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#241
August 2nd, 2008, 03:49 PM
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 Here's a question. If Germany was to switch, in 1934, to a First Past the Post System, who would be the winners and losers in the ATL? My thinking is basically as follows. The Center do very well in the south. The DNVP would do well in rural districts, but there would be a few shockers; in 1932 the KPD had started taking rural votes, and I think the Socialists, who had also started trying to woo rural areas, might be able to pick up on that. The DDVP, hrmm. They could probably woo a fair number of workers, and the middle class, but is it enough? Hrm.
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#242
August 2nd, 2008, 05:37 PM
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Hrmm. Sadly, I think you're right; Susano and I were talking about this earlier. A shame, since it has a lot of aspects that Stresemann would like, like tying voters to their local constituencies. But it would probably lead to a split between the DNVP and SPD... (Oops.)
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#243
August 2nd, 2008, 09:53 PM
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FPTP system? Don't think SPD would go for that, it’s in there program to have Proportional representation. Wouldn’t it give smaller extremist parties bigger opportunity to get in to the Reichstag by concentration their efforts to only a few voting districts to get success there? The communist would do that for sure.
FTPT is great for big parties and local parties but not for the midrange parties because it splits the voting to much for a single candidate to win over a bigger party. The biggest party in the Reichstag is SPD and I if is a “fair” system they would gain more than they lose.
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#244
August 4th, 2008, 03:40 AM
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#245
August 4th, 2008, 04:08 AM
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Good Intentions _________________ “We must strive to reform the parliamentary system. We must demand that the spirit of party be confined to what is vitally required for Germany’s development, that Parliament itself exert the pressure to produce a real and not merely formal majority. But if that fails in the present situation, because of the parties themselves, then let the cry go up, “res venit ad triarios!” and let responsible individuals find the courage to govern – that is, to assume leadership.”-1929 _________________ The sword clattered against Heinrich’s shield, and he staggered backwards. Clad in a blue tunic and plaid cloak, the warrior who was trying to kill him looked as if he’d stepped out of the forests of Teutoberg. “For Burgundia!” Heinrich stepped back, resisting the urge to smile. The Burgundian was stronger than him, and faster; but he Heinrich was smarter. Heinrich feinted, as if stumbling, and parried the Burgundian’s blow. Moving quickly, he pushed him backwards with his oak shield, and stabbed him with his sword. “Nice try, Burgundian,” he gloated. He savored the triumph, as his enemy fell. Indeed, he savored it so much he didn’t notice the spear that stabbed him in the ribcage. “Ah, crap,” he muttered, as he fell down. He turned towards his fallen foe. “Well, Hermann, nice try.” Hermann grinned. “Behold, the mighty Swabian! Slayer of Romans, Burgundians, and slaughtered by a spear to his back.” Henrich grunted as he watched the battle. “A cheap shot. But, we already knew Carl had a spear up his ass over something.” Hermann shrugged. “Doesn’t stop the Shield maidens from ogling him. I guarantee if he’d fallen they’d be over here to get him immediately.” After a few more minutes, the battle ended, and they got up to resume practice. So engrossed were they in a discussion of the battle and their mistakes that they paid no heed to the car that pulled over on the side of the road. A nice Mercedes, perhaps, but that wasn’t out of the ordinary. Indeed, they almost didn’t recognize the man walking towards them. After a moment, Hermann blinked. “It’s the President!” Henreich’s face went white. “What do we do?” ”I don’t know!” Hermann frowned. “Salute?” “That’s great for you,” said one of the shield maidens, “but what do we do?” While they were still arguing, Stresemann walked over, a smile on his face. “Good afternoon, children.” Hermann frowned at the term, but was too busy looking at Stresemann. He was older than he’d thought. His face was etched with wrinkles, and what as left of his hair was snow white. He looked like some one’s grandfather, and not the leader of Germany. For his part, Stresemann frowned as he surveyed the bruised and battered teenagers before him. “I am glad to see you are enjoying yourselves, but shouldn’t you be wearing helmets?” Heinrich shrugged. “Herr President, it’s less fun that way. Besides, we build strength through pain.” The President frowned. “Does your coach know?” Somehow, everyone felt ashamed enough by his tone to turn their eyes towards the ground. “Not exactly, Herr President.” Stresemann grunted. “Your minds are too valuable to the Reich for you to risk them in mock battles. From now on, you had better wear helmets.” One of the shieldbrothers banged his sword against his shield. “Yes sir! Hail Stresemann!” After a moment, Stresemann gravely returned the salute. “Heil Deustchland.” He looked them over, and walked away. Behind him, the youth of Germany returned to their game. [1] _________________ I have said since the beginning that the outset that the great living forces of the nation are not represented by the parties alone. In so saying I was thinking of the great movement that spread through the front-line soldiers, and the younger generation — organizations like the Young German Order, Reichsbanner, and Steel Helmets.