A MARKET-GARDEN alternative: plausibility check

Hello all. I’ve been thinking off and on for a while now about a scenario centered around some sort of alternative to MARKET-GARDEN that would make for an interesting thread, but also stand up to a plausibility check. While I had a certain idea in my head for a while, I wondered about the plausibility of the basic premise until I ran across this passage from Charles MacDonald’s volume The Siegfreid Line Campaign in the United States Army in World War II series, about German preparations in Belgium and Holland:



“Having received a report on 11 September that the Allies were assembling landing craft in British ports, Model reasoned that this meant a seaborne invasion of the Netherlands. Reports as late as the morning of 17 September, D-Day for Operation MARKET, of "conspicuously active" sea and air reconnaissance of the Wadden Islands off the Dutch coast fed both Model's and Rundstedt's apprehension. Both believed that the Allies would drop airborne troops in conjunction with a seaborne invasion. Even as Allied paratroopers and glidermen were winging toward the Netherlands, Rundstedt was ordering a thorough study of the sea- and air-landing possibilities in northern Holland. The results were to be reported to Hitler.”



So the premise is this: Air-drop the entire First Allied Army north of the Neder Rijn, with one division dropping immediately outside of Amsterdam and one outside Rotterdam with the objectives to move into and through the cities to seize as much port facilities as possible, assisted by Dutch Underground uprising in those cities. The third division drops in the space between the cities, with the primary objective to seize Schipol airfield and then orient eastward in a defensive posture.

At the same time, conduct a three-division seaborne assault in the vicinity of The Hauge with those units tasked to spread out, link up with the three airborne divisions to reinforce and consolidate to then begin an advance eastward. According to MacDonald, the Germans had stripped the operational units from this area in order to support the front line in Belgium. Follow on forces would include an armored division or two (over the beach), the British 52d Airmobile Division via Schipol, and the Polish Brigade as a reserve.



The advantage here is that you immediately place 9+ divisions across the Neder Rijn, and assuming that you capture at least one of the three port areas intact enough to place in operation within a few days a sufficient logistical capacity. You can advance eastwards without the major river obstacles in the original plan; in fact as your right flank moves east it can cut off German lines of communication and retreat across the Neder Rijn back towards Germany.



Like I said, it seems plausible if Model and Rundstedt considered it possible, correct? It certainly seems to at least make as much sense as the plan IOTL.
 
Like I said, it seems plausible if Model and Rundstedt considered it possible, correct? It certainly seems to at least make as much sense as the plan IOTL.
Of course, all sorts of things look more sensible than IOTL.

But seriously, I have always had the impression that Market Garden's most important assumption was that the German Army was broken in spirit, and had lost all will to fight. As it turned out, the only thing they had no shortage of was the will to fight...

Oops!
 
Like I said, it seems plausible if Model and Rundstedt considered it possible, correct? It certainly seems to at least make as much sense as the plan IOTL.
If Model considers such a move possible, he will be far more prepared to intercept it than he did Market Garden. The latter took him completely by surprise IOTL, and still he managed to pull off a defensive victory. Imagine, therefore, what sort of defeat he could inflict against an attack he anticipated.

Of course, all sorts of things look more sensible than IOTL.

But seriously, I have always had the impression that Market Garden's most important assumption was that the German Army was broken in spirit, and had lost all will to fight. As it turned out, the only thing they had no shortage of was the will to fight...

Oops!
And as it turned out, the Allies at Arnhem were unlucky enough to be dealing with the Wehrmacht's foremost defensive specialist.
 
The immediate objective of Market Garden was to capture the bridges complete as far as Arnhem to allow the bulk of the army to then pass through. The Arnhem action itself succeeded in doing just that. What failed was the timely seizure of the route to Arnhem. An alternative Market Garden might do well to address that rather than Arnhem itself?
 
The immediate objective of Market Garden was to capture the bridges complete as far as Arnhem to allow the bulk of the army to then pass through. The Arnhem action itself succeeded in doing just that. What failed was the timely seizure of the route to Arnhem. An alternative Market Garden might do well to address that rather than Arnhem itself?

If the operation had been successful, instead of the German offensive in the Ardennes, we would have had an Allied attempt to create the Ruhr pocket some three months earlier.

I don't know if for me a better alternative would be to capture Brest without playing hide and seek with General Ramcke and secure the mouth of the Sklada River while attacking further north so that the Germans could not send reinforcements to the islands.

and when the paratroopers are bored, the siege of Dunkirk is still going on behind the scenes.
 
