I have a complicated theory as to an amended Sevres that attempts to give everyone what they want. Except the Turks, that it, they'd get screwed. Here are my presumptions as to the aspirations of concerned parties:
The Powers:
Britain is committed to both the Arab Revolt and the Jewish Homeland, and wants to exercise influence through the Hashemites and Zionists.
France wants to exercise its historical influence among Middle East Christians, particularly in the region of Syria.
Italy wants a bone.
The locals:
The Hashemites and Arab nationalists want to form a state out of most of Arab Asia (the Mashreq).
The Zionists want a geographically contiguous and defensible state, or at least potential state.
The Maronites are split between a desire for a majority state in the Valley of Lebanon or, egged on by the French, a mini-empire.
The Kurds and Armenians want statehood and protection from the Turks. The Armenians, in particular, have very ambitious claims.
The Allowites are split between wanting a state or participating in the Arab national state.
The Greek national claims are well known.
The Turks want to keep whatever they can.
Here's my proposal to largely satisfy everyone (except the Turks).
1. Britain forms a "Jewish Homeland" roughly in the OTL Palestine mandate, extanding north to the Litani and perhaps some distance into the Golan, but otherwise entirely West of the Jordan. Contrary to OTL, immigration from Eastern European Jews is heartily encouraged, and local Arab complaints are ignored.
2. A large Hashemite Kingdom is formed under British patronage, including the Hedjaz, Transjordan, interior Syria up to the Beqaa and Orontes, and Iraq south of the Zagros (not including Mosul or Kirkuk). The capitol is in Baghdad. With British support, the Hashemites conquer Najd, Ha'il, and Za'idi Yemen in the 1920s. The Hashemites drop any claim to Palestine or the French protectorates.
3. Compared to OTL, Britain has given up the rich oilfields of northern Iraq but gained interior Syria. It may seem like a poor bargain, but: A.) By keeping Arab nationalism under a single, friendly, and successful crowned head, Britain avoids the Arab revolts in Iraq and Palestine, as well as maintaining a client in the Hedjaz; and B.) Britain dominates the Persian Gulf.
4. France is the sponsor of a number of local powers, which are all former demographic or linguistic minorities dependent on French patronage. These are: a Lebanon with a strong Christian (mostly Maronite) majority, an Allowite state, a vast Armenia stretching from the Mediterannean (Alexandretta) to the Black Sea (Trebizond), and a vast Kurdish state (OTL Turkish, Syrian, and Iraqi Kurdistan, including Mosul and Kirkuk).
5. Armenia, like Greece, will go through a population exchange with Turkey, as well as with Kurdistan. If the French are quick, they may also become the sponsor of an independent Georgia. All four or five of these states will be governed, per French preference, as republics.
6. France is a major winner compared to OTL; they lose interior Syria but gain northern Iraq and its oilfields, and about half of the Anatolian plateau. They gain an uncomfortable border with the Soviets (or, depending, a less uncomfortable one with White Russia), but the international prestige of being protectors of the Armenians. Like European Jewry in the wake of OTL's WWII, Armenians are widely supported and sympathized with in the wake of French discoveries as to the magnitude of the genocide.
7. Italy gets her claim in greater Cilicia. Featuring an overwhelming Turkish majority, especially as Greek and Armenian populations migrate to their national states, this territory is sullen and resentful of its new ownership. Turkey likely goes to war with Italy about the same time as her war with Greece, since this particular loss is utterly unacceptable.
8. Supporting their newfound position in the Middle East and the widely popular (in the West) Venizelos, the British and French support the Greek position in Turkey at least as much as OTL. Unlike OTL, the Italians are also highly supportive of the Greek position, since the Greeks are either actively or de facto allied with the Italians in opposition to the Turkish nationalists.
9. Actively facing not only the Greeks in the West but the Italians in the South and perhaps the French and their Armenian clients in the east, the Turkish nationalists are unable to recover Smyrna, much less Constantinople.
10. The effect on Italy is hard to predict; however, the war may be seen as slightly more worthwhile, and the Allied "betrayal" less severe. We may never see a fascist Italy. If we do see a nasty Italy in the coming decades, though, it may look to "finish the job" by conquering rump the Turkey (greater risk, but greater reward, than Ethiopia).
11. Britain, France, and Italy will want certain rights in the Dardanelles, and will get them in exchange for support against the Turks. If Russia goes White, she may get rights as well. However, Constantinople will be a Greek city, and possibly even the new capital.
12. What is left of Turkey is a rump, proto-totalitarian state (I imagine Ataturk ITTL like Venizelos in Rast's "Shift in Priorities.") The state is highly militarized, dramatically overpopulated after the expulsions from Greece and Armenia, and deeply vengeful.
Is this scenario plausible? What are the biggest flaws in the Powers' design per TTL?
