Light of the Nation - Part 5: Last Ride of the Rust Belt
In the wake of the Conventions, Former Governor Reagan, despite his primary woes, held a narrow lead over President Mondale. With the economy still dragging, Republicans had high expectations.
They would not be met.
Mondale had never been the most electric presence in the room. But you don’t wind up President without any appeal whatsoever. He ran as a calming, sober leader, in some ways emulating Ford’s Rose Garden Campaign from four years earlier. He was tested and he remained ready. His campaign went after Reagan for being a dangerous conservative, tying him to Social Security and Healthcare cuts. Reagan was unable to worm his way out after publicly opposing the Kennedy Plan. Laxalt proved a poor VP choice, reenforcing a radical conservative image of Reagan. John Anderson’s Moderate Independent Campaign would never truly get off the ground. But Anderson’s 4% nationwide came almost entirely at Reagan’s expense with other liberal Republicans flowing over to Mondale. This would prove especially vital in New England.
However Reagan was not to be underestimated. His nomination had been a shot in the arm for the evangelical movement. Abortion, Gays, the recent passage of the Equal Rights Amendment. All rallied the base for Reagan, alongside the omnipresent dogwhistles. And the economy continued to drag Mondale down. Reagan promised lower taxes would reduce the deficit, an end to inflation and a return to prosperity. He also was happy to blame any and all issues on Mondale empowering the Unions. True? No. Effective? Yes. Reagan did not pummel Mondale at the debates or anything, but the former actor’s Polish could not be denied. Most Americans came away thinking of Reagan as the winner. So the Gipper rode towards the election, thinking he would win one for himself this time.
A funny thing happened though. Unions were badly spooked by some of the talk from Reagan world, and felt they owed a debt to Mondale. Their jobs were already being shipped overseas. Many Conservative Blue Collar Workers would hold their nose for a Democrat, one last time. The October Surprise swung attention towards foreign policy, a strong point for Mondale. When Islamists fired on American merchant vessels, Reagan attacked Mondale as making America weak. Mondale meanwhile quickly secured a deal by leaning on other Iranian anti-Communist forces. Reagan came across as insensitive, uninformed, and trigger-happy. Mondale got to play the statesmen who understood how the world worked, keeping Americans safe without bowing to terrorists or weakening the anti-Communist front. He went into the election surging in the polls.
The election proved the closest since 1960. Reagan had campaigned extensively in the South, perhaps too extensively as only Georgia was close. It came down to thin wins in Missouri, Iowa, and Vermont (Vermont! It wasn’t even a landslide like ‘64!) but Mondale had won again. It had been close. “Too damn close,” in the words of one DNC member. Mondale’s Congressional majorities were nowhere near what they had once been. But for one last moment the New Deal Coalition had held, minus Dixie. They had beaten back the Reagan tide, and had four more years.
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Light of the Nation - Part 6: Far Far Away
Light of the Nation - Part 6: Far Far Away
Walter Mondale’s foreign policy in one word? Restraint. He’d seen what Vietnam had done to Johnson and Humphrey. No grand adventures.
And yet the hot sands of the Kalahari desert would present him with one of the great Cold War crises.
Mondale was no pacifist, and the Iranian Civil War had ended detente. “Good Fences Make Good Neighbors” was the phrase of the day. Pro-Washington Regimes would be bolstered, but escalation against Soviet influenced areas would not follow behind it.
In practice this meant limiting support towards groups like the Contras in Nicaragua, although aid to nearby dictatorships often served a similar role. UNITA, opposition in Ethiopia and Cambodia would all find the Mondale Government tight fisted, much to the fury of right wingers.
There were, of course, exceptions. Pressure from Catholics and Poles forced Mondale to slap harsh sanctions on Poland for repressing Solidarity. And when Communist infighting on Grenada broke out, Mondale’s CIA helped break it completely.
However Mondale remained on decent terms with his great power counterparts. Thatcher was a key cooperator in Grenada, and Mondale repaid the favor in the Falklands. Visits to China continued the process of opening started by Nixon. Relations with Moscow were cool but cordial.
However Mondale’s approach also meant buttressing some horrific regimes. Saudi Arabia, Zaire, most of Central America really. All in the name of preserving “freedom” the world over. Something of a sick joke, all things considered.
Public pressure did force Mondale to bow in some places. Congressional action got him to limit support for Indonesian occupations, when the Marcos government fell in the Philippines he did not fight back. However most consequentially he tightened sanctions on South Africa.
With both the SADF and UNITA lacking in resources, MLPA and Cuban forces were on the roll in Angola. In fact, by 1983, they were closing in on the border with South African occupied Namibia, which was already embroiled in an insurgency against the Apartheid regime. This was existentially threatening to P.W. Botha and the rest of the Government in Pretoria. Rhodesia had become Zimbabwe already, and if Namibia got worse…the apartheid regime might start to crack. Something needed to be done. Something drastic, to show the world resolve. On October 9th, 1983, sensors East and West observed major activity at the Vastrap Airbase in the Kalahari desert. Vela incident aside, it was South Africa’s first Nuclear Test, and was very much intended for public consumption. “Gemsbok 1” was a shot across the bow.
Mondale and the Soviets are, for once, of one mind. This is dangerous. Too dangerous to let anyone but the big boys handle. All the parties are dragged to Naples for a friendly “chat.” A permanent peace proved elusive, but the slouching towards Bethlehem was stopped at least. South Africa was to sign the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, leave Angola, and keep a “Demilitarized Strip” in the North of Namibia. In exchange the Cubans and Soviets pulled support from Namibian independence groups, and agreed to leave Southern Angola to the Angolans. There would be violations and recriminations and threats and death, but Mondale and his Foriegn Policy team had managed to avoid a full nuclear confrontation. Even if the right fumed for his “betrayal” of UNITA. South Africa was left nearly totally isolated, and stewed with rage.
Mondale’s Foreign policy occupies a transitional space in American policy. Vietnam Syndrome remained strong, but so to did a callous disregard for civilian life. Mondale faced just criticism and unjust criticism in his time, and history could only add to this mixed view.