Ike's reply to Monty's plan was

What you're proposing is this – if I give you all the supplies you want, you could go straight to Berlin – right straight (500 miles) to Berlin? Monty, you're nuts. You can't do it... If you try a long column like that in a single thrust you'd have to throw off division after division to protect your flanks from attack.

That was the problem, not enough divisions being used to protect XXX Corp's flanks, divisions that couldn't be used due to the topography of the land!

Could an earlier kick off at say around 7.00am for XXX Corp help?
Could dropping the first wave on the previous night help then dropping the 2nd at midday then the final again at night help?
 
Plausability of the plan. Like the concept, but there wasn't sufficient airlift capacity to silitaneously drop all three airborne divisions - historically the British couldn't land the Polish Brigade in the first lift for that reason. Also the seaborne landing of 3 Divisions, were there 3 "spare" divisions available?

You could drop 2 Divisions to take the cities and a Gliderborne force in Brigade strength to tackle the airport (possibly dropping another Brigade to support them). Flying in British 52nd Div on Day 2. However I doubt you'd be able to manage the 3 Div seaborne landing or the armoured follow up as there weren't that m,any combat ready uncommitted Divisions available.
 
Would this be before (as OTL's Market Garden) or after the landing at Walcheren (Op Infatuate)? If it's before, the competition for sealift and amphibious assault ships with INFATUATE, which as a part of clearing the Scheldt in order to bring Antwerp into operation was a very high priority, is likely to bring down more scrutiny of the plan by Eisenhower than the OTL Market Garden got.
 
Ike's reply to Monty's plan was

What you're proposing is this – if I give you all the supplies you want, you could go straight to Berlin – right straight (500 miles) to Berlin? Monty, you're nuts. You can't do it... If you try a long column like that in a single thrust you'd have to throw off division after division to protect your flanks from attack.
That was never Montgomery's plan. Post WW2 people's memories and writings can be misleading.
 
At the same time, conduct a three-division seaborne assault in the vicinity of The Hauge with those units tasked to spread out, link up with the three airborne divisions to reinforce and consolidate to then begin an advance eastward.L.
Interesting concept.

A three division landing on the Atlantic Wall is going to be a massive exercise - IIRC Neptune was a 3 division operation until January 1944.

I believe that in July there were various further seaborne landings being studied to offset the congealing of the frontline in Normandy - IIRC St Malo, and the southern side of Brittany. That might give some idea of the amphibious forces retained, and a good PoD - instead of FAAA doing lots of plans for airborne operations, there is a seaborne equivalent? Of course this probably kills any landings in the South of France.
 
Plausability of the plan. Like the concept, but there wasn't sufficient airlift capacity to silitaneously drop all three airborne divisions - historically the British couldn't land the Polish Brigade in the first lift for that reason. Also the seaborne landing of 3 Divisions, were there 3 "spare" divisions available?

You could drop 2 Divisions to take the cities and a Gliderborne force in Brigade strength to tackle the airport (possibly dropping another Brigade to support them). Flying in British 52nd Div on Day 2. However I doubt you'd be able to manage the 3 Div seaborne landing or the armoured follow up as there weren't that m,any combat ready uncommitted Divisions available.
I'd think the D-Day airdrops would be in the same general strengths (DIV(-)) as IOTL, with follow-on reinforcement in subsequent airlifts (either drops or through Schipol if secured). Also, can't put my finger on it now but I recall seeing a map that had a number of US Divisions still assembling in Normandy and England for movement into the line during this period which you could re-task for this operation. It would draw strength away from the three US Armies (1st 3rd and 9th) currently in action but the reward would be a force in 2(+) Corps strength across the river barriers and prepared to advance East that could threaten the Ruhr and flank the West Wall.
 
I’m curious about the landings around Hague. Would the waters there be mined?
I'd assume so, but worse than Normandy was? And according to MacDonald, the three Divisions allocated to defend the Netherlands had all been transferred to First Parachute Army and moved into Belgium. An obstacle is only effective if it is effectively covered, in this case those units were gone.
 
I'd assume so, but worse than Normandy was? And according to MacDonald, the three Divisions allocated to defend the Netherlands had all been transferred to First Parachute Army and moved into Belgium. An obstacle is only effective if it is effectively covered, in this case those units were gone.
There were Atlantic Wall Fortresses at the key points - Hoek van Holland (covering Rotterdam) and Ijmuiden (covering Amsterdam). Both will have a mixture of naval guns and anti-aircraft guns and a permanent fortress garrison, and will present the same sort of problem as Walcheren.

