How far does everyone here feel that it was the meddling of Adolf Hitler in the operational affairs of the German armed forces during Op: Barbarossa which led to its ultimate failure? Or - is there anyone here who feels that the Germans failed more so due to other reasons? Your views and opinions - plus ways of supporting them - would be greatly appreciated as I would love to know what this board thinks of this common question.
Hitler's Meddling
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Fletch
Kicked
According to Alan Clark, on reading Barbarossa, not much until after defeat was certain. Personally, on thi issue I defer to his judgement.
There was a joke in Germany that went something like this:
A man goes to the doctor and sees a map on the wall. “What is that enormous brown country?” he asks.
The doctor says, “That’s the Judeobolshevik Soviet Union.”
“And that great big green country?”
“That’s the judified and negrified United States.”
“And these red places all over?”
“That’s the effete and degenerate British Empire.”
“And this blue country, the not so big one in the middle?”
“Oh, that is Our Greater German Reich.”
The man had thought for a moment. Then, timidly, he had said, “Has the Führer seen this map?”
A man goes to the doctor and sees a map on the wall. “What is that enormous brown country?” he asks.
The doctor says, “That’s the Judeobolshevik Soviet Union.”
“And that great big green country?”
“That’s the judified and negrified United States.”
“And these red places all over?”
“That’s the effete and degenerate British Empire.”
“And this blue country, the not so big one in the middle?”
“Oh, that is Our Greater German Reich.”
The man had thought for a moment. Then, timidly, he had said, “Has the Führer seen this map?”
sumwhereinCA
Banned
lols. nice one.
anyways barbossa probally would of failed even without Hitler meddling. maybe if Stalin was killed early into the invasion and a very warm summer, than barbossa could of been won. maybe
Roddoss72
Banned
It did not help the German cause when the German army was to launch its major offensive on Moscow, that Hitler decided to send panzer group 3 to Leningrad and panzer group 4 to Kiev stripping army group centre of its armoured units, i believe had hitler had allowed those two panzer groups then maybe just maybe Moscow was his for the taking.
Grey Wolf
Donor
From what I read Hitler refused to give any ground at the START of the campaign, and this meant that when the first campaign season was over he would not allow his advance units to fall back to an easily defensible and EASILY SUPPLYABLE line with the result that lack of Winter clothing and starvation hit his advance forces hard. His senior generals wanted this fall-back to provide a well-supplied springboard for the second campaign as well, but his insistence on not giving up any land his forces had won cancelled that out
Grey Wolf
Grey Wolf
Fletch
Kicked
Again,I am heavily relying on Alan Clarks book Barbarossa(with bias I admit,but more detailed than Lawrence Rees book on the subject), but history in this sense has been slanted against Hitler, despite,with the information he was given what seemed sound desicions(this changed as Hitlers health failed). The Generals, eager to maintain their reputations were inclined after the war to blame Hitler for decisions they agreed with at the time.
Hitler was a monster, but I dont think he was a military incompetent.
Redbeard
Banned
The success in France 1940 to a large degree was owed to Hitler overruling his top brass and chosing untraditional suggestions from "lower" ranks.
His emphasis on defeating the enemy army and not taking cities or objectives was and still is considered common sense in military operations. His shift of focus to the south was consistent with this as the Soviets had considerable forces here that threatened the German presence in the centre. He did achieve a stunning victory, it just wasn't enough vs. the Soviets having collossal reserves.
Hitler's decision in late 1941 to stay and fight the Russian winter and offensive probably cost the Wehrmach less than a retreat under those conditions would have.
Personally I think taking Moscow might have seriously handicapped the Soviet ability to rebuild strength in 1942-43. That would have lead to a German victory, but nobody then or now could/can know for sure.
In short Hitler's decisions in this phase of the war might have lead to defeat, but we can't say the reason was incompetence.
Later however Hitler got kind of intoxicated by his own luck in decisions - he found it proved that he allways knew better than the Generals - the silly "no retreat" order is especially symbolic of this. With a more flexible campaign from 1942 I doubt if the Soviets would have had the breath to anything beyond throwing the Germans out of Russia. That might have left the Germans permanently in control of the European continent from Ukraine to the Channel.
