Well, I *do* think Snake is onto something when he argues that once the West was breached in 1862, the CSA had really lost it irretrievably. The geography, and the quality of commanders, really allowed the union to take full advantage of its advantages.
I'm just not sure that the Union public willpower had been anywhere near crested in the spring of 1863. I'm not sure that a failure to capture Vicksburg or a Chancellorsville in the West is enough to crack the North. I think you need something more.
I agree. I think it might be a good start - but in and of itself, no. It's more that inflicting that would potentially mean that as things unfold - by the time of the elections - things have fallen short.
But there's no possible "if the Confederacy wins at X it wins the war" - even Washington.
So the more likely choice seems to be sending Longstreet to Chattanooga. Perhaps you take his two corps, and you strip Beauregard down, too. With all that you have an advantage of 15-20,000 men, perhaps, over Rosecrans, with the Virginia & Tennessee RR still available for faster transport, as soon as possible (second week of May onward) though supplying that suddenly larger army would be a real challenge. But even so, the real problem is that you still have Bragg commanding it. Perhaps if *he* had a drinking accident, you could have Longstreet take command on short notice, or at worst, Hardee or Joe Johnston. But maybe it's Old Pete, and he has a good day and manages to defeat a big part of Rosey's army in detail somewhere south of Tullahoma.
(snip.)
Thanks for the link. Interesting discussion. I'm inclined to agree with your theory there: Lee was still the South's best hope because he was its best army commander, and the mistake may have been not maxing out all available forces to Virginia for a maximum push under his command.
Yeah. The West simply does not have anywhere the Confederacy can win big enough to disrupt things enough to matter. Grant doesn't have to pull out of Mississippi to reinforce Rosecrans even if somehow the AoT pulls off the closest thing to a Cannae the war permits.
Not that the ANV on its own can win the war, but it might be able to deliver enough of a blow to dislocate the Union's plans enough to lead to a situation around election time where people are angry about the losses of the Third Battle of Chattanooga and wanting to get rid of Lincoln - and get anyone who promises to oppose his polices in his place.
McClellan in OTL being elected would not be able to lose the war, McClellan handed that situation might manage to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory IF the AoT
and ANV are hanging on.
But as you noted Snake noting, the situation in the West stinks. I disagree with him that it's absolutely hopeless, but the best the CSA can do is - effectively - an effective delaying action, making it impossible for the Union to score significant triumphs without paying through the nose for them, and keeping its armies intact
and fighting as tenaciously as the Eastern armies did OTL.
Get that, and the advantages of the North actually run into the difficulties of facing so much to fight over. Don't get that, and it really isn't that big a deal that the CSA is so damn huge.
Trying to win the decisive thing in Tennessee runs into the fact all the advantages play to the Union not losing, and the CSA having unbelievable trouble keeping a big enough army together to be a major dilemenia - or even forming it.
Mars's crimson soaked jock strap, I have a hard enough time figuring out how to get 90,000 Confederates under Lee, and that with Lee OTL being 75,000 at Gettysburg.
15,000 men is a lot of men to pry loose from
anywhere with the situation as it is. North Carolina and Richmond supplying ten thousand would mean twisting Harvey Hill's arm practically out of its socket - it's not flat out impossible, but it would take total commitment on Davis's part. And five thousand from elsewhere - where is there an "elsewhere" which can do that? Beauregard's forces are scattered thinly, Sam Jones and Buckner's departments are undermanned as it is . . .
So . . . long story short, it's a mess. And Lee going on the defense doesn't really change that at all except forfeiting the opportunity to force Union strategists to respond to Confederate operations instead of vice-versa.