Remember in Normandy the Allies landed between the fortresses, on beaches poorly covered by the naval guns.
 
That was never Montgomery's plan. Post WW2 people's memories and writings can be misleading.

Re-read my post as I never said it was.

I was illustrating that Ike was correct in regards to a single thrust . . . . that you have to have enough divisions to protect the flanks which in Monty's case in M-G he clearly didn't.
 
Re-read my post as I never said it was.
You're quoting from Ryan's book who IIRC reports this as Eisenhower's comment to Montgomery at the Brussels airport meeting.

Reports made at the time are very different eg Tedder's letter to Portal quoted in Tedder's autobiography - "the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue, nor do I think it was so intended".
 
You're quoting from Ryan's book who IIRC reports this as Eisenhower's comment to Montgomery at the Brussels airport meeting.

Reports made at the time are very different eg Tedder's letter to Portal quoted in Tedder's autobiography - "the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue, nor do I think it was so intended".

Read my post again!

You're either deflecting or being deliberately ignorant of what I said and referenced in my post.

You keep mentioning the "500 miles to Berlin" quote despite fact I'm illustrating about Monty needing more divisions than he said he would need which was borne out in real like when XXX Corp couldn't fully control the terrain either side of the road to Arnhem.

You're quoting from Ryan's book who IIRC reports this as Eisenhower's comment to Montgomery at the Brussels airport meeting.

Are you saying that Ryan lied, made mistakes etc as he was a very respected biographer, well respected and like by the members of the military etc who he used in his novels?
 
So the premise is instead of crossing the Nederijn at Arnhem cross it further west near S'Hertogenbosch formerly known as the Swamp Dragon or Virgin of Brabant as she had never been taken. Where there are no bridges and most of your own have been deployed in France to sustain the advance to date.

A large part of the problem is the Allied armies have wildly outrun their supply in a pursuit pushed home with great vigour and effect. There always are German reserves and they can assemble very quickly within more or less pre war Germany. The British have advanced basically 250 miles in 11 days including crossing the Seine to do that they have left behind a lot of formations 43rd Wessex being the most obvious, with 11th and 7th armoured around Antwerp and Ghent initially its a pursuit, they are pursuing, they cannot keep supplied these units supplies and used their bridges to cross every river and canal they have come across, the allied air forces and german engineers being v good at what they do. The Allies still need to move their tactical air forces forward and establish them in the airfields in Belgium and northern France and need the roads to move forward the ground echelon and resupply. All this takes time, days maybe but it is still time.

The original plan from Dempsey was an immediate airborne attack to keep the pursuit going on hand he has basically Guards armoured a 2 Bde Div and odds and sods. This has the added advantage of not putting immediate strain on his supplies ( airborne carry their own supply and can be resupplied by air for a short while. Along the lines of the cancelled ops across France. Initially the idea is to get a corps sized Bridgehead across the Rhine at Arnhem which is useful as it crosses the Rhine a corps being more than 1 division. What happens next gets planned next.

Montgomery does want a single thrust, but that's not the issue under discussion at the time. The immediate issue is to keep the pursuit going as long as possible. Montgomery is not convinced and anyway cannot give orders - he is not the ground force commander and the airborne are under Ikes direct control.

Its only later when SHAEF gets involved that 11 amd and 43rd get assembled that you get Market Garden and by then Dempsey very dubious.

At the time of MG the allies cannot lift all three divisions in a single lift, supplying is a maybe - depends on the distribution of fighters and Flak - this is getting close to a direct route from East Anglia - Ruhr and DZ in the flooded areas of Holland with lots of former Dutch positions in various places and a fuckton of canals to cross. . And the best result is you get to feed Holland. and everywhere else.

By now its reasonable to suppose that the Germans will have prepared the demolition of ports and mining of the approaches would be a given the British have form on sudden seaborne descents going back to Drake.

The other issue is just because the Germans see there are landing craft does not mean there are landing craft. They get to see what the allies want them to see.
 
Even this does not deal with the biggest impediment to operations by the First Allied Airborne Army, its Commanding General Lewis H Brereton.
Who has somehow historically managed to avoid any responsibility or blame for the failure of Market Garden. When it was his decisions to avoid even attempting two drops in a day, or multiple Glider tows, that crippled the operation on the first day. He also was in charge of the severe mishandling of air-ops on the subsequent days.