At this time I would clearly call Hitler's operational leadership incompetent if not idiotic. Perhaps because he apparently acted on intuition. And intuition might be OK here and now, but in the long run nothing beats well prepared professionalism.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
His emphasis on defeating the enemy army and not taking cities or objectives was and still is considered common sense in military operations. His shift of focus to the south was consistent with this as the Soviets had considerable forces here that threatened the German presence in the centre. He did achieve a stunning victory, it just wasn't enough vs. the Soviets having collossal reserves.
Hitler's decision in late 1941 to stay and fight the Russian winter and offensive probably cost the Wehrmach less than a retreat under those conditions would have.
Personally I think taking Moscow might have seriously handicapped the Soviet ability to rebuild strength in 1942-43. That would have lead to a German victory, but nobody then or now could/can know for sure.
In short Hitler's decisions in this phase of the war might have lead to defeat, but we can't say the reason was incompetence.
Later however Hitler got kind of intoxicated by his own luck in decisions - he found it proved that he allways knew better than the Generals - the silly "no retreat" order is especially symbolic of this. With a more flexible campaign from 1942 I doubt if the Soviets would have had the breath to anything beyond throwing the Germans out of Russia. That might have left the Germans permanently in control of the European continent from Ukraine to the Channel.
At this time I would clearly call Hitler's operational leadership incompetent if not idiotic. Perhaps because he apparently acted on intuition. And intuition might be OK here and now, but in the long run nothing beats well prepared professionalism.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
Max Sinister
Banned
During WW1, he was just a private (Gefreiter). He wasn't as great as he thought himself to be. If he didn't advise it: Who then decided not to retreat when it'd have been a good idea? Why did he sack von Brauchitsch who had advocated to retreat in winter?
Germany could have won WW2
Hitler was a war strategist and that cost Germany and Europe dearly.
But with better leadership Germany could have defeated the USSR:
(1) Economy: If Germany wanted to go to war propper arrangements should have be made many years before the start: increase in factory space, r+d under one agency/ministery, providing bomb proof factories, increase railroad capacity and also increase import of oil, specialised metals (aluminium, uranium etc)
(2) transport: this was later a major set back and at least tripple the capacity
(3) specialising in weapon systems instead of many different systems: emphasising on UBoot type X, Focke wolf, panzer faust, Nebel rocket system, and of course Panther tanks
(4) development of a heavy long distance bomber to be able to bomb beyond the Ural and USA!
(5) Doubling size Luftwaffe so permanent air superiority could be garanteed.
(6) Development of comando units for operations beyond enemy lines (Much larger involvement of the Brandenburg units)
(7) Implementing the shock assault tactics of the waffen ss to the whole wehrmacht.
Secondly politically, they should have watered - or completely stopped - their ridiculous racial policy, therefore been able to maintain their (jewish) scientists (but this is contrary to their political belief systems) and able to recruit more foreign volunteers.
Thirdly politico-geographic: it was better to take Lithuani, instead of some portions of Poland
Fourthly: waiting till at least thirty to fourty percent of the infantry was mechanised.
As long as the UK was blocked and unable to interfere and the USA not entering the WW2 and with THE RIGHT STRATEGY he would be able to win.
Best line of attack: take out Read airforce and maintain air superiority, two axis towards Moskou then curve downwards to ocupy Ukraine and Caucasus, get the local minorities as allies and the communist regime would collapse.
The ultimate problem was that Germany was a dictatorship and a gradual breakdown of the regime would come: like the USSR collapsed in the 1990's
Hitler was a war strategist and that cost Germany and Europe dearly.
But with better leadership Germany could have defeated the USSR:
(1) Economy: If Germany wanted to go to war propper arrangements should have be made many years before the start: increase in factory space, r+d under one agency/ministery, providing bomb proof factories, increase railroad capacity and also increase import of oil, specialised metals (aluminium, uranium etc)
(2) transport: this was later a major set back and at least tripple the capacity
(3) specialising in weapon systems instead of many different systems: emphasising on UBoot type X, Focke wolf, panzer faust, Nebel rocket system, and of course Panther tanks
(4) development of a heavy long distance bomber to be able to bomb beyond the Ural and USA!
