NASA knew what they needed for an actual cheap and reusable working launcher, but OMB wouldn't fund it. They knew in 1965, they knew in 1969, and in 1970, and in 1972. Also...Shuttle was way more reusable than you think. If you go look at the Shuttle Zero Base Cost study from 1991, they were looking at a base cost to fly 1 flight per year of about $145 million in orbiter maintenance cost....but up the flight rate to 10, and it's only up to $210m. Adding 9 flights only adds about $65m, about $7m per flight. Not too shabby, really, for everything the Orbiter provided. SSME (which at this point was still before the Block I/IIA/II engines which dramatically reduced overhaul requirements and allowed the engines to stay on the vehicle more between flights) was $91m annual total for one flight, or $143 for ten, so $52m to add 9 flights, about $6m/flight. So the total cost of orbiter and engine turnaround was like...$13m, maybe $20m with the payload operations and handling and stuff. This is the kind of thing I point to about the technology being fundamentally pretty sound, but the architecture NASA got backed into and then locked into preventing it from being safe to fly enough to really see those lower per-flight costs swamp the large base annual costs. This kind of thing has been a large part of my ten-plus-year-journey of coming around from "Shuttle bad, reuse was tried too early" to "reuse was a worthy goal, Shuttle might even have had a shot at being hugely better if it had been able to operate safely, the question is...what does it take for that to happen".
A Sound of Thunder: The Rise of the Soviet Superbooster
- Thread starter nixonshead
- Start date
Some, if you take the zero base numbers above and assume you could almost zero out the costs of the external tank and solid rocket booster (not sure why it has a line both for SRB and ASRM, don't ask, it might be post-Challenger work-in-progress stuff) you could cut like $780m off the $2,000m cost of flying once, though adding a booster program and booster engine cost line probably easily adds back in another $200m or so so maybe more like $500m out of $2,000. Really, though, the most major impact would always come not by lowering the total cost before you fly once, but by spreading the cost to fly at all over as many launches as possible. If you cut the program cost before flying once down 25%, but you still only fly four times a year, that doesn't matter as much as holding the program cost constant and flying sixteen times a year.
I've gone on a similar journey with a slightly different destination, the revelation that the difference between the 9 flights and 10 flights a year was $87m was revelatory but that just made me curse their architecture even more, if they're accepted that in a world of limited budgets they couldn't have full reuse so should put up with full reuse of the lowest part of the stack it could have changed things so much. You're absolutely right that we should have had a 25ton to LEO with first stage reuse and mass production of the second stage by 1980, it would have changed so many things.
NOTS [Naval Ordnance Test Station] accomplished a vertical landing in 1962 using their Soft Landing Vehicle! used a radar to control its variable thrust engine ^.^ Was just a small scale test demo, not exceeding 150ft in altitude IIRC, but it showed promise nonetheless!
On Shuttle-C
There will be different versions in TL:
The one that launch Skylab B into orbit with engine pod under it
The "classical" Shuttle-C with Payload hull - this could launch Centaur as upper stage. (mostly for USAF )
The large one that launch upper stages and Lander for lunar mission
On last one i wonder,
Will they build the Lunar Injection Stage (LIS) from ET parts ?
Using engine pod restart to bring stack to moon ?
On capsule the Part 2 mention two men for lunar mission and use for Skylab B as rescue capsule
but Skylab B will have larger crew, this is not a problem.
Apollo CSM was used with three men, but it was proposed to modified capsule for nine men for fast return to earth.
Same will be case here
There will be different versions in TL:
The one that launch Skylab B into orbit with engine pod under it
The "classical" Shuttle-C with Payload hull - this could launch Centaur as upper stage. (mostly for USAF )
The large one that launch upper stages and Lander for lunar mission
On last one i wonder,
Will they build the Lunar Injection Stage (LIS) from ET parts ?
Using engine pod restart to bring stack to moon ?
On capsule the Part 2 mention two men for lunar mission and use for Skylab B as rescue capsule
but Skylab B will have larger crew, this is not a problem.
Apollo CSM was used with three men, but it was proposed to modified capsule for nine men for fast return to earth.
Same will be case here
If I remember my research correctly (it's been a while!), yes, at this point IOTL it was still official policy US that expendable launchers be phased out completely to be replaced by shuttle. However, DoD was getting nervous, and Commerce wanted to privatise. You'll note that in Everything, Everywhere..., NASA is still claiming expendables will be phased out, because 60 launches per year is plenty... but not everyone is buying that
By the time we get Borman and the Interagency Working Group, six months later, NASA are being a little more realistic on flight rates, and also realising they will have problems meeting all their committments, given their OTL manifest plus support for Skylab and, now, missions relating to supporting a sustained lunar presence (at least 1 orbiter flight per crewed mission, plus a test programme leading up to that). So it's a relatively easy deal to make with Commerce and DoD to say "ok, if you want expendables as a back-up to shuttle, and private industry will pay, why not?" In exchange, NASA get a five-orbiter fleet, so they no longer need to exaggerate the commercial benefits to get the programme approved - it's done. The official plan ITTL 1981 is DoD will continue to use their extant launcher fleet until Shuttle/Shuttle-C can take over all their launches, but if they hit schedule conflicts and there happen to be private companies offering the old rockets, the military will be glad of the opportunity to buy a ride.