[He might not have been deliberately incompetent or stupid, but he managed to oversee four of the worst failures in the application of allied airpower in WW2.]
 
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Hello all. I’ve been thinking off and on for a while now about a scenario centered around some sort of alternative to MARKET-GARDEN that would make for an interesting thread, but also stand up to a plausibility check. While I had a certain idea in my head for a while, I wondered about the plausibility of the basic premise until I ran across this passage from Charles MacDonald’s volume The Siegfreid Line Campaign in the United States Army in World War II series, about German preparations in Belgium and Holland:



“Having received a report on 11 September that the Allies were assembling landing craft in British ports, Model reasoned that this meant a seaborne invasion of the Netherlands. Reports as late as the morning of 17 September, D-Day for Operation MARKET, of "conspicuously active" sea and air reconnaissance of the Wadden Islands off the Dutch coast fed both Model's and Rundstedt's apprehension. Both believed that the Allies would drop airborne troops in conjunction with a seaborne invasion. Even as Allied paratroopers and glidermen were winging toward the Netherlands, Rundstedt was ordering a thorough study of the sea- and air-landing possibilities in northern Holland. The results were to be reported to Hitler.”



So the premise is this: Air-drop the entire First Allied Army north of the Neder Rijn, with one division dropping immediately outside of Amsterdam and one outside Rotterdam with the objectives to move into and through the cities to seize as much port facilities as possible, assisted by Dutch Underground uprising in those cities. The third division drops in the space between the cities, with the primary objective to seize Schipol airfield and then orient eastward in a defensive posture.

At the same time, conduct a three-division seaborne assault in the vicinity of The Hauge with those units tasked to spread out, link up with the three airborne divisions to reinforce and consolidate to then begin an advance eastward. According to MacDonald, the Germans had stripped the operational units from this area in order to support the front line in Belgium. Follow on forces would include an armored division or two (over the beach), the British 52d Airmobile Division via Schipol, and the Polish Brigade as a reserve.



The advantage here is that you immediately place 9+ divisions across the Neder Rijn, and assuming that you capture at least one of the three port areas intact enough to place in operation within a few days a sufficient logistical capacity. You can advance eastwards without the major river obstacles in the original plan; in fact as your right flank moves east it can cut off German lines of communication and retreat across the Neder Rijn back towards Germany.



Like I said, it seems plausible if Model and Rundstedt considered it possible, correct? It certainly seems to at least make as much sense as the plan IOTL.
Its a no from me

The simple part of the plan "assuming that capture at least one of the 3 ports" is what makes this a non starter.

The risks are enormous and I am not quite sure what the gains are here - the British planners of any such operation would dismiss any operation that required the capture of a port.

There is a reason why they developed the mobile Mulberry ports instead of trying to capture Cherbourg and Le Harve.

We have seen what happens to a port that the Germans have time to destroy with what happened at Brest and what with various ports along the channel coast having been captured as well as Antwerp taken intact - I do not see the prize here?

With regards to Op Market Garden my issue with it was that it failed not that it was attempted.

There are quite a few 'low hanging fruit' with regards to improving the fortunes of that operation

When it took place it was the only game in town as far as the allied leadership was concerned.

The reasons for failures are primarily the Germans who had in the couple of weeks before managed to frantically address their rout from France and get organised after the destruction of their army in France, as well as some curious operational limitations placed on the operation by the various commanders involved.

It is interesting to note that the only uncommitted reserve force the Germans had in the West in mid Sept 1944 was the recently formed 1st Parachute Army - more a weak corps with 30,000 men (most of them not paratroopers) - was placed directly in the path of XXX Corps planned advance.

I can only assume that the Germans also saw the threat of an attack in that direction and positioned this force accordingly.

Another simple change would be to move the Army boundaries north with 2nd BR Army taking up more of 1st Canadian Armys 'slice' with 1st US Army's boundary moving further north.

Antwerp was in the expected Canadian slice but was taken by a very opportunistic dash by the British army on the 4th Sept virtually intact well ahead of the rest of the British and Canadian forces.

The burden on the Canadian Army to capture various fortress ports and then also clear the Scheldt was quite heavy and might have been somewhat alleviated had the 2nd BR Army taken over more of the subsequent objectives.
 
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