No Schlieffen Plan

[victoria944]

The corner stone of Germany's problem was the French army was an incredibly powerful force, well armed, it's officer corps was experienced, and it had a tremendous history. People can argue about who had the best or strongest army, other things being equal how an army is handled can make up for varying weaknesses.

This is the German Command's problem, on it's Western border stood an army that had regularly been able to intervene in Germany, the grandparents of those alive would have experienced the power of France under Napoleon,
Many of those in the High Command of the Germany Army would have experience the crucial campaign of 1870 against France, a campaign that could easily have led to the French occupying the Rhine again and even the death of Prussia.

So France was lodged in the psychi of the German planners in a way that Russia wasnt, France was a danger that Russia wasnt, France had ambitions regarding Germany that Russia didnt. France was the only power that had direct ambitions against German territory.

France was the enemy, the objective was to take Paris - once achieved the rest would be relatively a matter discussion. To understand the necessity of the France first strategy it's necessary to place the French army in it's proper context, it was entirely feasible if Germany put Russia first in a new conflict, that France might reach the Rhine. Then the question would have been how could the GHC have been so blind as to attack the weaker enemy first. If Germany makes Russia the priority they have the problem of what to do, how to resolve the conflict, do they advance all the way to Moscow, what if Russia continues to fight, what if Russia bleeds the German Army whilst the French with their superb Army
manage to advance into AL. Could Britain have put Japan first in WW2.

I think it inconceivable for the GHC ( or for any High Command ) to do anything other than initially to concentrate on knocking the main danger out of the war. It's what any strategy has to aim to do, unless of course you think your side doesnt have the capacity to defeat the main enemy.
And German did have the ability to defeat France, just as France had the ability to defeat Germany.

As regards Britain, Germany could not be sure of her neutrality if Belgium was not violated ( Germany on the defensive in the West ).
There was the problem of Turkey, her closeness to Germany and the shared interest Britain and France had in the region. There is the problem of the German naval threat. Britain may use the war to occupy Germanys colonies, while Germany sits on the defensive in the west with its armies month after month pursuing the Russians. The idea that Britain needs an excuse to enter the war is a red herring, the press will see to that, the German navy is the only credible threat Britain faces to its position in the the world. If the CP defeat France and Russia then Britain faces them alone at some point in the future, Turkey threatens Britans position in the middle east and therefore its control of India. And Japan is obviously a force for the future, what it's ambitions will be - in a future where Russia and France are no longer world powers - unknown. And after the defeat of France and Russia where will Italys ambitions turn other than French and likely British possessions in the med.
The survival of Britains position in the world depends on France defeating Germany oherwise Britains position is radically more difficult.
Britain is going to enter the war one way or another - regardless of treaties or sentiments. With Germany on the defenssive in the west
Britain may enforce a blockade, the only way to fight such a blockade is to defeat France or defeat the Royal Navy.

As time drags on feeling in Belgium may change, the question of Belgium safety once Russia is defeated may play on the mind of people at large,
pressure might cause Belgium to allow Britains army to camp in Belgium as a "precautionary" measure, France and Belgium may grow closer, in which case historians may say how daft the GHC were to send there armies trundling away many miles in the opposite direction of Paris.

I think it entirely imrpacticable that the GHC could put Russia first. Given that the avance through Belgium is logical - as it's a suicidal strategy to fight France where she is strongest. Germany's best option was to advance through Belgium. given that France is the main danger Germany has to adopt a strategy to knock France out first. This has to be done quickly as the Russian potential to put unknown numbers into the field will grow with time. The longer Germany delays knocking out France the more it's international position deteriorates, just as the more likely that a French defeat is the more the dangers grow for Britains world position. The longer France survives the greater the forces ranged against Germany threaten to grow. Germany is the threat to Britains position in the world, and so Britain is bound to do what it can to strenghten France, given time Britain will have to fight Germany. Nobody can have any certainty what Italy Japan Turkey America or Britain will do.

If Germany advances from AL it runs into exactly what it has to avoid, a potentially long drawn out war with France.

[corditeman]

...Could be the decisive aspect.

Much of the work needed on the very heavy guns used in WW2 in the Crimea had already been done in WW1. The guns were intended to shatter the ouvrages of the Maginot Line by punching through up to seven metres of reinforced concrete.

I wonder whether these guns in WW1 could have shattered the French forts in Alsace-Lorraine and allowed a German breakthrough. I am sure that Krupps would come up with the goods.

As others have pointed out, this can lead to no BEF in Belgium and no American involvement. An 1870s result, but with large areas of Eastern France annexed by Germany. Then (and only then) Germany could have hammered Russia. The Tsar could have lost the Crimea and St. Petersburg.

