What if no Falklands Task Force in 1982?

Probably done before, but since it is the 25th anniversary and all...
What if, instead of launching a naval task force to reclaim the Falklands, the UK had relied solely on diplomatic efforts?

Then Argentina wins by default. The Brits gain a reputation for being soft and unwilling to stand up for their interests. The Soviets take note and are a bit more aggressive. The Chinese also take note and are much more intransigant in negotiations over Hong Kong.

I wonder what would happen if the Argies had waited until their national day, 25th of May, to invade. The southern hemisphere winter would make an immediate military response impossible, the Brits would have to wait until November or so. Would they be able to maintian the rage for 6 months when unable to do anything?

Submarines would work fine. Without the ability to launch a task force, perhaps Maggie would impose a direct blockade on Argentinia until they left the islands.

If it wasn't for the First Sea Lord, Maggie and co. were about to give up, given that they had just practically killed the navy.

Phoenix said:

If it wasn't for the First Sea Lord, Maggie and co. were about to give up, given that they had just practically killed the navy.

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On paper, but fortunately the changes hadn't been brought into effect by early 1982.

I wouldn't have put it past the RN to say "we can do it" during the SA winter, and actually do it. A lot of it was, and is, to do with attitude.

Fellatio Nelson said:

I wouldn't have put it past the RN to say "we can do it" during the SA winter, and actually do it. A lot of it was, and is, to do with attitude.

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Attitude for sure, we had guys putting in for transfer and willing to go down in rank just to try and get on the task force.

Diplomacy wasn't gonna work with Argentina's military junta. They took the islands with the goal of raising pride and pushing support for the economically-failing military regime. Britain's whupping sent the junta packing.

If Britain really wanted to go blow the Argentines away, winter or not they woulda gone and done it. It would have been significantly harder for the Argentines to hold the place during the winter, too.

Anaxagoras said:

Then Argentina wins by default. The Brits gain a reputation for being soft and unwilling to stand up for their interests. The Soviets take note and are a bit more aggressive. The Chinese also take note and are much more intransigant in negotiations over Hong Kong.

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Spain might get a bit more aggressive about Gibraltar too.

I think Spain was angling to get into NATO at the time and was very pro Britain. The task force would not be able to operate in the Falklands winter by the admission of its own commanders. They worked backwards from an end date of June 15, after which the troops, planes and ships couldn't fight, this is where they came to the April 21-25 landing window.

Riain said:

I think Spain was angling to get into NATO at the time and was very pro Britain. The task force would not be able to operate in the Falklands winter by the admission of its own commanders. They worked backwards from an end date of June 15, after which the troops, planes and ships couldn't fight, this is where they came to the April 21-25 landing window.

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Had push come to shove, they could have done it, although the greater attrition on ships and limited flying conditions would have been very noticeable; it would probably have required a number of ships coming straight off other operations to delay their departure until fit for the rigors ahead, more ships involved (as replacements); doubtless also changes in strategy to limit the amount of time the Task Force was at sea in the area. Don't forget, the RN was well used to working in similarly 'choppy' seas in the northern hemisphere in winter months. It's very purpose was dominated by the need to provide forces for the North Atlantic region throughout the year.

OTOH, unless the Argentinians had based jet fighters at Stanley, their aircraft (and to a lesser extent their ships) would have been similarly handicapped by poor weather.

As happened OTL, the weather was often very poor - so much so that large frigates couldn't make headway so the carriers had to continue to their positions independently.

By mid-June OTL many ships in the Task Force were falling to bits and in dire need of refit - some of the ships were developing hull cracks, in addition to guns and systems being worn out - and had the objective not been achieved within a month or so of that date it would have seriously compromised their ability.

(The Navy would probably also have presented the case as "we need this done by such and such a date" for various reasons, partly to stop the politicians dawdling once they had been despatched because you can't keep a huge force like that at sea for too long.)

The troops on the ground were a bigger concern, they would get bogged down in the snow, especially since due to the weather they would be amazingly hard to keep supplied.

Riain said:

The troops on the ground were a bigger concern, they would get bogged down in the snow, especially since due to the weather they would be amazingly hard to keep supplied.

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They were not using ground transport so snow would not have made a lot of difference.
British ground forces regularly trained then and now in conditions like that in Norway, the Suffield training area in Canada and of course Luneburg Heath is pretty desolate in January and Febuary. The soldiers could have done it.

The Dean said:

They were not using ground transport so snow would not have made a lot of difference.
British ground forces regularly trained then and now in conditions like that in Norway, the Suffield training area in Canada and of course Luneburg Heath is pretty desolate in January and Febuary. The soldiers could have done it.

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Wasn't it some marine who commented that only a force used to training on Dartmoor and in the Welsh hills could have done it?

And they had to walk anyhow, because the snow tractors broke down and most of the helicopters were lost when the Atlantic Conveyor was sunk.

The weather would have grounded the helicopters which supplied the troops away from the beachheads. Helicopters were used because ground transport was impractical. So with no ground transport and helicopters grounded due to weather how are troops to be supplied away from the beachheads?

Riain said:

The weather would have grounded the helicopters which supplied the troops away from the beachheads. Helicopters were used because ground transport was impractical. So with no ground transport and helicopters grounded due to weather how are troops to be supplied away from the beachheads?

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Not necessarily; as it was, a lot of the flying weather was abysmal, which postponed operations or else forced the troops to rely on other means.
Even so, many pilots flew in absolutely appalling weather and there was the constant disruption caused by enemy aircraft appearing (and the Sea Harriers were purposefully kept well away from San Carlos during the landings to avoid blue-on-blue with the ships' air defence systems, so the helos were very vulnerable). In wartime the usual peacetime flying regs go out the window.

As already stated, there was a dire shortage of heavy helicopters, so great use was made of pontoons and landing craft to ferry men and supplies ashore:
thereafter, many units had to manpack whatever they required when they went inland. They might have required more ships to unload more troops and supplies at different points along the route to Stanley.

Where there's a will, there's a way.

It was done in South Georgia! and have you seen the conditions they operated in when retaking them?
It could and would have been done endex.

Concept of Britishness would have suffered more damage earlier, fuelling Scottish Independence movement.

Risks were taken and great deeds were done because the groundwork had been laid before the weather really socked in. The end was in sight by the end of May with Mt Kent occupied by the SAS, and a fortnight of hard, dangerous work is something that people can contemplate to achieve victory. But if we move the whole scenario to a May 25 start date then the parameters become very different. An 8 week gap until the landing means a mid July landing, when the weather is well and truly atrocious. How do you plan an advance when you expect 3 or 4 months of unusable weather instead of 2 or 3 weeks? The April 1st invasion was just early enough to allow an immediate response, any later and there would be an enforced wait for the next campaigning season. However that said, with a few months to prepare and and an embargo in place agianst Argentina Britain would be in a vastly better position to prosecute the war to maximum effect and minimum casulaties.