I'd really appreciate it if someone more skilled than me would draw a map of this scenario!
The Powers:
Britain is committed to both the Arab Revolt and the Jewish Homeland, and wants to exercise influence through the Hashemites and Zionists.
France wants to exercise its historical influence among Middle East Christians, particularly in the region of Syria.
Italy wants a bone.
The locals:
The Hashemites and Arab nationalists want to form a state out of most of Arab Asia (the Mashreq).
The Zionists want a geographically contiguous and defensible state, or at least potential state.
The Maronites are split between a desire for a majority state in the Valley of Lebanon or, egged on by the French, a mini-empire.
The Kurds and Armenians want statehood and protection from the Turks. The Armenians, in particular, have very ambitious claims.
The Allowites are split between wanting a state or participating in the Arab national state.
The Greek national claims are well known.
The Turks want to keep whatever they can.
Here's my proposal to largely satisfy everyone (except the Turks).
1. Britain forms a "Jewish Homeland" roughly in the OTL Palestine mandate, extanding north to the Litani and perhaps some distance into the Golan, but otherwise entirely West of the Jordan. Contrary to OTL, immigration from Eastern European Jews is heartily encouraged, and local Arab complaints are ignored.
2. A large Hashemite Kingdom is formed under British patronage, including the Hedjaz, Transjordan, interior Syria up to the Beqaa and Orontes, and Iraq south of the Zagros (not including Mosul or Kirkuk). The capitol is in Baghdad. With British support, the Hashemites conquer Najd, Ha'il, and Za'idi Yemen in the 1920s. The Hashemites drop any claim to Palestine or the French protectorates.
3. Compared to OTL, Britain has given up the rich oilfields of northern Iraq but gained interior Syria. It may seem like a poor bargain, but: A.) By keeping Arab nationalism under a single, friendly, and successful crowned head, Britain avoids the Arab revolts in Iraq and Palestine, as well as maintaining a client in the Hedjaz; and B.) Britain dominates the Persian Gulf.
4. France is the sponsor of a number of local powers, which are all former demographic or linguistic minorities dependent on French patronage. These are: a Lebanon with a strong Christian (mostly Maronite) majority, an Allowite state, a vast Armenia stretching from the Mediterannean (Alexandretta) to the Black Sea (Trebizond), and a vast Kurdish state (OTL Turkish, Syrian, and Iraqi Kurdistan, including Mosul and Kirkuk).
5. Armenia, like Greece, will go through a population exchange with Turkey, as well as with Kurdistan. If the French are quick, they may also become the sponsor of an independent Georgia. All four or five of these states will be governed, per French preference, as republics.
6. France is a major winner compared to OTL; they lose interior Syria but gain northern Iraq and its oilfields, and about half of the Anatolian plateau. They gain an uncomfortable border with the Soviets (or, depending, a less uncomfortable one with White Russia), but the international prestige of being protectors of the Armenians. Like European Jewry in the wake of OTL's WWII, Armenians are widely supported and sympathized with in the wake of French discoveries as to the magnitude of the genocide.
7. Italy gets her claim in greater Cilicia. Featuring an overwhelming Turkish majority, especially as Greek and Armenian populations migrate to their national states, this territory is sullen and resentful of its new ownership. Turkey likely goes to war with Italy about the same time as her war with Greece, since this particular loss is utterly unacceptable.
8. Supporting their newfound position in the Middle East and the widely popular (in the West) Venizelos, the British and French support the Greek position in Turkey at least as much as OTL. Unlike OTL, the Italians are also highly supportive of the Greek position, since the Greeks are either actively or de facto allied with the Italians in opposition to the Turkish nationalists.
9. Actively facing not only the Greeks in the West but the Italians in the South and perhaps the French and their Armenian clients in the east, the Turkish nationalists are unable to recover Smyrna, much less Constantinople.
10. The effect on Italy is hard to predict; however, the war may be seen as slightly more worthwhile, and the Allied "betrayal" less severe. We may never see a fascist Italy. If we do see a nasty Italy in the coming decades, though, it may look to "finish the job" by conquering rump the Turkey (greater risk, but greater reward, than Ethiopia).
11. Britain, France, and Italy will want certain rights in the Dardanelles, and will get them in exchange for support against the Turks. If Russia goes White, she may get rights as well. However, Constantinople will be a Greek city, and possibly even the new capital.
12. What is left of Turkey is a rump, proto-totalitarian state (I imagine Ataturk ITTL like Venizelos in Rast's "Shift in Priorities.") The state is highly militarized, dramatically overpopulated after the expulsions from Greece and Armenia, and deeply vengeful.
Is this scenario plausible? What are the biggest flaws in the Powers' design per TTL?
I'd really appreciate it if someone more skilled than me would draw a map of this scenario!
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