(5) Doubling size Luftwaffe so permanent air superiority could be garanteed.
(6) Development of comando units for operations beyond enemy lines (Much larger involvement of the Brandenburg units)
(7) Implementing the shock assault tactics of the waffen ss to the whole wehrmacht.
Secondly politically, they should have watered - or completely stopped - their ridiculous racial policy, therefore been able to maintain their (jewish) scientists (but this is contrary to their political belief systems) and able to recruit more foreign volunteers.
Thirdly politico-geographic: it was better to take Lithuani, instead of some portions of Poland
Fourthly: waiting till at least thirty to fourty percent of the infantry was mechanised.
As long as the UK was blocked and unable to interfere and the USA not entering the WW2 and with THE RIGHT STRATEGY he would be able to win.
Best line of attack: take out Read airforce and maintain air superiority, two axis towards Moskou then curve downwards to ocupy Ukraine and Caucasus, get the local minorities as allies and the communist regime would collapse.
The ultimate problem was that Germany was a dictatorship and a gradual breakdown of the regime would come: like the USSR collapsed in the 1990's
I don't believe that would be feasible in Hitler's day, certainly not on a significant scale. Resources would be better employed elsewhere, in my opinion.
well there where some german bombers that would have fitted the profile
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amerika_Bomber
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amerika_Bomber
Fletch
Kicked
Its a year sinse I've read Barbarossa, so my memory is scetchy to say the least, but its going by Clarks opinion of the man. I believe it was something to do with the tyupe of army the Wehermacht was trained to be. Gonna get book out again tonight and give proper answer.
Riain
Banned
It wasn't Hitlers meddling in the operational aspects of Barbarossa which doomed it before it began, it was his lack of political willpower in the 2 years before. If he had pushed his war economy from Sept 39 his divs could have started in May rather than June '41, with forces of much greater strength, reach and persistance. This is what German forces lacked, rather than good battle direction. It was in the biggest things; politics, diplomacy, economics where Hitler's failures counted, not in meddling with Me262 production and moving armies around in Russia.
Hitler pushed German rearmament as far as it could go by 1939. Perhaps a few more efficiencies could have been found, but Germany had the best army it could have expected to have when it started the war. Increasing raw material imports would have forced a drastic reduction in rearmament because the country would have to have increased exports to pay for it all. The Third Recih's central bank deserves a lot of credit for being able to manage a truly atrocious foreign exchange situation. For years they managed to live hand to mouth, using foreign exchange as soon as it came in (central banks today have a minimum reserve of 6 months of foreign exchange).
Agreed - Germany would have benefited by not making so many different models of each vehicle/weapon.
Intercontinental bombing may have been possible by '45, but had Germany put that much development into such a bomber, it would have lost the war well before that. Germany could not have sustained a campaign against the Soviet Ural factories.
It would have cost too much in terms of fuel (to train the pilots and then get the planes into the air in combat) and raw materials. As it is, Germany had to continue pumping out obsolete aircraft like the Me-109 because it couldn't afford to shut down the assembly line for a few months and modify it to produce a new aircraft.
May have helped, but wouldn't have won the war.
Some of the SS was good, receiving the best equipment the Germans had to offer, while other divisions were nothing special. The entire Heer was aggresive; there was nothing special about SS tactics. To equip the entire army to SS standards would have been impossible.
Germany simply fought too many wars and had too many enemies. Frankly, without Case Yellow, even Britain and France (with their ability to purchase weapons from the U.S.) may have proved too much for the Third Reich.
Roddoss72
Banned
Agrippa
Actually the Germans had a fully operational trans-atlantic heavy bomber in the later half of 1942 it was the Me-264 Amerika Bomber, it was capable of delivering a heavy bomb load on a one way trip to Washington D.C or a light bomb load on a round trip, Messeschmitt had argued for over two years for the large four engined heavy to go into production but Goering and Hitler would not allow the bomber to go into production, and on another aircraft the He-177 Greif Heinkel like Messerschmitt ran up against a wall of indifference by Goering to allow the He-177 to be converted into a four engined heavy rather than the coupled twin heavy, and again they were denide until it was too late.
