, it's arguable that those who said "don't fight the last war" were at least as wrong as the guys who did prepare to re-fight the last war.

The "last war" had many aspects that were echoed in WW2, but that people who said "don't fight the last war" had said would not happen again. The "this war is different" crowd were wrong when they said that bombers could not be stopped (they could be, just as did were in the last war); when they said that U-Boats would not be a major problem because of treaties and Asdic (they were, just as in the last war); that the infantry of the last war would be replaced almost entirely by armour (as Liddell Hart and/or Fuller said); when they said that the civilian populace could not last against bombing (it did, just as it did in the last war); when they said that battleships were obsolete (they were in the Pacific but not in the ETO) and I think when they said that artillery was largely obsolete.

You can make a pretty good case that if the Allies had followed the "don't fight the last war" concept and had prepared for a new war along the lines outlined by Douhet, Trenchard and the bomber barons, Liddell-Hart, Fuller, etc then the Brits and French would have lost. The guys who hung onto the lessons of the last war may often have been in the right.

True, you don't go all theoretical, you make sure your reforms are valid. But the French in particular remained too stuck in the past.
 
But on the other hand, it's arguable that those who said "don't fight the last war" were at least as wrong as the guys who did prepare to re-fight the last war.

The "last war" had many aspects that were echoed in WW2, but that people who said "don't fight the last war" had said would not happen again. The "this war is different" crowd were wrong when they said that bombers could not be stopped (they could be, just as did were in the last war); when they said that U-Boats would not be a major problem because of treaties and Asdic (they were, just as in the last war); that the infantry of the last war would be replaced almost entirely by armour (as Liddell Hart and/or Fuller said); when they said that the civilian populace could not last against bombing (it did, just as it did in the last war); when they said that battleships were obsolete (they were in the Pacific but not in the ETO) and I think when they said that artillery was largely obsolete.

You can make a pretty good case that if the Allies had followed the "don't fight the last war" concept and had prepared for a new war along the lines outlined by Douhet, Trenchard and the bomber barons, Liddell-Hart, Fuller, etc then the Brits and French would have lost. The guys who hung onto the lessons of the last war may often have been in the right.
Had the British and French been capable of fighting in May 1940 like they had done in the summer of 1918 then WW2 would have been a damn sight shorter and very likely not so World War!
 
Why did they do that again?

Was it because the Norwegians on several occasions having boarded the Altmark had somehow not found - more accurately chosen not to find or indeed hear them as they were all shouting etc at the time the 300 odd POWs being illegally transported through their waters?

Having chosen not to exercise their neutrality by freeing the POWs the British acted for them.
Ah yes, freeing some POWs and then two months later mounting a large naval incursion to lay minefields in Norwegian territorial waters while also prepping several infantry brigades to basically do exactly the same thing the nazis were doing, at the exact same time. Without giving any serious thought to what the Germans might be up to. Clearly all the fault of those pesky norgie coastguards.

It's dramatically easier to know what "should" have been done in 2024 than it was to know it in 1940.

There is just the tiniest possibility that actually running a major operation at the start of the war is harder than you seem to think. Yes, Norway didn't go off perfectly - for anyone on either side
And there is also the tiniest possibility that if a supposedly top tier navy struggles to overpower a third-rate navy with no meaningful operational experience and wonky equipment that is executing a half-baked boys-own daydream of a plan at the absolute limits of their range, something is amiss. Doubly so if the third-raters actually manage to succeed in their objective before being chased off home.

Six months into the war, in a theatre the RN was already actively intervening in to forestall German activity, right on their own doorstep, and they still managed to get caught with their pants round their ankles wearing two left clown shoes. Literally half the German landings were at the exact same places the British were themselves intending to invade, but there seems to have been little consideration of what the Germans might try or any contingency planning to foil them.

Consider what an allied Norway would have meant in the short term for the blockade of Germany, the sub war, the strategic situation of Sweden, Air Defence Great Britain etc and I think the nazis came out far ahead, regardless of consolation prizes like tankers or sinking a large portion of their poorly designed ships. That’s without even considering later events like the Russia convoys and the nazi surface raiders.
 
I think it's been suggested in other threads that the brain of one of the original timeline senior French generals may well have been in the process of being rotted by syphilis or something like that in 1940 - which if true seems to me to stack events in favour of Germany unless he makes the correct decisions completely by accident.
Gamelin may have had neurosyphilis, but he still had his wits at the time. And frankly blaming Gamelin is cheap. The fatal problems of the French military were systemic, and cannot be reduced down to Incompetent Person X. Ultimately the French lost because of a bad institutional culture, which is something you can't weed out so easily. The French tanks were not, as often claimed, superior to those of the Germans, but they would have been sufficient if the French command culture was dynamic and promoted an ethos of initiative. Equipment did not lose the French the Battle of France.
 
Ah yes, freeing some POWs and then two months later mounting a large naval incursion to lay minefields in Norwegian territorial waters while also prepping several infantry brigades to basically do exactly the same thing the nazis were doing, at the exact same time. Without giving any serious thought to what the Germans might be up to. Clearly all the fault of those pesky norgie coastguards.


And there is also the tiniest possibility that if a supposedly top tier navy struggles to overpower a third-rate navy with no meaningful operational experience and wonky equipment that is executing a half-baked boys-own daydream of a plan at the absolute limits of their range, something is amiss. Doubly so if the third-raters actually manage to succeed in their objective before being chased off home.

Six months into the war, in a theatre the RN was already actively intervening in to forestall German activity, right on their own doorstep, and they still managed to get caught with their pants round their ankles wearing two left clown shoes. Literally half the German landings were at the exact same places the British were themselves intending to invade, but there seems to have been little consideration of what the Germans might try or any contingency planning to foil them.

Consider what an allied Norway would have meant in the short term for the blockade of Germany, the sub war, the strategic situation of Sweden, Air Defence Great Britain etc and I think the nazis came out far ahead, regardless of consolation prizes like tankers or sinking a large portion of their poorly designed ships. That’s without even considering later events like the Russia convoys and the nazi surface raiders.
Yes of course - because the Ore Carriers fuelling the German war machine where transiting through Norwegian waters and there was something of a war going on!

What would you have the British do? Nothing?

Germany was always going to invade Norway - they invaded all their neighbours except Switzerland and had started planning the invasion well before the evil and incompetent Royal Navy got involved.

A British invasion of Norway before the German invasion would almost certainly have been similar to the invasion of Iceland - administrative in nature and with the collusion of the Norwegian authorities.

As for the Germans winning in Norway - not before France fell they didn't and the withdrawal of the allied forces in Norway was directly linked to that event not the fighting prowess of the Germans.

Germany suffered its first land defeat of WW2 in Norway when Narvik was recaptured and had it not been for the defeat of France in France then its likely that the Germans would have been totally defeated in the North of Norway if not ultimately all of it.

And if that happened then the heavy losses the KM had suffered in its 'Hail Mary' plan would not be seen as a success other than managing to deliver the troops and losing half their ships in the process.
 
Top