Thoughts, folks?

[Gannt the chartist]

I would like to know what part of the UK blockade was clearly illegal.

That said if Belgium not attacked I think UK intervention is very unlikely - it may come later with another moral cause - ?use of poison gas but even then its more likely to be a threat of force rather than a declaration of war in the first instance and in the meanwhile a vast expansion of UK ground forces.

I could see a unilateral declaration that the Channel is neutral and an armed neutrality to enforce it which favours the French a little, and severe regulation of commerce through the North sea which will cause tensions all around. How the Germans continue to trade in the face of the French blockade will be an interesting variant of a U Boat war.

There are also likely to be British efforts to limit the war as far as possible with a lot of pressure on Italy and the Ottomans to stay out.

[victoria944]

It's unthinkable that Britain will let France fall, once this happens Britains position in the world rapidly unravels.

If france falls Britain ends up facing the ambitions of Germany Italy Turkey and Japan without a credible ally, if France falls Russia is irrelevant.

[lucaswillen05]

Originally Posted by Mac Gregor

Thank you Gentlemen these were more the comments I was looking for from those that say Germany would be less likely to win the war.

So is it impossible for the Germans to launch a major offensive from Alsace Lorraine? If so is this due to the lack of infrastructure or are the French fortifications to powerful?

The Germans were able to do it in 1870so why not 40 years later in August 1914? We also need to consider the nature of the French War Plans which involved an offensive in Alsace Lorraine. They actually implemented this plan in OTL and were trounced in what became known as the Battle of the Frontiers. Terence Zuber describes the part of this battle taking place in the Ardennesaround Longwy.

If we assume that the French still implement their pre war plan and the Germans implement the only other offensive war plan they can implement without the Schlieffen Plan or invading Switzerland what we end up with is a massive meeting engagement (or series of meeting engagements) The best guide to the way this would have turned out has to be he OTL Battle of the rontiers in which the French army was roundly thrashe, much as Napoleon III's armies were roundly thrashed in 1870 (this is putting it mildly). If the French armies of 1914 suffer a defeat on the scale of August 1870 the war in the west is as good as over. If Britain does intervene the BEF still takes a week or two to mobilise, cross the channel and deploy. If the politial decision by Lord Grey is delayed even by a few days or a week or two the BEF is still deploying through the Chhannel Ports when the Germans win the Battle of the Frontiers in this varioant and start marching on Paris. With large sections of the French army destroyed or at best badly battererd the French are in no position to prevent a repeat of 1870. The best thing Lord French can do is to evacuate the BEF before it is caught up in the French disaster. Lord Grey (or his successor as there will very likely be a No Confidence Vote considering that many MPs were against going to war in the first place) will have to negotiate a ceasefire with Germany soon after the French government or it's successor as that government and the Third Republic would probably both fall in consequence of a military disaster on such a massive scale. World War 1 in the west is over by Christmas. Germany moves to Phase 2 of her war plans shifting millions of troops east for a 1915 showdown with Russia. Judging from the way Russian armies performed in OTL the war in the east could well be won by the Cewntral Powers by the end of 1915. A 1916 Revolution still takes place and might even be as early as 1915. Tsar Nicholas II still falls although whether there is still a new Kerensky government or whether the Germans still send Lenin back in a train for him to take power is a moot point.

[victoria944]

You talk as though German victory were guaranteed, France could have won in 1870, the French army was superb in 1870, in both 1870 and 1914 France had the potential to defeat Germany, and Prussia in 1870 and Germany in 1914 had th potential to defeat France. This was war against possibly the best army in the world, only Germany can rival the French army. So the strategy of advancing through the difficult terrain and heavly fortified regions bordering AL, with French dispositions that were designed to meet such an attack was easily questionable. The French werent going to make the same mistake twice. I think given the course of the war on the western front, it's entirely likely a German attack from AL becomes bogged down in barbed wire, trenches and machine guns. Meanwhile the Russians are steady mobilising what would seem like endless masses.

[DerGreif]

Originally Posted by victoria944

[...] This is the German Command's problem, on it's Western border stood an army that had regularly been able to intervene in Germany, the grandparents of those alive would have experienced the power of France under Napoleon,
Many of those in the High Command of the Germany Army would have experience the crucial campaign of 1870 against France, a campaign that could easily have led to the French occupying the Rhine again and even the death of Prussia.

So France was lodged in the psychi of the German planners in a way that Russia wasnt, France was a danger that Russia wasnt, France had ambitions regarding Germany that Russia didnt. France was the only power that had direct ambitions against German territory.