At this point, NASA is still fully committed to STS exclusively for its own launch needs.
Interlude: Burn-Through
Interlude: Burn-Through
Washington DC, June 1982
Ken Mattingly, astronaut and US Navy aviator, was considering ordering a third beer when he saw his old Apollo comrade and current boss, Frank Borman, finally enter the expensive DC restaurant and head towards him. Mattingly was half out of his chair, when Broman reached the table and waved for him to stay seated.
“Sorry, Ken,” Borman opened. “Got held up in another damn budget meeting.”
Mattingly checked his watch: it was already past ten in the evening, and they had agreed to meet for dinner at nine.
“Is the Administrator’s job making you soft, Frank?” Mattingly joked. “I remember you pulling all-nighters in the sim back on Apollo.”
“I remember being a heck of a lot younger,” Borman groused, reaching for the water jug as Mattingly took another sip of beer. “So, what’s the occasion? You offered to pay for dinner, so I know it has to be important.”
Mattingly put his beer down, his face becoming serious. “Have you read the post-flight inspection report for STS-3?”
“When would I have time for that?” asked an exasperated Borman. “That’s Chet’s job, he’s in charge of shuttle ops.”
“And has he mentioned O-ring erosion to you?” Mattingly asked.
“O-ring erosion? On the solids?” Borman asked.
“That’s right,” Mattingly confirmed, pulling a sheaf of photocopies from inside his jacket. “Here’s the report from the SRB recovery team. Take a look at the part I’ve highlighted.”
Borman quickly scanned down the document. “‘Postflight examination found an erosion depth of 0.053 inches on the primary O-ring… likely caused by hot motor gases…’ Is this a Criticality 1 item?”
“Criticality 1R,” Mattingly confirmed. “So in theory, it’s redundant”.
“In theory?”
“I spoke to a guy on the V&C Committee,” Mattingly went on. “He wasn’t convinced that the redundant seal would hold in case of a burn-through.”
“From what this says, he’s right,” Borman agreed, still reading the report. “But why are you bringing this to me? The Shuttle Program Office should be handling this.”
“They should be, but I checked with Jack this afternoon. The STS-4C and -5 launch readiness reports make no mention of this issue. Marshall hasn’t even assigned it a formal tracking number! I took it to Chet, but he said to leave it with the experts at Marshall.” Ken paused to take another gulp of beer before continuing. “I mean, he’s probably right, the risk of a total burn-though is minimal. But dammit Frank, that was Hal’s and my ass on the line on STS-3! At the very least, Jack and his crew deserve to know about it before they go up.”
Borman was looking grim, muttering under his breath. “‘Airplane-like operations’ my ass! We’d never put up with this sort of crap at Eastern!” He raised his gaze to meet Mattingly’s eyes. “Thanks for bringing this to me, Ken. You can tell the rest of the astronauts that this sort of thing is going to stop. I’ve been hearing too many stories of short-cuts in the program.”
“Listen,” Borman went on. “I think we need a comprehensive review of our manned space program. Even putting aside the human cost, if the President is serious about beating the Soviets to a moonbase, we can’t afford the sort of bad press and delays that an accident would cost us. So we need to find all these shortcuts and start devising fixes - or at least mitigations. And that should be led by someone who understands what it means to put their life in the hands of these systems, someone who knows and feels what an ‘acceptable risk’ really is - and what it isn’t.”
Mattingly’s face soured. “Why do I get the feeling I’ve just lost my flight status?”
Borman shook his head. “No, you’re still an astronaut, unless and until Hoot says otherwise. This needs to be done by an active astronaut. Marshall or the contractors can argue the toss with other engineers or bureaucrats, but they can‘t ignore an astronaut.”
Borman put out his hand. “Congratulations, Ken. You’ve just volunteered to head up the Manned Spaceflight Safety Taskforce.”
++++++++++++++++++++
Frank Frederick Borman II (March 14, 1928 – November 7, 2023)
Thomas Kenneth Mattingly II (March 17, 1936 – October 31, 2023)
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Now that is a massive butterfly, this isn't going to stop the Shuttle from killing a crew at some point, there's too many failure points in the architecture but if Mattingly does a through job and Borman backs him (which I assume he will) the odds of a catastrophe will lengthen closer to their post Columbia level (which was probably as safe as STS could be barring a redesign).
