And my timeline from the past few rounds of the MoTF continues...
It should be remembered that Mussolini’s gamble in the Balkan Crisis was not as reckless as is popularly believed. Germany’s aggressive behavior during the past decade had soured relations with the European powers, and Berlin was uncomfortably aware that a German attack on another state would be viewed with disapproval. Mussolini was also acutely aware that time was also working against Italy. The effects of German-Yugoslav co-operation were truly kicking in, and Yugoslavia was starting a new build-up of its already strong military. And while Mussolini entertained many delusions he correctly guessed that, if this were allowed to continue, a war with Yugoslavia would be too costly to justify any gains Italy might possibly make.
Italy had in that period become a de facto ally of the USSR, both having similar goals of disrupting Germany’s attempts to dominate the Balkans. Although it would not have done to publically state collaboration with the very ideology the Fascist movement claimed to oppose – particularly not at such a difficult moment – Italy certainly did engage in secret correspondence with Stalin. It seems probable that Mussolini did have some inkling of the Soviets’ designs.
And so the Duce took the chance. And in August 1949, when tension in Croatia reached critical mass, Italy was quick to act. Support to the rebels, both in the form of supplies and Italian ‘advisors’ ‘volunteers’ led to several ‘incidents’, and before long Italy and Yugoslavia were officially at war.
The Italian plan hinged upon rapidly crushing Yugoslavia and presenting Germany with a fait accompli - the Italians were well aware that a long and bloody war was not a popular idea in Germany. Indeed it seems that if they had succeeded, popular unrest in Germany would have toppled any government attempting to fight a long and tedious war against Italy and Croatia for the sake of some Serbs. Italy could then begin negotiations from a position of relative strength, and could afford to make concessions. After all (reasoned Mussolini), even if Croatia alone became an Italian puppet, Germany could still trade with Slovenia and Serbia. And puppet Croatia itself did not even have to be a large one.
Operation Lightening, the initial Italian onslought, was launched before the Yugoslav armies could properly organize, was a success. Before long the Italians had taken much of the Dalmatian coast, taken Zagreb and in doing so cut Slovenia off from the rest of the country, and approached Kotor. In theory the numerically and materially superior Italian army should have rapidly finished off Yugoslavia, already destabilized by the developing civil war. But then the overstretched Italians were halted by the regrouped Yugoslav armies. Mussolini's grand plan had failed, and Italy faced the very stalemate it hoped to prevent.
But this was by no means the end. There was still the possibility that Hungary, Bulgaria and possibly even Romania would soon pile onto Yugoslavia, quickly ending the war. Mussolini certainly anticipated this - and again he was partly right (besides the issues which really mattered). Bulgaria was first to act, cautiously occupying eastern Macedonia. However, the ferocity of the Serbian defence discouraged them from doing much, and the Bulgarian army halted before encountering any significant resistance. And while everyone knew that the USSR was stirring, which discouraged Turkey and Romania from intervening at once – but the Bulgarians still did not wish to learn the limits of their tolerance the hard way.
Hungary had recently been mending ties with Yugoslavia, Voivodina having a rather low priority on the list of Hungarian irredenta. But seeing Bulgaria’s success, they eventually decided to follow suit in a somewhat more subtle manner. Voivodina was home to a significant Hungarian minority, which now took the opportunity to rise up, and there was suspicious traffic across the Hungarian border in areas where they operated. Czechoslovakia did not react, demonstrating once and for all that the Little Entente was dead, but Romania issued stern warnings to Sofia and Budapest. This put a definite end to farther incursions, which in Hungary’s case had been very minor to begin with. (At this point it must be remarked that, while Romania’s threats issued to its ally irked the USSR, it is completely wrong to claim that this in any way caused the Soviet-Romanian dispute which follwed.)
The Italians continued to launch offensives, but without success. This was due to staunch Yugoslav resistance, overextension, damaged infrastructure, and the excellent performance of partisans behind the Italian lines. With the advance in Bosnia and Dalmatia grinding to a bloody halt, an attempt was made to take Slovenia. The initial Italian assult had focused on Zagreb, and as a result insufficient forces were deployed to take Slovenia. The northern Yugoslav province subsequently became a very irritating thorn in Italy’s side, sustained by German supplies and equipment sold at suspiciously low prices. The Ljublijana Offensive succeeded in taking the city in November after a bloody siege, but completely failed in its primary objective of ending organized resistence in Slovenia.
At this point Hungary decided that even if its gains were to be disappointingly small, it was time to wrap things up. Fortunately Budapest had several cards to play. Firstly, the war was not all that popular in Germany, and it would be difficult to explain why German soldiers would have to die fighting Hungary if this could be easily avoided. Secondly it occupied the only convenient route by which Germany could reach central Serbia. After brief negotiations in Vienna Hungary acquired several border villages in eastern Slovenia and a few more in northern Vojvodina in return for adopting benevolent neutrality and allowing the relieved Germany to dispatch supplies across its territory to Yugoslavia, also somewhat relieved to pay a minimal price.
(I’m still not sure what eventually happens with Bulgaria. By this point things are clearly turning against it, so I’m not sure if it will likewise get away with minimal gains, or with nothing at all.)
Mussolini’s hopes were once again dashed, and as winter approached Italy braced itself for a long, protracted conflict. In a one-on-one struggle, it still could have prevailed – Yugoslavia was not as well prepared to fight a long war as its opponent, and could not have followed up on its initial successes for long. But time was precisely what the Italians lacked. For the Yugoslav army had already served its purpose. Germany indeed did not wish to fight a prolonged war in which it would have to do nearly all the heavy lifting by itself, a single kick to knock the Italian military down was a completely different matter. The balance did not appear to require considerable force to overturn, particularly since the Italian advances were being halted and the Serbs were actually advancing.
There was still a small chance that France and Britain would get Italy out of the trouble it had landed itself in. But the anti-German grouping had become somewhat less close-knit then it had been during the early 1940s. And Britain and France had little intention to support Mussolini in a war of blatant aggression. And so they stood by as Germany declared war on Italy. And as the German airforce contested Italian air supremacy and mostly prevented retaliatory bombings while the army marched into Tirol, Slovenia and Bosnia, the relieved politicians in Berlin thought that the situation was once again under control.
They were about to find out just how wrong they were…