Germany had the aircraft, the technology, and the know how but thay lacked one crucial ingrediant and that was capable leaders with foresight.
Again incorrect about Germany's industrial capacity.
Actually the Germans had a fully operational trans-atlantic heavy bomber in the later half of 1942 it was the Me-264 Amerika Bomber, it was capable of delivering a heavy bomb load on a one way trip to Washington D.C or a light bomb load on a round trip, Messeschmitt had argued for over two years for the large four engined heavy to go into production but Goering and Hitler would not allow the bomber to go into production, and on another aircraft the He-177 Greif Heinkel like Messerschmitt ran up against a wall of indifference by Goering to allow the He-177 to be converted into a four engined heavy rather than the coupled twin heavy, and again they were denide until it was too late.
Germany had the aircraft, the technology, and the know how but thay lacked one crucial ingrediant and that was capable leaders with foresight.
Again incorrect about Germany's industrial capacity.
As it has been said, Hitler's decisions did hurt Germany in 1942-44, but also were responsible in the first place for their victories in 1940. So without hitler meddling, you don't have a victorious Reich and maybe no WWII. Maybe the best situation for Germany would have been a Hitler that somehow dissapears in 1942, before Stalingrad, and some competent generals like Manstein, Guderian or Kesserling taking over.
Redbeard
Banned
It wasn't impossible for Germany to be better prepared, but Hitler forbad any further war preparations - he was convinced that his bluff would work one more time. For instance the army's stocks of artillery ammo were depleted after the Polish campaign and not refilled again until spring 1940. It is true that German finances were in a mess, but we can't expect the consequences of that to be like those in a capitalistic free society. Try to have a look on Soviet economy, and they shouldn't have been able to exist at all. In the end they didn't, but for decades such systems simply can squeeze much more out of the poor people of the country.
The line from PzI to VI appear quite stringent, and the Pz IV was in production for all of WWII. The same applies to Bf 109, the most numerous plane in WWII. The focus on very heavy tanks or bombers instead of fighters (Me 263) had its origin in Hitler and proved very expensive, but that is another matter than many different models. The great diversity came mainly though impressing captured materiel.
If you want many different models and intricate design go to UK.
Here I agree. Large strategic bomber forces were very expensive, and probably wasn't worth the effort. I wonder however if a limited campaign early in the war could have diverted significant resources to US home defence. Something like a floatplanes dropping bombs now and then at night over eastcoast cities. The floatplanes could be refueld at sea by "Milkcows".
The allies for much of the war actually thought the Luftwaffe was two or three times bigger than it actually was. I agree that Germany just couldn't double the Luftwaffe but putting even more emphasis on technology like SAMs might have paid off. I wouldn't call the Bf 109 obsolete for any time during the war. Like the Spitfire it had a tremendous potential for upgrading, and keeping it on the production line IMHO appear very sensible.
Agree, commando units were handy in many instances, and if not for other things then for cool hero images. Anyway I think the Germans were quite well off in this regard. Just think of Eben-Emael (sp?) or the crossings of the Meuse in 1940
Genarally agree, and having a large part of the army being horse drawn perhaps wasn't such a bad idea in a Russian campaign.
Had Case yellow bogged down in 1940 the Germans would have been doomed, the British alone by a great margin outproduced the Germans in 1941. The greatest mystery IMHO is how unprepared Germany was in 1939, not even Blitzkrieg was at hand, but evolved by co-incidence during the French campaign. Apparently the German leadership was shocked when UK and France declared war, and considering how much focus Hitler and the Germans in general before the war had to a two front war being the doom of Germany, it is quite remarkable that the Germans by themselves got that much invloved in exactly that.
German abilities in strategy and diplomacy apparently was in deep coma between Bismarck and Adenauer.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard