Fairey Fulmar also designed as a single seat version alongside the Hurricane & Spitfire?

A good reason might've been to escort the BC bombers between 1938 and 1942, ie. until BC sorts out the night time navigation and targeting.
Another reason might've been that of geography, since UK have had the substantial pieces of real estate thousand miles away from the G.B. These territories were also supposed to be defended by the RAF.

But how does Germany Intercept the bombers? They have to detect, scramble fighters and get to height in the time it takes the bomber to reach the target? You could escort with fighters, or have a higher flying faster bomber. If the target is the Rhur and bases are in France you dont need long range fighters. Its only if France has fallen or if you are penetrating deep into German observed territory, or if they have a long range radar network. FREYA gives 8 minutes warning early war. Once you try to penetrate a long distance into observed territory that changes but up to mid 1940 not an issue. Even if you do have longer ranged fighters the attack will be limited to their range and the hope that using Mk1 Eyeball scouting ahead or at low speed to match the bomber and Mk1 Eyeball you can successfully attack the defending fighters before they get engaged. Which worked so well for the Luftwaffe over England. Even then flying in daylight does not solve the weather, or accuracy problem.

You cannot accurately bomb a target unless you can see it, and can fly straight and level for long enough to set up the bomb sight. In daylight only 10% of the time do you have clear weather. The accuracy issue is a miss by 5 miles or 500 yards is still a miss. The only solution to that is drop lots of bombs in the same general area at the same time, preferably on an area target OR have really expert crews and highly specialised weapons with very advanced equipment. Exactly the same technology that enables you to do this in daylight also enables you to do the former at night and until you have built a very large number of aircraft able to sustain attacks over time its not going to work anyway.

The 8th in 1944 (in 43 they are just getting massacred) are blind bombing, mostly, inaccurately, always and have a numerical superiority of fighters often and some degree of controlled intercept. Additionally the non strategic parts of the allied air forces are beating up northern France, Belgium and the Netherlands so any german defences, Radar, Fighters and flak are under attack anyway and any of those attacks might be a sweep ahead of an incoming raid forming over East Anglia.

Who do you defend against? And how. Same detection issues apply until you can deploy radars and control systems. The possible opponents are the IJN. Italy. France, USA. Well the last two are out. Italy only applies to the Med, fair enough, but really only part of the Med and the red sea, possibly Gib. The IJN attacks and all other things being equal they are now in a war against a vastly superior Navy, not constrained by the treaties now with the USN sitting across your own supply lines. The main defence against them would be early detection of the approaching force and sinking them. So maybe having ASV equipped scout planes is a better idea.

But from about 36 the primary threat is Germany. Again no war and there will be GCI stations at major bases and point defence fighters. Italians randomly bombing the Western Desert is not an issue. Long ranged escorts are useful but not in any way decisive. Look at the US or IJN losses while escorted against paltry number of defending CAP in the Pacific in 42. Less than if unescorted for sure but not impressive. Long ranged interceptors only useful if you have long ranged detection, and the intercept point can be anywhere between detection and weapons release so long is a relative concept.

Again its a time and resource issue. Both are finite. What's more useful, building long ranged fighters in an effort to escort the small number of bombers you have at best 10% of the time when you can see the target. or building more bombers and enabling them to navigate accurately enough at night all the time which also gives enough bombs on target to increase the damage to the target. or building more point defence fighters to protect your industrial base so you can do more things over time.
 
The armoured flight deck proved it's value in the Mediterranean and in the Pacific. In the Pacific, the Royal Navy aircraft carriers survived several Kamikaze hits which if they had hit USN carriers would have forced their retirement to have a new flight deck and more than likely a new hangar fitted. In the Mediterranean they were able to survive several Stuka hits and survive. Do not underestimate the value of the armoured flight deck - "man brooms" being what the RN commanded after a Kamikaze hit whereas the USN commanded, "retire to Hawaii".
Quite the contrary. The Royal Navy wasn't exposed to the scale of kamikaze air attacks that the US was and yet suffered more hits (relatively speaking). The evidence is that more fighters to provide a better CAP would have been more effective than the passive protection of an armoured flight deck (at least when operating carriers in large groups). This is quite aside from the issue of the greater punch of a larger airgroup and the fact that the damage suffered by the RN carriers was more serious than first thought. The damage they sustained warped the hull girder (as the flight deck formed part of the girder) seriously shortening their lives. The US carriers had the hanger as a superstructure on top of an armoured deck with the hull girder below, so the girder wasn't affected and rebuilding the superstructure was relatively straightforward (as was modernization later on).

I agree that in 1936 the armoured flight deck made a huge amount of sense as faster aircraft speeds made fighter interception before the bombs were dropped really difficult. By 1944 radar had radically transformed things and the RN suffered from having to rearm before the USN.
 
The damage they sustained warped the hull girder (as the flight deck formed part of the girder) seriously shortening their lives.

Not quite the whole truth.

Underwater explosions, hard running, bigger aircraft and post war economics had a lot more to do with decommissioning carriers than minor depressions in the deck girder.

HMS Illustrious (87), which had taken the worse damage was kept until 1955!
 
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That's what I quote.

Rains on everybodies parade who tries to make the spit a mustang.

Without large inner wing tanks, spitfire with most fuel in front of the pilot, will never be a long range fighter.

The article mentions

Incidentally, Supermarine produced a design proposal involving moving the radiators from under the wings to the fuselage underside just aft of the cockpit; clearly the Mustang had been an object lesson. A company report in December 1942 claimed a 30 mph speed increase would accrue from that and certain other modifications but the scheme was taken no further.


Anyone seen anymore on this
 
What most people here seem to be promoting is a Spiteful done earlier. Outward opening landing gear, Check. Greater Range, Check. Improved pilot view, Check.
All this started with specification 470 in late 1942. It just took too long under wartime conditions to come to fruition.
Alternatively when designing the new wing for the Mark 21 Spitfire the undercarriage opening direction is reversed.
We might as well suggest that Martin-Baker see what they can do?
The MB 3-5 had the range for an escort-to-Berlin, and a navalised variant would be what the FAA was looking for.
It was based on Air Ministry specification F.18/39, issued in May 1939, unfortunately due to Martin-Baker's low point on the totem pole, they did not get any priority on resources and the prototype unfortunately did not fly until August 1942. Which then crashed in September killing Valentine Baker.
(To which having English Electric takeover Napier before '42 would help)
 
Quite the contrary. The Royal Navy wasn't exposed to the scale of kamikaze air attacks that the US was and yet suffered more hits (relatively speaking). The evidence is that more fighters to provide a better CAP would have been more effective than the passive protection of an armoured flight deck (at least when operating carriers in large groups). This is quite aside from the issue of the greater punch of a larger airgroup and the fact that the damage suffered by the RN carriers was more serious than first thought. The damage they sustained warped the hull girder (as the flight deck formed part of the girder) seriously shortening their lives. The US carriers had the hanger as a superstructure on top of an armoured deck with the hull girder below, so the girder wasn't affected and rebuilding the superstructure was relatively straightforward (as was modernization later on).

I agree that in 1936 the armoured flight deck made a huge amount of sense as faster aircraft speeds made fighter interception before the bombs were dropped really difficult. By 1944 radar had radically transformed things and the RN suffered from having to rearm before the USN.
As far as I am aware, all RN carriers which suffered a Kamikaze hit were structurally sound and operational with a few hours whereas USN carriers that suffered a hit were invariably withdrawn to Hawaii or the US west coast for repairs. The Armoured Deck proved it's value and enable RN carriers to survive and continue to function.
 
That's what I quote.

Rains on everybodies parade who tries to make the spit a mustang.

Without large inner wing tanks, spitfire with most fuel in front of the pilot, will never be a long range fighter.

The article says otherwise - there were easily workable ways to make a Spitfire a long range fighter.

Saying 'but it will never be a Mustang, range-wise' imisses the point - even if there is no 700-750 miles worth of combat radius ( as the Merlin Mustangs with fuselage tanks were good for), the combat range of 500+ miles attainable by Spitfire with extra tankage is a far cry vs. 200-250 miles that mid-war Spitfires were capable for.
 
The article says otherwise - there were easily workable ways to make a Spitfire a long range fighter.

The article makes it very clear that it is not easy. And it took years to get mods into service.

Wing bag tanks either side if weapons, strengthen undercart, if not fuselage, slipper tank, etc.

Hence why I suggested the radiator move and new inner wing.
 
Commander 'Mike' Crosley gave this account of the RAF-style "slipper" drop tank fitted to Seafires:


Amongst the piles of ammunition, wireless sets, pilot’s seats, propeller spinners, tail steering arms, wing mats, sweating bodies and noise, we could see several huge slipper-shaped petrol tanks. Some of these were being offered up to the underside of the Spitfire’s fuselage — where a bomb might ordinarily be — and the fuel lines were being connected by an invisible, sliding fit. There was only a half-inch gap between the underside of the fuselage and the top surface of the tank, which was all of six feet long by two feet wide. We found that it could hold 90 gallons of 100 octane fuel. This was more than the Spitfire carried in its internal tanks. A closer study of the jettison arrangements showed that a Bowden cable release in the cockpit let go the lifting ring — stressed to three tons breaking strain — in the top surface of the tank. The tank then slid backwards onto two lugs sticking out two inches from the fuselage underside. The nose of the tank then dropped and the airflow forced it downwards and clear of the fuselage underside. The slightest skid, we thought, and the whole thing would come clear of the two lugs, slide back and hit the tail. However , the Spits would now have a range of 400 miles and would allow a fly-off to Malta well before we got to ‘bomb alley’.
 
The article makes it very clear that it is not easy. And it took years to get mods into service.