-1926 _________________ Of the various youth movements that swept Germany in the 1920s, perhaps the most important in the long run was the Young German Order, under the leadership of Artur Mahraun. Mahraun, a veteran of the 1921 border conflict with Poland, had initially toyed with opposing the German government, and the Young German Order had actually been banned by the Prussian government in 1923. After 1924, however, the Young Germans began to pursue a more moderate role in German society. While the Order’s organizational structure drew its inspiration from the traditions of the Teutonic Knights, and it hoped to make the existing party system superfluous in the not-too distant-future, was nevertheless a supporter of Stresemann’s policies in the 1920s. Mahraun opposed the ideas of the National Socialists, and, although mildly anti-semitic, opposed its racist policies [2]. Mahraun believed, like others, that the German people needed to be renewed; but through physical fitness, internal colonization, and communal labor. Mahraun was among the earliest to advocate the idea of a voluntary work corps, and was an enthusiastic proponent of Stresemann’s effort to reach an accommodation with France. Mahraun, like so many Germans, hoped nostalgically for a return to the community of the trenches; but unlike others, he did not think that the German people needed war to come together. Stresemann and Mahraun did not actually meet until 1930, when concern over the Nazi’s success among Germany’s youth brought the two together. While Stresemann criticized the Order’s unwillingness to admit Jews, citing their role in the Great War, he nevertheless applauded a group that wanted to rebuild Germany as a community while respecting democracy. Mahraun, for his part, saw Stresemann as a second Bismarck, and promised his movement’s support for him. Stresemann intimated that in the not too distant future a possibility of a position in the government might open, and Mahraun, in turn, implied that the movement might consider its ban on Jews. [3] After the Nazi coup, the Young German Order became the basis for the Young German Movement. As noted previously, the organization expanded into a wide range of activities, but among the most unusual were the Ritterbrüder, or Brother Knights. The Ritterbrüder were, essentially, historic reenactors, seeking to revive the communal spirit of ancient Germany. Some observers noted their obsession with conducting mock battles in the forests and fields of Germany, but they also sought to recreate a society modeled on the perceived solidarity of the ancient Germanic tribes. The movement was overwhelmingly successful, serving to bind the German youth together. Yet there were those who found the movement’s incessant activities annoying; visits around Christmas to request donations for winter relief, parades in celebration of local events, and support before elections. And while Stresemann never gave official support to the movement’s idolization of him, he never vocally expressed opposition to it. This was only one of a series of efforts to bind Germany’s youth to the state. The National Youth Service, established at the end of 1933, had a twofold purpose. First, by giving youth jobs with the state, it sought to keep them out of the employment market. Secondly, it sought to revive the spirit of the trenches by uniting Germans from across the Reich in common service. Unlike the German Youth, this is somewhat less popular, since a surprisingly large amount of time is spent providing cheap labor to farmers. The fact that the movement keeps track of everyone in pseudo regiments is, naturally, coincidental. _________________ “History will duly describe the World War and set the peace of Versailles down as a document of disgrace. The world owes Germany reparations, the Treaty of Versailles must fall. Let us not lose our belief in the future!”-1922 _________________ Stresemann’s relationship with the German military was long and complicated, going back to his days as an annexationist in the Great War. Yet by the 1920s, Stresemann supported reconciliation with France, and publicly warned that another war would destroy Europe and Germany. Indeed, the Reichswehr was bitterly critical of Stresemann’s renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine at Locarno, something he saw as necessary. He seemed to be a true prophet of peace, but in conversations with the Reichswehr he showed a different face.  Stresemann meets in 1925 with the leaders of Britain and France Stresemann claimed that his support for disarmament would help Germany, for Germany would militarize while the other powers wound down, and once they were all at a relatively low, equal level, Germany could strike back. Indeed, Stresemann’s foreign policy bears a marked similarity to a 1926 Reichswehr strategy memorandum, which argued that Anschluss and ending the Rhineland occupation were necessary prerequisites for the use of military force to establish German hegemony in Europe. Nor did he oppose the beginning of German rearmament, in violation of Versailles, in the late 1920s. When the time came for Germany to rearm, the groundwork had been laid; and this was do in no small part to Germany's Nobel Peace Prize winning president. _________________ “What is regrettable about current developments is the excessive being placed purely on the considerations of economics and profession in the political battle. If the idea behind special interest parties is victorious, then the political life of the German people will eventually break up into agricultural interest and into industrial groups, civil service and white collar interests – but unfortunately there will be no common spiritual bond.”