Actually what was lodged in the minds of some German generals was the seemingly easy victory in 1870/71. And even with this in mind Moltke the Elder switched to a "Russian first strategy", which was the predominant war plan in the German Empire for a quite a long time. It was Schlieffen who finally left this strategy favouring a "France first strategy". Moltke the Younger stayed with Schlieffen's plans but made already modifications to it. A "Russia first plan" was still part of his portfolio until 1912, when it was finally ditched. And in the end Russia was a far greater danger to Germany than France. France's leadership were no longer actively pursuing the return of A-L to France. Especially Poincarre, although a nationalist, had this no longer on his agenda. He supported a detente with Germany which was developing quite well after the second Moroccon crisis.

Russia on the other hand threatened Austria-Hungary, which was Germany's most reliable and strongest ally. That was one reason why Germany's leadership was willing to go to war for the sake of Austria-Hungary. Furthermore Russia's rapidly developing railway system and its equally fast armament program were a real threat to German military security. Estimates of the GGS showed that Russia could crush Germany alone in 1916. In 1914 it was already a formidable foe. Another reason why part of the German leadership wished a quick war with Russia - to defeat it decisively as long as they still could.

France was the enemy, the objective was to take Paris - once achieved the rest would be relatively a matter discussion. To understand the necessity of the France first strategy it's necessary to place the French army in it's proper context, it was entirely feasible if Germany put Russia first in a new conflict, that France might reach the Rhine. Then the question would have been how could the GHC have been so blind as to attack the weaker enemy first. If Germany makes Russia the priority they have the problem of what to do, how to resolve the conflict, do they advance all the way to Moscow, what if Russia continues to fight, what if Russia bleeds the German Army whilst the French with their superb Army
manage to advance into AL. Could Britain have put Japan first in WW2.

I think it inconceivable for the GHC ( or for any High Command ) to do anything other than initially to concentrate on knocking the main danger out of the war. It's what any strategy has to aim to do, unless of course you think your side doesnt have the capacity to defeat the main enemy.
And German did have the ability to defeat France, just as France had the ability to defeat Germany.

That is not consistent with the facts. Moltke the Elder had put Russia first in his war plans. Only Schlieffen changed that and even Moltke the Younger had still plans for a Russia first (or France neutral) strategy up until 1912. Diplomats and the civilian leadership saw Russia as the far greater threat, especially Bethmann Hollweg who was quite the Russiaphobe.

The reason for a change in the war plans had nothing to do with France being the "stronger" enemy or the "main" enemy. They were based on the following assessments:
1. To fight a successful war it must be a quick war.
2. A quick victory cannot be achieved against Russia.
3. The only chance to achieve a quick victory is to attack France first as strongly as possible.

As you can see the reason for attacking France first was that it was seen as the weaker enemy. These assessments are in and of themselves true. The problem was that the chance of a qick victory even against France was very low. A study of the GGS from May 1910 showed that even if anything was to go according to plan - something which is already very unlikely - than the Germans would still face considerable difficulties in securing the victory. That means that the GGS bet knowingly on a very slim chance of a quick victory. they took that risk instead of preparing for a prolonged war properly. Moltke the Younger of course knew of the risk he was taking, therefore he modified the Schlieffen-plan to leave the Netherlands unscathed as a "breathing pipe" in case of a prolonged war and a British blockade.

If the GGS had gone through with its assessment by any PoD it should have looked like this:

4. The chance of a quick victory even against France is very slim.
5. Considering the high probability of a prolonged war under any circumstances, the war plans should be made in anticipation of a prolonged war.
6. That means avoiding a British blockade at all costs.
7. And that means Russia has to be attacked first whereas a defensive stance has to be taken in the west.
8. Stockpile supplies.

There were enough officers in the German army who realised that. Actually Moltke himself realised most of the problems. There is only some nudging needed to convince him of a different strategy. For such a development I might refer to my timeline.

(Actually if one had really thought this through one should have come to the conclusion that
9. War should be avoided at all costs. But that seems tio be really diffcult to achieve.)

As regards Britain, Germany could not be sure of her neutrality if Belgium was not violated ( Germany on the defensive in the West ).

The German leadership was quite eager to accept and believe offers of British neutrality during the crucial days before the outbreak of the war which lead even to a stop in the mobilisation plans in the west. So even if Germany should not have been sure of that, the German leadership seemed willing to take that risk in OTL. In a different TL they might have even better reasons for this depending on the PoD.

There was the problem of Turkey, her closeness to Germany and the shared interest Britain and France had in the region. There is the problem of the German naval threat. Britain may use the war to occupy Germanys colonies, while Germany sits on the defensive in the west with its armies month after month pursuing the Russians.