There was no doctrine to make Spitfire as long-ranged as possible. Without the doctrine, it was and still is very hard to make something new, that will be seen as going against the prescibed doctrine(s).
As early as second half of 1942, Spitfire V was with the 29 imp gal rear tank (in conjunction with the 170 gal tank) in order to help out make the ferry flights longer. By late 1942, Spitfire VIII was with 120 im gals total. Ergo, have the 29 imp gal tank also fitted on the Spitfire VIII, for 149 imp gals total, add a good drop tank (already done by 1942) and there is a LR Spitfire. Without a new wing or a new radiator system.

BTW - it was probably too bad that Supermarine never mooted the leading edge radiators for the Spitfire, these radiators almost being a trademark for the fastest British aircraft of 1942-46.

Also, having the Spitfire III in production provides both a low-drag Spitfire and a bit more fuel (99 instead of 84 gals) alredy in 1940.
 
There was no doctrine to make Spitfire as long-ranged as possible. Without the doctrine, it was and still is very hard to make something new, that will be seen as going against the prescibed doctrine(s)

A bit of chicken and egg??

No one knew how to use the new monoplane stressed skin fighter. Or radar. Dowding and Park had to write it.

A long ranged Spit would have doctrine written for it, the same way Mustang had doctrine evolved around it.
 
The article mentions

Incidentally, Supermarine produced a design proposal involving moving the radiators from under the wings to the fuselage underside just aft of the cockpit; clearly the Mustang had been an object lesson. A company report in December 1942 claimed a 30 mph speed increase would accrue from that and certain other modifications but the scheme was taken no further.


Anyone seen anymore on this

The only thing I can find in Buttler (p118) is a '42 griffon powered elliptical-shaped gull winged and V- tail. It has the same vertical radiator as proposed in an early "spitfire for FAA 39 version (p117) It ALSO has inward retractable undercart and folding wing
 
A bit of chicken and egg??

Egg predates chicken by millennia ;)

No one knew how to use the new monoplane stressed skin fighter. Or radar. Dowding and Park had to write it.

A long ranged Spit would have doctrine written for it, the same way Mustang had doctrine evolved around it.
Radar cannot help own fighters past several hundred of miles.
Fighters were fighters. The fabric-covered Furies and Hurricanes have had the same task as the stressed skin Spitifre or Typhoon - the air defence of Great Britain. There was no doctrine of fighter escort.

RAF was free to specify the ever-greater fuel load for Spitfires, if there was a doctrine for the escort fighters. Or, specify greater fuel tankage for Tempest and Typhoon. Or, specify a 2-engined LR escort fighter. But, as above, no doctrine = no specification = no design.

USAAF specified the LR fighters by 1942 - one of results was the stillborn XP-75, but the spec also prompted eg. Lockheed to increase fuel tankage on the P-38 from 300 to 410 by second half of 1943. The panic of mid-1943 saw P-47s being outfitted with drop tanks by Autumn of 1943. All of that predates the actual use of P-51Bs by months. It even predates the use of P-51A.
Or, see Japanese - the quest for ever longer ranges on fighters, so these can protect the bombers - both 1- and 2-engined - gave birth to the drop-tank outfitted A5M, and then to the A6M, with G1N in pipeline.
Same as with Germans, the spec for a Zerstoerer included the request for long ranges, that gave birth to the Bf 110.
 
Quite the contrary. The Royal Navy wasn't exposed to the scale of kamikaze air attacks that the US was and yet suffered more hits (relatively speaking). The evidence is that more fighters to provide a better CAP would have been more effective than the passive protection of an armoured flight deck (at least when operating carriers in large groups). This is quite aside from the issue of the greater punch of a larger airgroup and the fact that the damage suffered by the RN carriers was more serious than first thought. The damage they sustained warped the hull girder (as the flight deck formed part of the girder) seriously shortening their lives. The US carriers had the hanger as a superstructure on top of an armoured deck with the hull girder below, so the girder wasn't affected and rebuilding the superstructure was relatively straightforward (as was modernization later on).

I agree that in 1936 the armoured flight deck made a huge amount of sense as faster aircraft speeds made fighter interception before the bombs were dropped really difficult. By 1944 radar had radically transformed things and the RN suffered from having to rearm before the USN.

Economics and resources have to come into it as well. Carrier air groups are extremely expensive to run and a 72 a/c carrier is running at very close to twice the cost of a battleship even in peacetime when aircraft are expected to last for five years. For most of the war the RN just didn't have enough pilots to fly the big US-style air groups.

As CT and others have noted, there are some in depth papers that indicate that the claims that the British carriers were retired early because of kamikaze damage are a myth. They were tired from having been in action (and taken hits) for years before most of the US carriers were launched, and the UK had neither the cash or the need for them post war.
 
For most of the war the RN just didn't have enough pilots to fly the big US-style air groups.

And....
While the RAF could feed in aircrew from EATS, the FAA had to rely on USN to train a significant number of pilots.

With the secondary issue that all observers with naval officers, even before the RN take over of FAA.
 
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