-1926 _________________ The first two years of Stresemann’s presidency, from 1932 to 1934, can best be prepared to Roosevelt’s New Deal. While neither president had any clear, long range plans about the future of their nation, both had vague aspirations that they rapidly gave shape. In Stresemann’s case, his most pressing goal was the reform of the German government, to prevent the formation of special interest parties, as had emerged in the past. Democracy could not survive, in the opinion of Germans of the left, right, and center, if people were voting for parties with names like the German Agricultural League or the Reich Party of the German Middle Class. Pursuit of narrow economic interests would doom the Republic, but it was unclear how to solve the problem. Stresemann’s own instincts followed his approval of the British Parliamentary system, and replacing Germany’s proportional representation with a first past the post system. [4] This idea was quickly tossed aside when it was realized that it would lead to the annihilation of the DDVP, leaving Socialists, and the German National Party to duke it out for control of Germany. How was Stresemann able to get so much done in his first term as president? To put it simply, by banning the Nazi Party, he removed them from the Reichstag; yet this caused additional problems for Stresemann, because this would have given the KPD and SPD a majority of the Reichstag. Fortunately, the KPD and SPD were too busy sniping at each other to form a united front, and the Social Democrat Prime Minister, Otto Braun, pushed to get the Nazi seats to count as being “present”, but abstaining. [5] The end result is that Stresemann continued to use Article 48 of the German constitution to rule without the support of the Reichstag, reducing it, albeit temporarily, to a rubber stamp. [6] Yet once this was in place, Stresemann was able to use this power to revise Germany’s constitution as he saw fit. For instance, the constitution was amended to give the power to create the government’s cabinet, meaning that even if the president didn’t use Article 48 to rule by decree, the legislature would only have control over creating laws and budgets. He also was amend the constitution so that parties received state funding in proportion to their votes, and required that a party have at least 5% of the nation’s votes to be represented in the Reichstag. Combined, these measures crushed the minor, bourgoiese parties, meaning that if the German middle class wanted to be represented, they had to turn to either the German Democratic People’s Party (DDVP) or German National People’s Party (DNVP). The formation of the Deutsche Rundfunkanstalt, as the German Broadcasting Corporation, was known, represents another one of his attempts to strengthen democracy in a questionable way. The far right had at its command an extensive press apparatus, headed by the DNVP’s Alfred Hugenberg. Even corporations were buying the media, with I.G. Farben snapping up the liberal Frankfurter Zeitung. Thus, the DFA served as a valuable counterpoint. Since it was an entirely new organization, it was staffed only by supporters of the DDVP, Center, and to a lesser extent the SPD. With government funding the DFA’s radio waves blanketed Germany, bringing the republic news of its leader’s triumphs. Taken together, this all sounds somewhat harsh, and it is no wonder that there were those on the left and right who called Stresemann a dictator. Yet it must be remembered that his goal was the salvation of Germany and its people. He only had the best intentions, you see. [1] The original plan was to have Stresemann have what Henreich interprets as a tear of joy, but I felt the tear thing made it a bit too much of an "aww, who's a poor widdle president of eighty million people? You are, yes you are!" Stresemann has guided Germany between Scylla and Charybdis. By God, he'd be proud of it. [2] The Young German Order did not allow Jews in. Historically the movement did think Stresemann was one of Germany’s greatest leaders. [3] It's amazing what money does. [4] What does this mean? In the Weimar Republic, you voted for the party you wanted to win, and the parties get seats based on the number of votes. In Britain and America, you vote for a delegate for your district; if he gets the majority of votes, he takes the seat for your district. I don’t believe it’s necessarily better; first past the post tends to lead to a two party system, while proportional representation allows for a wider range of viewpoints. But Stresemann doesn’t want a wide range of viewpoints; he wants two parties, three at most, that express the will of the Volk. [5] The Nazis did a similar trick to get the Enabling Act [6] The idea of strengthening the president was popular by 1930 across much of German society, and Stresemann proposed having the state fund parties to break the DVP’s reliance on industrialists for funding. Naturally this system encourages stagnation among Germany's parties. It's much harder for a new party to gain headway and start, and the larger parties have a deadlock on funding.