Sure, these were all points of contention between the two Empires. But what you are neglecting is the fact that
1. Germany and Britain had come already to a kind of implicit naval agreement for quantoty relations, with no new naval law firthcoming sionce 1912 in the foreseeable future
2. Germany and Britain had reached an agreement on the issues in the Ottoman Empire, especially the Baghdad railway, and te colonies right before the outbreak of the war.

The idea that Britain needs an excuse to enter the war is a red herring, the press will see to that, the German navy is the only credible threat Britain faces to its position in the the world.

Actually that is not a red herring. I have explanied that in detail here.

If the CP defeat France and Russia then Britain faces them alone at some point in the future, Turkey threatens Britans position in the middle east and therefore its control of India. And Japan is obviously a force for the future, what it's ambitions will be - in a future where Russia and France are no longer world powers - unknown. And after the defeat of France and Russia where will Italys ambitions turn other than French and likely British possessions in the med.

If the CP defeats France decisively, yes. Therefore British war entry or pressure to give France a favourable peace will increase with German armies succeeding. With a defensive stance on the west on the other hand that is not very likely. Actually Russia is the far more threatening power in this region for British interests. If Russia was defeated decisively by Germany, Britain could have been quite thankful that this threat is removed. Although RUssia and Britain had worked on agreements to soften the tensions arising from the Great Game, these were rising again right before the war. Therefore it was very difficult to sell a war to the British public which goal was to defend Russia, an autcratic regime of the worst kind which was one of the greatest dangers to British India and Persia. And Japan was allied to Britain precisely to keep Russia in check.

[...]Britain is going to enter the war one way or another - regardless of treaties or sentiments. With Germany on the defenssive in the west
Britain may enforce a blockade, the only way to fight such a blockade is to defeat France or defeat the Royal Navy.

Again I refer to this post.

As time drags on feeling in Belgium may change, the question of Belgium safety once Russia is defeated may play on the mind of people at large,
pressure might cause Belgium to allow Britains army to camp in Belgium as a "precautionary" measure, France and Belgium may grow closer, in which case historians may say how daft the GHC were to send there armies trundling away many miles in the opposite direction of Paris.

No, Belgium was very adamant of staying truely neutral in case if a war. Belgium plans were mgeared towards defending against a French invasion from the west, a German invasion from the east or a British landing in the north. Belgium was prepared to fight all of them. And Belgium could be sure that in case of British or French pressure, it would have the support of Germany as it had the support of the other states in case of German invasion. Firthermore, the British politicians knew that it was fruitless to pressure Belgium on this issue. In the cabinet talks leading up to the war, the cabinet agreed that a preventetive occupation of Belgian territory by the BEF would not work and only alienate the Belgians driving them into te German camp. The cabinet made it clear that they would need a call for help by Belgium to intervene.

I think it entirely imrpacticable that the GHC could put Russia first. Given that the avance through Belgium is logical - as it's a suicidal strategy to fight France where she is strongest. Germany's best option was to advance through Belgium. given that France is the main danger Germany has to adopt a strategy to knock France out first. This has to be done quickly as the Russian potential to put unknown numbers into the field will grow with time. The longer Germany delays knocking out France the more it's international position deteriorates, just as the more likely that a French defeat is the more the dangers grow for Britains world position. The longer France survives the greater the forces ranged against Germany threaten to grow. Germany is the threat to Britains position in the world, and so Britain is bound to do what it can to strenghten France, given time Britain will have to fight Germany. Nobody can have any certainty what Italy Japan Turkey America or Britain will do.

If Germany advances from AL it runs into exactly what it has to avoid, a potentially long drawn out war with France.

Again, I have to disagree strongly.

1. As I already described above a "Russia first strategy" was actually the smarter alternative, even without hindsight, considering that the GGS knew that the chances for a quick victory against France were very, very slim. A long war was far more probable.
2.
a) If Germany takes a defensive stance on the western front its international position will grew stronger, the longer the war takes. Already the initial position would be much better. Russia was all around despised for being an autocratic suppressive regime. Britain had a lot of tensions with Russia over Persia and India. And it was now backing a state, which harboured terrorists. If Germany had only declared war against Russia, then France would have to declare war against Germany to defend said regime. And France politicians knew the dangers if this situation perfectly well. Therefore they ordered their mobilisied troops to stay far away from the German border, so they would not fire the first shot. They thought it paramount that Germany was the agressor - although they had a treaty with Russia, they declared no war on 2nd or 3rd August, when Germany was already at war with Russia for two days!
b) Not to mention the problems Britain would have had domestically. Postponing the implementation of Home Rule worked in OTL because of the war. Delaying the war entry for some time and you see Ireland erupting much earlier, which would actually make war entry ever less feasible.

Originally Posted by corditeman

...Could be the decisive aspect.

