Well... You are actually quite correct - contrary to popular belief.
Long answer : we need to look at the situation and how this is achieved. Let's say that Mustafa Kemal is killed during the retreat from Syria in 1918. This deprives the Turks of a capable figure to lead them and thus removes at least a serious opponent of the Constantinople government, thus making the movement to resist the treaty of Sevres - at least for the moment - somewhat weaker and more divided. The Greeks on the other hand still disembark on Smyrna, where they set out to consolidate their control over the area that was under their occupation. There will be tension between the Greeks and the Turks, and incidents like the storming of the Turkish barracks in Smyrna and the skirmishes in the countryside will most likely happen ITTl too, but that will be all.
The government at Constantinople will be unable to react decisively during that period, as it is at the mercy of the Allies, but this will not last forever. The continued unrest in eastern Anatolia and the (presumable) lack of a centre of power other than Constantinople probably mean that there is no analogue of the 1920 treaty with the Soviets, who may actually end up attempting to reclaim the territories the Imperial Russian army had conquered in 1915-16. This puts the Soviets closer to the Mediterranean, as well as in a position to push more into Anatolia and the Middle East in the future, if they are successful, and thus threaten Mosul and the oil fields there in the future. If the advance in eastern Anatolia coincides with a more prolonged period of trouble in Syria (Feysal's removal by the French) and Iraq (the revolt against the British), then the Western powers may start reconsidering their position on Turkey and begin supporting said country as a bulwark against the Soviets. Add to that the rivalry between the Italians and the French on the one hand and the British on the other about influence in the area and you get a situation where all three compete for influence in Turkey. This could be used by the Sultan's government to play everyone against each other and extract concessions, as well as support to reestablish control over the centre and the east of Anatolia, a goal which they achieve by 1924.
Greece, meanwhile, would have been kept in check by the British and the French. If there is no escalation following the landing at Smyrna, then the Liberal government can, perhaps, begin demobilisation. This could help it immensely in the 1920 elections, as demobilisation was a key winning point for the opposition. If king Alexander is also not bit by that monkey and thus continues to reign, then Greece is more stable than OTL and one of the main arguments the Allies used to distance themselves from Greece (namely the return of Constantine I) isn't present. Greece would be the scene of low-level competition between the British and the French (the Italians are not in a very good position, due to Albania, the Dodecanese and the controversy of the limits of the Greek and the Italian zones in Asia Minor), something that would force its government to remain more focused on diplomacy and foreign affairs.
Thus, in 1925, we have a Turkey which still remains under Ottoman rule, has managed to reestablish a degree of control over most of Anatolia and has managed to recover many of the large areas that were expected to be the sphere of influence of the various European powers, particularly Italy and France, which actively try to court it. Now, the Turkish government can start considering its position vis-a-vis Greece. They won't be able to employ military means, for obvious reasons; but they most probably support various groups -covertly- in order to undermine the Greek presence in the area (I would call it a Greek analogue of the Troubles). They will also shift their international trade away from Smyrna: this will be largely natural, because Smyrna, the main port of Asia Minor until the early 20th century, is now under the control of a foreign power, but it will also be supported by the government. Antalya would be a good port to replace Smyrna as the main exports and trade hub of Turkey.
As far as Greece is concerned, once the enthusiasm from the "liberation of Ionia" subsides somewhat and the Liberals lose their majority (unless Venizelos goes full dictatorial in all but name), there will be some realisations: namely, that the area is not easily defended and stretches military resources too thin, which in turn forces the government to keep military expenditures at chronically high levels. The area has also lost a large part of its economic potential, as it has lost its connections to the vast hinterland, which Smyrna served as the main trading centre and exports port for. Also, non-Liberal politicians and members of the old elite realise that, like the areas annexed after the Balkan Wars, the region there contains a large number of people who are very supportive of Venizelos, as well as a prosperous and capable elite of local landlords, merchants and bankers, all of whom could threaten tip the balance even further in favour of the Liberals and their leader; this could lead them to begin working with the other groups in the area ( namely the Turks and old local elites that feel threatened by Liberal initiatives such as land reform), something that could work somehow or backfire spectacularly (the lack of a large-scale Greco-Turkish war probably means that there will be no populations exchange like the one in OTL, which means that there will be millions of Muslims and Turks inside Greek territory in general (namely the areas annexed in 1912-1920)). At the same time, the divide between the "Old Greece" and the "New Lands" will be existent here too: the locals may start having grievances about the behaviour of some officials sent by Athens and about the potential lack of opportunities to participate in the local and regional administration, due to imposed barriers which lead to these posts being filled with people from mainland Greece (again, as in the areas that came under Greece's control in 1912-13). All these factors could lead to a protracted period of domestic instability relative weakness.