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Last edited by Faeelin; August 4th, 2008 at 04:14 AM..
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#246
August 4th, 2008, 07:32 PM
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Faeelin
Interesting. Some of those quotes make him sound a lot more dangerous than Hitler. From what glimpses you gave of the TL future he takes a radically different viewpoint and goes down in history as basically a good guy. Steve
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#247
August 4th, 2008, 07:57 PM
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#248
August 4th, 2008, 08:34 PM
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Some of the main aims in terms of overturning the Versailles treaty and regaining German military dominance of Europe. However being neither anti-Semitic nor barking mad he could generate and lead a far more dangerous 3rd Reich than Adolph. Steve
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#249
August 4th, 2008, 09:25 PM
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Great update. It begins to seem that in the long run Stresemann's Germany will turn to be not much nicer than La Rocque's Fourth Republic.
Good intentions, indeed  - mobilization of the youth, state broadcasting corporation geared up for propaganda, culling of the political parties, and of course the semi-secret rearmament.It's getting more and more interesting. BTW, how goes USSR in this TL - more or less as per OTL or not? Are the Germans still using Soviet facilities for their military build-up? Does Soviet Russia remain their privileged trade partner?
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#250
August 4th, 2008, 09:58 PM
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What's wrong with a youth movement? The post WW1 generation felt isolated from politics and turned to the extremes; why not try to bring them into the body politic? Moreover, given that the far right has amassed a press empire, why shouldn't the Republic? Quote:
Certainly, the Fourth Republic may encourage them to stick together.
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#251
August 4th, 2008, 10:01 PM
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Stresemann, after all, is too smart to call German hegemony "The Thousand Year Reich." A European Union, though...I don't say that's what's happening, but it is food for thought. Bu what's wrong with Germany rearming? Why should it have to bow its head while Poland has a larger military?
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#252
August 4th, 2008, 10:01 PM
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Pleonexia While Germany regained a measure of stability under its president, tension remained. 1933 to 1935 were somewhat quiet, domestically, as if the nation had exhausted itself in the chaos that led to the Nazis’ rise. Yet even so, tension between the parties had been building, as the left, right, and Center [1] moved to fill in the vacuum. Let’s take a quick look at what Germany’s political parties are up to. (The Communists, whose efforts to form a united front are ignored by the Socialists, and the Center, who has returned to its traditional Catholicism, shall not be mentioned). _______________________ Volkspartei or Klassenpartei? The Social Democrats in the 1930s In 1932, the Social Democrats (SPD) were an ailing, divided party. They’d lost voters to the Communists and Nazis, and few in the party felt optimistic about the nation’s future. In the long term, the outlook was bleak. Even before the Depression, it had been faced with stagnating membership. Like the other German parties, it was confronted with an aging base, and by 1930 the average SPD voter was forty years old. The SPD’s support remained the working class [2], but as Germany developed a modern economy with a growing service sector, its base would only shrink. Even within the proletariat its support was shrinking. Unskilled laborers turned to the KPD in hopes of a brighter future, and it is a sign of the party’s passivity that it tolerated Stresemann’s actions, for the most part, until 1935. In essence, the Socialists had ossified. The SPD’s executives had the power to expel party members, owned the party’s property, and made almost all decisions without consulting the rank and file. Nor were the executives a varied bunch; while there were eighteen seats on the executive committee, only thirty-three people sat on it between 1918 and 1933, with the youngest members being in their late forties. Little wonder, then, that party had such trouble attracting Germany’s youth. This presented an interesting problem. How do you introduce socialism democratically if the majority of the nation opposes it? The answer was simple, although it took the party almost a decade to embrace it. In 1925, the party’s Heidelberg Congress acknowledged that it must do more to win over white-collar workers and farmers, and by 1928 between a quarter and a third of its voters were nonproletarians. The party’s economic policy also underwent a dramatic shift as a result of the Depression. At the 1925 Party Congress the SPD had supported “organized capitalism”, that is, an economy dominated by cartels and monopolies. Such an economy would ultimately end in the state’s takeover the economy, as the free forces of capitalism would gradually erode. [3] The SPD did make headway in one surprising area. Since 1927 the Social Democrats had called for the breakup of Germany’s large estates and support for farmers, and although this policy was ineffective at first, it found fertile ground during the Depression. Yet it was not the SPD that broke into rural areas. The KPD had begun making gains in the countryside in the 1932 election, encouraging the Socialist Democrats to divert more resources to the area. [4] In the 1936 election, the SPD was able to portray the DNVP as the tool of the large landowners, tapping into widespread discontent that still existed. The Socialists ultimately held that the government should, ideally, promote greater worker control of their factories, and nationalize certain industries as the first steps on the long road to a Socialist state. Meanwhile, the Depression destroyed any notions of an organized economy as the stepping stone to Socialism out of the water. Germany’s economy suffered worse than any of its neighbors, and it certainly had a more cartelized and “organized” economy than, say, France. [5] The SPD’s leadership belief that lowering prices and wages would save the economy clearly became an illusion, as the Depression continued, leaving the party lost in the wilderness. What was to be done, then? The answer came from the Berlin School of Economics, which arose in the 1930s. The Berlin School referred to the thoughts of a variety of North European economists about how to emerge from the Depression. In contrast to traditional economists, they proposed that the government adopt a countercyclical approach to the economy, and that depressions could be counteracted by government policy. The earliest strands of thought emerged in 1931, when a Socialist statistician, Vladimir Woytinsky, proposed that the proper response to the economic crisis should be moderate inflation. Woytinsky, thought that the economy was suffering from a lack of demand, and that the situation would only be resolved by the government stimulating the economy through public works and infrastructure improvements. Thus far, it sounds like typical Keynesianism or the Stockholm school. Where it departs from Keynesian, however, is that it imagines a much vaster system of government controls on the economy. The Berlin school advocated direct state investment in German industry to “squeeze out” private capital. The ultimate cause of the Depression had been underconsumption, but that had been brought on by the inefficiencies of the German cartel economy. Only state planning could take Germany down the road to becoming a prosperous, democratic state. [6] _______________________ A Resurgent Right In the aftermath of the Nazi putsch of 1933, the German right was in disarray. There were still many who would, and did, turn to the far right, but the movement was divided. The failure of the Nazi movement in Austria only accelerated internal divisions, and alienated many middle class Germans. At the same time, economic recovery returned many to the DDVP, and the Anschluss of Austria in face of calls for negotiation and delay on the part of Germany’s neighbors caused a fair amount of confusion. One couldn’t very well claim that Stresemann was too nationalist, after all. Perversely, the salvation of the DNVP came from its younger ranks. While Hugenberg stewed and railed against “the French puppet”, a young politician, Walter Lambach, came into his own. As early as 1928, he had blamed the DNVP’s failure on its support for the monarchy and radical right. The DNVP, in his eyes, had become a puppet of big industry, and had to recognize that trade unions and the republic were facts of life. For pointing out the obvious, Hugenberg had tried to kick him out of the party in 1928, but by 1934 it was clear he was right. Lambach did not gain control of the DNVP, which he thought would be impossible. Rather he joined the Conservative People’s Party (KVP), established in 1930 by moderates from the DNVP. The KVP’s platform for the 1936 election was simple. While applauding Stresemann’s role in protecting democracy and establishing a government “more in keeping with the German tradition,” it criticized him for going too far. It claimed that Stresemann had set up a proto-police state, to be expanded as time went on. It criticized excessive involvement in the economy, and thought that his foreign policy was a combination of idealism and adventurism that would threaten Germany. The KVP also argued against Stresemann’s economic policies. On the one hand, it opposed his policies to promote free trade at the expense of German hearth and home. On the other hand, it opposed his efforts to regulate and ultimately break the German cartels, giving it the support of heavy industry.As the cartels' vast political and press machine mobilized against Stresemann, it ensured a bitter struggle once the election was over. _______________________ The Heirs of Bismarck: Stresemann and the DDVP Among the most controversial aspects of Stresemann’s platform was his opposition to the trusts and cartels that played such a major role in Germany’s economy. Stresemann’s ambivalence about cartels can be traced to his prewar days as a leader of the Saxon Manufacturers’ Association, which defended the interests of small businesses. The cartel’s efforts to cut a deal with France during the Ruhr occupation indicated that they were out for their interests, and not those of Germany. Finally, the cartels were able to use their disproportionate influence to dominate and distort the German economy. [7] Stresemann’s opposition to cartels was also political. The DVP was portrayed in the 1920s as a puppet of heavy industry, and thus his attacks on cartels from 1934 onward was designed to win the support of a middle class that feels threatened by firms with tens of thousands of workers, churning out goods In factories that appear as dark, satanic mills. The DDVP had therefore supported laws banning the construction of new department stores, criticized cartels for fixing prices too high, and, in short, carried out populist measures designed to win the support of the German middle class. Streseman’s attack on the cartels must be seen in light of a question asked by many German economists. Why had Germany done so poorly in the 1920s? To be sure, it was an unfavorable environment for growth, with reparations draining capital from Germany, protectionism on the rise, and world trade fundamentally altered from the prewar era. But Germany also had advantages over the rest of the world; for instance, it possessed the highest per capita number of researchers, and its economists were among the foremost proponents of “rationalization” on the American model. Yet even the golden years of the 1920s had been marked by high unemployment and sclerotic growth. What had gone wrong? Despite the desires and claims of industrialists to promote “Americanization” and “rationalization”, the 1920s had actually seen the opposite developments. German bankers invested cautiously in tried and true industries, while underinvesting in new economic sectors. Giant corporate organizations, like the Vereinigte Stahlwekrke and IG Farben, had sucked up capital while reducing competition on the marketplace. Moreover, by reducing economic flexibility, they had made the downturn worse. [8] More controversially were Stresemann’s efforts to reform the nation’s welfare state. Public spending on welfare benefits, health care, subsidized housing, the growing number of civil servants had strained Germany’s budget, making it dependent on American loans. The loss of American capital following the Wall Street crash was one reason the Depression had been so severe, and it was obvious, to Stresemann, that the budget had to be slashed. This had been obvious as early as 1928, when Stresemann claimed that given how much Germany spent on social services, “One would think we won the war.” The problem, the DDVP claimed, was that other parties argued over how to divide a small cake; only the DDVP wanted to bake a bigger one. Despite the awfulness of the metaphor, this is the heart of the DDVP’s platform in 1936. The DDVP’s posters depicted statistics on soaring automobile production, the decline in unemployment, and radio ownership. One of the most effective political posters simply shows an image of Stresemann, with a map of the enlarged Germany in the background. The DDVP also compared Stresemann to Bismarck. Among the most notable propaganda posters was one showing Bismarck placing his hand on Stresemann’s shoulder and declaring, “Carry on, Stresemann. You are finishing my work.” Meanwhile, to woo younger Germans, Stresemann pushed for the nomination of a series of younger candidates for the Reichstag election. Some of these candidates, former members of the German Youth, used the movement to support them at rallies, while affirming their devotion to the German people. Meanwhile, while the DFA did not take a stance on the outcome of the election, broadcasters spent the months before the election talking about the buoyant German economy, in contrast to the troubles of its neighbors, and the atrocities conducted by the Nazis in Austria.  President Stresemann addressing the Reichstag _______________________ The Election of 1936 The Reichstag elections of 1936 were conducted in July, in the Indian summer between the annexation of Austria and the rise of the Fourth Republic. The results were, to be honest, unsurprising. Election Results German Democratic People’s Party 116 Social Democrats 108 Center Party 72 Communist Party 36 German National People’s Party 32 Conservative People’s Party 34 The election of 1936 was a triumph for Stresemann and the DDVP. Its victory meant that, provided it received the support of the Center Party, it could rule without the support of the Conservatives or the Social Democrats, since the two parties would never agree on legislation. The Communists were reduced to their pre-depression isolation 1932, while the DNVP had been crushed. There were warning signs; many of the DDVP’s Austrian votes were likely to return to traditional voting patterns as time went on, and the Conservative Party’s electoral success was stunning. Yet to Stresemann it seemed to be a vindication of his policies, and a sign he should press forward. Yet the 1936 Reichstag election was far less important than previous elections. The president could now propose laws and appoint ministers as he pleased; he could even pass laws and budgets without the support of the Reichstag. Thus when the SPD refused to join his coalition unless he raised unemployment benefits, Stresemann shrugged and went on without them. In 1928, Chancellor Stresemann tried to form a national government, gaining the support a broad spectrum of German parties. In 1936, President Stresemann saw no need. [1] I couldn’t resist. [2] To be fair, the party did attract increasing white collared civil service workers. [3] Evidently before Blade Runner it didn’t occur to anyone that the corporations could run the state, rather than the other way around. [4] Well, why not? Certainly other nation’s farmers have no problem turning to the left. [5] Actually in a lot of ways Eastern Europe suffered worse, but nobody remembers them. [6] This is basically the policy the SPD adopted in 1932, but elaborated on. El Pip can now explode in rage. [7] And, of course, their support for the German right. [8] An interesting sidenote. Ludwig Erhard, architect of Germany’s post World War II economic renaissance, did not end up getting his second dissertation (required for a university position) accepted because he didn’t become a member of the Nazi Party. His second dissertation addressed the role of cartels in the stagnation of Germany’s economy. Anyway, historically he ended up working in the 1930s and early 1940s in an economic institute, where his ideas were ignored in favor of economists in favor of the Nazi vision of a centralized economy. I promise; this is the last of the domestic politics of Germany for the moment. We now return to the fall of Nanjing. Any claim that he and his teachers influence on the DDVP’s economic platform in the 1930s is entirely accurate.
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#253
August 4th, 2008, 10:05 PM
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#254
August 4th, 2008, 10:37 PM
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Not a lot if that was the case. However when its persuading other nations to disarm while secretly building up forces itself for aggressive action is a totally different matter. "Stresemann claimed that his support for disarmament would help Germany, for Germany would militarize while the other powers wound down, and once they were all at a relatively low, equal level, Germany could strike back. Indeed, Stresemann’s foreign policy bears a marked similarity to a 1926 Reichswehr strategy memorandum, which argued that Anschluss and ending the Rhineland occupation were necessary prerequisites for the use of military force to establish German hegemony in Europe. Nor did he oppose the beginning of German rearmament, in violation of Versailles, in the late 1920s. When the time came for Germany to rearm, the groundwork had been laid; and this was do in no small part to Germany's Nobel Peace Prize winning president." In part this could be political manouvering. Seeking to keep quiet the unreconstructed militarists who were unwilling to accept responsibility for the mess they had made of Germany in the 1st couple of decades of the century and sought to blame other and regain power. However to the outside observer it would sound less than reassuring that he is actually interested in peaceful co-existence. Steve
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#255
August 5th, 2008, 10:48 AM
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And part of that is regaining military parity. Theres absolutely nothing wrong with that.
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#256
August 5th, 2008, 04:56 PM
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Read my previous post. Steve
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#257
August 5th, 2008, 06:56 PM
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I adressed that. Part of undoing Versailles and the injustices doen against Germany is reaching military parity with the other pwoers (mainly France) again. If that is done rather by underhanded methods than by miulitary action, all the better.
As for "German dominance" - *shrugs* Why should Germany not partake in this game? Its not a game restricted to just, say, the USA, UK, France and Russia/USSR.
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#259
August 5th, 2008, 07:42 PM
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I have to agree with Susano. Looking from German POV Stresemann's politics is very reasonable - he's doing his best to promote German interests, and without bloodshed. Of course German neighbours (Poland, for example) have their own interests and they every right to protect them but I can not condemn a German for doing what is best for Germany without committing any crime (yet). However, since Poland's and Germany's interests were obviously in conflict I can see a war coming. After Piłsudski's death there is no one in Poland who would dare to give up Polish claims to Gdańsk/Danzig. Of course giving up Pomerania, Silesia and Posen is totally out of the question.
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#260
August 5th, 2008, 07:50 PM
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