Much of the work needed on the very heavy guns used in WW2 in the Crimea had already been done in WW1. The guns were intended to shatter the ouvrages of the Maginot Line by punching through up to seven metres of reinforced concrete.

I wonder whether these guns in WW1 could have shattered the French forts in Alsace-Lorraine and allowed a German breakthrough. I am sure that Krupps would come up with the goods.

Yes, as I already described here, very heavy siege guns were in the making. Ludendorff and Bauer wished for even more. How they would have fared against French fortresses can only be specualted at, because they never were deployed against them properly. Their results against Belgium and RUssian fortresses were impressive, though.

As others have pointed out, this can lead to no BEF in Belgium and no American involvement. An 1870s result, but with large areas of Eastern France annexed by Germany. Then (and only then) Germany could have hammered Russia. The Tsar could have lost the Crimea and St. Petersburg.

Thoughts, folks?

No large annexations in eastern France. What we would see might be the annexation of Longwy-Briey - or something similiar to the Ruhr-occupation. But anything else in France woud be contested by the British and would threaten there war entry. French Congo might be another possibility. But nothing else I see feasible.

Originally Posted by Gannt the chartist

I would like to know what part of the UK blockade was clearly illegal.

Hobbes explains it very well in his book Imperialism at Sea, Brill Academic Publishers 2002, pp. 73. You can read these pages online at google books, they are included in the preview.

That said if Belgium not attacked I think UK intervention is very unlikely - it may come later with another moral cause - ?use of poison gas but even then its more likely to be a threat of force rather than a declaration of war in the first instance and in the meanwhile a vast expansion of UK ground forces.

I could see a unilateral declaration that the Channel is neutral and an armed neutrality to enforce it which favours the French a little, and severe regulation of commerce through the North sea which will cause tensions all around. How the Germans continue to trade in the face of the French blockade will be an interesting variant of a U Boat war.

There are also likely to be British efforts to limit the war as far as possible with a lot of pressure on Italy and the Ottomans to stay out.

I agree with this assessment.

Originally Posted by victoria944

It's unthinkable that Britain will let France fall, once this happens Britains position in the world rapidly unravels.

True, but having Germany on the defensive in the west is far from France falling. Only when the situation changes and German forces are advancing this might change - but then it might be already too late. But Britain will most certainly ensure a rather mild peace for France.

Kind regards,
G.

[lucaswillen05]

Originally Posted by victoria944

You talk as though German victory were guaranteed, France could have won in 1870, the French army was superb in 1870, in both 1870 and 1914 France had the potential to defeat Germany, and Prussia in 1870 and Germany in 1914 had th potential to defeat France. This was war against possibly the best army in the world, only Germany can rival the French army. So the strategy of advancing through the difficult terrain and heavly fortified regions bordering AL, with French dispositions that were designed to meet such an attack was easily questionable. The French werent going to make the same mistake twice. I think given the course of the war on the western front, it's entirely likely a German attack from AL becomes bogged down in barbed wire, trenches and machine guns. Meanwhile the Russians are steady mobilising what would seem like endless masses.

Judging by the French performance ain the Battle of the Frontiers.. considering ther offensive nature of the French war plans, meeting an equally offensive German war plan the French fortifications aren't going to help much as they did not help much during the initial French offensives known as the Battle of the Frontiers the chance of an even bigger French defeat in the opening phase of the war is highly likely. If it were something on the scale of the French defeats of August 1870 in pretty much the same area and assuming no BEF or a badly delayed BEF a situation where France is actually knocked out of the war is highly probable. Even in OTL something of this sort came very close to reality.

As for events in the Eastern Front need I remind you of a place called Tannenburg. A large part of the Austrian army, with the exceptiion of those Austrian corps depployed against Serbia, were figting the Russians. As in OTL all they really had to do was hold the Russians off. And, by the way, Russian mobilisation/deployment was very slow in OTL although there were some alarming moments for the Central Powers in late 1914. If the Germans do succeed in knocking France out as planned early in the war most of the German forces committed to the OTL Sclieffen plan (most likely the same forces are committed to our variant Alsace Lorraine plan) can, in the event of a decive German win, be transferred too the East. In OTL and even with the forces deployed against Russia the Germans astill won by 1917 and imposed the Ttrewaty of Brest Litovsk. If the Central Powers knocked France and Britain out of World War 1 in the summer/early autumn of 1914 the chances of an earlier victory against Russia have dramatically increased. And, without the Western Front no need for the Germans to transfer the Eastern Front forces to France and Italy as they did in OTL 1917 - 18 as with France and probably Britain knocked out of the war in 1914 and Russia defeated in sometime between 1515 and 1916 the war would be over, The Turks don't get involved, the Austrians stom Serbia as they did in 1915 ad the Roumanians do the sensible thing (keep out iof it. End result the Hapsburg Empire continues to stagger on as it had since 1866 under effective German domination. Germany expands East taking control of Poland and parts of Russia itserlf, Russia ends up with an eary Russian Revolution and civil war but does not dare try anything of what was tried in 1920. Kaiseer Wilhelm II would today be remembered as a great German Empieror who set the stage for the greater German Empire extending into what was once Poland and parts of Western Russia. A defeated and humiliated France plots towards the next watr much as she did after 1870. The Entente Cordiale breaks up. Britain, though on the losing side. managed to get the BEF (which hardly fired a shot) away and reached a setlement weith the Germans. The British Empire continues and, without the stresses placed upon it by the two world wars ogf OTL probably lasts much longer than it did and probably still exists in some form in 2012.

[Mac Gregor]

Originally Posted by DerGreif

Actually

Well said DerGreif

[wolf_brother]

Considering there was no Schlieffen "plan" even IOTL...

[DerGreif]

Originally Posted by wolf_brother

Considering there was no Schlieffen "plan" even IOTL...

Oh sure, there was. If you are referring to Terrence Zuber, he was thoroughly debunked by a whole bunch of historians including Mombauer.

If anything the plan execuuted was not identical to the plan Schlieffen had developed, because Moltke modified it taking into account the high probability of a prolonged war.

Originally Posted by Mac Gregor

Well said DerGreif

Thank you.

Kind regards,
G.

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by corditeman

...Could be the decisive aspect.

Much of the work needed on the very heavy guns used in WW2 in the Crimea had already been done in WW1. The guns were intended to shatter the ouvrages of the Maginot Line by punching through up to seven metres of reinforced concrete.

I wonder whether these guns in WW1 could have shattered the French forts in Alsace-Lorraine and allowed a German breakthrough. I am sure that Krupps would come up with the goods.

As others have pointed out, this can lead to no BEF in Belgium and no American involvement. An 1870s result, but with large areas of Eastern France annexed by Germany. Then (and only then) Germany could have hammered Russia. The Tsar could have lost the Crimea and St. Petersburg.

Thoughts, folks?

No. Just......no. This is not the 1870s. The armies are much larger, the rifles far more accurate, the artillery more powerful and more effective, everyone has machine guns, and the logistics of armies has bloated far more from the 1870s. The French of 1914 are not those of 1870, here Germany is cramming a huge amount of manpower into the kind of area where the French start providing multiple Kindermorden and Germany destroys its own military power and provides a means for Russia and France to win their war circa 1916, assuming it doesn't ultimately decide to invade Belgium after all when this proves to be a disaster.

Originally Posted by lucaswillen05

The Germans were able to do it in 1870so why not 40 years later in August 1914? We also need to consider the nature of the French War Plans which involved an offensive in Alsace Lorraine. They actually implemented this plan in OTL and were trounced in what became known as the Battle of the Frontiers. Terence Zuber describes the part of this battle taking place in the Ardennesaround Longwy.

If we assume that the French still implement their pre war plan and the Germans implement the only other offensive war plan they can implement without the Schlieffen Plan or invading Switzerland what we end up with is a massive meeting engagement (or series of meeting engagements) The best guide to the way this would have turned out has to be he OTL Battle of the rontiers in which the French army was roundly thrashe, much as Napoleon III's armies were roundly thrashed in 1870 (this is putting it mildly). If the French armies of 1914 suffer a defeat on the scale of August 1870 the war in the west is as good as over. If Britain does intervene the BEF still takes a week or two to mobilise, cross the channel and deploy. If the politial decision by Lord Grey is delayed even by a few days or a week or two the BEF is still deploying through the Chhannel Ports when the Germans win the Battle of the Frontiers in this varioant and start marching on Paris. With large sections of the French army destroyed or at best badly battererd the French are in no position to prevent a repeat of 1870. The best thing Lord French can do is to evacuate the BEF before it is caught up in the French disaster. Lord Grey (or his successor as there will very likely be a No Confidence Vote considering that many MPs were against going to war in the first place) will have to negotiate a ceasefire with Germany soon after the French government or it's successor as that government and the Third Republic would probably both fall in consequence of a military disaster on such a massive scale. World War 1 in the west is over by Christmas. Germany moves to Phase 2 of her war plans shifting millions of troops east for a 1915 showdown with Russia. Judging from the way Russian armies performed in OTL the war in the east could well be won by the Cewntral Powers by the end of 1915. A 1916 Revolution still takes place and might even be as early as 1915. Tsar Nicholas II still falls although whether there is still a new Kerensky government or whether the Germans still send Lenin back in a train for him to take power is a moot point.

Because 1870 is not 1914. In 1914 all the armies everywhere are much larger than they were in 1870. Artillery is far more sophisticated than it was in 1870, in terms of the types of arms, their reach, and their lethality. Rifles are more accurate, more lethal, tend to fire smokeless powder, all the armies have huge quantities of reserves. The Germans aren't facing an army as in 1870 deeply divided among itself and with the civilian leadership, they're facing a large modern army that was able to outlast them in will in for instance Verdun. Germany can't ram an army that size into the Alsace-Lorraine forts, while in this case the bloodshed here will keep the Germans from reinforcing the East, which at least potentially helps Samsonov and Rennenkampf.

[wolf_brother]

Originally Posted by DerGreif

Oh sure, there was. If you are referring to Terrence Zuber, he was thoroughly debunked by a whole bunch of historians including Mombauer.

If anything the plan execuuted was not identical to the plan Schlieffen had developed, because Moltke modified it taking into account the high probability of a prolonged war.

The "plan," was, from the very beginning, an intellectual exercise; a propaganda device by Schlieffen to goad the German government into increasing the size of the military's budget, and to pour more into railways along Germany's western borders. Truly Moltke made very little changes to this PR piece, which says a lot, considering that Schlieffen himself had offered no real doctrine for such a campaign; e.g. there were no unit orders or operational details - at all. The biggest change that Moltke had made prior to the outbreak of the war as to decide that invading the Netherlands and Belgium was a Bad Idea, and reduced the number of troops the overall operation called for. He was caught off-guard by the opening of hostilities, and from that point forward was, in essence, making it up as he went along - something that was certainly hindered by his own mistakes and by Wilhelm II's interference. As well once the facts on the ground began to diverge from the 'plan,' Kluck, Bülow, Duke Albrecht, and the other German commanders began to operate on their own initiative. There was no overall 'plan' on the part of the Germans during WWI - the German commanders, officers, and troops on the ground certainly had no idea or overall picture of why or what the hell they were doing laying siege to Liège when they were at war with France. Hell, as early as the winter of 1914 Falkenhayn, who succeeded Moltke, already knew that the war was lost for Germany - he was merely hoping for some leverage to provide for a suitable armistice, something which the domestic politics of Imperial Germany foiled.

I've argued this point before.

[Simreeve]

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston

Rifles are more accurate, more lethal, tend to fire smokeless powder

But wasn't it official French military policy at that time to emphasise bayonet charges over marksmanship?

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by Simreeve

But wasn't it official French military policy at that time to emphasise bayonet charges over marksmanship?

Only if we say that the Germans had the exact same policy given how often "superior German tactics" meant massing teenagers in the path of machine guns with the means to attack said machine guns the direct frontal assault.

[DerGreif]

Originally Posted by wolf_brother

[...] The biggest change that Moltke had made prior to the outbreak of the war as to decide that invading the Netherlands and Belgium was a Bad Idea, and reduced the number of troops the overall operation called for. [...]

Actually he changed a little bit more: He strengthened the left wing, because in the end he feared a French breakthrough there, although Schlieffen wanted a further advancing French army, to better surround it. The details on the coup of Liege and so forth were also his work.

The Schlieffen-plan was not a bad idea in 1905. Russia was very weak after its war with Japan. One could actually believe in a one-front-war. And then it all made sense. But the situation changed dramatically already in 1910.

As to the rst of your post: I will come back to this tomorrow. As far as I remember the latest research on this subject it is pretty clear that there was a Schlieffen-plan and that there was a Moltke-plan.

Kind regards,
G.

[DerGreif]

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston

No. Just......no. This is not the 1870s. The armies are much larger, the rifles far more accurate, the artillery more powerful and more effective, everyone has machine guns, and the logistics of armies has bloated far more from the 1870s. The French of 1914 are not those of 1870, here Germany is cramming a huge amount of manpower into the kind of area where the French start providing multiple Kindermorden and Germany destroys its own military power and provides a means for Russia and France to win their war circa 1916, assuming it doesn't ultimately decide to invade Belgium after all when this proves to be a disaster.

A German rush into the forts would be a bad idea indeed. But that was never the plan. The offensive into French territory from Alsace-Lorraine was primarily planned as counter-attacks, while French were being heavily bloodied on the German fortifications - as they were in OTL actually (only this time worse). Moreover the French had no very heavy siege guns available. They had superiority in light and medium field guns, but were inferior when it came to the heavy and very heavy guns. Therefore busting fortresses were next to impossible for the French. Germany on the other hand, could outflank and counterattack the invading French armies. Following their retreat very heavy siege guns could have been deployed against the fortresses of Toul-Nancy. How well they would have worked is up to speculation but they most certainly would have worked better than what was deployed against Verdun. In Belgium they delivered impressive results but the fortifications there were inferior to the French ones. If Toul-Nancy falls Germany has a chance to press forward, although I believe that trench warfare would develop quickly. In the end it would be not worse for Germany than what happened in OTL at Verdun. But probably it would be worse for France, because they lose even more soldiers in their initial offensive than in OTL.

[...]The Germans aren't facing an army as in 1870 deeply divided among itself and with the civilian leadership, they're facing a large modern army that was able to outlast them in will in for instance Verdun. Germany can't ram an army that size into the Alsace-Lorraine forts, while in this case the bloodshed here will keep the Germans from reinforcing the East, which at least potentially helps Samsonov and Rennenkampf.

I doubt that the blded statement can be as broad and general as you imply here. The rest I agree with to certain degree. But seeing that Verdun did nothing to stop the Germans in Russia and that in this case the French have bloodied themselves before (If we assume a German counter-attack). Of course, Germany on the offensive through the heavily fortified border-strip with the French thoroughly entrenched in their fortresses will indeed have the results you describe there, but that was never on the table of the war-planners.

Kind regards,
G.

[Gannt the chartist]

Thankyou for an intelligent and cogent response and the reference.

The reference however is an an assertion of the author's opinion (or possibly that of his source, a historian) not a court judgement, Law or legal opinion.

Something is not illegal just because an academic thinks it is.

Slightly earlier he notes that the doctrine of continuous voyage and what constitutes contraband would always be (and will always be) subject to interminable dispute.

There were at the time only two relevant jurisdictions as to what or was not legal - relevant in that their opinion would have carried weight with the belligerent powers. One is a UK admiralty court the other is a US court.

http://www.americanforeignrelations....ing-point.html

has a readable summary of the US and British practice.

The key issues are:

that what the UK did was no more than accepted practice in time of war and specifically had been accepted by US courts during the ACW, after the UK had sued in them.

that the US accepted the UK actions were reasonable.

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by Gannt the chartist

I would like to know what part of the UK blockade was clearly illegal.

That said if Belgium not attacked I think UK intervention is very unlikely - it may come later with another moral cause - ?use of poison gas but even then its more likely to be a threat of force rather than a declaration of war in the first instance and in the meanwhile a vast expansion of UK ground forces.

I could see a unilateral declaration that the Channel is neutral and an armed neutrality to enforce it which favours the French a little, and severe regulation of commerce through the North sea which will cause tensions all around. How the Germans continue to trade in the face of the French blockade will be an interesting variant of a U Boat war.

There are also likely to be British efforts to limit the war as far as possible with a lot of pressure on Italy and the Ottomans to stay out.

Blockading neutral countries, expanding absolute contraband list, expanding conditional contraband list, not inspecting at sea, censoring neutral mail, not close blockading the German ports, etc. Basically the whole blockade mechanism. Read Captain Mahan work about 1908 on a possible European war, he explains the entire concept of how it would work, if all sides followed the rules.

The Laws of War are the UK need a 2-1 ratio of capital ships, more than the concept of what is needed for a decisive battle. For the blockade to be legal, the UK had to keep capital ship with continual gun range of each German port or at least the approaching channels to each port. So the UK need a fleet in the Baltic stronger than the High Seas Fleet and a fleet in the North Seas stronger than the High Seas Fleet.

In wars of national survival, inconvenient rules are almost always ignored, and the UK was just following the pattern of other nations. The USA did not even maintain a consistent position from 1916 to 1918.

On you "can see", let me explain this clearly to you. Stopping another nations warship in the open ocean (more than 3 miles from coast from memory at this time) is ALWAYS AN ACT OF WAR. Period. No exceptions.

BTW, protecting the channel greatly favors France since the Germans can no longer get at the bases of France or effectively interdict or even legally interdict. A neutral declaration would have had had to prevent any attacks on German colonies, protect German merchant shipping and protect the German North Sea Coast.

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by lucaswillen05

The Germans were able to do it in 1870so why not 40 years later in August 1914? We also need to consider the nature of the French War Plans which involved an offensive in Alsace Lorraine. They actually implemented this plan in OTL and were trounced in what became known as the Battle of the Frontiers. Terence Zuber describes the part of this battle taking place in the Ardennesaround Longwy.

Russia. Just that simple.

There are many facts which make A-L more difficult in 1914 than 1870. But if everyone remains totally neutral, German will curb stomp France, the question is how fast. It is a matter of how many die in the war and how long it takes. Also, if the UK stayed neutral along with Russia, France would need to keep a lot of troops on the Channel coast to prevent the inevitable amphibious assaults. And German has a fair shot at imposing a blockade on many of the French ports.