Well that's one way of killing a shuttle struck down! Even if it doesn't safety-proof the program completely, it should at least push out any major catastrophe until maybe the mid-90s. In the mean time, it gives the Americans a fighting chance at actually beating the Soviets to a moon base. A slim chance, but still.
What's the chain of events that led to this. Is it just a random butterfly? Or something that requires Borman to be in the big chair?
What's the chain of events that led to this. Is it just a random butterfly? Or something that requires Borman to be in the big chair?
Well thats one failure mode eliminated by the looks of it, let's hope that the other several hundred choose to hold off, and we get a perfect space program! Love the dialogue! Wonder if this will somehow lead to Shuttle-C eventually happening, would be real useful for putting together a lunar base!
He's an airline man who mentions this wouldn't be tolerated at Eastern airlines so he probably took a closer look instead of go fever also Ken is a fellow astronaut and someone he's predisposed to listen to.
Also Ken's investigation is going to bring up the foam (it was known of very early on). As the SRB fix will be very early (and by OTL it then stays fixed) and they already have a survival shelter in Skylab expect a recommendation that all flights go to orbits that can at least access the station in an emergency.
Then with a higher flight rate due to five birds and (eventually) two pads, STS 30x can be adopted and even in a non station flight they can probably have a second bird ready (especially if the Orbiter's get the long duration upgrade) in time.
Combined with the arm extension (which seems simple) and the automatic controls (likely developed early for the C) that should let foam be mitigated now instead of twenty years and seven dead later.
That's not how statistics work. If this task force can push the odds from 1 in 9 to 1 in 100 that 1 in 100 could still happen on the next flight, on the 100th, or at any point in between.
What is a moon base? If it's any sort of structure visited by multiple crews the prize goes to whoever wants to go to the effort, the Soviets could do it within the next few years, long before the US gets back to the moon but might choose not to. If it's somewhere where you can do actual science and that significantly extends your stay the Soviets again have a head start and a much better architecture. But if the US goes for something quick and dirty and the Soviets go for something useful the US might just "win".
Shuttle C is already happening.
There is not much that can be done for the tiles, on-orbit fixing is theoretical, replacing them wholesale will be an expensive development, not to mention testing and test flights
Shuttle to Station orbits are a good safety net, but if cargo's require other orbits (Probes, military payloads, Hubble) this would negate the rule, not to mention Lunar transfer windows and needing the right lunar inclination as well as proper lighting conditions for landing
Plus the STS-3xx missions would suck up resources, at above 15 Shuttle flights a year preping a second orbiter for every launch would be easy, but the payload carried would need to be removed, OTL STS-3xx flights were done for Station rescue, the Hubble repair mission was flown when the Shuttle fleet was largely slowed for safety post Columbia, and Endeavour was rolled back and fitted with a payload afterwards for its station construction mission
Getting Rid of the SRB's will be a easy fix, the Utah delagation will be pissed, but the replacement's WILL take time to be made and tested, not to mention manufacturing locations and such, which will affect the design
ever hear of the story where the SRB was measured with a horses ass
basically the width is made by the transportation method, the SRB had to fit through a tunnel somewhere along the Utah to Florida rail line, it would be better to have a factory in florida or the gulf states, but politics will change this
Not to mention Shuttle-C's hogging pad space, i left that out in the above reply
iirc there is a photo of 3 shuttles on crawlers outside the VAB as Columbia had an issue and orbiters were being shuffled in the bay
It's worth pointing out that when Skylab B is fully developed there might not be a need for a STS-3xx mission if there is a Assured Crew Vehicle (presumably derived from the lunar capsule) waiting on the station. After all the whole idea of the STS-3xx was in the event of an orbiter being unable to reenter safely the backup launches, the crew transfers and the original shuttle tries to land automatically, if it makes it great, if it doesn't then it's a loss of an orbiter but no lives. But if a shuttle launches and a problem is identified the crew can go to the station and return on an extra ACV that is stashed there for exactly this scenario. At that point NASA has to do an emergency launch to replace the extra ACV before it goes back to normal ops but considering the inevitable safety stand down from the loss of an orbiter that wouldn't be significantly more disruptive.
Would that lead to the SRB-X if it was the case? I doubt at this time they will just close shop with their SRBs.
depends on commerical viability and USAF interest, most rocket developments were funded through the military (Atlas, Delta), the OmegaX failed to get funding and was canceled
Not to mention the refurbishment and transportation costs, and the need for a 39 a or b pad to launch
I sure as shit don't want the thing flying with crew, Ares-1 was a deathtrap, thank god it never entered use
Scratch one failure mode. And without Challenger, and with the added pressure of the lunar program, one can assume that stuff like Shuttle-Centaur and the five-segment boosters (maybe even external tank stretches?) are going to go ahead. Good callback to Borman's airline experience.
Now that's intriguing. I wonder about the lateral precision (without GPS for landing)--but OTOH, landing radio beacons existed. Images of Saturn IB vertical landings flow to my head...